Attorney General v Taylor

Case [2020] NZSC 152


NOTE: HIGH COURT ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF THE WITNESS IDENTIFIED IN [13], [64] AND [65] OF THE JUDGMENT IN
M v ROPER [2018] NZHC 2330 REMAINS IN FORCE.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI

 SC 56/2020
 [2020] NZSC 152
BETWEEN

ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Applicant

AND

MARIYA ANN TAYLOR
First Respondent

AND

ROBERT ROPER
Second Respondent

SC 57/2020

BETWEEN

ROBERT ROPER
Applicant

AND

MARIYA ANN TAYLOR
First Respondent

AND

ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Second Respondent

Court:

O’Regan, Ellen France and Williams JJ

Counsel:

A C M Fisher QC, E N C Lay and K F Gaskell for
Attorney-General
J F Mather and L M Herbke for Mr Roper
G F Little SC and G E Whiteford for Ms Taylor

Judgment:

21 December 2020

Reissued:

22 December 2020

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe applications for leave to appeal are dismissed.

BLeave is reserved for the applicants to make a further application for leave to appeal to this Court on the issue of false imprisonment if the application to the Court of Appeal for recall of its judgment is unsuccessful.

CThe Attorney‑General must pay Ms Taylor costs of $1,250.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Background

  1. These applications arise out of civil proceedings brought by Ms Taylor against Mr Roper for sexual assault and false imprisonment while both were employed by the Royal New Zealand Air Force in the late 1980s. 

  2. Ms Taylor was 18 years of age when she joined the Air Force.  Mr Roper was her superior.  Ms Taylor alleges that between 1985 and 1988, Mr Roper bullied, verbally abused, sexually harassed, inappropriately touched and falsely imprisoned her while she was carrying out her duties.  Ms Taylor left the Air Force in 1988.

  3. In 2014, Mr Roper was found guilty of 20 counts of sexual offending against members of his family and three other women.  The offending took place between 1976 and 1988 and included sexual offending against a young woman who was on work experience at the Whenuapai airbase in 1987 (not Ms Taylor).  Ms Taylor contacted police two days after the verdict.

  4. In 2016, Ms Taylor withdrew her police complaint and filed High Court proceedings against both Mr Roper and the Air Force, alleging that Mr Roper’s actions caused her extreme distress, depression, anxiety and post‑traumatic stress disorder.  She also argued that the Air Force was vicariously liable for Mr Roper’s actions and had breached its duty of care as her employer.

  5. The High Court found on the balance of probabilities that Mr Roper did assault and falsely imprison Ms Taylor as alleged.[1]  It also found that those actions caused Ms Taylor’s post‑traumatic stress disorder, but not her anxiety or depression.[2]  But the Court held that Ms Taylor’s claims were time‑barred by the Limitation Act 1950.  The Court considered there was insufficient evidence that Ms Taylor was operating under a disability as at 1988, and so the exception under s 24 of the Limitation Act did not apply.[3]  While it did not need to decide the…

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Attorney General v Taylor [2020] NZSC 152
Case
[2020] NZSC 152
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Attorney General v Taylor, the Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed applications for leave to appeal brought by the Attorney-General and Mr. Robert Roper against Ms. Mariya Ann Taylor. The matter arose out of civil proceedings brought by Ms. Taylor against Mr. Roper for sexual assault and false imprisonment. The Court of Appeal had reversed the High Court’s decision on the issue of limitations, finding that Ms. Taylor was operating under a disability from 1988 until 2014, and so her claims were filed in time. The Attorney-General sought leave to appeal the issue of false imprisonment, and Mr. Roper sought leave to appeal both the false imprisonment issue and the limitations issue. Ms. Taylor opposed the applications but sought leave to cross-appeal on the issues of accrual and ACC cover for her assault claim if leave to appeal were granted.

The Supreme Court found that it would be inappropriate to hear an appeal on the false imprisonment issue until the parties had an opportunity to argue the section 21B issue in the Court of Appeal. The Court recognised that this would cause delay, but it was unavoidable. The Court also found that the limitations ground in Mr. Roper’s application did not meet the criteria for leave as it essentially challenged the Court of Appeal’s assessment of the evidence. No question of general or public importance arose, and the ground did not meet the higher threshold for a miscarriage of justice in relation to civil appeals. Therefore, the applications for leave should be dismissed on the basis that the applicants may seek a recall in the Court of Appeal so that the issue of section 21B can be ventilated. The applicants may renew their applications for leave in this Court on the issue of false imprisonment should the Court of Appeal decline their application for recall.

The Supreme Court dismissed the applications for leave to appeal and reserved leave for the applicants to make a further application for leave to appeal to this Court on the issue of false imprisonment if the application to the Court of Appeal for recall of its judgment is unsuccessful. The Court also ordered that the Attorney-General must pay Ms. Taylor costs of $1,250. The Registrar should provide a copy of this judgment to the Accident Compensation Corporation.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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