Balfour v R
[2013] NZSC 149
•18 December 2013
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC 110/2013 [2013] NZSC 149 |
| BETWEEN | DAVID NEIL BALFOUR |
| AND | THE QUEEN |
| SC 111/2013 | |
| BETWEEN | DARYL KIRSTY REID BALFOUR |
| AND | THE QUEEN |
| Court: | Elias CJ, Glazebrook and Arnold JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant D N Balfour in person |
Judgment: | 18 December 2013 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The applications for leave to appeal are dismissed.
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REASONS
The applicants, Mr and Mrs Balfour, were convicted of three representative animal neglect charges under the Animal Welfare Act 1999.[1] Their appeal to the Court of Appeal having been unsuccessful,[2] they seek leave to appeal to this Court. Broadly, the grounds on which they seek leave are:
(a)The trial Judge was wrong not to exclude all of the illegally obtained evidence. Although he excluded some of that evidence, he ruled that other parts were admissible on the basis of an evaluation under s 30 of the Evidence Act 2006.[3] The applicants raise a number of points under this head.
(b)The use of representative charges was unjustified and prejudicial to the applicants. The Court of Appeal’s analysis of this point was, they contend, in error.
(c)The evidence of two expert witnesses should not have been admitted, in one case because the witness was said not to be impartial and in the other because the expert’s notes were not disclosed to the defence.
[1]R v Balfour DC Palmerston North CRI-2007-010-136, 22 December 2011.
[2]Balfour v R [2013] NZCA 429.
[3]R v Balfour (2009) 9 HRNZ 211 (DC) at [244].
We are not satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice that we hear and determine these appeals. The applicants argue that the Court of Appeal’s discussion of the relevance of alternative investigative techniques (s 30(3)(e) of the Evidence Act) raises a question of general or public importance. We do not agree. All that this case involves is the application of well-established principles to a particular fact situation. Nor do we accept that there is a risk of a substantial miscarriage of justice. The Court of Appeal addressed the matters raised by the applicants in detail. We are not persuaded that any material error in the Court’s analysis has been identified. Finally, the failure of the applicants’ business does not make this a matter of general commercial importance.
The applications for leave to appeal are accordingly dismissed.
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent
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