BETWEEN […..] JOY Applicant AND THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

[2001] NZCA 470

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND  CA 208/01

BETWEEN      […..] JOY

Applicant

AND                THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

Respondent

Hearing:  19 November 2001

Coram:Richardson P Blanchard J Tipping J

Appearances:            Applicant in person

J M Jelas for Respondent

Judgment:                 20 November 2001

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY RICHARDSON P

1. Mr Joy seeks special leave to appeal to this court against the judgment of the High Court (Heron J, R D McCallum and G J Cook) of 14 March 2001, having been refused leave to appeal by the High Court. In terms of s124(3) of the Human Rights Act 1993, this court may grant special leave "if, in the opinion of that Court, the question of law involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal for decision".

1. Mr Joy alleged that the New Zealand Police had breached the provisions of the Privacy Act 1993 on at least three occasions. His complaint was investigated by the Privacy Commissioner. When the Commissioner decided to take no further action, Mr Joy himself brought proceedings against the Police before the Complaints Review Tribunal, appearing in person.  The  Tribunal dismissed the proceedings. In relation to one matter the  Tribunal  made certain factual findings in favour of Mr Joy upholding the claimed breach of

the Privacy Act by the Police but held that it did not warrant a remedy for the reasons the Tribunal gave.

1. The High Court dismissed Mr Joy's appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, essentially against those findings of breach, while going on for the record to correct the reasoning of the Tribunal in relation to remedy.

1. Mr Joy advanced the application for special leave in relation to each of the three incidents. On analysis of the judgment of the High Court  we  are satisfied that there are no questions of law involved in the proposed appeal. Rather, the questions Mr Joy seeks to raise involve essentially factual findings which are not susceptible to challenge under s124(3) by way of further appeal. In essence, Mr Joy's argument is that the Tribunal and, on appeal, the High Court, did not correctly assess the evidence before the Tribunal and he emphasised in particular as to the first incident, the significance to him of any disclosure by the Police; and in respect of the third incident, the factual assessment in finding good faith disclosure under the provisions of s48.

1. While we respect Mr Joy's concern to have his past put behind him the application for special leave must be dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs.

Solicitors

Crown Law Office, Wellington, for respondent. Privacy Commissioner, Auckland.

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