Auckland Standards Committee 1 v Fendall

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV 2012-404-001059 [2012] NZHC 1825

UNDER the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 and the Law Practitioners Act 1982

BETWEEN  AUCKLAND STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1

Appellant

ANDROBYN PHILIPPA JOY FENDALL Respondent

Hearing:         17 July 2012

Counsel:         G M Illingworth QC for the Appellant

D Jones QC for the Respondent

Judgment:      2 August 2012

[RESERVED] JUDGMENT OF WYLIE J

This judgment was delivered by Justice Wylie

On 2 August 2012 at 3.00 pm

Pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date:

Distribution:

GM Illingworth QC: gmi@xtra.co.nz

M A Treleaven: mark.treleaven@lawsociety.org.nz

D Jones QC: david@davidphjones.co.nz

M Dew: maria@mariadew.co.nz

AUCKLAND STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1 V FENDALL HC AK CIV 2012-404-001059 [2 August 2012]

Introduction

[1]      The Auckland Standards Committee 1 (“the Committee”), appeals against a decision of the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 14 February 2012.  The respondent had pleaded guilty to a charge of misconduct in her professional capacity, and in its decision, the Tribunal censured the respondent, and ordered her to pay the costs of the appellant and to make a contribution towards its costs.

[2]      The Committee in its notice of appeal asserted that the penalty imposed on the respondent was manifestly inadequate given the seriousness of her misconduct and further, that the order for costs was manifestly appropriate in all the circumstances.   The appeal is opposed by the respondent.   It was asserted on her behalf that there is no compelling reason to find that the censure imposed was manifestly inadequate, or that the Tribunal improperly exercised its discretion in limiting the respondent’s contribution to its costs.

Background

[3]      The respondent is in her early fifties.   She has practised law since 1983, initially as a solicitor, and since 1996, as a barrister.  She practised principally in the criminal area, as a youth advocate, in the mental health area as a mental health advocate, and as counsel for the child in Family Court matters.  Most, if not all, of her work was undertaken at the behest and cost of either the Legal Services Agency or the Ministry of Justice.

[4]      On 28 August 2009, the Legal Services Agency wrote to the New Zealand Law Society, Auckland Branch, advising that the respondent’s listing approvals to provide services under the legal aid and duty solicitor schemes had been cancelled as from September 2009.  The cancellation came to the attention of the media and it was reported by the New Zealand Herald, under a somewhat sensational heading, on

26 September 2009.

[5] The matter was referred to the Committee, and the Committee considered it at a meeting on 30 October 2009. The Committee resolved to commence an own motion investigation pursuant to s 130(c) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act

2006.

[6]      Inter alia, the Committee obtained a copy of the decision made by the Suspension Consideration Panel of the Legal Services Agency cancelling the respondent’s listing approvals.  That decision was dated 24 August 2009.  It referred to…

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Details
Case
[2012] NZHC 1825
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was brought by the Auckland Standards Committee 1 against a decision of the New Zealand Lawyers and Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal. The respondent had pleaded guilty to a charge of misconduct in her professional capacity, and in its decision, the Tribunal censured the respondent, and ordered her to pay the costs of the appellant and to make a contribution towards its costs. The Committee asserted that the penalty imposed on the respondent was manifestly inadequate given the seriousness of her misconduct and further, that the order for costs was manifestly appropriate in all the circumstances. The appeal was opposed by the respondent. She asserted that there was no compelling reason to find that the censure imposed was manifestly inadequate, or that the Tribunal improperly exercised its discretion in limiting the respondent’s contribution to its costs. The appeal was dismissed. The Tribunal’s decision as to the appropriate penalty in the present case was a decision taken in the exercise of a discretion. The appeal can only succeed if the Tribunal erred in law or principle, or if it took into account an irrelevant consideration, or failed to take into account a relevant consideration, or if its decision is plainly wrong. The Tribunal stated that to remove Ms Fendall from practice by suspending her would be an unnecessary and excessive regulatory response. The public interest did not require that Ms Fendall be removed from practice. The Tribunal was not plainly wrong in the decision it made in that regard.

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