IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND BLENHEIM REGISTRY
CIV 2014-406-000005
CIV 2014-406-000019
CIV 2014-406-000020 [2015] NZHC 2980
BETWEEN LYNDA ROSE BARRY
Plaintiff
AND
FRANCIS CARLISLE Defendant
Hearing: On Papers Counsel:
S J Zindel for Plaintiff
M G Locke for DefendantJudgment:
26 November 2015
COSTS JUDGMENT OF BROWN J
[1] This judgment addresses costs in three different proceedings involving the parties, namely:
(a) CIV-2014-406-20 – a proceeding brought by the plaintiff under the
Property (Relationships) Act 1976, which was discontinued.
(b)CIV-2014-406-5 – a proceeding brought by the plaintiff seeking an order to prevent the lapse of a caveat she had registered against the title to the defendant’s property to preserve her rights pending the disposition of the specific performance proceeding.
(c) CIV-2014-406-19 – the plaintiff’s proceeding seeking specific performance of a deed, which was the substantive proceeding that ultimately proceeded to trial on 4 to 8 May 2015 and which was
determined in my Judgment dated 6 July 2015.
BARRY v CARLISLE [2015] NZHC 2980 [26 November 2015]
[2] The related nature of the proceedings is demonstrated in the following
succinct chronology:
August 2013
The plaintiff commenced a proceeding under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (the PRA) in the Blenheim Family Court (which later became CIV-2014-406-20).
August 2013 to
August 2014
The defendant filed 13 affidavits in opposition to the CIV-2014-406-20 proceeding deposing to the absence of any qualifying de facto relationship under s 4C of the PRA.
3 February 2014
The plaintiff lodged a caveat against the defendant’s property based on her claim to an interest under the deed (the subject of the CIV-2014-406-19 proceeding).
4 March 2014
The plaintiff filed the CIV-2014-406-5 proceeding seeking an order that the caveat not lapse.
13 March 2014
The High Court made an order that the caveat not lapse on the basis that the plaintiff would file proceedings in relation to the deed no later than 11
April 2014. Costs in the caveat proceeding were reserved.
8 April 2014
The plaintiff filed the proceeding CIV-2014-406-19.
23 April 2014
The PRA proceeding was transferred to the
Blenheim High Court.
4 November 2014
A notice of discontinuance of the CIV-2014-406-20 proceeding was filed.
15 December 2014
Costs judgment of Associate Judge Matthews.
4-8 May 2015
Trial in Blenheim High Court of CIV-2014-406-19 proceeding.
6 July 2015
Judgment in CIV-2014-406-19 proceeding.
[3] The plaintiff initially applied for legal aid in September 2014 and was eventually granted legal aid on 20 March 2015. Consequently the defendant requests the Court to:
(a) Fix costs against the plaintiff personally in respect of the period prior to the date of her application for legal aid.
(b)Find extraordinary circumstances and fix costs against the plaintiff for the period in respect of which she was legally aided or such part thereof as the Court may consider just.
(c) In the event that the Court declines to grant (b) above, to fix the costs that would have been awarded against the plaintiff if she had not been legally aided so that…
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- AGLC
- Barry v Carlisle [2015] NZHC 2980
- Case
- [2015] NZHC 2980
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues centered around the principles governing the award of costs, especially in relation to legal aid recipients under the Legal Services Act 2011. Specifically, the court had to decide whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying an order for costs against Barry during the period she was legally aided, and if not, what the costs would have been if she had not been legally aided.
The court concluded that exceptional circumstances were not present to warrant an order for costs against Barry during her period of legal aid. Although the specific performance claim was ultimately unsuccessful, the court found that Barry's conduct did not rise to the level of exceptional circumstances as required by the Legal Services Act 2011. The court did, however, order that Barry would have been liable for costs in the specific performance proceeding if not for her legal aid status. The costs were quantified at $6,690.00 for the period before Barry's application for legal aid and an additional $53,245.00 for the period during which she was legally aided.
The final orders were that Carlisle was entitled to costs of $9,222.50 in the discontinued PRA proceeding, no costs were awarded in the caveat proceeding, $6,690.00 in the specific performance proceeding, and an order that Carlisle would have been entitled to an additional $53,245.00 in the specific performance proceeding if Barry had not been legally aided.
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