Auckland Council v Body Corporate 366567
[2025] NZCA 78
•27 March 2025 at 11.00 am
| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA109/2024 |
| BETWEEN | AUCKLAND COUNCIL |
| AND | BODY CORPORATE 366567 |
| Hearing: | 13 March 2025 |
Court: | Katz, Thomas and Ellis JJ |
Counsel: | C M Meechan KC, S C Price, M J Ferrier and C M Fairnie for Appellant |
Judgment: | 27 March 2025 at 11.00 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe application for leave to amend the respondent’s notice of cross-appeal is granted except in relation to proposed para 2.2.
BCosts will lie where they fall.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Ellis J)
Auckland Council (the Council), Body Corporate 366567 and the owners of the apartments in a 40-level apartment building on Gore Street, Auckland Central (collectively, for convenience, the Body Corporate) have appealed and cross-appealed a decision of Walker J in the High Court.[1] The Judge found the Council tortiously liable for losses resulting from certain defects in the Gore Street building but dismissed a number of other similar claims. In broad terms, liability was established where the claims were not found to be statute barred and where the defects were proved, on the balance of probabilities, to be in breach of the building code.[2]
[1]Body Corporate 366567 v Auckland Council [2024] NZHC 32 [judgment under appeal].
[2]Building Regulations 1992, sch 1 [building code].
The appeal and cross-appeal are scheduled to be heard over ten days in August this year.
The Body Corporate has applied for leave to amend its grounds of cross‑appeal.[3] Although the Council has consented to most of the proposed amendments, it continues to oppose two of them. The question this judgment is concerned with is whether leave to make the two amendments should be granted.
Relevant law
[3]Because the appeals have already been set down for hearing and the application is opposed (in part), leave is required under r 34 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005.
There is no dispute as to the legal principles relevant to such an application.[4] The touchstone is whether there is material prejudice or unfairness to the opposing party. And as this Court said in McCollum v Thompson, the relevant unfairness stems from the fact that:[5]
… if the party opposing the raising of the new point would, on an objective assessment, have fairly wished to run the case differently in the trial court had the point been raised, the appeal court cannot provide that opportunity without ordering a new trial. To put a party to the delay and expense of a new trial because something that could have been raised in the trial court was not raised would be unjust. Indeed, it would run against the principle that litigation should be final, and it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
First proposed amendment: “judicial methodology”
[4]The parties have referred, in particular to McCollum v Thompson [2017] NZCA 269, [2017] NZAR 1106; Foodstuffs (Auckland) Ltd v Commerce Commission [2002] UKPC 25, [2004] 1 NZLR 145; and Motor Vehicle Dealers Institute Inc v UDC Finance (1991) Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 659 (CA).
[5]McCollum v Thompson, above n 4, at [54].
The first contested amendment is grouped in the notice of cross appeal with two others under the heading “judicial methodology”, as follows:[6]
2.2 The Court erred in requiring the Respondents to prove on the balance of probabilities that the building would not comply with the functional requirements and performance criteria of the building code in future events. A lesser degree of likelihood was sufficient. The balance of probabilities standard does not apply to the evaluation of risk in respect of future events.
2.3 The Court erred by adjudicating between expert opinions rather than undertaking its own analysis of evidence, and in respect of building code issues failing to analyse the meaning of the relevant code provisions, drawing inferences as appropriate and assessing whether there was reasonable assurance of compliance with the code.
2.4 The Court relied excessively on the burden of proof rather than analysing all relevant evidence and/or drawing inferences where appropriate to resolve factual disputes, and in doing so it engaged in erroneous judicial methodology.
[6]A further proposed amendment, numbered 2.1, is no longer pursued by the Body Corporate.
The Council now objects only to the inclusion of para 2.2, so this is the focus of the discussion that follows.
At the hearing of the leave application, we had lengthy discussions with Mr Illingworth KC about the nature of the argument intended to be encapsulated by para 2.2. The mere fact that we had difficulty understanding the point supports the Council’s contention that the amendment is prejudicial and should not be permitted; it is difficult to see how the prospect of an already very lengthy and complex appeal being diverted by an obscure and poorly articulated argument would be in interests of justice. But we nonetheless attempt to address the proposed argument as best we can.
The starting point is the relevant parts of the amended statement of claim, in which the claim against the Council was pleaded as follows:
62. Auckland City Council was the territorial authority responsible for performing duties and exercising powers under the Building Act in relation to the Gore Street Apartments.
63. Auckland City Council owed the plaintiffs a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in performing the following functions under the Building Act:
(a) issuing the Building Consents;
(b) inspecting the building work;
(c) issuing the Code Compliance Certificates.
64. In breach of its duties, the Auckland City Council:
(a) issued the Building Consents when there were not reasonable grounds for it to be satisfied that the proposed building work would comply with the Building Code;
(b) failed to ensure that a sufficient inspection regime was undertaken and/or did not undertake inspections with sufficient thoroughness so as to ensure that the building work complied with the requirements of the Building Consents and/or the Building Code;
(c) failed to identify the Defects in the course of its inspections and/or failed to take steps to ensure the Defects were identified;
(d) failed to take steps to ensure that the Defects were rectified;
(e) issued the Code Compliance Certificates when it did not have reasonable grounds to be satisfied that the building work complied with the Building Consents and/or the Building Code.
65. As a result of the Auckland City Council’s breaches:
(a) The Gore Street Apartments was built with the Defects;
(b) The Gore Street Apartments require the Remedial Work
(c) The plaintiffs have / will suffer the Economic Loss.
66.As a further consequence of the Auckland City Council’s negligence, the second plaintiffs have / will suffer distress, inconvenience, anxiety and loss of enjoyment.
The alleged defects were set out in a schedule to the statement of claim which described each defect and the clauses of the code allegedly breached.
Although not explicit in this pleading, it is evident that the case in the High Court proceeded on the basis that, in order to prove loss caused by the Council’s alleged breaches of duty, the Body Corporate was required to prove on the balance of probabilities that the defects were, in fact, breaches of the building code.
The issue with which we are presently concerned arises because compliance with some of the requirements or performance standards imposed by the building code can only be measured on the occurrence of a contingent future event, such as fire. By way of example, this can be seen from cl C4 of the building code at the relevant time, which was entitled “Structural Stability During Fire Clause”. Clause C4.1 states that its objective is to safeguard people from injury due to loss of structural stability during fire, and to protect household units and other property from damage due to structural instability caused by fire. The relevant standards are then articulated as follows:[7]
[7]Building code, above n 2.
FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
C4.2 Buildings shall be constructed to maintain structural stability during fire to:
(a) Allow people adequate time to evacuate safely,
(b) Allow fire service personnel adequate time to undertake rescue and firefighting operations, and
(c) Avoid collapse and consequential damage to adjacent household units or other property.
PERFORMANCE
C4.3.1 Structural elements of buildings shall have fire resistance appropriate to the function of the elements, the fire load, the fire intensity, the fire hazard, the height of the buildings and the fire control facilities external to and within them.
C4.3.2 Structural elements shall have a fire resistance of no less than that of any element to which they provide support within the same firecell.
C4.3.3 Collapse of elements having lesser fire resistance shall not cause the consequential collapse of elements required to have a higher fire resistance.
So the question confronted by the Body Corporate at trial was how — in the absence of an actual fire — could it establish that the relevant defects in the building breached these requirements, causing the plaintiffs loss.
It seems the way the case proceeded at trial was that breach of the future performance requirements of the building code had to be proved, just like other breaches, on the balance of probabilities. As we understand it, this involved calling expert evidence which involved hypothetical modelling of both the possible fire events themselves and of likely building performance in such events.
The point now sought to be raised by the Body Corporate on appeal is that where a pleaded defect is said to affect the future performance of the building, this approach is inapt; it should not have to prove on the balance of probabilities that the building will not meet the standards required by the building code. The Body Corporate says it raised the issue of an alternative approach in the High Court but this submission was wrongly rejected by the Judge.
The relevant part of the judgment under appeal addressed the issue as follows:[8]
[279] The plaintiffs’ written submissions draw an analogy between the manifestation of a latent defect and the identification of a design or construction issue meaning there is no reasonable assurance that it will perform in accordance with the Building Code in a future event such as fire or earthquake. Here they say the system of assurance which underpins the compliance certificate regime has broken down. As Tipping J stated in Spencer on Byron:
[45] In cases where negligent inspection has given rise to the potential for physical damage but no such damage has yet occurred, it cannot be the law that you have to wait for physical damage to occur before you are regarded as having suffered loss or harm. It is not determinative whether the loss suffered at the outset is characterised as financial or physical. It is measured by the cost of bringing the building up to the standard required by the code and thereby removing the potential for physical damage and the associated health and safety concerns. A duty of care should be recognised in respect of pre‑emptive expenditure as well as expenditure necessary to reinstate or repair physical damage which has actually occurred.
[280] I accept this submission. In his oral closing submissions, Mr Lewis then submitted in response to questions that the plaintiffs were content to prove loss by establishing non-compliance with the Building Code on the balance of probabilities. However, after a short reflection, he advanced a different proposition. He suggested that another way to look at the future performance issue is to rely on the same statutory standard that a council is required to address at the code compliance stage. Since that standard does not import any warranty of code compliance, the plaintiffs should not have to establish the converse — that there is no code compliance. Instead, the plaintiffs must show there were not reasonable grounds to be satisfied that the construction will comply with the performance requirements of the Building Code.
[8]Judgment under appeal, above n 1, quoting Body Corporate No 207624 v North Shore City Council [2012] NZSC 83, [2013] 2 NZLR 297 [Spencer on Byron] (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
The Judge, however, rejected this “different proposition”:
[281] The Council did not have advance notice of this alternative approach and this articulation potentially elides breach at the [code compliance] stage with the notion of loss. The submission was not fully developed. As I did not have the benefit of full argument on it by all parties I intend to adopt the approach in the plaintiffs’ written closing submissions. That is, whether the lack of compliance with the consented plans and specifications also translates into lack of compliance with the Building Code.
As already noted, the Body Corporate wants to argue on appeal that it should not have been required to prove on the balance of probabilities that the relevant defects in the building meant it would not comply with the functional requirements of the building code in future, and that something less is required. But quite what that “something less” was, however, proved difficult to define.
In his written submissions, Mr Illingworth appeared to be saying that the Body Corporate should “only” need to prove that the existence of a particular defect meant there could be no “reasonable assurance” that the building code would be met. That seems similar to the italicised (reasonable grounds to be satisfied) submission recorded in [280] of the judgment under appeal, above. Mr Illingworth said this “reasonable assurance” threshold was derived from Body Corporate No 207624 v North Shore City Council (Spencer on Byron), where the Chief Justice said:[9]
[14] It is impossible to conclude on what is known at present that failure to meet the code standards in relation to water exclusion does not impact directly on the safety and sanitariness of the building. They are the conditions of the building affecting the health and hygiene of occupants which the owner is obliged to remedy if not compliant with the code. The scheme of the Act is to provide the owner with assurance of compliance. If, through want of care on the part of the Council, that system of assurance fails, then the owner is entitled to look to the Council for his loss.
…
[16] The code, with which the Council certified compliance, is a minimum standard, as the legislation makes clear. Building work which is not code‑compliant is contrary to the Act. The Act sets up an interlocking system of assurance under which all undertaking building work or certifying compliance with the code are obliged to observe the standards set in it. The principal mechanism of the Act for checking for code compliance is the building consent and certification undertaken here by the Council (but which, at the option of owners could be undertaken by private approved contractors engaged by the owner). …
[9]Spencer on Byron, above n 8 (footnotes omitted).
These dicta from Spencer on Byron are uncontroversial. The idea of “assurance” here relates to the way in which the relevant regulatory system works — namely, by specifying processes that, if followed, provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the building code. And we understand the proposition that, if this system of assurance breaks down, then some form of liability might be established. For example if it could be shown on the balance of probabilities that the Council did not have reasonable grounds to be satisfied that the building consent had been complied with then there will immediately be a question mark over the “assurance” that the building code has been complied with. But that does not suffice to prove loss in the form of the cost of remediating building defects; as recognised in the High Court a further step (in the form of proving that the defects in fact constituted breaches of the code) is required. Nor could such an approach be said to require any change to the standard of proof, as appears to be contemplated by the proposed para 2.2 in the amended notice of cross-appeal. We do not, therefore, consider it further.
In the course of the hearing before us, however, a rather different point emerged. Mr Illingworth referred us to a number of cases that had not been referred to in the Body Corporate’s written submissions.[10] Unlike the concept of reasonable assurance just discussed, those cases are concerned with the standard of proof where the assessment of loss or damage relates to future events — or what is often called damages for loss of chance.[11]
[10]The cases to which Mr Illingworth KC referred us were: RJ Davidson Family Trust v Marlborough District Council [2017] NZHC 52, [2017] NZRMA 227 at [104]–[125]; Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 at 640 and 643; Fernandez v Government of Singapore [1971] 1 WLR 987 (HL) at 993–994; Takaro Properties Ltd v Rowling [1986] 1 NZLR 22 (CA) at 63–64; and Vero Insurance New Zealand Ltd v Morrison [2015] NZCA 246 at [34]–[38].
[11]Regrettably, these cases were not provided to us at the time nor referred to in the Body Corporate’s written submissions. Ms Meechan KC had no advance notice of them, nor any opportunity to respond — a point we return to at [24].
Although an ordinary negligence case will involve determining whether, on the balance of probabilities, the asserted loss has in fact been caused, where the loss is said to lie in the risk of a future event occurring, the assessment is done in terms of the degree of probability of that future event or loss occurring. Adjustments are made upwards or downwards to any award of damages, based on the assessed probability. And as Dean, Gaudron and McHugh JJ explained in Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd:[12]
[Q]uestions as to the future or hypothetical effect of physical injury or degeneration are not commonly susceptible [to] scientific demonstration or proof. If the law is to take account of future or hypothetical events in assessing damages, it can only do so in terms of the degree of probability of those events occurring. The probability may be very high — 99.9 per cent — or very low — 0.1 per cent. But unless the chance is so low as to be regarded as speculative — say less than 1 per cent – or so high as to be practically certain — say over 99 per cent — the court will take that chance into account in assessing the damages.
[12]Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd, above n 10, at 643.
To the extent the Body Corporate is suggesting that this approach should be adopted in the present case, the future risk that would need to be assessed is (presumably) the risk of a particular identified defect in the Gore Street building not maintaining sufficient structural stability during a hypothetical fire to:[13]
(a)allow people adequate time to evacuate safely,
(b)allow fire service personnel adequate time to undertake rescue and firefighting operations; and
(c)avoid collapse and consequential damage to adjacent household units or other property.
[13]Building code, above n 2, cl C4.2. Presumably, the assessment of the experts would be required to be couched in probabilistic reasoning in a range of scenarios.
We acknowledge that such a risk assessment might be done on a “chance” basis — namely by asking: “In the event of a fire, what is the chance of the identified defect resulting in one or more of those three requirements not being met?” We also acknowledge that this is a different inquiry from asking: “In the event of a fire would the identified defect result, on the balance of probabilities, in one or more of those three requirements not being met?” The latter question is binary, in the sense that the Body Corporate either succeeds in meeting the standard of proof or it does not. The former question is not.
The difficulty with this is that the approach taken in the cases referred to by Mr Illingworth appears to involve a considerable shift from that pleaded and the analysis advanced in the High Court in this case. As discussed, counsel’s closing submissions and the passages from the judgment seem to us to have been concerned with a wholly different point. The resulting prejudice to the Council were that to be argued on appeal seems clear. Moreover, at this relatively early stage it is not possible for us to assess whether the new ground (if permitted) would require new or different evidence. And because the relevant cases were not identified before the hearing of the leave application, we have not had the advantage of being able to test that with counsel. Ms Meechan was not, in fact, able to make submissions on the merits of the new argument at all because, as should by now be clear, it was not fully articulated before us.
As things stand, therefore, the Body Corporate has not persuaded us that there is not a material risk of unfairness and prejudice if leave on this point were to be granted. Leave to include para 2.2 in the notice of cross-appeal is declined, accordingly.
Second proposed amendment: acoustic evidence
It was common ground that construction noise associated with the remedial works necessitated vacation of some of the Gore Street apartments while that work was being done, and that consequential loss (in the form of alternative accommodation costs and the like) might flow from that. At trial, however, there was no agreement about which apartments would be affected by noise to an extent that their vacation could be said to be justified. That issue turned on expert evidence about likely noise levels in different parts of the building during the remediation.
Two acoustic engineers were called to give this evidence: Mr Finley for the Body Corporate and Mr Day for the Council. The two experts used different standards to assess appropriate noise limits.[14] Mr Finley primarily relied on AS/NZS 2107:2016 Acoustics — Recommended design sound levels and reverberation times for building interiors (NZS 2107). Mr Day relied on NZS 6803/1999 Acoustics — Construction Noise (NZS 6803). The two standards (neither of which were directly applicable) yielded different results, in terms of unacceptable decibel levels.
[14]Judgment under appeal, above n 1, at [1561].
In closing submissions, counsel for the Body Corporate submitted that the Judge had, in essence, a binary choice between the two standards, advocating for Mr Finley and NZS 2107. The Judge preferred the evidence of Mr Day, and his reliance on NZS 6803.[15]
[15]At [1579].
As originally drafted, the relevant part of the Body Corporate’s notice of
cross-appeal read:2.22 The Court erred in finding that NZS 6809/1999 is a more relevant acoustic standard to determine noise levels than AS/NZS 2107/2016 for the purposes [of] determining losses resulting from the need to vacate Gore St during repairs:
(a)The Court failed to recognise that, as AS/NZS 2017/2016 measures noise levels experienced by occupants within the building where the work is undertaken, and NZS 6809/1999 (and the Auckland Unitary Plan) only measure noise experienced by persons outside the building, AS/NZS 2017/2016 is more relevant to the sensitivity of hotel guests and residential occupiers within the building and therefore the issue of how many floors will need to be vacated during repairs.
(b)The Court accepted evidence from the Auckland Council’s expert, Mr Day, that AS/NZS 2107/2016 is not designed to deal with construction noise but steady-state or quasi-steady-state sounds, based on a limitation in the standard which Mr Day acknowledged does not apply, so the Court’s finding is not supported by the evidence.
The Body Corporate now seeks leave to take a less binary approach. The proposed amended version of the “acoustic evidence” cross-appeal would read as follows:
2.30 The Court erred in finding that NZS 6803:1999 was an appropriate standard to determine noise levels for the purpose of assessing losses resulting from the need to vacate Gore St during repairs:
(a) The Court did not undertake the required legal analysis.
(i)The object of damages in tort is to put the victim in the position they would have been in if they had not suffered the wrong.
(ii)The Court’s finding that owners and occupants must tolerate construction noise before being able to claim compensation on a vacancy basis is inconsistent with that objective.
(b)The Court’s factual analysis was also flawed.
(i)It has incorrectly framed the issue as a choice between AS/NZS 2107:2016 or NZS 6803:1999 when determining the appropriate noise limit, when neither standard applies.
(ii)The Court failed to recognise that NZS 6803:1999 (and the Auckland Unitary Plan) only measures noise from outside the building, and not noise from construction activities within the building (which transmits differently within the building).
(iii)A bespoke analysis is required. Only the body corporate’s expert undertook such a bespoke analysis.
As already noted, this line of argument represents a departure from the position taken by the Body Corporate during its closing address at trial. But as proposed para 2.30(b)(iii) indicates, the Body Corporate’s “new” position is, in fact, grounded in the evidence of Mr Finley. Mr Finley did not, in fact, advocate for the wholesale application of NZS 2107 but, rather, took into account a number of other matters he saw as relevant, including the requirements of the Unitary Plan. The Council had Mr Finley’s brief of evidence well before trial and responded to it — both in terms of instructing an expert and in terms of cross-examination — as it saw fit. We are unable to see any material unfairness or other prejudice arising from the signalled change in position on appeal.
We grant leave to amend accordingly.
Result
The application for leave to amend the respondent’s notice of cross-appeal is granted except in relation to proposed para 2.2.
As both sides have had a measure of success, costs will lie where they fall.
Solicitors:
MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Auckland for Appellant
Grimshaw & Co, Auckland for Respondents
SCHEDULE 1
(as provided by the Appellant)
| Second Respondents |
| 6 B Fort St Apartment Limited A & T Globe Investment Limited AB Holdings Ltd (assignor), Charles Chu Liu (assignee) Ah Kow Lim and Bee Hong Lim Alain Marcel Louis Musy and Christine Marie Claude Musy (assignors), The Auckland Sailors Home (assignee) Alan James Williamson, Lynette Yvonne Williamson and Whakatane Trustee Services Limited Alastair Hugh Vesey Hamilton Alexey Trustees Limited (assignor), Andrew John Broczek and D.G. Trustee Co (2012) Ltd (assignees) Alexey Trustees Limited (assignor), Snan Adbul-Munem Mohammed Daoud Al‑Shakarchi (assignee) Altamira Group Limited Altamira Group Limited (assignor), Bingyin Zhang (assignee) Amit Patel and Anit Patel Anant Gopalan and Pravina Gopalan Andrew John Wilson Andrew Scott Trumper Anthony James Lovelidge and Kathryn Daveen Lovelidge (assignors), Xin Huang (assignee) Anton Pesegov, Aleksei Pesegov and Iuliia Pesegova Archibald McGeoch Robinson Broadfoot Hawkins Arvind Joshi and Arpana Joshi Aza Property Limited (assignor), Choi I Yee (assignee) Baofeng Guo, Yanwei Li and Haiyan Yang Barbara Lynn Sutherland Barnabas Weisi Soon (assignor), Xiaoyi Luo (assignee/assignor), Yam Li Shirley Tan (assignee) Bei Chen (assignor), Jingmeng Sun (assignee) Belinda Josephine Sophia Nathan Beng Gek Jerene Yap (assignor), Jian Ping Tao and Yanfen Jin (assignees) Beng Keng Neo (assignor), Abdulaziz Nasser A Alsultan (assignee) Bernard Henri Jean Grivot (assignor), The Auckland Sailors Home (assignee) Bertrand Roger Boyer and Sylvette Boyer Bhapuj Limited Blue Horizon Properties Ltd Boon Leong Alvin Clarence Koh and Bee Lin Mary Wee (assignors), Bingyin Zhang (assignee) Boon San Gan and Sok Hwee Lowe Bradley Ian Coulton and Gina Elizabeth Coulton (assignors), Xiaoyi Luo (assignee/assignor), Yam Li Shirley Tan (assignee) Bruce Duncan Haines and Linda Margaret Haines Bruce Gilbert Alder, Suzanne Elsie Alder and Chapmans Trustees Limited Bruno Paul Henry Royce Budiono Tjahjono C & C Gillson Properties Ltd Changhong An Chau Hee Lee and Hwee Khim Tan Chee Bang Liaw and Hui Ching Mah Chee Keong Yong (assignor), Xiaoying Lu (assignee) Chee Wee Loo and Chih Leng Gan (assignors), Michael Wu and Hsiu-Lin Wu Hsu (assignees) Chek Jin Adrian Tan and May Lene Esther Yeo (assignors), Yin Tang (assignee) Cheng Wui Phua Chengfeng Hui and Li Li Cher Siang Peter Ang and Wee Bin Lian Chi Ma (deceased), Tingting He and Xiaoling Ma (beneficiaries of the estate) Chin Tap Goh (assignor), Wei Cheng Ananda Goh (assignee) Chongqing Zhou Choon Lian Goh and Man Lin Liew Choon Sian Tan and Suat Peng Tan Chrest Properties Limited (assignor), Ling Kan (assignee) Christine Janick Jocelyne Nuns Christopher Lee Fowler and Annalisa Louisa Argia Fowler Christopher William Vernon Chuan Yau Hoo and Bee Choo Khoo Chun-Jen Tseng and An-Tzu Chien Chye Shin Jimmy Wong and Siew Chin Pam Constantino Banal Turla and Maria Victoria Turla Cuimei Luo Cuong Phi Lam and Yu Zhu Guo D and J Pooch Limited (formerly Shel-Em-Iah Resthome Limited) (assignor), David Leslie Pooch (1/2 share) and Judy Lagsa Pooch (1/2 share) (assignees) Dalila Bouibeb Daniel Loh Dassler Holdings Limited (assignor); JS Rental Holdings Limited (assignee) David Peter Clatworthy and Joanna Lee Clatworthy David Robert Point and Nathalie Christine Marie Point (1/2 share) and Helene Marie Therese Marthe Saint-Omer (1/2 share) David Sing Chi Yuen DDSC Properties Limited (assignor), Liang Xi Zhou (assignee) Deena Nasir (assignor), Abdul Monem Nasser (assignee) Delilah Properties Ltd Denis Yves Georges Schneider (assignor), Philippe Germain Louis Bonnet and Isabelle Lucie Bonnet (assignees) Devindran Swami and Melanie Swami (assignors), City Renovation Holding Limited (Assignor/Assignee), Lifu Liu and Yang Lawyers Trustee Limited (Assignee) Dmitry Selitskiy (assignor), Andrew Grant Hay and Yana Hay (assignees) Dominique Similien Marie Gerard Ganachaud Donna Lee Adlam Dorea Investments Ltd Dorothea Stone and Peter John Stone Dorothy Jean Weavers (assignor), Guanheng Li (assignee/assignor), Weiqing Huang (assignee) Dorran Properties Limited (assignor), Min Huang (assignee) Dougal Justin Alexander McPherson, Brendan Kevin O’Sullivan Eric Jean Jose Quintane and Gisele Sophie Quintane Eui Chul Baik (assignor), Yung Sil Seo (assignee/assignor), Baofeng Guo, Yanwei Li and Haiyan Yang (assignees) Evadoj Properties Limited (assignor), SCK Trustees Ltd and Stephen Carrick Kirk (assignees) Fang Lu Foo Keong Lee and Tet Fah Wong Francis John Kosmalski (assignor), Parallel South Limited (assignee) G & S Property Investments Limited (assignor), Ho Fai Edmund Lai (assignee) Gary Francis Jones Gary John Considine and Sharon Denise Considine (assignors), Weiyao Wu (assignee) Geoffrey Vaughan Ruthe (1/2 share) and Elizabeth Mary Painter (1/2 share) Gong Ing San @In San Goran Milanovic Gore Street Investment Limited Grogs Gold Limited Haiqi Chen Han Khim Lee and Bee Lan Ong Hassan Dean Limited Heng Kwan Dung and Kwee Fen Lim (assignors), Mark Colin Gibson (assignee) Hin Cheong Foong and Michelle Chuinwei Tan Hock Tiong Sng and May Lian Judy Ng Hojem Investments Limited (assignor), Yi-Chieh Wu (assignee) Honetana & Payne Investments Limited Hoon Choi (assignor), Moon Chul Choi and Keum Sook Choi (assignees) Huafeng Cao (assignor), Weiqing Huang (assignee) Huiling Daisy Jin Ichiro Watanabe and Hiroko Watanabe Insight Developments Limited Insight Developments Limited (assignor), Weiqing Huang (assignee) Irina Pyagay J & E Fernz Investments Limited Jack Henry Butland and Trustee Services NZ Limited Jamal Salman Alsamarra'I and Soha Abdulmajid Albazi (assignors), Andrew John Broczek and D.G. Trustee Co (2012) Limited (assignees) James Andre Rota (assignor), Chao Zheng (assignee) Jane Mason and Rosalie Mason Janet Margaret Kemp (assignor), Yam Keow Tan (assignee) Jasoda Devi Nair Jean-Louis Francois Boissin and Jeanette Boissin Jee Yuen Tan and Anna Guat Eng Ng (assignors), Yu Wang (assignor/assignee), Mark Colin Gibson (assignee) Jeffrey Allan Romeril and Shona Elizabeth Romeril Jiafang Wang Jingfeng Xu (assignor), Mark Colin Gibson (assignees) Joan Patterson Joan Rosanne Dempster Joel Marc Friedman Johann Franz Gehring and Dirk Christian Gehring John Hutt Patterson John Hutt Patterson (1/2 share) and Joan Patterson (1/2 share) John William Wardrop, John Herbert Bongard and Sam John Bongard John Zheng Miao Joseph Keen Hoong Yee and Lee Lee Yong Josie Chen Josie Chen (assignor), Jianhui Huang (assignee) Julie Grace Bartlett June Lorraine Devereux Jung Min Woo and Yeong Heui Jeong Junxiang Huang Kai Sin Ong and Kwee Lian Jessie Lee Kar Ming Leung Karen Bernadette O'Connor and Wesney John O’Connor (assignors), Mark Colin Gibson (assignee) Karen May Peters (assignor), Bingyin Zhang (assignee) Kauri Ridge Enterprises Limited (assignor), Onewa Limited (assignee) Kelvin Gavin Michael (assignor), NPL Holdings Limited (assignee/assignor), Mark Colin Gibson (assignee) Kelvin Kin Wang Chan and Nga-Sze Wong Kelvin Lawrence Trim (1/2 share) and Janice Ngaire Trim (1/2 share) Keng Weng Leong and Yim Peng Wong Kerry Noel Brickland and Leanne Joan Najbert Kevin John Parker, Gillian Hilary Parker and Gregory Roy Dunning (assignors), Auckland Apartments Limited (assignee) Kim Hong Oh and Siew Juan Lui (assignors), Bruno Paul Henry Royce (assignee) Kings Ransom Limited Kiran Devi Ireland and Russell James Ireland Kirandeep Kaur Bajaj KM & DM Properties Limited Kok Liong Lawrence Fong and Jye Yi Regina Chung (assignors), Bingyin Zhang (assignee) Konstantin Khamenok Konstantin Selitskiy (assignor), Neo Coup Limited (assignee/assignor), AB Holdings Limited (assignee/assignor), Ting Wang and Chang Lu (assignees) Kooi Chuan Sim and Rosemary Buck Lan Pang Kwan Wei Chua and Ai Ling Tan Lanikai Properties Limited Lee Meng Ong and Tee Fook Wong Leigh Richard Bosman and Rosemary Rae Bosman LEP Limited Li Heng Liang and Yong Tian Liang also known as Yong Tian Qu Liang (assignors), Doris Yishan Jiang and Shih-Ju Yang (assignees) Li-Cheng Wang and Shih-Chang Hsu (assignors); Franklyne Road Investments Limited (assignee) Lijia Zhang and Zhaoyan Zong (assignors), Hok Yin Danny Liu (assignee) Lijia Zhang and Zhaoyan Zong (assignors), Yuanhua Zhang (assignee) Lili Jiang and Jianfeng Zhang Lingyi Xu (assignor), Qing Zhang (assignee) Liubov Ievleva Mangawhai Estate Trust Limited (assignor), Andrew John Broczek and D.G. Trustee Co (2012) Ltd (assignees) Marcel Martinus Hermanus Van Oosterom and Matty Christina Eerlanda Van Oosterom (assignor), Timothy John Grimley and Annette Linda Grimley (assignees) Margaret Anne Smith (assignor), Andrew Mark Henry (assignee) Margaret Pusplata Kumar and Pramod Kumar Martin Keith Nicholls (assignor), Hsiu-Lin Wu Hsu and Michael Wu (assignees) Martine Florence Temata Sachet Merdeka Properties Limited (assignor), Jialin Yin (assignee) Merdeka Properties Limited (assignor), Yunbing Zhao and Xuemin Huang (assignees/assignors), Ling Huang (assignee) Michael Conrad Thoms Michael George Caleb and Vivien Kwee Suang Koh Michael Wu Michael Wu and Hsiu-Lin Wu-Hsu Michelle Kwok Hang Lee Mil Yung Mak and Edward Yip Seng Lye Min Yun Chiang and Yi Ta Hsieh Mukesh Kumar (assignor), Bruno Paul Henry Royce (assignee) Murray Gordon Wells and John Anthony Rive Nadia Filip (assignor), Baofeng Guo and Jun Guo (assignees) Neil Rodney Smith and Frances Mary Smith Netpacific Limited Nicholas Wai Sheng Loe (assignor), Weichen Zhang (assignee) Nigel John Lankey Noel Thomas Smith Notnil Holdings Limited (assignor), The Auckland Sailors Home (assignee) O.B. One Limited Olena Holdings Limited Palu Karuppannan and Ramasamy Peremawathi Patrice Paul Barachet Patricia Lorraine Elvey (assignor), Reagan Wu and Hsiu-Lin Wu Hsu (assignees) Patrick Makoto Saint Patrick Su Vun Thien and Cynthia Lee Ung Su Paul Francis Thatcher Paul Robert White and Joanna Victoria White Peng Hao Wong Peter Ee Kong Ling and Kuan Kuan Ong (assignors) Hsiu-Lin Wu Hsu and Reagan Wu (assignees) Philippe Germain Louis Bonnet and Isabelle Lucie Bonnet Pin Foo Lam (also known as Peng Foo Lam) and Foong Lian Lam Piow Chi Pang (also known as Piow Chi Boh) and Boon Say Tan PL Limited (assignor), Zhineng Deng (assignee) Public Trust as Executor of Estate of Teremoana David Meti and Phillis Rangiau Meti (assignors), Yiqian Zhang (assignee/assignor), Yaozhang Qu (assignee/assignor); 2F2F Limited (assignee) Purcell Investments Limited (assignor), Andrew John Broczek and D.G. Trustee Co (2012) Limited (assignees) R & R Investments Auckland Limited R H & R M Investments Limited (assignor), Shona Elizabeth Romeril and Jeffrey Allan Romeril (assignees) Rad Developments Limited Raed Abdul Amir Al Jawad and Suha Al Jawad Reagan Wu Richard Howard Gray Richard Howard Gray (assignor), NPL Holdings Limited (assignee/assignor), Liping Ouyang (assignee/assignor), Qian Wang (assignee) RJ Shaw Investments Limited (assignor), Xiao Ying Lu (assignee) Robert Andrew Wilson, Isabel Margaret Wilson and Andrew John Wilson (assignors), Andrew Mark Henry (assignee) Robert Kwan Hon Ho and Paul John McCormick Robert Paul Brennan (assignor), Weiqing Huang and Fei Sun (assignees) Robert Paul Brennan (assignor), Xia Zhao (assignee/assignor), Weiqing Huang and Fei Sun (assignees) Robyn Kaye Bailey and Susan Grace Barker Roland Stuart James and Lorraine Leslie James (assignors), Fenglian Wang (assignee) Rong-Sheng Liu and Chu-Li Liu Huang Rongying Tang Sai Teang Lim and Vin Wah Lee Sam Mathai and Sherly Adappurputhenpurayil George Senecio Holdings Limited (assignor), Kin Mei Eleanor Mak (assignee/assignor), Yam Li Shirley Tan (assignee) Seng Poo Poh and Kim Peck Wong Seong Wooi Tan and Mee Ling Lee (assignors), Ting-Yi Lee and Yu-Ying Lee (assignees) Shaoying Liu and Zhiqiang Wang Shargar Pty Limited (assignor), Zhihui Li (assignee) Sharon Jane Oliver and Edward Tauati Tanoi Shin Ok Lim Kim (assignor), Ru He (assignee) Shore Properties Limited SHP Investments Limited Shreya Harish Raney (assignor), Guanheng Li and Jing Ma (assignees) Siew Fong Yew and Chee Onn Chwee (assignors), Lili Herawati Shaw (assignee/assignor), Xiaochen Yang (assignee/assignor), Charles Chu Liu (assignee) Siew Kee Yip and Bee Kum Ong Siew Leng Tan and Kok Meng Goh (assignors), Zhiwei Qu (assignee) Siu Chun Ewards, Natasha Jessie Ewards and Mattias Per Ewards Sometx Limited Soo Deuk Lee and Young Hee Lim Soun Ha Youn and Jae Youn Lee Stallard Properties Limited (assignor), Siqi Chen (assignee) Stephen James Borrie Stephen William Rawhiti and Judith Elizabeth Rawhiti Steven Chon-seng Chan and Winny Weng-I Chan (assignors), Jason Kun-Hou Chan, Angela Nga-Ieng Chan and Bobby Kun-Sun Chan (assignees) Steven Kong Hooi Cheng Su Lii Lee (assignor), Yat Kong Chan (assignee/assignor), Michael Wu, Hsiu-Lin Wu Hsu and Yi-Chieh Wu (assignees) Surjit Singh and Bhupindar Kaur (assignors), Robert Gordon Whiting (deceased) and Shirley Jit Kwok (assignees), Shirley Jit Kwok (assignor), Fan Yang and Haoyi Liu (assignees) Suzanne Lee Ruttle and Peter William Aalbers Syed Ahtha Bin Syed Idris and Chee Wen Kong Sze Wan Tsang Tak Wai Chan (assignor), Jason Kun-Hou Chan, Angela Nga-Ieng Chan and Bobby Kun-Sun Chan (assignees) Tan Choon Lam (assignor), Iok Kim Chang and Qingyan Zhou (assignees) Teck Kim Koh and Wang Yiang Fan Teik Lee Ho The Auckland Sailors Home The Ginger Group Property Limited The Wrightstuff Investments Limited Thierry Luc Christian Druart (assignor), Auckland Apartments Limited (assignee) Thierry Patrick Louet and Christine Louet Thomas Pressentin Tianhong Cao Timothy Earl Behrend and Maren Olsen Behrend Tong Zheng, Xiaojun Song and Yuchen Song (assignors), Ho Fai Edmund Lai (assignee) Tony Kee Wai Ho (assignor), Michael Wu and Hsiu-Lin Wu Hsu (assignees) Tony Victor Novis Voyager Investments Limited Wai Leng Au Yeong Wan Wah Ho and Yoon Loong Loke Warwick Holmes Tankard and Michael Gerard Sinkinson Wayne John Toddun, Michele Toddun and Geoffrey Christopher Wales Wayne Thomas Goldsack and Jennifer Diane Goldsack (assignors), In Josh I Trust Limited (7/10 share) and Nadia Arthur (3/10 share) (assignees) Wei Min Qu Wei Ping Chuang and Kwee Keng Kwek Weili Min Xian Min Qu and Xin Bai Xiangmin Tang and Hui Zhang, (assignors), Ngai Shing Lee and Lin Pek Chio (assignees) Xiaobo Hu (assignor); Hsiu-Lin Wu Hsu (assignee) Xiaodong Fang Xiaolin Zhao (assignor), Hong Dai (assignee/assignor), Weiqing Huang (assignee) Xing Fan Miao Xu Cui Yahong Xing Yam Keow Tan (assignor), Ajita YunRu Goh (assignee) Yan Li Yan Sun (assignor), Wei Wang (assignee) Yew Chin Law and Guat Chiew Ng Yew Mun Wong Yi Ping Yuan and Ya Ping Hu Yibin Wang (assignor); Qin Zhao (assignee) Yim Fun Chan and Sook Han Chew (assignors); Beverley Elaine Walker (1/2 share) and Mark Rex Walker (1/2 share) (assignors/assignees), Alset Management Limited (assignee) Ying Zhang Yinglin Zeng, Wanjing Zeng and Xiaoyun Ma Yiqi Wang Yow-Fuh Tseng Yu Ming Lee Yu Qing Li and Lie Li Yu Tai Yen and Ai Lian Lim (assignors), Parallel South Limited (assignee) Yuan He (assignor), Yam Li Shirley Tan and Yam Keow Tan (assignees) Yuan Zhang Yueying Wen (assignor), Yimin Qian (assignee) Yuhua Chen Yun Qian Yun Zhou Zhengwen Yu Zhiyi Ma (assignor), Huifang Jin (assignee) |
0
4
0