Avison v McFarlane

Case [2015] NZCA 471


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA498/2014
[2015] NZCA 471

BETWEEN

NGAIRE JANE ELIZABETH AVISON
Appellant

AND

WAYNE JAMES MCFARLANE, NGAIRE JANE ELIZABETH AVISON AND DAVID WILLIAM BUTLER AS TRUSTEES OF THE AVIAN TRUST
First Respondents

WAYNE JAMES MCFARLANE
Second Respondent

Court:

Cooper, Venning and Williams JJ

Counsel:

J C Gwilliam for Appellant
R J Fowler QC for Respondents

Judgment:

(On the papers)

5 October 2015 at 10 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for recall is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Williams J)

  1. Mr Fowler QC filed a memorandum on 14 September 2015, the tenor of which was to seek recall of the costs aspect of our judgment of 16 June 2015.[1]  Such recall requires a “very special reason”.[2]

    [2]Horowhenua County v Nash (No. 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (SC) at 633.

  2. Mr Fowler submits that his client made a Calderbank offer to settle the appeal on terms, he submitted, “virtually identical” to the outcome in the appeal.  Mr Fowler appended the 30 March 2015 correspondence to his memorandum.  He submitted that the offer should have been taken into account in the costs award.

  3. Mr Gwilliam filed a memorandum in response submitting that:

    (a)the Calderbank offer was in fact only the first in a series of offers and counter-offers and was, in any event, ultimately withdrawn;

    (b)the exchange of correspondence related to the potential settlement of a number of outstanding issues only some of which were before this Court in the appeal;

    (c)the result was not virtually identical to the respondent’s Calderbank offer because other assets and issues were the subject of the offer (and subsequent counter-offer) and those matters were not before this Court; and

    (d)in any event, the proposed settlement was unsatisfactory from a practical point of view as it would have involved Ms Avison owning a property she did not want situated next door to Mr McFarlane and his new wife.

  4. We do not consider that there is any “very special reason” to recall the judgment and revisit the costs award in this appeal.  We agree with Mr Gwilliam that the Calderbank offer put before us was directed at resolving all issues, not just those live in the appeal.  In particular, it proposed a resolution that was not open to this Court to direct in the appeal.  In addition, the offer identified was not the last offer made by Mr Fowler’s client.  Its relevance is therefore peripheral at best.  The last offer made by Mr Fowler’s client, dated 20 May 2015, also had all of the problematic attributes to which we have referred in relation to the first offer.

  5. We conclude therefore that it cannot be said that the offer of 30 March 2015 would have made any material difference to costs in the appeal.  The application for recall is dismissed accordingly.

Solicitors:
Main Street Legal Ltd, Upper Hutt for Appellant
JAG Legal, Lower Hutt for Respondents


Details
AGLC
Avison v McFarlane [2015] NZCA 471
Case
[2015] NZCA 471
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, the case of Avison v McFarlane involved a dispute between Ngaire Jane Elizabeth Avison and Wayne James McFarlane, along with Ngaire Jane Elizabeth Avison and David William Butler as trustees of the Avian Trust. The case revolved around a costs appeal and a request for recall of the earlier judgment regarding the allocation of costs. The appeal was heard by Cooper, Venning, and Williams JJ.

The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether there was a "very special reason" to recall the earlier costs judgment in light of a settlement offer made by one of the parties. The respondents argued that a Calderbank offer, which is an offer to settle on terms including costs, had been made and should have been considered in the costs award. The respondents contended that the offer was virtually identical to the outcome of the appeal, and thus, should have been taken into account.

The court examined the nature of the Calderbank offer and its relevance to the appeal. The respondents' counsel submitted that the offer should have been considered because it was essentially the same as the outcome of the appeal. However, the appellant's counsel argued that the offer was not relevant because it pertained to a broader set of issues not all of which were before the court, and it was ultimately withdrawn. Furthermore, the appellant's counsel highlighted that the offer was impractical as it would have resulted in the appellant owning a property she did not desire, situated next to the respondent and his new wife. The court concluded that there was no "very special reason" to recall the judgment and adjust the costs award, agreeing with the appellant's counsel that the Calderbank offer was not relevant to the appeal. The court dismissed the application for recall.

The final orders of the court were that the application for recall was dismissed, and the earlier costs judgment remained unchanged.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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