IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC CRI 3/2004
POURSHAD MARCO ARVAND
v
THE QUEEN
Hearing:7 July 2004
Coram:Elias CJ
Tipping JAppearances: W Lawson for Applicant
J C Pike for Respondent
Judgment:15 July 2004
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
[1] Pourshad Marco Arvand seeks leave, pursuant to s13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003, to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal against conviction. He contends that the issues involved, or at least some of them, are matters of general or public importance (s13(2)(a)) and that a substantial miscarriage of justice would occur unless his intended appeal to this Court is heard (s13(2)(b)).
[2] Mr Arvand was convicted after a jury trial in the High Court at Rotorua on a number of counts of stupefying, sexual violation, indecent assault and fraud. The trial Judge ruled that the deposition evidence of two of the sexual complainants, K and S, could be read at the trial, they being out of the country. The Crown’s case in summary was that Mr Arvand targeted females of Asian ethnicity who were living in or visiting New Zealand and perpetrated both sexual attacks and fraud upon them. K and S were visitors to New Zealand at the relevant time. They had subsequently returned to Japan and declined to return to New Zealand to give evidence at the trial; albeit they had earlier given evidence at depositions.
[3] The Court of Appeal held that the trial Judge should not have allowed K’s deposition evidence to be read to the jury, largely because of interpretation problems. The Judge’s decision to admit S’s deposition evidence was, however, upheld.
[4] The first point Mr Arvand wishes to pursue on further appeal is the proposition that the Court of Appeal was wrong to have made this distinction. He contends that S’s deposition evidence should also have been excluded. In delivering the Court’s judgment Hammond J said (at paragraph [26]):
Instances in which persons who had been visiting New Zealand who would not wish to return to New Zealand for a trial of this character, elicit sympathy. The trauma of returning to a foreign jurisdiction is also sometimes overlaid also with cultural considerations. The difficulties standing in the way of prosecutors are then self-evident. Nevertheless, it must only be in truly exceptional cases pertaining to charges of a sexual character that the complainant should not be presented for examination before the jury. We consider, entirely on the facts, that this is such an exceptional instance. The appellant was literally “caught in the act”, and with the complainant in the state she was then found to be in. Those are matters of objective fact, attested to by independent witnesses.
[5] Mr Lawson rightly accepted he could not challenge the “truly exceptional” test which the Court of Appeal adopted. His complaint was rather that the facts of this case were not truly exceptional. Hence no point of principle is involved. The Court of Appeal’s view that the facts…
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- Case
- [2004] NZSC 2
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Court of Appeal was fully entitled to consider that the independent evidence of S's state, coupled with the fact that she had been cross-examined at depositions, made the case sufficiently exceptional to justify her deposition being read at trial. The court also found that the Court of Appeal was entitled to find that there was no sufficient risk of prejudice to justify a new trial due to the late supply of Professor Begg's brief of evidence. The court was not satisfied that the proposed grounds for appeal qualified for leave under s13 of the Supreme Court Act, and the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal under s13 of the Supreme Court Act.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was initially heard in the High Court at Rotorua, where Arvand was convicted. He appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal. Arvand then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand under section 13 of the Supreme Court Act 2003. The Supreme Court considered his application for leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed it.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court of Appeal was wrong to have made a distinction between the deposition evidence of K and S, and whether S’s deposition evidence should also have been excluded.
2. Whether the late supply by the Crown of the brief of evidence of Professor Begg constitutes a substantial miscarriage of justice warranting a further appeal.
3. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in not upholding Arvand’s complaint about the trial Judge's ruling that declined to allow a complainant, H, to demonstrate her English language ability in front of the jury.
Held
1. The Court of Appeal was not wrong to distinguish between the deposition evidence of K and S, and S’s deposition evidence was not to be excluded. The application on this point does not qualify for leave to appeal.
2. The late supply by the Crown of Professor Begg's brief of evidence did not constitute a substantial miscarriage of justice warranting a further appeal. The application on this point does not qualify for leave to appeal.
3. The Court of Appeal did not err in not upholding Arvand’s complaint about the trial Judge's ruling that declined to allow a complainant, H, to demonstrate her English language ability in front of the jury. The application on this point does not qualify for leave to appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court examined the application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing Arvand’s appeal against conviction. The Court considered three main points raised by Arvand. Firstly, regarding the distinction made by the Court of Appeal between the deposition evidence of K and S, the Court held that S’s deposition evidence was appropriately admitted. The Court of Appeal’s view that the facts were truly exceptional was supported by the independent evidence of S’s state, corroborating her allegation of lack of consent. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal’s decision to uphold the exercise by the trial Judge of her discretion under s184 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 was not plainly wrong.
Secondly, concerning the late supply by the Crown of Professor Begg’s brief of evidence, the Court held that there was no substantial miscarriage of justice warranting a further appeal. Despite the late timing of the disclosure, the Court of Appeal was entitled to find that there was no sufficient risk of prejudice to justify a new trial, as no basis was identified upon which it could be suggested that Arvand might reasonably have been able to cross-examine Professor Begg to better effect or call evidence himself, so as significantly to cast doubt on what the Professor said at the trial.
Lastly, regarding the Court of Appeal's refusal to uphold Arvand’s complaint about the trial Judge's ruling that declined to allow a complainant, H, to demonstrate her English language ability in front of the jury, the Court held that the issues raised did not qualify for leave to appeal. The Court found that these matters concerned individual features of an unusual case and their nature could hardly be regarded as a matter of general or public importance. The Court of Appeal's ruling about the degree of relevance of proposed evidence and a proposed line of cross-examination was upheld, and no miscarriage of justice concerns reasonably arose from the decision.
The Supreme Court concluded that none of the points raised qualified for leave to appeal under s13 of the Supreme Court Act, and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.