Barton v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2020-404-000686

[2020] NZHC 1099

UNDER the Habeas Corpus Act 2001

IN THE MATTER

of an application for a writ of habeas corpus

BETWEEN

DAVID SIMON BARTON
Applicant

AND

CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Respondent

Hearing: 22 May 2020

Appearances:

Applicant in person (via AVL) RW Belcher for Respondent

Judgment:

25 May 2020


JUDGMENT OF DOWNS J


This judgment was delivered by me on Monday, 25 May 2020 at 10 am pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor, Auckland. Copy to: Applicant

BARTON v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2020] NZHC 1099 [25 May 2020]

[1]        David Barton is in prison. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus. He contends his detention (in prison) is unlawful.

[2]        On 17 August 2018, Mr Barton was sentenced by Judge K G Glubb to 38 and a half months’ imprisonment. The Judge imposed this sentence as Mr Barton was found guilty of evading tax. Mr Barton appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal.1

[3]        I was given the warrant of commitment in relation to Mr Barton. It confirms Mr Barton’s sentence for the tax evasion offending, imposed 17 August 2018.2 It follows Mr Barton must persuade me his detention is unlawful.3

[4]        Mr Barton did not dispute the apparent legality of the warrant of commitment. Rather, Mr Barton argued the Judge had no power to imprison him. Indeed, Mr Barton argued no District Court Judge had the power  to  imprison  him—or anyone  else. Mr Barton argued s 19 of the District Court Act 2016 contained a “colossal mistake”. This section reads:

19   Powers of Judges

(1)   A Judge has the power—

(a)to exercise the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the court in accordance with his or her warrant of appointment; and

(b)if applicable, to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by a warrant to sit in the Family Court or to conduct jury trials, or conferred by a designation to sit in the Youth Court.

(2)   A Judge exercises the jurisdiction of the court by—

(a)hearing and determining proceedings in the court; and

(b)exercising the powers conferred by this Act or any other enactment on the court or Judges of the court.

(3)   Nothing in subsection (1) limits section 436 of the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989.


1      Barton v R [2019] NZCA 644.

2      Sentencing Act 2002, s 91.

3      Bennett v Superintendent, Rimutaka Prison [2002] 1 NZLR 616 at [70].

[5]        Mr Barton said absence of reference to a defendant or prisoner meant no District Court Judge could sentence anyone to imprisonment.

[6]        The argument is ambitious—and wrong. Section 19(1) confers civil and criminal jurisdiction to a District Court Judge in accordance with her or his warrant of appointment. So, for example, only a jury-warranted Judge may preside at a jury trial (incidentally, Judge Glubb has a jury warrant). Section 19(2) provides, unremarkably, a District Court Judge exercises the…

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Case
[2020] NZHC 1099
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, David Barton applied for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his detention in prison was unlawful. Barton had been sentenced to 38 and a half months in prison for evading tax, a sentence upheld by the Court of Appeal. Barton argued that no District Court Judge had the power to imprison him, contending that there was an error in the District Court Act 2016. However, the Court found that the Act clearly confers the necessary criminal jurisdiction to District Court Judges, and that the Sentencing Act 2002 supports this interpretation. Barton's application was dismissed as his detention was found to be lawful, as he was serving a sentence that had not yet expired.

The central legal issue in this case was whether a District Court Judge had the power to imprison a defendant following conviction for a criminal offence. Barton argued that there was an omission in the District Court Act 2016 that meant no Judge could sentence anyone to imprisonment. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the Act clearly confers the necessary criminal jurisdiction to District Court Judges. The Court further noted that the Sentencing Act 2002 supports this interpretation, as it provides mechanisms for imposing imprisonment where an offender is liable. Barton's argument was deemed ambitious and incorrect.

The Court found that Barton's detention was lawful, as he was serving a sentence that had not yet expired. While Barton raised an ancillary matter regarding his medical condition, the Court found this argument beyond the scope of the habeas corpus application. The Court did note, however, that the Department of Corrections has a duty to ensure Barton receives appropriate medical treatment, and Barton had not provided sufficient evidence to suggest this duty was not being met. The application was dismissed.

The Court dismissed Barton's application for a writ of habeas corpus and found his detention to be lawful. The Court further noted that the Department of Corrections must ensure Barton receives appropriate medical treatment, although Barton had not provided sufficient evidence to suggest this duty was not being met.

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