Bell v Police
[2025] NZHC 2881
•1 October 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WAIHŌPAI ROHE
CRI-2025-425-000040
[2025] NZHC 2881
BETWEEN ALLAN OTTO BELL
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 22 September 2025 Appearances:
K L E Coote for Appellant
M B Brownlie for Respondent
Judgment:
1 October 2025
JUDGMENT OF PRESTON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 1 October 2025 at 3.00 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
BELL v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2025] NZHC 2881 [1 October 2025]
Introduction
[1] Allan Bell (aged 40) appeals a sentence of two years and two months’ imprisonment imposed by Judge Walker in the Invercargill District Court on 8 August 20251 after he admitted charges of:
(a)Driving while disqualified (third or subsequent);2
(b)Failing to stop when followed by red and blue flashing lights (aggravated);3
(c)Reckless driving;4
(d)Wilful damage;5
(e)Possession of methamphetamine;6
(f)Possession of cannabis;7
(g)Possession of utensils for methamphetamine;8
(h)Breach of protection order (x 2);9
(i)Possession of cannabis for supply (x 5);10
(j)Supplying cannabis;11
1 Police v Bell [2025] NZDC 17990.
2 Land Transport Act 1998, ss 32(1)(a) and 32(4). Maximum penalty: two years’ imprisonment;
$6,000 fine.
3 Land Transport Act, ss 52A(1)(a)(ii), 52A(3), 52A(6) and 114(2). Maximum penalty: $10,000 fine.
4 Land Transport Act, s 35(1)(a). Maximum penalty: three months’ imprisonment; $4,500 fine.
5 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 11(1)(a). Maximum penalty: three months’ imprisonment; $2,000 fine.
6 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 7(1)(a) and (2). Maximum penalty: six months’ imprisonment.
7 Misuse of Drugs Act, s 7(1)(a) and (2). Maximum penalty: three months’ imprisonment.
8 Misuse of Drugs Act, s 13(1)(a) and (3). Maximum penalty: one year imprisonment.
9 Family Violence Act 2018, ss 98(1)(a) and 112(1)(b). Maximum penalty: three years’ imprisonment.
10 Misuse of Drugs Act, s 6(1)(f). Maximum penalty: eight years’ imprisonment
11 Misuse of Drugs Act, s 6(1)(e). Maximum penalty: eight years’ imprisonment.
(k)Possession of methamphetamine for supply (x 3);12
(l)Supplying methamphetamine (x 3);13
(m)Supplying stimulants and depressants;14 and
(n)Breaching a restraining order (x 5).15
Facts
[2] Mr Bell’s offending, which can be grouped into three tranches, is captured in full in the decision of Judge Walker:
[5]The facts in relation to the first set of offending is that a protection order was made against [Mr Bell] on 1 March 2017 and it was a condition of that order that [Mr Bell] not possess or have under [his] control any weapon.16
[6]On 26 November 2023, [Mr Bell was] the subject of court bail conditions not to drive a motor vehicle. On 10 February 2024, [Mr Bell] drove a motor vehicle … in Invercargill. [Mr Bell] admitted to being on a bail condition not to drive and [Mr Bell was] arrested for breach of bail. [Mr Bell’s] car was searched. In [Mr Bell’s] jacket pocket was a glasses case containing three clear plastic bags containing white crystalised powder. Also contained was a rolled up
$5 note and a glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine. [Mr Bell’s] cellphone was seized by the police. During the search of [Mr Bell’s] car, the police located a bag of white crystalised powder, a jar containing pre-packaged cannabis, electronic scales, and a rifle case containing a replica .22 calibre rifle, subsequently identified as being an air rifle along with an extendable baton. The total weight of the crystalised white powder which was of course methamphetamine was 4.27 grams. The total weight of the pre-packaged cannabis was
17.18 grams. A subsequent extraction of data from [Mr Bell’s] cellphone showed that [Mr Bell] was dealing drugs.
[7]On 4 February 2024, [Mr Bell] supplied an associate with a $50 bag of cannabis. On 27 January 2024, [Mr Bell] offered to supply the same associate methamphetamine, a point and a half for $90. On 27 January 2024, [Mr Bell was] in possession of cannabis for supply to an associate. On 13 January 2024, [Mr Bell was] in possession of 30 Ritalin pills which are a Class B controlled drug for the purposes of supplying them to an associate. On 7 February 2024, [Mr Bell]
12 Misuse of Drugs Act, ss 6(1)(f) and (2). Maximum penalty: life imprisonment.
13 Misuse of Drugs Act, ss 6(1)(c) and (2). Maximum penalty: life imprisonment.
14 Misuse of Drugs Act, ss 6(1)(c) and (2). Maximum penalty: life imprisonment.
15 Oranga Tamariki Act 1989. Maximum penalty: $2,000 fine; three months’ imprisonment.
16 Mr Bell subsequently told police that he was unaware of the conditions of the protection order.
offered to supply an associate with a ball of methamphetamine. On 25 December 2023, [Mr Bell] offered to supply an associate with cannabis. On 4 February 2024, [Mr Bell] were in possession of cannabis for supply. On 11 January 2024, [Mr Bell] offered to supply another associate with cannabis and finally on 4 February 2024, [Mr Bell was] in possession of cannabis for supply.17
[8]In relation to the second set of offending, they relate to the five charges of breaching a restraining order made by the Family Court. [Mr Bell was] served with that restraining order on 3 September 2024. On 24 September 2024, [Mr Bell] named one of the victims as a principal contact person when [Mr Bell was] in rehab with the Salvation Army.
[9]After that time, [Mr Bell] had multiple contacts with the victim and the children who were the subject of that restraining order. In explanation when [Mr Bell] were asked about that, [Mr Bell] said that the order was, to use [Mr Bell’s] word, “bullshit” and that [Mr Bell was] fighting a restraining order in the Family Court.18
[10]The third set of offending relates to driving. [Mr Bell was] last before the Gore District Court on 28 February 2024, when [Mr Bell was] disqualified for 18 months and [Mr Bell was] sentenced to four-and- a-half months’ home detention on a charge of driving whilst disqualified.
[11]On 30 April this year, [Mr Bell was] on electronically monitored bail, [and] sought and [was] surprisingly granted an exemption to leave to go to KFC to get some food for the family on the condition that [Mr Bell] be back at [his] address by 3 pm. [Mr Bell] drove [Mr Bell’s] partner’s car to shop at Kmart and then went to KFC. A police car noted [Mr Bell] leaving at approximately 2.45 pm and pulled in behind [Mr Bell]. [Mr Bell was] signalled to stop. Somewhat inexplicably [Mr Bell] accelerated away reaching an estimated speed of 80 kilometres an hour in a 50 kilometre an hour zone and travelling on the wrong side of the road to overtake slower vehicles. Because of the manner of [Mr Bell’s] driving, [Mr Bell] were not pursued by the police.
[12]The police confirmed shortly afterwards that [Mr Bell was] driving north, on the northern motorway travelling at speed, passing cars and causing oncoming cars to get out of [Mr Bell’s] way. [Mr Bell] then stopped in a layby, removed [his] electronic bracelet and threw it out of the car before continuing on at speed. Near Hawkesbury Village [Mr Bell] passed a heavy truck and trailer on a blind corner at speed. [Mr Bell] then travelled onto the wrong side of the road to avoid roadworks controlled by traffic signals while driving at 80 kilometres an hour on the wrong side of the road in a 30 kilometre an hour temporary speed zone, forcing oncoming traffic to pull to the left to avoid a collision. Road spikes were then deployed by the police and
17 This offending detailed in this paragraph was expressed in the summary of facts by way of text message exchanges between Mr Bell and associates.
18 I detail the circumstances of the breaches of the restraining order in more detail later in the judgment.
[Mr Bell] continued on travelling through Waikouaiti at 120 kilometres an hour in a 50 kilometre an hour zone. [Mr Bell] continued to drive recklessly putting other road users at risk until [Mr Bell] lost [his] front tyres completely and the car was travelling on its wheel rims only. [Mr Bell] only stopped when the vehicle became completely inoperable.
District Court decision
[3] The Judge considered Mr Bell’s cannabis and methamphetamine offending fell within category 2 of R v Terewi and band 1 of Zhang v R respectively.19 The Judge accepted that Mr Bell’s role in the methamphetamine offending was at “the lesser level” and that there were indications he was selling to subsidise his own habit.
[4] For the drug and drug related charges together with the charges of breaching a protection order, the Judge adopted a starting point of 36 months’ imprisonment.20 He applied a two-month uplift for the five breaches of restraining orders. Noting that Mr Bell was for sentence on his 16th charge of driving whilst disqualified, and that such offending alone would attract a starting point of 16 months’ imprisonment, the Judge applied an eight-month uplift on a totality basis. Against Mr Bell’s record of driving matters, a further two-month uplift was applied for failing to stop for police and the reckless driving charge, offending that the Judge described as “prolonged … particularly reckless driving which put multiple road users at risk”.21 The total starting point came to 48 months’ imprisonment.
[5]Turning to Mr Bell’s personal mitigating factors, the Judge said:
[24]… I acknowledge that you say your offending was methamphetamine driven and that your impulsive and irrational decisions appear to reflect that. You attempted residential drug treatment but you were exited from that programme but I give you some credit for the fact that you tried.
19 R v Terewi [1999] 3 NZLR 62 (CA); and Zhang v R [2019] NZCA 507, [2019] 3 NZLR 648.
20 At [19].
21 At [22].
[25]There is an alcohol and drug report … which … places you in the severe level of drug use. He recommends that you abstain or stay away completely from all alcohol and drugs and that you undertake further residential treatment, as well as medical support for various mental health needs. It appears from material I have read, that your use of drugs has impacted on your life in just about every respect.
[26]I accept that your drug addiction has had direct impact on your offending and I acknowledge what is said in the reports about your mental health needs and the need for medical support. I am going to apply a 20 per cent reduction for all those matters.
[27]Although your counsel seeks further discrete discounts for other factors, totalling 55 per cent from the starting point, in my view, that is too high.
[6] After factoring in a “substantial” 25 per cent credit for Mr Bell’s guilty pleas, the net deductions came to a total of 45 per cent. The Judge considered that “fairly reflects overall [Mr Bell’s] situation”. He declined to afford any further credit for a relatively short period on EM bail because Mr Bell had offended during that period.22
[7] This resulted in an end sentence of two years and two months’ imprisonment, which the Judge determined was the least restrictive option appropriate in all the circumstances.23 Mr Bell was disqualified from driving for 36 months and ordered to pay reparation on the reckless driving and wilful damage charges.24
The appeal
[8]Ms Coote for Mr Bell advances four grounds on the appeal:
(a)Insufficient credit was given to recognise Mr Bell’s methamphetamine addiction, which was causative of his offending. Citing Zhang v R, Ms Coote highlights that substance abuse and violence were recurring themes throughout Mr Bell’s upbringing, and that a credit of 30 per cent or more is appropriate.25
22 At [23].
23 The pre-sentence report also recommended imprisonment as the outcome.
24 Orders for destruction of the drugs and paraphernalia and forfeiture and destruction of the weapons and cell phone were also made.
25 Zhang v R, above n 19, at [10(k)] and [149].
(b)A deduction should have been afforded for the 329 days that Mr Bell spent subject to restrictive bail conditions or the 55 days spent on electronically monitored bail (EM bail).
(c)The two-month uplift imposed for the five breach of restraining order charges was excessive in circumstances where the appellant has no history of this kind.
(d)The end sentence was manifestly excessive in the circumstances and insufficient consideration was given to the need to provide a rehabilitative response.
[9] Mr Brownlie for the Crown opposes the appeal, submitting that there is no error in the sentence imposed.
Analysis
Insufficient credit for addiction?
[10] Credits for an offender’s background remain a discretionary exercise.26 The Supreme Court’s decision in Berkland v R has clarified that a causative contribution between an offender’s background and offending will be sufficient to merit a credit at sentencing.27 Mr Bell’s background factors are set out in a pre-sentence report dated 25 June 2025 and a drug and alcohol report dated 30 July 2025.
[11] It is unnecessary to describe Mr Bell’s childhood and background factors in full detail, but I note that his self-reporting clearly indicates that he had a difficult childhood. Mr Bell reported moving around homes a lot as a child and described his father as a violent “mobster”. He lived with his mother until the age of five, at which point she moved to Australia and Mr Bell was placed into the custody of his maternal grandmother. He explained that violence was “a common theme” of his childhood and he would often receive beatings.
26 Rivers v Police [2024] NZHC 2847 at [43]; and Collins-Roberts v R [2025] NZHC 2448 at [36].
27 Berkland v R [2022] NZSC 143, [2022] 1 NZLR 509.
[12] Mr Bell describes his first exposure to alcohol at the very early age of four. This developed into more social drinking in his teenage years and falling into a pattern of heavier binge drinking and drinking every day. Mr Bell reports making positive steps in reducing his alcohol consumption recently—this being consistent with how the present offending does not seem to have involved alcohol in any way. Mr Bell similarly reported significant use of cannabis in his teenage years, his first experience with cannabis having been at age 19, but that he has now ultimately ceased use.
[13] Mr Bell reported using methamphetamine frequently since 2019, his first exposure to the drug having been at the earlier age of 19. He told both report-writers that he uses it as a form of self-medication to relieve symptoms he considers consistent with undiagnosed attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).28 He reported being unable to cease taking methamphetamine, despite wishing to, and falling quickly back into a methamphetamine habit after completing a stint in residential rehabilitation. He also reported being removed from a subsequent residential rehabilitation program in September 2024 due to an absence over the weekend and signs he had been in a fight, at which point he again resumed methamphetamine use. It is regrettable that Mr Bell’s efforts to undergo rehabilitation at the Bridge Drug Treatment Residential programme have been stifled by his exit, preventing the achievement of meaningful progress. As the District Court Judge acknowledged,
Mr Bell’s drug screening placed him at a severe level of drug use.29
[14] Mr Bell states he has had some serious mental health complications from his methamphetamine use. He told the report writer he was diagnosed with substance induced psychosis in the past. Mr Bell reported that his siblings have also struggled with alcohol consumption. The drug and alcohol report writer opined that “this is suggestive of a likely genetic predisposition towards alcohol or substance use and/or dyscontrol.”
28 It was also recorded in the pre-sentence report that Mr Bell has been questioning if he has undiagnosed Oppositional Defiance Disorder.
29 At [25].
[15] The Judge, in applying a 20 per cent reduction to Mr Bell’s sentence, rightly recognised that his drug addiction has had a direct impact on his proclivity to offend. Indeed, as noted in the pre-sentence report, Mr Bell states he and his partner were methamphetamine addicts in the time leading up to the offending. It is apparent that there is a complex suite of factors which are relevant to the nature and extent of Mr Bell’s addiction and to his offending. As the Judge put it, this 20 per cent discount also reflected an acknowledgment of what was said in the reports about Mr Bell’s mental health and medical needs.30
[16] I agree that Mr Bell’s relevant criminogenic factors such as early exposure to alcohol, cannabis and methamphetamine has made it more likely he would have such a predisposition for its use later in life. However, in my view, a combined reduction of 20 per cent as imposed by the Judge, was correct, if not generous. As the cases cited by Mr Brownlie demonstrate, smaller reductions for very similar background factors are routinely given.31
Reduction for time spent on bail
[17] While the Sentencing Act 2002 only identifies time spent on EM bail as a mandatory mitigating factor,32 it is common ground that discounts may be given for time spent on bail simpliciter. Whether there should be a discount and the scale of it will depend on the restrictiveness of the bail conditions and the level of compliance with them.33
[18] Mr Bell was subject to bail simpliciter between 12 February 2024–4 January 2025, a total of 327 days. Mr Bell breached his bail on 4 January 2025. The conditions of Mr Bell’s bail were that he reside in Gore, not consume drugs, not possess a weapon,
30 At [27].
31 See Blackburn v Police [2023] NZHC 3780 at [16]–[19], [30(a)–(e)] and [33]. In Blackburn, this Court held that there was a nexus between the appellant’s relevant criminogenic factors such as considerable history of drug (including methamphetamine) and alcohol addiction similarly developed at a young age; exposure to serious violence in childhood; a disconnection from Māori culture and early gang associations and his offending. A 10 per cent discount was provided. See also Swinburne v Police [2024] NZHC 619 and Rushton v Police [2023] NZHC 2754, although I observe that a methamphetamine addiction was not a factor in those cases.
32 Section 9(2)(h).
33 Kreegher v R [2021] NZCA 22, (2021) 29 CRNZ 622 at [49].
appear at his next hearing, and not enter Invercargill except for attending court, lawyer appointments, or work and income pre-arranged appointments. There was no curfew.
[19] I am unable to accept Ms Coote’s submission that these are particularly restrictive or onerous bail conditions.34 The only condition that could be argued to be potentially restrictive was the prohibition on entering Invercargill save as excepted. However, I have not been provided any evidence of the impact of any specific restriction or limitation this had on Mr Bell’s everyday affairs. I acknowledge Mr Bell was compliant with bail simpliciter for nearly a year, but it is notable that his remand on straight bail was terminated by a breach that resulted in a remand in custody. It was open to the District Court Judge to refuse a credit.
[20] Mr Bell was on EM bail from 4 March 2025 until he breached his bail on 12 April 2025. He was readmitted to bail on 15 April until 1 May 2025. He was subject to standard EM bail conditions. These included to reside at his bail address for 24 hours, seven days a week, and not to leave that address without the prior approval of the Department of Corrections’ EM bail team. He was not to consume, possess or use any alcohol or drugs, nor was he to use any internet capable device except for the purposes of communicating with his counsel. Mr Bell was also not permitted to associate or have contact directly or indirectly with any victims or alleged victims of his offending. In total, Mr Bell spent 55 days on EM bail. Ms Coote acknowledges that the driving charges occurred while Mr Bell was subject to EM bail but emphasises the restrictiveness of the conditions were such that a credit is justified.35
[21] Given the short period of time that Mr Bell was subject to EM bail and that many of the present charges arose while Mr Bell was subject to EM bail, I consider it was open to the District Court Judge to decline to issue a deduction.
34 Compare with Kreegher v R, above n 33, at [49] where a five per cent deduction was granted on appeal to reflect that the appellant was on bail without incident for three years, with “moderately restrictive conditions” including a 7 pm–7 am curfew.
35 Time spent on bail with an EM condition is a mitigating factor under s 9(2)(h) of the Sentencing Act 2002. The extent to which the sentence is discounted taking account of this factor requires an evaluative assessment of all the circumstances in s 9(3A) of the Sentencing Act, namely: (1) the period of time spent on EM bail; (2) the restrictiveness of the EM-bail conditions; (3) the extent to which the EM-bail conditions were complied with; and (4) any other relevant matter: see Shramka v R [2022] NZCA 299, [2022] 3 NZLR 348 at [61].
Uplift for five breaches of restraining order
[22] Mr Bell was convicted on five occasions of breaching a restraining order between October and November 2024. The circumstances giving rise to the charges are as follows:
(a)Mr Bell was visited at the rehabilitation facility he was at by his former partner (the mother of his children) with the protected persons, namely his children.
(b)Mr Bell was picked up by his former partner and the children for weekend day leave from the rehabilitation facility.
(c)Mr Bell spent the night with his children in Dunedin while on overnight leave from the rehabilitation facility.
(d)Mr Bell transferred $155 into his former partner’s bank account for their son’s birthday.
(e)Mr Bell had his brother drop presents and snacks at the doorstep of his former partner for one of the children’s birthdays.36
[23] Ms Coote submits that the first three breaches of the restraining order were initiated by the appellant’s former partner,37 and that none of the breaches involved any threatening behaviour. She informs that there were no allegations of family violence in relation to these interactions and the appellant’s former partner actively supported his efforts to address his methamphetamine addiction, which explains her visits to the rehabilitation facility with their children. Ms Coote submits that, in reality, once protection or restraining orders are made, often in response to immediate concerns, many couples find themselves unable or unwilling to pursue the formal
36 The summary of facts also records that on one occasion, Mr Bell tried to call his former partner twice, despite the fact she had his phone number blocked.
37 I note, however, the summary of facts records that Mr Bell told Oranga Tamariki that on the two occasions he saw his children while in rehabilitation this was arranged through his mother, not former partner.
process required to have them discharged, given the cost and complexity of doing so, which leads parties to try to manage informally, as occurred in this case.
[24] I accept, as Ms Coote submits, that Mr Bell showed a genuine desire to maintain contact with his children, and there is obvious social benefit in fostering that relationship. However, the fact of the matter is that restraining orders are protective instruments. Even if the breaches were not threatening, repeated non-compliance undermines their issuance and protective function. In my view, the five breaches warranted being marked by an uplift. While the first three breaches may have been at the lower end of the scale, still the final two, while well-intentioned, are deliberate breaches. Mr Bell’s subsequent conduct in trying to make contact through his ex- partner despite her refusal and blocking his number and his admitted disrespect of the restraining order,38 is also of concern. I do not consider the uplift was outside of the acceptable range available to the Judge.
[25] Also under this ground, Ms Coote sought to argue that the District Court Judge placed undue weight on the presence of the air rifle found in Mr Bell’s car, as the weapon that led to the protection order breach was an extendable baton and the charge relating to the air rifle was dismissed. This does not advance her submission that the two-month uplift was manifestly excessive, as the District Court Judge did not refer to the air rifle as factoring into her decision to impose the uplift.39 It is an unrelated matter.
Insufficient consideration to a rehabilitative sentence?
[26] Ms Coote’s essential submission on this ground is that the global starting point imposed for the drug offending was outside the available range. Ms Coote says that the District Court Judge could have adopted a more holistic approach in assessing the methamphetamine and cannabis offending, rather than treating them as separate matters. She cites the case of Hamblin v R as an example of such an approach,
38 See the District Court Judge’s summary of the facts reproduced at [2].
39 The Judge mentioned the rifle at [6] when noting it was found in Mr Bell’s car during the police search and again at [17] as follows: “When you were stopped by police, you had bags of methamphetamine weighing 4.27 grams and cannabis as I said earlier weighing 17.18 grams along with electronic scales, an air rifle and extendable baton. I accept all of that suggests a fairly low- level unsophisticated drug dealing operation run from your car …” .
submitting that a lower starting point of two years and six months’ imprisonment could have been appropriate as adopted by the District Court in Hamblin v Police40 (the starting point was set by the District Court in Hamblin and was not sought to be disturbed on appeal to this Court).
[27] The appellant in Hamblin faced four charges of supplying methamphetamine, one of possession of methamphetamine for supply and one of supplying cannabis. He also faced several driving charges: failing to stop for red and blue flashing lights; dangerous driving; reckless driving; speeding and careless driving. It seems that the starting point adopted in that case was a global starting point that took into account all the charges the appellant faced. I note that the two-year six-month starting point adopted by the District Court Judge in Hamblin seems to be inconsistent with a sentencing indication delivered by the District Court “of three and half years’ imprisonment before personal mitigating factors”.41
[28] Ms Coote seems to be critical of the Judge assessing the methamphetamine and cannabis offending with reference to the respective tariff cases. No error is disclosed. The Judge set a global starting point that incorporated both the methamphetamine and cannabis offending in the present case, after assessing the applicable category or band of offending under the relevant tariff case. This is both orthodox and an appropriate way of determining what may be an appropriate uplift to a lead charge, or, as here, an appropriate global starting point.
[29] In my view, a rigid comparison of the starting points between Hamblin and the present case is not helpful. The offending in the present case was serious and justified a starting point in the range of 36 months imprisonment.
[30] In arguing for a more rehabilitative sentence, Ms Coote highlights that both the methamphetamine and cannabis offending were committed with the same objective: to fund the appellant’s addiction. So much was ultimately accepted by the District Court Judge.42 Ms Coote further submits that the alcohol and drug report provided
40 Hamblin v Police [2022] NZHC 3055.
41 See [4].
42 At [18] the District Court Judge stated, “I accept … there are indications that you were selling to subsidise your own habit”.
evidence that Mr Bell’s efforts to engage in rehabilitation were both persistent and genuine.
[31] I agree that Mr Bell in the report expressed a strong motivation to resume treatment focused specifically on his methamphetamine use. Mr Bell indicated that a potential course of treatment at St Marks in Blenheim could be pursued upon his release. To the extent Ms Coote’s submissions in this regard were advanced in relation to setting a lower starting point, I note that rehabilitative needs are not relevant to an assessment of the appropriate starting point, this forming part of step two of the sentencing methodology. Ms Coote rightly, in my view, did not submit that Mr Bell’s rehabilitative factors justified a sentencing credit at step two. Although expressing an interest in rehabilitation represents a positive step in the right direction, it does not compel an award of a discrete credit.43 While the path of recovery from addiction can be long and involve many setbacks, what is missing in Mr Bell’s case, as his counsel accepts, is real meaningful progress towards rehabilitating himself. Mr Bell is to be encouraged to engage with St Marks in Blenheim, on the other programmes to which counsel referred in oral submissions, regardless of the outcome of his appeal.
Conclusion
[32]The appeal is dismissed.
………………………………………
Preston J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Invercargill
Eagles, Eagles & Redpath, Invercargill
43 See Collins-Roberts v R, above n 26, at [41], citing Berkland v R, above n 29, at [159]–[160]. In Berkland, the Supreme Court found that “exceptional” rehabilitative actions were afforded a 10 per cent deduction.
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