Bennett v Auckland Council
[2013] NZHC 1357
•10 June 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2005-404-007348 [2013] NZHC 1357
UNDER the Public Works Act 1981
BETWEEN JANICE AILEEN BENNETT, GILLIAN MADGE CLARK, and ROSALIE HILDA MAITLAND
Plaintiffs
ANDAUCKLAND COUNCIL Defendant
CIV-2006-404-001881
BETWEEN PATRICIA DORA MARY SPENCER- WOOD
Plaintiff
ANDAUCKLAND COUNCIL Defendant
CIV-2005-404-007350
BETWEEN DAVID JOHN McCORMICK Plaintiff
ANDAUCKLAND COUNCIL Defendant
CIV-2005-404-007095
BETWEEN THE ROYAL NEW ZEALAND FOUNDATION FOR THE BLIND, DONALD ALEXANDER McINTOSH and LYNDA ANNE RYAN
Plaintiffs
ANDAUCKLAND COUNCIL Defendant
BENNETT & ORS v AUCKLAND COUNCIL [2013] NZHC 1357 [10 June 2013]
CIV-2005-404-004351
BETWEEN INEZ BEVERLEY LAVELL and LESLEY ANNE HENSLEY Plaintiffs
ANDAUCKLAND COUNCIL Defendant
CIV-2005-404-004280
BETWEEN CHARLES WILLIAM WILLIAMS and
JEAN ELIZABETH MORLEY Plaintiffs
ANDAUCKLAND COUNCIL Defendant
CIV-2005-404-007351
BETWEEN DONALD MICHAEL STEWART Plaintiff
ANDAUCKLAND COUNCIL Defendant
Hearing: 17 May 2013
Appearances: C R Carruthers QC, W L Aldred and P M Cassin for Plaintiffs
M E Casey QC and G Milner-White for Defendant
Judgment: 10 June 2013
JUDGMENT OF VENNING J DISCOVERY/INTERROGATORIES
This judgment was delivered by me on 10 June 2013 at 4.00 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High
Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
Solicitors: P Cassin, Auckland
Kensington Swan, Auckland
Copy to: C Carruthers, Wellington
M Casey, Auckland
Introduction
[1] The Auckland Council (the Council) seeks orders directing the plaintiffs in the above proceedings to provide further and better discovery and to answer certain interrogatories.
Background/Parties
[2] The Council is the successor of the Waitakere City Council and Waitakere
Properties Ltd (a local authority trading enterprise under the Local Government Act
1974). From 1989 it also became responsible for the Auckland Harbour Board’s (the
Harbour Board) operations and obligations.
[3] In September 1951 the Harbour Board acquired certain land from its original owners under the Public Works Act 1928. The land was acquired for the purposes of port facilities and associated industrial and commercial purposes.
[4] The various plaintiffs claim to be the successors of the original owners. They say that, with the coming into effect of the Public Works Act 1981 (the Act) on 1
February 1982, the Harbour Board became obliged to offer the land to them as it was no longer required for public works. The plaintiffs seek orders declaring the Council is to offer the balance land to them (where the land or part of it is still retained) at a price to be fixed as at 1 August 1983 and, in addition, where the land has been sold, the plaintiffs seek damages following an inquiry (with the damages to be fixed as the difference between the price at which the land should have been offered to the plaintiffs and the market value of the land on the dates that it was disposed of).
[5] The Council denies that the Harbour Board became obliged to offer to sell the land to the original owners or the plaintiffs under the Act. It says the land was not, on the coming into force of the Act, held for any public work, but alternatively, if it
was, it was held for various public works purposes.1
1 The plaintiffs say that argument is not open to the Council, it having been resolved against it in Waitakere City Council & Anor v Bennett [2009] NZRMA 76. However at [95] of that decision the Court confirmed that was a question of fact to be determined on the evidence.
[6] Next, the Council says the land was purchased for commercial and industrial purposes, rather than for public works. Further, and in the alternative, if the Harbour Board was under any obligation under the Act, it says it was impractical, unreasonable or unfair to offer to sell the land to the original owners or plaintiffs.
[7] Finally the Council says that the plaintiffs’ claim are statute barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act 1950 or the corresponding equitable jurisdiction to refuse discretionary declaratory relief.
Practical issues
[8] The circumstances of the individual plaintiffs vary. For that reason the claims have not been formally consolidated as such, although for management purposes they have been called together and at the substantive fixture they will be heard together.
[9] Although there is only one application for further and better discovery on CIV-2005-404-7348, I understand counsel accept that the outcome of that application will apply to the other files. The application to answer interrogatories is directed at all plaintiffs.
The matters in issue on these applications
[10] Counsel are agreed that the further information sought falls into the following four categories:
(a) the circumstances in which the defendant acquired the land from the former landowners in 1951;
(b)the circumstances of the owners and current plaintiffs in August 1983 (which is the date the plaintiffs say the land should have been offered back);
(c) what knowledge the plaintiffs had of the Council’s (or its predecessors’) obligation to offer the land back to them, and when they first became aware of that obligation; and
(d) information regarding the plaintiff’s funding arrangements with a
litigation funder.2
Discovery generally
[11] The Council considers the plaintiffs’ discovery inadequate in that it does not address the circumstances in which the land was originally acquired, and the circumstances of the owners and current plaintiffs in August 1983. Also, the plaintiffs have failed to provide any information regarding their funding arrangements with a litigation funder.
[12] Further or particular discovery is available under r 8.19 if the Court considers that there are grounds for believing a party has not discovered documents that should have been discovered.
[13] With the amendment to the High Court Rules from 1 February 2012 and the focus on tailored discovery, particular discovery might properly be considered as an application for further tailored discovery. The starting point is still that the documents sought must be relevant, but discovery of even relevant documents could be refused if to require discovery would be contrary to the interests of justice where, for instance, the costs of discovery might be disproportionately high or discovery
oppressive: Air National Corporate Ltd v Aiveo Holdings Ltd.3
Interrogatories generally
[14] Interrogatories are provided for at High Court Rule 8.34 and following. The interrogatories must relate to a matter in question in the proceeding. Rule 8.40 provides for objections to interrogatories. The Commentary to McGechan suggests
that, although on its face r 8.40 appears to limit the grounds of objection, Wilson v
2 The further discovery sought is directed at categories (a), (b) and (d) above. The interrogatories are directed at categories (a), (b) and (c).
3 Air National Corporate Ltd v Aiveo Holdings Ltd [2012] NZHC 2258.
BCNZ; and Attorney-General v Wang NZ Ltd4 confirm there was no intention to modify the general law when the rule was initially enacted.
The first category – the circumstances in which the defendant acquired the land from the original landowners
[15] The plaintiffs plead that the original vendors were not willing sellers. The Council seeks further discovery of documents concerning the original acquisition of the land. It also seeks to interrogate the plaintiffs about the circumstances in which the land was initially acquired. The discovery and interrogatories are particularly directed at establishing the basis upon which it is alleged the original vendors were not willing sellers of the land.
[16] Mr Casey submitted information relating to whether the land was sold under an element of compulsion was relevant to the Council’s pleaded defence the land was purchased by agreement for commercial and industrial purposes and also to the exercise of the Court’s discretion as to relief.
[17] The plaintiffs’ first response is that the documents and questions sought are irrelevant because the principal issues are whether the land was held by the Harbour Board under the Public Works Acts of 1928 and 1981 and whether the land was no longer required for such work so as to trigger the mandatory obligations under s 40. Next, to the extent they can be said to be relevant, the circumstances concerning the taking of the land are set out and pleaded in the statements of claim. The plaintiffs refer to the relevant gazette notice advising the scheme of development, the advice by the Harbour Board to the original owner, the resolution of the Harbour Board to proceed with the acquisition, the advice the Harbour Board by letter to the original owner and the subsequent approach by an agent of the Harbour Board leading to the ultimate sale of the property.
[18] I accept the force of Mr Carruthers’ argument to the extent I agree that s 40 does not itself refer to the compulsory acquisition of the land. Compulsion is not a
pre-requisite to the application of s 40. Section 40 applies in circumstances where
4 Wilson v BCNZ (1987) 1 PRNZ 368 (HC); and Attorney-General v Wang NZ Ltd [1990] 3
NZLR 148 (CA).
land is held under the Act (or any other Act) for public works. The circumstances of acquisition are not relevant to the public authority’s obligations under s 40(1). I also note that s 40(5) refers to the section applying where the land was acquired or taken. Acquired is quite a different concept to taken and does not suggest compulsion.
[19] If the matter rested there I would accept Mr Carruthers’ submission that whether the plaintiffs were willing sellers or not, and particularly whether there was an element of compulsion was not necessarily a matter in question in the proceeding.
[20] However as noted, the Council also puts in issue, in its pleading at least, that the land was purchased by agreement for commercial and industrial purposes [as opposed to for public work]. If that was the case s 40 would not apply at all.5 I have to observe that, given the Council accepts the gazetting of the proposals in relation to the development of the land under the Public Finance Act (No. 3) 1944 it is difficult to see how any resultant sale of that land could be said not to be for a public work as
defined in the Act. However, that matter remains to be determined at the substantive hearing.
[21] The last substantive matters advanced by Mr Casey in support of the further information sought in this category are perhaps the most persuasive. Mr Casey submitted that if the Court has to consider the application of s 40(2) or to determine whether to exercise its discretion and grant relief, then whether the land was taken compulsorily or not could be a relevant factor in those decisions.
[22] In a number of cases the Court has accepted that whether the land was taken compulsorily could be relevant to the issue of the s 40(2) determination. In Nicholls v Victoria University of Wellington the Court of Appeal discussed that issue.6 The Court observed it might be very difficult to determine whether there was an element of compulsion or whether the Act was merely a convenient procedure used to the
mutual satisfaction of both parties at the time.
5 Local Government Act 1974 s 572 (as it applied prior to its repeal in 2003).
6 Nicholls v Victoria University of Wellington [2002] 1 NZLR 659 at [26].
[23] In Bowler Investments Ltd v Attorney-General7 Tipping J implicitly accepted that compulsion could be relevant to the s 40(2) determination, finding that it was not right to suggest that the absence of any element of compulsion led ipso facto to the conclusion that it was unreasonable to offer the land back to the original owner or their successor.
[24] The issue of when the decision under s 40(2) is to be made, and whether it can be made by the Court if not made by the relevant Chief Executive seems to be open on the current state of the authorities. Section 40(2) requires the Chief Executive of the relevant local authority to make the decision where land is no longer required for public work. That obligation would appear to arise at the time that the land is first not required for public work. On its face it would seem conceptually difficult for that to be a continuing obligation. In Edmonds v Attorney-
General8 Miller J considered that if the relevant authority did not invoke the
subsection to justify a decision not to return the land at the time it was difficult to see why the Court ought to reach a decision on its behalf sometime later. However, in deference to the way in which the matter was argued Miller J went on to consider whether the Council acquired the land in addition to its conclusions with respect to the decisions made by the Executive.
[25] On appeal the parties again urged the Court to make the finding whether it was unfair or unreasonable to offer the land back rather than refer matters back to the Chief Executive. The Court of Appeal observed that it should be cautious about deciding the matter given the comments of the Supreme Court in Hood v Attorney- General.9
[26] In the more recent case of Mark v Attorney-General10 the Court of Appeal left open whether it would be unfair or unreasonable to transfer the land back was a
decision for the Chief Executive or for the Court.
7 Bowler Investments Ltd v Attorney-General (1987) 7 NZAR 73. .
8 Edmonds v Attorney-General HC Wellington CIV-2000-485-695, 3 May 2005 at [148].
9 Hood v Attorney-General [2007] NZRMA 28.
10 Mark v Attorney-General [2011] 2 NZLR 538 (CA) at [94].
[27] As noted, in Hood v Attorney-General the Supreme Court discussed the approach in the Courts below but expressly left open whether s 40(2) turned on the circumstances at the date the obligation to offer back arose. The Court also did not express a view whether it was open for the Court to determine whether it was fair and reasonable for the land to be retained under s 40(2).11
[28] Given the above authorities, at this interlocutory stage it cannot be said the issue of compulsion is not relevant to the application of s 40(2).
[29] Further, whether the land was compulsorily taken against the vendor’s wishes as opposed to under a mutually satisfactory arrangement could be relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion as to whether, ultimately, any relief should be granted to the plaintiffs.
[30] On the application for discovery, the plaintiffs take the point that there is no basis for belief that they have failed to discover relevant documents. They note that the affidavit of Ms Amos in support of the application simply notes there are no documents from the families of the plaintiffs or the original vendors of the land.
[31] I consider there is force in the plaintiffs’ submission on this practical, threshold point. As noted, the pleadings put in issue that the plaintiffs were not willing settlers, primarily by reference to the Gazette notice and subsequent contact as pleaded. The affidavit of documents confirms the plaintiffs have searched for relevant documents. It is not surprising there may be no other documents after 60 years. Further, I consider that in any event it would be oppressive and burdensome to require the plaintiffs to search for documents relating to events that occurred 60 years ago, given that the issue of whether the original landowners were willing vendors or not, while potentially relevant, cannot be said to be a major issue and, to the extent relevant, can be dealt with by interrogatories.
[32] For those reasons, I disallow the Council’s request for discovery. Some of
the interrogatories sought on this topic also fall into the category of oppressive and burdensome. While I approve the interrogatories at 6.1(a) and (b), I disallow the
11 Hood v Attorney-General, above n 9, at [7].
interrogatories at 6.1(c) to (f) inclusive as being too oppressive, burdensome, or not sufficiently relevant to the material issues in this case. Similar reasoning applies to the balance interrogatories on this issue.
The second category – the circumstances as at August 1983
[33] The Council next seeks records and details of the financial position of the original landowners and the current plaintiffs as at August 1983, when it is said the obligation to offer back arose. The Council says the information is relevant to the consideration of whether, if it was under an obligation to offer the land back in 1983 it would have been impractical, unreasonable or unfair to offer it to the plaintiffs at that time.
[34] The plaintiffs object to this further discovery and the related interrogatories on the basis that they are irrelevant. First they submit the offer back obligation falls on the defendant and there is no statutory basis to avoid its obligation on the basis its offer would be unlikely to be accepted.12 Next, relying again on the judgment of Miller J in Edmonds v Attorney-General13 counsel repeated the submission that the
Court should not, in the context of this proceeding, embark on a consideration of the factors in s 40(2)(a) or (b). Mr Carruthers also submitted that, had the legislature intended that s 40 offerors would be able to make preliminary inquiries of former landowners as to their ability to repurchase, it would have expressly provided for that s 40. Finally, if the Court did not accept those submissions, Mr Carruthers submitted the applications should not be granted in any event because the offeree’s impecuniosity was irrelevant. It would be open to a s 40 offeree to approach an investor or lending institution to provide the necessary funds.
[35] Again, while I acknowledge the force of the submissions made for the plaintiffs the difficulty for them lies in comments made by the Court of Appeal in Hood in relation to the application of s 40(2). In Hood the Court rejected the
submission for the Crown in that case that the consideration of whether it would be
12 Rowan v Attorney-General [1997] 2 NZLR 559.
13 Edmonds v Attorney-General, above n 8.
unreasonable or unfair was to be judged only from the point of view of the land holding agency.14 The Court stated that:15
The interests of the former owners and the practicalities of any offer back to them were, therefore, clearly (and rightly) taken into account.
[36] I also note that at [131] of its decision in Attorney-General v Edmonds16 the Court of Appeal noted the challenge to Miller J’s finding that the Edmonds family would have acquired the land had it been offered back at any time since 1992 was not vigorously pursued on appeal and, importantly, for present purposes, observed that the finding was plainly open on the evidence. The inference is that whether the family would have (or could have) acquired the land was a valid consideration.
[37] Similar reasoning must apply to the consideration of whether it could be said to be impracticable to offer the land back. If the interests of the former owners and the practicalities of any offer back to them is to be taken into account then their ability to have funded the purchase at the time would be a relevant factor when considering whether it would be impracticable to offer the land back.
[38] Finally, it is not a complete answer to suggest the offerees could have approached an investor or lending institution for financial assistance. That rather begs the question. The likely success of such an approach would have been affected by their financial circumstances given that the land would have been offered back at the then market value.
[39] For those reasons I accept that the financial circumstances of the former owner (if still alive at the time) and/or their successors as at August 1983 are potentially relevant. However, again I consider the discovery sought of “all financial and other records of the personal and financial circumstances of the [relevant] persons ...” to be so broad and general as to be oppressive and burdensome. It is unreasonable to require the plaintiffs to seek out or seek to obtain such a general category of document after 30 years. To the extent it is relevant the issue can be
dealt with by the appropriately focused interrogatories. I allow interrogatories
14 Hood v Attorney-General CA16/04, 2 March 2005 at [96]–[97].
15 At [96].
16 Attorney-General v Edmonds [2006] NZCA 146 at [131].
6.2(d), 6.3(d) and 6.4(d). However, again, I do not consider that age, place of residence and family circumstances are sufficiently relevant and disallow them. Again the same reasoning applies to the similar interrogatories in the other proceedings.
Third category – the plaintiffs’ knowledge of their rights
[40] There are a series of interrogatories at 13.1 to 13.13 directed at, on the defendant’s argument, both the limitation defences pleaded by the defendant and other discretionary factors including the delay by the plaintiffs in making and advancing their claim, bearing in mind the length of time since the claimed obligation arose.
[41] Mr Carruthers submitted that the issues raised in these interrogatories were not relevant to the pleaded Limitation Act defences but, in any event the claims for declaratory relief do not give rise to limitation issues: Attorney-General v Edmonds Sisters of Mercy v Attorney-General & Ors; Mark v Attorney-General.17 Further, with regard to the submission that delay on the part of the plaintiffs might be relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion as to whether to grant a declaration, he submitted that that delay could not excuse the defendant from its continuing failure to address its obligations under s 40.
[42] Whether the Limitation Act applies is dependent upon the nature of the claim. In the present case the plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and also damages following an inquiry. To the extent that the plaintiffs’ claim seeks damages it is apparently based on allegations of a negligent breach of statutory duty. The Limitation Act could arguably apply to those causes of action.
[43] To the extent that the relief sought is declaratory, the limitation issue may depend on whether the relief is sought pursuant to an application under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972, the Declaratory Judgment Act 1908 or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court (common law declaratory relief). In the Sisters of Mercy
case Randerson J doubted there was jurisdiction to make the declaration sought
17 Attorney-General v Edmonds, above n 16; Sisters of Mercy v Attorney-General & Ors HC Auckland CP219-99, 6 June 2001; Mark v Attorney-General, above n 10.
under the Declaratory Judgments Act. He did not express a view on the Court’s general jurisdiction but accepted that there was jurisdiction under the Judicature Amendment Act.
[44] It appears the declaration sought in the present case relies on the Court’s inherent jurisdiction rather than under the Declaratory Judgments Act. But in any event, I agree with Mallon J in Mark & Ors v Attorney-General18 that it does not matter whether the declaratory relief is sought under the Judicature Amendment Act or the inherent jurisdiction. The Limitation Act does not apply to the claim for declaratory relief.
[45] However, as noted by the Court of Appeal in Mark & Ors v Attorney-General
& Ors, such declaratory relief is a flexible and discretionary remedy, which:19
enables a court considering the exercise of such relief to have concise control over the circumstances and terms on which any relief might be granted and if it might be granted at all.
[46] While the comments in that case were directed at discretionary relief in terms of a declaration under the Judicature Amendment Act, similar considerations would apply to a declaration sought under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Delay, particularly delay if the plaintiffs were aware of relevant facts, could count against discretionary relief. The Court might be inclined to decline the equitable relief of a declaration if the parties were aware of their rights and sat on them.
[47] While I therefore accept the plaintiffs’ knowledge at particular times could be relevant to this issue, I consider that a number of the questions asked are not directly relevant to the principal issue of delay or whether the plaintiffs sat on their rights. I approve the interrogatories at 13.3, 13.7, 13.9, 13.11 and 13.13. The plaintiffs’ answers to those interrogatories will provide the information particularly relevant to
the delay issue. I disallow the other interrogatories.
18 Mark & Ors v Attorney-General & Ors HC Wellington CIV-2002-485-799, 27 October 2009.
The fourth category – the litigation funding issue
[48] Finally, the defendant seeks particular discovery in relation to the litigation funding arrangement and any arrangement as to the application of the proceeds of the claim.
[49] The plaintiffs have purported to comply with the procedure described by the Supreme Court in Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd20 by providing a solicitor’s letter which contained some details about the funder. The letter disclosed the identity of the litigation funder as S40 Limited with its registered office at Wellington. As such it is amendable to the jurisdiction. The letter also stated that S40 Limited was solvent and was in the process of arranging a bank/insurance company bond to meet any adverse costs award. Finally, the letter stated that the litigation funding arrangement did not provide specifically for the terms on which
funding could be withdrawn.
[50] Mr Casey submitted that more than that was required. He submitted Contractors Bonding was not directly applicable. Contractors Bonding was a commercial case. In the present case the plaintiffs seek declaratory relief. He submitted the identity of the final beneficiary was a matter which the Court should be fully informed of before determining if any such remedy was appropriate.
[51] While Mr Casey accepted that this was not a representative action as was the case of Saunders v Houghton,21 he nevertheless submitted that there were seven sets of proceedings brought by the plaintiffs with a common representation. The potential liability of the Council if the claims were made out was significant. He submitted that, as a minimum, a redacted form of the agreement should be disclosed.
[52] For similar reasons the Council also seeks correspondence between the litigation funding entity and the individual plaintiffs. Mr Casey submitted it was relevant to know the extent of the arrangements entered into between the plaintiffs and the litigation funder. He made the submission that in the absence of further
information the defendant believed the plaintiffs had no direct interest in the
20 Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2012] NZSC 98.
litigation. He went so far as to suggest the proceeding was being run by, and for, the benefit of the litigation funder and other financial backers.
[53] Mr Carruthers made the point that both in Contractors Bonding and Saunders v Houghton the issue of the litigation funder’s role and involvement in the proceedings arose in the context of an application to stay for abuse of process rather than in the course of an interlocutory application for discovery and/or interrogatories as in this case. However, Mr Carruthers accepted that he did not want to invite the defendant to apply for a stay to resolve this issue and that the issue should, if possible, be determined in the context of the present applications.
[54] An important feature of the Court’s acceptance of funding arrangements with litigation funders is that there is a benefit for the litigants from the proceedings.22 To that extent there should be confirmation that the plaintiffs retain a proper benefit in the outcome of the litigation.
[55] That is particularly relevant in a case where the plaintiffs seek discretionary declaratory relief from the Court to give effect to their rights under the Act as successors of the original land owners.
[56] The purpose of the relevant provisions of the Act is to provide an opportunity to the original owners or their successors to purchase the land back. It is not, as the Court has said, to provide a “windfall” for unrelated third parties. To that extent the arrangements between the litigation funder and the plaintiffs on a successful outcome of the case is relevant.
[57] As the Court of Appeal observed in Mark v Attorney-General:23
While it is true that there is nothing to stop the original vendors of the acquired land or their successors from onselling the land, in this case it is not this group who stand to take the major benefit: the windfall gains would accrue to Pritchard.
[58] In dismissing the application for leave to appeal from that decision the
Supreme Court made the same point:24
22 See Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd above n 20 at [52].
23 Mark v Attorney General, above n 10, at [90].
24 Mark v Attorney-General [2011] NZSC 94 at [2].
When the factual position is realistically appraised, we find it somewhat surprising that the case was brought in the first place – apparently for the benefit principally of a developer who thought fit to acquire any rights of the nominal plaintiffs.
[59] I am satisfied that it is necessary, given the nature of this case and the considerations that may arise in terms of its ultimate disposition, for the Court and the Council to be informed and to be aware of the extent to which the plaintiffs as successors of the original owners will benefit from these proceedings.
[60] I note that in Contractors Bonding in addition to the information which had been supplied, the Court also directed the disclosure of a redacted version of the litigation funding agreement. I consider that to be appropriate in this case.
[61] The plaintiffs are to provide further discovery by producing a redacted version of the litigation funding arrangement in sufficient form to provide the details of the ultimate division of the benefits/proceeds of litigation and responsibility for costs. I am not prepared, however, in the absence of any suggestion otherwise, to accept the proposition or suggestion that there are side agreements. Discovery of correspondence with the litigation funder is not required.
Result/orders
[62] (a) The plaintiffs are to file an affidavit annexing a redacted copy of the litigation funding arrangement within 14 days of delivery of this decision. The redacted copy of the funding arrangement is to provide sufficient unredacted information to disclose the arrangements between the plaintiffs and the litigation funder regarding the division of the benefits from this litigation, and also any arrangements in relation to the costs of the litigation. Apart from that, however, the defendant’s application for further and better discovery is dismissed.
(b) The plaintiffs are to answer the interrogatories at 6.1(a), 6.1(b),
6.2(d), 6.3(d), 6.4(d), 7.1(a), 7.1(b), 7.2(d) (if alive), 7.3(d), 7.4(d),
8.1(a), 8.1(b), 8.2(d), 8.3(d), 8.4(d), 9.1(a), 9.1(b), 9.2(d), 9.3(d),
9.4(d), 9.5(d), 10.1(a), 10.1(b), 10.2(d), 11.1(a), 11.1(b), 11.2(d),
11.3(d), 12.1(a), 12.1(b), 12.2(d), 12.3(d), 12.4(d), 13.3, 13.7, 13.9,
13.11 and 13.13.
[63] The interrogatories are to be answered within 28 days of delivery of this decision by the plaintiffs filing and serving statements in answer to the above interrogatories. Such answers are to be verified by affidavit.
Timetable
[64] Counsel are to file a timetable providing for the further interlocutory steps in this proceeding leading to a further telephone conference before the confirmation of the fixture date.
[65] Such memorandum is to be filed within 21 days of delivery of this decision. The Registrar is to refer it to me.
Costs
[66] Both parties have had a measure of success. Costs are to lie where they fall on this application.
Venning J
0
4
0