BETWEEN J Appellant AND D Respondent
[2023] NZHC 3851
•21 December 2023
NOTE: PURSUANT TO S 35A OF THE PROPERTY (RELATIONSHIPS) ACT 1976, ANY REPORT OF THIS PROCEEDING MUST COMPLY WITH SS 11B,
11C AND 11D OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT 1980. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE SEE
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NOTE: PURSUANT TO S 124 OF THE CHILD SUPPORT ACT 1991, ANY REPORT OF THIS PROCEEDING MUST COMPLY WITH SS 11B, 11C AND 11D OF THE FAMILY COURT ACT 1980. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION,
PLEASE SEE https://www.justice.govt.nz/family/about/restriction-on-publishing- judgments/
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV 2023-404-001332
[2023] NZHC 3851
IN THE MATTER OF The Property Relationship Act 1976 BETWEEN
J
Appellant
AND
D
Respondent
Hearing: 12 October 2023 Representation:
Appellant, self-represented Respondent, self-represented
Judgment:
21 December 2023
JUDGMENT OF TAHANA J
This judgment was delivered by me on 21 December 2023 at 12 noon Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
…………………………
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
J v D [2023] NZHC 3851 [21 December 2023]
Introduction
[1] I have anonymised the parties to protect their child’s privacy and will refer to the appellant, as Jack, and the respondent, as Donna.
[2] This is an appeal of two judgments of Judge S J Maude in the Family Court determining the division of relationship property between Jack and Donna.1
[3] Jack and Donna were married for 11 years. They have been separated for 10 years. They share a child (who is now an adult). They are both successful businesspeople who arranged their affairs through a family trust (the Trust). At separation, the Trust held a number of assets including the family home, a 98 per cent shareholding in a family business (PPL) and a commercial property.
[4] Jack and Donna have spent nearly a decade litigating in both the High Court and the Family Court. In 2018, the High Court ordered that the Trust’s assets be distributed equally between Donna and Jack in accordance with the recommendations of the professional trustee (the Trustee).2
[5] In 2017, Jack applied to the Family Court to determine how the relationship property should be distributed which resulted in the decisions under appeal. Judge Maude determined that Jack owes Donna:
(a)$5,625.00 after considering the equal division of the remaining relationship property; and
(b)interest of 4.5 per cent on outstanding child support.
[6] Jack appeals and says further discovery is required as that would disclose that Donna’s company (CMS) was also relationship property. If CMS was included as relationship property, its value would help to offset the amount Jack owes to Donna
1 [Redacted] (Judge Maude, 15 March 2023); and [Redacted] (Judge Maude, 24 April 2023, supplementary decision).
2 [Redacted].
for child support. Further, Jack says that he has an outstanding child support application which the Family Court has refused to hear.
[7] Donna cross appeals and wishes to re-open the distribution of assets by the Trust despite Judge Burns striking out her application under s 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 (FPA).3 Donna says she is entitled to $225,050.00, which amounts to half of a debt owed by the Trust to Jack; half of $379,112.00 paid to Jack by the Trust to purchase PPL; and a half share of further monies paid by PPL to Jack while Donna was also a director of PPL. Donna is aggrieved that there has not been a fair and equitable division of relationship property.
[8] At the hearing, the parties could not agree on the common bundle of documents, and I requested further submissions as to what had been placed before the Family Court.
[9]I therefore need to determine the following issues:
(a)Can this appeal be used to challenge the decisions of Judge Burns?
(b)Can additional evidence be adduced on appeal?
(c)Did the Family Court err in:
(i)Awarding interest on Jack’s outstanding child support payments?
(ii)Declining to grant leave for further discovery?
(iii)Determining that CMS is not relationship property?
(iv)Declining to grant any relief in relation to the relationship property debt of $450,100.00?
3 [Redacted] (Judge Burns, 8 March 2022). Judge Burns struck out Donna’s application under s
182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1990 because this Court had already determined the distribution of the Trust’s assets but noted that relationship property issues could nevertheless be considered as part of the relationship property proceeding.
(v)Determining that funds advanced in relation to PPL were not relationship property?
[10] Before considering each of the above issues, I set out the relevant factual background and approach on appeal.
Factual background
Marriage and establishment of Trust
[11] Jack and Donna married on 24 March 2002, separated on 15 August 2013, and divorced on 4 September 2016.
[12]Prior to marriage:
(a)Donna was the sole shareholder and director of her own company (CMS). CMS was incorporated in 1998.
(b)Donna lived in a property in Parnell owned by a family trust in her name (the DD Trust). Donna says she was not a beneficiary of the DD Trust and a copy of the trust deed was not before the Court.
[13]Prior to marriage:
(a)Jack indirectly owned his own company (NZT), of which he was the sole director. NZT was incorporated in 1984.
(b)Jack also owned a property (Number 9). Jack and Donna lived in that property before they decided to purchase the neighbouring property (Number 7) and build their own home.
[14] On 20 May 2002, the parties settled the Trust. Number 7 was held by the Trust. The parties lived at the Parnell property owned by DD Trust while the property at Number 7 was being built.
[15] The DD Trust then sold the Parnell property and advanced $465,000.00 to the Trust from the proceeds of sale. That advance was recorded by way of a deed of acknowledgement of debt between the trustees of the Trust and the trustees of the DD Trust. Number 7 became the family home.
[16] $450,100.00 was also advanced to the Trust. Jack says these funds were from the proceeds of sale of Number 9. Donna says these funds were relationship property as Number 9 was the family home prior to being sold.
[17] Jack, Donna and their child are beneficiaries of the Trust. Their child is the sole final beneficiary.
[18] On 28 March 2008, Jack and Donna established PPL, a family business with 98 per cent of the shares vested in the trustees of the Trust. Donna and Jack held one per cent each of the remaining shares. The Trust also procured a commercial property.
Separation, settlement and Trust litigation
[19] After they separated, in 2014 Donna applied to the High Court to have Jack removed as trustee of the Trust. On 11 December 2014, the Court removed both Jack and Donna and appointed the Trustee.4
[20] In November 2015, Jack and Donna attended a mediation which resulted in a settlement agreement dated 3 November 2015 (the Settlement Agreement). Under the Settlement Agreement, it was agreed that $465,000.00 would be advanced from the sale of Number 7 to DD Trust, and $465,000.00 would be advanced to Jack for the purposes of purchasing PPL.
[21] In 2018, unhappy with the Trustee’s performance, Donna applied to the High Court to remove him, but was unsuccessful.5 The Trustee also sought directions as to how the remaining Trust capital should be distributed. Brewer J ordered that the Trustee distribute the Trust capital equally by settling the assets into two separate trusts: one with Donna as discretionary beneficiary and their child as final beneficiary
4 [Redacted].
5 [Redacted].
(Donna’s Trust); the other with Jack as a discretionary beneficiary and their child as final beneficiary (Jack’s Trust).6
[22] There was no application before the High Court under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (the Act) and no determination was made on any relationship property issues.
Family Court proceedings
[23] In March 2017, Jack applied to the Family Court for orders dividing the relationship property.
[24] On 15 January 2021, Judge Burns ordered Jack to pay a lump sum for child support to Donna. The Judge reserved the issue of whether interest was payable on that lump sum to be determined with the relationship property proceedings.7
[25] On 23 March 2021, Jack applied under s 104 of the Child Support Act 1991 for an order that the provisions of that Act relating to the formula assessment of child support be departed from.
[26] Jack appealed Judge Burns decision of 15 January 2021 and Hinton J dismissed his appeal.8
[27] In a minute dated 23 August 2021 Judge Burns noted the appeal had been dismissed and accordingly, the proceedings under the Child Support Act have come to an end. The file was therefore closed.
[28] In relation to relationship property issues, in May 2021, Donna applied, pursuant to s 182 of the FPA, for resettlement of the Trust. Her application was struck out by Judge Burns on 8 March 2022 on the basis that all issues relating to the Trust had been dealt with by the High Court.9 Donna did not appeal that decision.
6 [Redacted].
7 [Redacted].
8 [Redacted].
9 [Redacted] at [31].
Decisions under appeal
[29] On 15 March 2023, Judge Maude determined that Jack was liable to pay interest on outstanding child support. The interest rate to be applied was determined at 4.5 per cent to be calculated at six monthly rests on a cumulating basis commencing 15 January 2021, that being the date of the child support determination.10
[30] Judge Maude also determined what property was (and was not) relationship property and concluded that Jack owes $5,625.00 to Donna.11 The Judge reserved leave for the parties to file further submissions on two issues:
(a)Whether further provision from relationship property should be made for Donna in respect of alleged debt owed by the Trust to Jack, which debt was determined to be relationship property; and
(b)Whether further provision should be made in Donna’s favour in respect of retained earnings held by Jack from his Amway business.
[31] On 24 April 2023, Judge Maude issued a supplementary judgment determining that there was no relationship property arising from Jack’s Amway income.12 In relation to the debt, Judge Maude considered that there was no evidence that the original debt had been passed on as a liability owed by the new trusts to Jack and therefore there was no evidence the relationship property debt still existed. No further relief was granted to Donna.
Grounds of appeal and cross-appeal
[32]Jack’s notice of appeal states:
The discovery process was thwarted. This has resulted in the information required for a fair division of assets under the Property Relationships Act 1976 to not be available for the Judge at the hearing.
[33]In his written submissions, Jack states:
10 [Redacted] at [38], [49] and [50].
11 [Redacted] at [158].
12 [Redacted].
In conclusion, this appeal seeks redress for two crucial aspects of my case. Firstly, it implores the court to reconsider the denial of the discovery process, recognising its pivotal role in ensuring a fair and equitable resolution. Secondly, it urges the immediate reinstatement of the child support application. These actions are imperative to rectify the injustices that have occurred in the proceedings thus far. …
[34] Donna’s cross appeal states that she appeals the two Judge Maude decisions and the decision of Judge Burns regarding s 182 of the FPA.
[35] The grounds of Donna’s cross-appeal appear to be that she wishes to re-open the distribution of the Trust’s assets on the basis that the distribution does not accord with an equal division of relationship property:
No Relationship Property matters or issues were before or heard by Brewer J during the hearing in April 2018 nor have any of the income or capital awarded by the Trustee been scrutinised with a Relationship Property lens. ...
… The Trustee himself conceding he did not think it appropriate for him to consider relationship property issues.
Approach on appeal
[36] Section 39(1) of the Act provides a right of appeal in relation to a decision of the Family Court making, or refusing to make, an order. A party may appeal to the High Court against the decision.13 Appeals proceed by way of rehearing.14
Can this appeal be used to challenge the decisions of Judge Burns?
[37] Both parties sought to challenge Judge Burns’ decisions, including the minute dated 23 August 2021 confirming that the proceedings under the Child Support Act have come to an end, and the decision of 8 March 2022 striking out the application under s 182 of the FPA.
[38] This appeal is limited to an appeal of the judgments of Judge Maude.15 Neither party can use this appeal to overturn Judge Burns’ decisions. Further, for the reasons set out in this decision, I do not consider it is necessary to re-open those decisions.
13 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 39(2).
14 District Court Act 2016, s 127.
15 [Redacted] (Judge Maude, 15 March 2023); and [Redacted] (Judge Maude, 24 April 2023, supplementary decision).
Hinton J has confirmed that child support has been calculated correctly and this Court has already determined the distribution of assets by the Trust. This appeal is therefore concerned with whether there is remaining relationship property to which either party has a valid claim.
Can additional evidence be adduced on appeal?
[39] During the hearing, it became apparent that the common bundle of documents Donna sought to rely on was more extensive than those Jack had filed. I could not discern which documents had been before Judge Maude and/or which documents were new documents that Donna was seeking to rely on. I therefore directed the parties to file memoranda addressing this issue.
[40] Donna has since indicated that while some of the documents she wishes to rely on were before Judge Maude, others were not. I do not understand why the parties did not simply file the common bundle that was before the Family Court. That would have avoided unnecessary time and expense. I accept that all documents that were before Judge Maude should form part of the common bundle.
[41] In terms of extracts from the report of the Trustee regarding how the distribution of Trust assets was calculated, I grant leave for those extracts to be adduced as evidence. I note that while r 20.16 of the High Court Rules 2016 ordinarily requires that further evidence must be given by affidavit, the Court may direct otherwise. In circumstances where the contents of the report are not disputed, the report was previously before the High Court in the context of the Trust litigation as an exhibit to an affidavit of the Trustee, and the report is directly relevant to the current status of relationship property, it is necessary that the table be admissible if I am to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of these proceedings. I therefore grant leave for that table to be adduced as evidence to establish that the debt owed to Jack was taken into account in determining the distribution of Trust assets. That proposition was not contested by Jack.
[42]All other documents that were not before Judge Maude are excluded.
Did the Judge err in awarding interest on Jack’s outstanding child support payment?
[43] No. Jack did not advance any reasonable ground to challenge the interest rate imposed by Judge Maude. Jack must pay the outstanding child support including the interest as determined by Judge Maude. This cannot be delayed or avoided.
[44] It is a matter for Donna (and not this Court) as to whether she initiates enforcement proceedings against Jack for the outstanding monies. The enforcement of Judge Maude’s decision is not a matter for this appeal.
Did the Family Court err in declining to grant leave for further discovery?
[45] Jack argues that Judge Maude was unable to properly determine the issues because of the lack of discovery regarding Donna’s company, CMS.
[46] Judge Maude declined to order further discovery after considering Judge Burns’ reasons for declining further discovery.16 Judge Burns noted that the parties had been separated for 10 years and it was time for them to resolve all final issues. He had been involved in the proceeding for a long time noting “numerous directions have been made and the situation does not ever seem to improve,” and further that:
I have already ruled that the discovery phase has concluded and I was not going to allow further applications, which seem to be never ending, to continue. Therefore, I am going to direct that no further documentation be filed by either party as of today without leave of the Court. Good grounds for leave will have to be advanced.
[47] Against that backdrop, Judge Maude unsurprisingly declined to order further discovery.17
[48] That disclosure of information was problematic between the parties was also evident some nine years ago in 2014 when Donna applied to this Court to remove Jack as trustee:18
16 [Redacted] at [33]–[35].
17 At [35].
18 [Redacted].
[18] [Jack’s] reluctance to provide information to [Donna] continued even after she had commenced proceedings in September 2014 and notwithstanding that [Jack] undertook to the Court that information would be provided. ...
…
[20] The files could and should have been made available promptly and [Jack’s] prevarication likewise causes concern as to the extent to which he can be relied upon.
[49] Judge Maude considered the evidence before the Court and had “little difficulty” in being satisfied that the shares in CMS were not relationship property. I therefore do not consider that Judge Maude erred in declining to grant leave for further discovery. That would have prolonged and delayed resolution further.
Did the Family Court err in determining that CMS is not relationship property?
[50] CMS had been incorporated prior to the relationship and had been operated as separate property. Judge Maude was not satisfied that inter-company lending between CMS (Donna’s company) and NZT (Jack’s company) amounted to interminglement as defined in the Act.
[51] Further Judge Maude considered the financial statements of CMS noting that retained earnings ($775,903.00) were largely offset by a debt ($662,693.00) owing to Donna as shareholder. Judge Maude noted that there was no breakdown of the nature of the retained earnings, so it was unclear as to whether they contained salary or wages owing to Donna. There was also no detail of the nature of the debt.
[52]In the above context, Judge Maude noted that:19
It is accepted that more discovered evidence would have assisted the Court, however, as I have already observed Judge Burns ruled on 16 November 2022 that no further discovery was to be sought.
[53] Judge Maude nevertheless held that, “[t]he reality is that the shareholding in this company is the separate property of [Donna].”20
19 [Redacted] at [56].
20 At [57].
[54] In the context of an almost decade long dispute and where the Judge was able to make a determination as to the status of CMS, I am not satisfied that Judge Maude erred by not requiring any further discovery and then concluding that CMS was not relationship property.
[55]I reject this ground of appeal.
Did the Family Court err in declining to grant relief for the relationship property debt?
Funds advanced by Jack to the Trust
[56] Judge Maude notes that at the parties’ mutual request, time was allowed for them to continue discussions and negotiations in order to resolve issues between them, either in full or in part.21 Jack says that as part of those discussions, he and Donna agreed that they would not pursue claims that funds advanced to the Trust by Jack and the DD Trust were relationship property. Jack said he advanced $450,100.00 and the DD Trust had advanced $465,000.00 for the property at Number 7.
[57] Jack raised this issue in his supplementary submissions to Judge Maude dated 3 April 2023:
This was agreed in the time spent working through matters outside of the hearing that the offset of the [DD Trust] claim by [Jack] and [Donna’s] claim of the $450,100 would not be continued and the court was advised accordingly.
In [Jack’s] final submissions, he referred to this at paragraph 58, page 12 (attached for reference).
It is also recorded in the notes of evidence at 83 (attached for reference).
Should [Donna] now not honour this agreement I respectfully request that the [DD Trust] claim by [Jack] be reinstated and the opportunity to provide final submissions on that be granted.
[58] Judge Maude does not refer to Jack’s request in relation to his claim against the DD Trust in the supplementary judgment.
21 At [5].
[59] In considering the status of the funds advanced, I first consider whether Judge Maude erred in declining to grant any relief in relation to the $450,100.00 debt. I then consider whether there is any merit in Jack’s claim that $465,000.00 advanced by the DD Trust is also relationship property.
[60] It is accepted that $450,100.00 advanced by Jack to the Trust constituted a relationship property debt. Jack did not seek to challenge this on appeal other than by saying it was agreed it would not be challenged. No binding settlement agreement was signed to this effect. I also note that Donna has continuously maintained that this debt is relationship property.
[61] Judge Maude noted that the Trustee had credited the full $450,100.00 to Jack in distributing the Trust’s assets. However, the table prepared by the Trustee and referred to by Donna in support of that proposition did not form part of the agreed bundle of evidence, so the Judge held that it was not available for the Court to consider. Judge Maude also considered that realignment now of how the Trust had distributed assets between the two new trusts would need to be way of appeal to the High Court. I note that Donna did not appeal Brewer J’s judgment.
[62] I have reached a different view as to the admissibility of the table which evidences that the debt of $450,100.00 was offset against funds distributed by the Trust to Jack for the reasons set out at [41]. I accept that the debt was taken into account so that Jack received the benefit of the Trustee treating $450,100.00 as being advanced by Jack only when the final distribution of Trust assets was made.
[63] In considering the status of the debt, Judge Maude noted that there was no evidence that the debt had been repaid to Jack by the Trust. I accept this is correct but the debt was taken into account when calculating the final distribution so that Jack received the benefit of the debt which was offset against payments made by the Trust to Jack.
[64] Judge Maude also acknowledged that any claim by Donna could only be by either appeal of the High Court decision or by establishing that the original debt had been passed on as a liability owed by the new trusts to Jack. Judge Maude did not
consider there was any evidence of the latter. I agree that the High Court decision could only be challenged by way of appeal. Donna did not appeal. In relation to whether the liability had been passed on, I reach a different view to Judge Maude. This is because the decision of Brewer J indicates that Jack’s Trust was to take over responsibility for payment of the debt to Jack:22
That trust [Jack’s Trust] takes over any responsibility to pay [Jack] the
$450,100 owed to him which is explained in Report 5, (a claim for which the trustee is considered time barred)
[65] The above evidences that Jack’s Trust has assumed liability for repayment to Jack. Jack therefore holds the debt in his own name and Donna is entitled to half of that debt, being $225,050.00.
[66] I therefore consider that Judge Maude erred in finding that there was no evidence that the original debt had been passed on as a liability owed by the new trusts to Jack. Donna is therefore entitled to $225,050.00 of the debt owed by Jack’s Trust to Jack.
Funds advanced by the DD Trust to the Trust
[67] Turning to the issue of whether the funds advanced by the DD Trust are relationship property, a deed of acknowledgement of debt acknowledges that
$465,000.00 of the proceeds of the sale of a property at Parnell were advanced by the DD Trust to the Trust to facilitate the purchase of Number 7. Donna says she was not a beneficiary of the DD Trust.
[68] Donna’s evidence is that she and Jack lived in the Parnell property owned by the DD Trust rent free while their new property at Number 7 was being built. The DD Trust then sold the Parnell property and loaned the sum of $465,000.00 to the Trust.
[69] Jack and Donna signed the Settlement Agreement on 3 November 2015 in which they both agreed that upon the sale of the family home at Number 7,
$465,000.00 would be advanced to the DD Trust and $465,000.00 would be advanced to Jack to purchase PPL. Jack did not, at that stage, assert that the monies owed to the
22 [Redacted] at [81].
DD Trust were relationship property. Further the Trustee did not treat this payment as a discharge of the $450,100 owed by the Trust to Jack. That liability remained and was passed on to Jack’s Trust.
[70] The Settlement Agreement is reflected in the agreement for the purchase of the business of PPL:
the Trustee (on behalf of the [Trust]), the majority shareholder of the Vendor, has previously agreed (in terms of the 3 November 2015 Settlement Agreement) to lend $465,000 to the Purchaser Guarantor [Jack] or his nominee on the basis that those funds would be applied towards the Purchase Price. The Purchaser Guarantor [Jack] and the Trustee hereby agree that the Purchase Price together with interest thereon owed by the Purchaser forms part of the $465,000 to be advanced to the Purchaser Guarantor [Jack] in terms of the 3 November 2015 Settlement Agreement
[71] Brewer J determined that Donna is estopped by the terms of the Settlement Agreement from re-opening matters settled by agreement. The same applies to Jack. In those circumstances, Jack cannot now assert that he is entitled to 50 per cent of the
$465,000.00 paid to the DD Trust, nor can Donna challenge the $465,000.00 advanced for the purposes of enabling Jack to purchase the business of PPL.
[72] Further, Donna’s evidence is that she was not a beneficiary of the DD Trust at the time the funds were advanced. I cannot therefore determine that the funds advanced by the DD Trust were relationship property.
[73]I reject Jack’s claim for 50 per cent of the funds advanced by the DD Trust.
Did the Family Court err in determining that funds advanced in relation to PPL were not relationship property?
[74]Judge Maude was asked to determine:23
(a)whether Donna should be paid half of the monies PPL paid to Jack until Donna ceased to be a director on 27 December 2015, less retention for taxation; and
23 [Redacted] at [81]–[111].
(b)whether funds the Trust lent to Jack to enable him to acquire PPL ($379,112.00) were relationship property.
[75] Judge Maude acknowledged that any salary PPL paid to Jack during the relationship was relationship property, but that there was no evidence that the salary remained at separation. There is no error in that conclusion. In the absence of evidence as to funds remaining at separation, there are no funds to divide.
[76] In terms of any salary PPL paid to Jack post separation, Judge Maude rightfully noted that Jack is entitled to keep any salary he received after separation. In relation to the nature of the payments, Judge Maude observed:
[91] There is no evidence before the Court to assist it as to whether the sums drawn post separation in 2014, 2015 and 2016 were by way of income (in which case post separation, they would have simply been for [Jack] to retain as his separate funds) or by way of drawings from the company, thereby diminishing the value of the company in respect of which the [Trust] held 98% of the shares and the parties 2%.
[77] In the absence of evidence as to the nature of the payments to Jack, there is no basis for finding that Judge Maude erred in declining to determine that the value of PPL was diminished.
[78] In respect of the $379,112.00, Judge Maude noted that the money was advanced by the Trust to enable Jack to purchase the business of PPL and that a two- way consideration facilitated by the Trustee could not be revisited by the Court. There is no error in this conclusion. Donna is estopped by the terms of the Settlement Agreement from challenging that payment.
[79] Judge Maude rejected Donna’s constructive trust argument, stating that any such argument would properly have to be made by the Trust, the Trust no longer existed, and that it was a “long bow” for Donna to argue that funds paid from PPL to Jack before the wind up of the Trust could lead to a finding that Jack held funds on constructive trust for one beneficiary of the Trust. The sale and purchase agreement makes it clear that Jack does not hold those funds and the funds were applied as payment for the purchase price of PPL, which has been taken into account in the distribution of the Trust’s assets.
[80] There is no error in Judge Maude’s conclusion regarding PPL. I reject Donna’s cross-appeal on this issue.
Result
[81]For the reasons set out above:
(a)I dismiss Jack’s appeal.
(b)I uphold Donna’s appeal in part.
(c)Donna is entitled to half of the debt owed by Jack’s Trust to Jack, being
$225,050.00.
(d)The decisions of Judge Maude24 otherwise stand and Jack is required to pay to Donna:
(i) $5,625.00;25
(ii)the outstanding child support debt, which as at 15 January 2021 was $143,794.8926 (Child Support Debt); and
(iii)interest on the Child Support Debt of 4.5 per cent to be calculated at six monthly rests on a cumulating basis commencing 15 January 2021.27
[82]The parties were self-represented. I therefore decline to award any costs.
[83] Finally, I urge the parties to move forward for the sake of their child. The time has come to finally resolve all issues and I urge Jack to promptly comply with the
24 [Redacted] (Judge Maude, 15 March 2023); and [Redacted] (Judge Maude, 24 April 2023, supplementary decision).
25 [Redacted] at [158].
26 [Redacted] at [36].
27 At [49] to [50].
terms of this judgment so everyone can move forward.
Tahana J
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