B v Department of Internal Affairs

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ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS,

OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF APPELLANT PURSUANT TO S 200 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011 REMAINS IN FORCE.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CRI-2023-404-454

[2023] NZHC 3558

BETWEEN

B

Appellant

AND

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Respondent

Hearing: 28 November 2023

Appearances:

T D Clee for Appellant

J L Gibson for Respondent

Judgment:

7 December 2023


JUDGMENT OF O’GORMAN J


This judgment was delivered by me on 7 December 2023 at 3 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

T D Clee, Barrister, Auckland Meredith Connell, Auckland

B v DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS [2023] NZHC 3558 [7 December 2023]

[1]    On 1 September 2023, B was sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment in relation to three representative charges of exporting, distributing, and possessing  objectionable  publications.1  The  prosecution  was  brought  by  the  New Zealand Customs Service.

[2]    The basis of the appeal is an allegation that the sentence is manifestly excessive. The appellant contends that a period of imprisonment of less than two years is appropriate. If accepted, the appellant seeks home detention, and asks that registration not be imposed to the extent  it  is  discretionary  under  s 9  of  the  Child Protection (Child Sex Offender Government Agency Registration) Act 2016 (the Registration Act).2

[3]    In support of the appeal, counsel for B sought leave to adduce updates about B’s continued treatment from Safe Network (SAFE) and from his registered clinical psychologist, Ms Gow.3 The respondent had no objection to this further updating material being received and leave was accordingly granted.

[4]    The submissions on appeal are that the end sentence is manifestly excessive because:

(a)the starting point was too high; and

(b)the discounts were insufficient.

Legal principles

[5]    The Court must allow an appeal against sentence if it is satisfied that there has been an error in the imposition of the sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed.4 Generally, the sentence must be shown to be manifestly excessive or wrong


1      New Zealand Customs Service v [B] [2023] NZDC 19070.

2      On the grounds the Court cannot be satisfied in terms of s 9(2) that the person poses a risk to the lives or sexual safety of one or more children, or children generally.

3      This application was made under s 335(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, with the principles set out in Lundy v R [2013] UKPC 28, [2014] 2 NZLR 273 at [120]; and R v Bain [2004] 1 NZLR 638 at [22].

4      Criminal Procedure Act, s 250.

in principle.5 The focus is on the end sentence imposed, rather than the process by which it is reached.6

[6]    The claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive (or inadequate) is inevitably premised on the contention of prior error, which may include questions of whether the starting point was too high given the facts, or of incorrect discounts.7

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Details
Case
[2023] NZHC 3558
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involves an appeal by B against his sentence imposed by the District Court. B was sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment in relation to charges of exporting, distributing, and possessing objectionable publications. The appellant appeals on the grounds that the sentence is manifestly excessive. The legal issue for the Court was whether the District Court had erred in imposing the sentence and, if so, whether a different sentence should be imposed. The Court found that the sentence was manifestly excessive and substituted a sentence of home detention for a period of nine months. The Court also found that the appellant did not pose a risk to the lives or sexual safety of one or more children, or of children more generally and therefore no registration order pursuant to s 9 of the Child Protection (Child Sex Offender Government Agency Registration) Act 2016 could be made.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence of two years and six months’ imprisonment imposed in the District Court was quashed. The Court imposed a sentence of home detention for a maximum period of nine months, subject to the standard conditions referred to in s 80C(2) of the Sentencing Act, and special conditions imposed under s 80D. The sentence was to be served at the address specified in the PAC report dated 30 August 2023. The special conditions of home detention included the appellant undertaking and completing the SAFE programme and appropriate assessment, treatment/counselling as directed by a probation officer. The special conditions also included restrictions on the appellant’s use of the internet and contact with persons under 16 years of age.