IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2013-404-4227 [2014] NZHC 906
BETWEEN AUCKLAND COUNCIL
Judgment Creditor / Respondent
AND
PETER WILLIAM MAWHINNEY Judgment Debtor / Applicant
Hearing: 16 April 2014 Appearances:
Mr P W Mawhinney in person
Mr M C Frogley for Auckland CouncilJudgment:
7 May 2014
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE J P DOOGUE
This judgment was delivered by me on
07.05.14 at 4 p.m, pursuant to
Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
AUCKLAND COUNCIL v MAWHINNEY [2014] NZHC 906 [7 May 2014]
[1] I gave judgment in this proceeding on 27 February 2014. The proceeding in question was an originating application to set aside a bankruptcy notice which the judgment creditor, the Auckland Council had served on Mr Mawhinney. Of relevance to today’s hearing is the ground set out at paragraph 2(d) of the application which stated:
(d) The judgment creditor has set-offs, counter-claims and cross- demands that exceed the amount of the relevant judgment which he was unable to use as a defence in the action in which the relevant judgment was given that are based on the unlawful omission of the judgment creditor processing resource consent applications and requests for certificates of compliance in the time periods and by the procedures set down in the Resource Management Act 1991.
[2] The debt which was the subject matter of the bankruptcy notice arose from a costs order of $427,189 which Mr Mawhinney was ordered to pay by decision of the Environment Court dated 14 June 2012.
[3] In the judgment which I gave I determined the issue about counter-claims, setoffs and cross-demands adversely to Mr Mawhinney.
[4] The essential features of the claim which Mr Mawhinney brought were that the Council, through not processing a subdivision application, had caused him and what we will describe as the “Mawhinney interests” loss. In the course of my judgment I referred to an earlier decision of the High Court1 where the Judge concluded that the Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”) which was the statutory backdrop to Mr Mawhinney’s claims left intact alternative remedies in the
form of statutory rights of appeal and judicial review and that these were the only available remedies for persons who considered that a territorial authority had failed to exercise its powers and duties.2 In turn, the Judge in that case referred with
approval to what Fogarty J said in the early round of litigation between the parties in
Mawhinney v Waitakere City Council.3
The Judge said there was no policy vacuum
within which there was a need to identify a common law liability for damages in that
case against the territorial authority which Mr Mawhinney had sued.4 The Judge pointed out that if the territorial authority does not exercise their statutory duty, which was essentially the thrust of Mr Mawhinney’s claim, then judicial review could be sought.5
[5] In my judgment I noted that Mr Mawhinney had now advanced an alternative basis upon which he might obtain…
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- Case
- [2014] NZHC 906
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined Mr Mawhinney's claims that the Council's failure to process a subdivision application caused him and the "Mawhinney interests" losses. The court referred to previous decisions that highlighted the statutory remedies available under the Resource Management Act 1991, which left no policy vacuum for a common law liability for damages against the territorial authority. The court concluded that if the territorial authority did not exercise their statutory duty, judicial review could be sought. Mr Mawhinney also argued that Rule 30.3 of the High Court Rules allowed for damages to be claimed as part of a judicial review proceeding. However, the court rejected this argument.
Mr Mawhinney subsequently filed an application for recall of the judgment, arguing that the court had overlooked section 314 of the RMA, which he believed provided a basis for a damages claim. The court considered whether the application for recall should be granted based on the second category in Horowhenua County v Nash, where counsel fails to direct the court's attention to a legislative provision or authoritative decision of plain relevance. The court found that section 314 was not relevant to the matter at hand, as it concerned actions that have or are likely to have an adverse effect on the environment and did not provide for the payment of damages for breach of economic interests due to negligent administrative action by a council. Therefore, the application for recall was dismissed.
The court ordered that the parties should confer on the question of costs and, if unable to agree, file memoranda not exceeding five pages on each side within 10 working days of the date of the judgment.
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