Arps v Department of Corrections
[2020] NZHC 706
•8 April 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CRI-2020-409-000011
[2020] NZHC 706
BETWEEN PHILLIP NEVILLE ARPS
Appellant
AND
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Respondent
Hearing: 24 March 2020 Appearances:
A M S Williams for Appellant D S Taffs for Respondent
Judgment:
8 April 2020
JUDGMENT OF OSBORNE J
This judgment was delivered by me on 8 April 2020 at 2.10 pm Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date:
ARPS v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS [2020] NZHC 706 [8 April 2020]
[1] This is an appeal against special conditions imposed by the District Court upon the appellant, Phillip Neville Arps, on his release from prison earlier this year.1 They were imposed under s 94 Sentencing Act 2002 (“the Act”).
Background
[2] The appellant appears to have a deep-seated enmity towards people of the Muslim and Jewish faiths. The enmity has been manifested in vitriolic language and activity. It seemingly occupies his mind both when he is awake and asleep. It has led him into offending on two occasions in recent years. The first involved offensive behaviour when he filmed himself, with others, delivering dead animal heads to the door of a mosque in Christchurch. The second resulted in his pleading guilty to two charges of distributing objectionable publications in 2019 in the form of edited video footage of the shootings which occurred at the mosque in question and at another mosque.2
[3]As recorded by Judge O’Driscoll in the District Court:3
Mr Arps was sent an electronic copy of the video on the day of the shooting. The following day he sent the video to another person and instructed them to include crosshairs and a “kill count”. This would mimic a first-person shooter video game, with the kill count increasing as people were killed. Mr Arps had the modifications completed so he could distribute the video. Mr Arps also distributed the unmodified video to approximately 30 of his associates, He deleted the video and did not send it to anyone after the Prime Minister made comments about the possibility it was objectionable.
[4] For the 2019 offences, the appellant was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment, a sentence which he appealed unsuccessfully to the High Court and the Court of Appeal.4
1 Department of Corrections v Arps [2020] NZDC 1409 (“District Court judgment”).
2 At the time the appellant was sentenced, the person who had filmed himself carrying out the shootings at the mosque had yet to be charged. He has since been charged with and was on 26 March 2020 convicted of 51 acts of murder, 40 acts of attempted murder and one act of terrorism.
3 At [9].
4 Arps v Police [2019] NZHC 2113; Arps v Police [2019] NZCA 592.
[5] At the time of sentencing on the objectionable publication charges, Judge O’Driscoll imposed on the appellant standard and special conditions of release, the special conditions being:
(a)Mr Arps is to attend a psychological assessment with a departmental psychologist;
(b)Mr Arps is not to possess or use any electronic device capable of accessing the internet or capturing, storing or distributing images;
(c)Mr Arps is to attend and complete any recommended intervention for alcohol and drug use to the satisfaction of his probation officer; and
(d)Mr Arps is to make available any electronic device capable of accessing the internet that is used by him or in his possession for inspection by a probation officer.
The additional release conditions
[6] Shortly before the appellant’s release from prison in January 2020, the Department of Corrections applied for orders varying and adding further special conditions to the appellant’s sentence, pursuant to s 94 of the Act. The appellant opposed the application. Following the hearing, in which the Department’s witnesses were cross-examined, Judge O’Driscoll imposed a further five special conditions:5
(a)not to enter or to loiter near any Mosque, prayer room or other area where the Muslim community congregate, unless he has the prior written approval of a probation officer, or unless an adult approved by the probation officer in writing is present;
(b)not to have contact with or otherwise associate with the victims of his offending, directly or indirectly, unless he has the prior written consent
5 District Court judgment, above 1, at [129]–[151].
of his probation officer. The victims of Mr Arps’ offending are identified as any member of the Muslim community;
(c)to comply with the requirements of electronic monitoring, and to provide access to the approved residence to the probation officer and the representatives of the monitoring company, for the purpose of maintaining the electronic monitoring equipment, as directed by the probation officer;
(d)to submit to electronic monitoring in the form of GPS technology, as directed by a probation officer, to monitor his compliance with any condition as to his whereabouts; and
(e)not to possess or use firearms or be involved in any activity involving firearms including Airsoft/BB gun style weapons without the prior written consent of his probation officer.
[7] This appeal is against all but condition (a) (the “whereabouts condition”). In relation to both conditions (b) and (e) the appeal is pursued upon the basis that a reframed condition may be appropriate.
The statutory regime
[8] Section 93 of the Act provides for the imposition of conditions on the release of an offender sentenced to imprisonment for a short term (not more than 24 months) as the appellant was.
[9] The required purpose of a s 93 special condition is established in s 93(3) which provides:
(3)A special condition must not be imposed unless it is designed to—
(a)reduce the risk of reoffending by the offender; or
(b)facilitate or promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender; or
(c)provide for the reasonable concerns of victims of the offender.
(3A) The court must not impose an electronic monitoring condition described in section 15(3)(f) of the Parole Act 2002 unless it has had regard to the opinion of the chief executive of the Department of Corrections in a pre-sentence report provided under section 26.
[10] In Patterson v R, the Court of Appeal explained that the power to impose special conditions is subject to implicit limits.6
[11] First, the Court of Appeal observed that any such condition must be tailored to the offender’s circumstances, addressing their particular risk of reoffending or prospects of rehabilitation, or victims. The Court quoted its earlier decision in R v Jannsen:7
[15] The discretion must also be exercised consistently with the principles in s 8 of the Sentencing Act, the first five of which (those in paragraphs (a) – (e)) require that any condition imposed relate explicably to what has been described succinctly as “the precise criminality”: R v Meroiti CA392/99 26 October 1999 at [6], quoting R v Duffy (1994) 15 Cr App (s) 667 at 681. And that must include an assessment of the effect of the offence on any victim: s 8(f).
[12] Secondly, in Patterson, the Court of Appeal also identified that the “least restrictive sentence” principle applies to special conditions under s 93.8
[13] Finally, the Court of Appeal agreed with the observation of Williams J in the High Court judgment which was appealed that “any given condition must exhibit a rational nexus to the s 93(3) purposes, and … when considered with other conditions to be imposed it must be reasonably necessary and proportional”.9
[14] Section 94 of the Act provides for applications for variation of release conditions where special conditions were previously imposed under s 93 of the Act.
[15] On such an application, one of the courses open to the Court (under s 94(3)(a) of the Act) is to impose additional conditions. The facts in Chief Executive of Department of Corrections v Palmer present an instance of this Court imposing (under
6 Patterson v R [2017] NZCA 66 at [16].
7 At [16], quoting R v Jannsen [2007] NZCA 450.
8 Patterson v R, above n 6, at [17].
9 At [18], citing Patterson v R [2017] NZHC 49 at [38].
s 94) additional conditions of release in the light of the conduct of a defendant while serving his sentence of imprisonment.10
The District Court judgment
[16] In his reserved judgment, Judge O’Driscoll identified the applicable legal principles.11 Those principles were not challenged either in the Court below or on appeal.
[17] Judge O’Driscoll then referred to evidence given by Christina Wilson, the Service Manager of Corrections Services at Christchurch. His Honour identified four matters constituting the grounds relied upon by Ms Wilson being:12
(a)Her assessment of the appellant as posing a high risk of further offending, and, in particular, a high risk of causing harm to others through possible emotional abuse and victimisation of the Muslim community.
(b)Recordings of 10 telephone calls between the appellant and his associates during his imprisonment, providing evidence of his anti-Muslim, anti-government and anti-police rhetoric, including threats to Department of Corrections staff and/or community safety.
(c)Numerous letters written by the appellant from 7 October to 22 December 2017 containing similar views.
(d)Material within the phone calls and letters which indicates a willingness by the appellant to circumvent or breach conditions already in place.
[18] Judge O’Driscoll reviewed in detail the evidence relied upon by Corrections, first in the form of the appellant’s letters and then in the course of his telephone calls.13
10 Chief Executive of Department of Corrections v Palmer [2017] NZHC 1648.
11 District Court judgment, above n 1, at [15]–[34].
12 At [37].
13 At [58]–[69] and at [70]–[74] respectively.
[19] I will not repeat here the numerous passages quoted by Judge O’Driscoll whose judgment was necessarily the subject of a suppression order in relation to the content of the appellant’s letters and telephone calls. The passages quoted by his Honour support the conclusions drawn by Ms Wilson. His Honour referred to the “recurrent themes in the letters and phone calls”.14 The matters which his Honour found on the evidence to be established included:
(a)The letters and phone calls clearly demonstrated an extreme dislike if not hatred for the Jewish and Muslim community.15
(b)The appellant’s views and expressions on the Muslim community could not be said to amount to “joking” or “flippant” comments nor were they “one-off” comments designed to impress or exaggerate.16
(c)There was clear evidence that the appellant was thinking about ways to get around his current release conditions which prohibited his contact to the internet and there was a demonstrated lack of respect for the Court and by implication any orders made by the Court.17
(d)There was a lack of remorse, which along with other material that heightened the risk of reoffending, could be taken into account in considering the necessity to impose further release conditions.18
[20] Judge O’Driscoll expressly recognised the entitlement of the appellant to hold views about segments of the community which the majority do not hold. His Honour recorded that it was not his intention to criticise the appellant’s views nor suppress his right to hold or convey those views to others (taking into account s 14 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990).19 His Honour then turned to consider each of the special release conditions sought by the Department. In doing so, he summarised that he had
14 At [100].
15 At [101]–[103].
16 At [104]–[105].
17 At [122] and [124].
18 At [125].
19 At [126]–[127].
to consider whether the proposed conditions were necessary and proportionate and had a rational nexus for the purposes of s 93 and of the Sentencing Act generally.
Considerations applying to all conditions
[21] Judge O’Driscoll identified two particular aspects of the appellant’s mind set and behaviour which caused him concern and led his Honour to conclude that the imposition of additional conditions was justified:
[132] First, I take into account the evidence that reflects Mr Arps’ current mind set and his intentions when released from prison. His continued references to violence, killing, weapons, revenge, vengeance, striking back and hatred of certain ethic groups in the time leading up to his release are both concerning and disturbing. This is a matter that clearly increases the risk of re-offending when released from prison and demonstrates the need to provide for the interests of his victims.
[133] Second, I also take into account the evidence that demonstrates the manipulative nature of Mr Arps’ intention to attempt to get around the current release conditions. His lack of remorse for anything he has done in the past is clearly evident.
The whereabouts condition
[22] Judge O’Driscoll found the whereabouts condition to be justified as providing for the reasonable concerns of the victims under s 93(3)(c) of the Act and preventing re-offending against the Muslim community under s 93(3)(a) of the Act. His Honour referred to the concern caused in the Muslim community by the appellant’s current offending. His Honour noted (in contrast to the appellant’s statement that he has no intention of going to a mosque) that he had gone to the steps of the mosque on the occasion of his previous offending. His Honour noted the “firmly entrenched” nature of the appellant’s views.20
[23] Unsurprisingly, the appeal did not challenge the imposing of the whereabouts condition. There was a rational connection to the two purposes identified by his Honour. The condition was necessary and proportionate.
20 At [134]–[136].
Non-contact condition
[24] Judge O’Driscoll held that the proposed non-contact and non-association condition (condition (b)) was appropriate, accepting that the victims of the appellant’s offending (to be protected under s 93(3)(c) of the Act) were the members of the Muslim community. The Judge recognised that both the previous and present sets of offending were against the Muslim community and that the prison letters and phone calls showed that the appellant had no remorse but intended to continue to further his political and social ideology. The expression of those ideological views (while within the appellant’s entitlement) were matters the Court was entitled to take into account in assessing the risk of reoffending against the Muslim community. Judge O’Driscoll rejected the submission for the appellant that his views would be expressed to those who agree with his views and not to the Muslim community, noting that during his previous offending the appellant had expressed his views directly to the Muslim community. The Judge noted that Corrections could manage a non-contact condition in a reasonable way that would ensure inadvertent contact does not constitute a breach.21
The two GPS conditions
[25] I will refer to special conditions (c) and (d) collectively as the “GPS conditions”. Condition (c) requires the appellant to submit to GPS monitoring as directed. Condition (d) is an enforcement provision for the purpose of maintaining the GPS equipment. The Department proposed two exclusion zones in the areas surrounding the two mosques (in the areas of Linwood and Hagley Park). Ms Wilson gave evidence that she had designed the exclusion zones to enable the appellant to recognise the boundaries quickly and to enable, if needed, plenty of time for response to intrusion. Ms Wilson explained that the condition was designed to prevent the appellant from contacting victims of his offending.
[26] The GPS monitoring would occur through the appellant’s wearing an electronic anklet which would send an alert to the monitoring team only if he intruded beyond the perimeter of either exclusion zone.
21 At [145]–[148].
[27] Counsel for the Department invoked the conclusion reached by Edwards J in Armstrong v Nicholas (when imposing special conditions requiring GPS monitoring) that an exclusion zone of itself did not eliminate the risk of reoffending and that GPS monitoring, in the circumstances of that case, was the minimum required to mitigate the risk.22
[28] Judge O’Driscoll was satisfied that the Department had made out the case for electronic monitoring in order to monitor the appellant’s compliance with his whereabouts condition.23 His Honour found that the GPS conditions were necessary to deal with the risk that Mr Arps would seek to circumvent (other) imposed conditions.24
The firearms condition
[29] Judge O’Driscoll was satisfied that condition (e) (preventing the possession or use of firearms) was appropriate because of two matters in particular:25
(a)the appellant’s offending had involved turning the video of the shooting of the Muslim victims into a shooting game with crosshairs and a kill-count, with the consequence that it would be highly distressing to the victims of his offending if he were to be seen (by them) with a weapon; and
(b)the Department’s evidence included an incident where the appellant is said to have shouted “Allāhu akbar” in the content of an Airsoft game.
[30] The Judge noted that the appellant would be able to ask his Probation Officer for permission to play with Airsoft weapons at a particular time and place.26
22 Armstrong v Nicholas [2018] NZHC 5 at [31] and [34].
23 District Court judgment, above n 1, at [137].
24 At [143].
25 At [149]–[150].
26 At [151].
The appeal
Grounds of appeal
[31] The ground of appeal which the appellant stated in his notice of appeal, in relation to all conditions, was that they are neither necessary nor proportionate to reduce the risk of reoffending, to facilitate the rehabilitation or reintegration of the appellant, or to provide for the reasonable concerns of the victims. The second of those purposes (rehabilitation or reintegration) does not require further consideration
– it was neither part of the reasoning of Judge O’Driscoll nor a matter relied upon by Mr Taffs, for the Department, in support of the conditions.
Non-contact condition
[32] In relation to the non-contact condition Mr Williams, in his written synopsis, recorded that the condition is not in general terms opposed but that it is a very difficult condition to enforce and to comply with.
[33] Mr Williams referred to New Zealand’s multi-cultural society and the many roles which members of the Muslim community play within it. He submitted that it is difficult to impose a condition which could be breached simply by the appellant’s going about his daily business, such as dealing with a cashier at the supermarket. Mr Williams submitted that the appellant could (unwittingly) commit countless breaches of the non-contact condition in such daily situations. He therefore concluded that the condition is unnecessary, with the whereabouts condition being sufficient to restrict him from going to certain places, mitigating against any risk and providing for the reasonable concerns of the victims of his offending.
[34] Mr Williams submitted that Judge O’Driscoll’s observation as to the Department’s ability to manage the condition in a reasonable way to deal with inadvertent contact did not represent an appropriate approach.27
[35] For the Department, Mr Taffs submitted that the risks relating to the appellant’s behaviour had to be assessed in light of the fact that the offending for which he is
27 District Court judgment, above n 1, at [148].
serving his sentence is his second against the Muslim community. Mr Taffs submitted that the material relating to the appellant’s conduct while in prison demonstrated a palpable risk that he intended to instigate further offending (or at least cause significant distress) to members of the Muslim community.
[36] When regard is had to the contents of the appellant’s prison conversations and writings (both in relation to his attitudes and intentions towards the Muslim community and his willingness to disrespect and circumvent the decisions of those in authority), the Judge’s dual finding of risk of reoffending and provision for the reasonable concerns of the victims was justified.
[37] The emphasis of the appellant’s case on appeal was not so much on the appropriateness of a condition designed to meet those purposes but rather on whether the whereabouts condition alone was appropriate to meet those purposes.
[38] Again, the Judge’s conclusion that the additional non-contact condition was required was justified having regard to the appellant’s conversations and writings. The whereabouts condition is designed to protect the Muslim community in particular localities. The non-contact condition is designed to protect members of the Muslim community wherever they happen to be. The two conditions are in that way complementary. They may overlap but they do not duplicate one another.
[39] That leaves only the remaining concern raised by Mr Williams, namely the possibility of the appellant’s unwittingly contacting a member of the Muslim community, such as in the context of a supermarket transaction. Again, the Judge correctly rejected that as a reason for not imposing such a condition. In relation to the level of risk posed by the appellant, the need for a strict condition that precluded the appellant finding wriggle room was a valid consideration. Judge O’Driscoll was also entitled to take into account the probability that the Department would manage such a condition in a reasonable way to guard against viewing inadvertent contact as a breach. Unmentioned by the Judge, but also relevant, is the fact that the terms “contact” and “associate” within condition (b) are to be construed pursuant to the associated words
rule.28 In short, the terms “contact” and “associate” derive their colour from each other. Therefore condition (b) does not cover an unwitting contact with a member of the Muslim community. This judgment of itself will serve to confirm that interpretation in relation to the condition imposed upon the appellant.
The GPS conditions
[40] Mr Williams characterised the GPS conditions as an unnecessary restriction which places a significant burden on the appellant. He submitted that the whereabouts restriction is sufficient to mitigate any limited risk that the appellant may reoffend and to address the reasonable concerns of the victims. In this context, Mr Williams noted that the appellant has no history of non-compliance with conditions imposed on him. He submitted that the appellant’s deletion of the objectionable material “as soon as he discovered that it was objectionable” serves to confirm his ability to comply with a condition.
[41] Mr Williams submitted that the GPS conditions are unlikely to deal with any risk of reoffending as police response time to a GPS-detected breach would likely see the offence committed by the time police arrived. Mr Williams therefore suggested that the most significant purpose of GPS monitoring would be to provide evidence of any breach. Given the appellant’s well-known appearance and the monitoring of the sites by way of CCTV, Mr Williams suggested that the appellant would inevitably be identified promptly and held to account (regardless of GPS monitoring).
[42] Mr Williams submitted also that the relevant risk of reoffending here lies in the distribution of further objectionable material rather than the commission of an offence in the vicinity of one of the mosques.
[43] Finally, Mr Williams noted that any breach of the other conditions imposed would place the appellant at risk of a further term of imprisonment, which Mr Williams characterised as a “significant protective factor”.
28 Also known by the Latin maxim noscitur a sociis. See J F Burrows (ed) Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at pp [232]–[237].
[44] For the Department, Mr Taffs submitted that the GPS conditions serve the dual purpose of lessening the likelihood of further offending and providing a layer of protection to the victims.
[45] Mr Taffs noted that the exclusion zones are around the two mosques in Christchurch, and that the appellant’s exclusion from the area around the Hagley Park mosque should not inconvenience him at all given that he does not reside in that area. Mr Taffs notes in any event the reservation whereby the probation officer may approve trips within the exclusion zones in appropriate circumstances.
[46] Mr Taffs placed reliance on the approach adopted by this Court in Armstrong v Nicholas where, in relation to a similar exclusion zone approach to GPS monitoring, the Court found the restraint on Mr Nicholas to be the minimum required to mitigate the risk he posed.29
[47] Mr Taffs submitted that Judge O’Driscoll correctly found that the GPS monitoring was a “necessary and proportionate response to the risk” given that it both allowed police time to respond to any breaches of the exclusion zone and responded to the prospect that the appellant might seek to circumvent imposed conditions.
[48] Mr Taffs responded to a theme in the submissions of Mr Williams which had suggested that the risk of the appellant reoffending might be regarded as low. Mr Taffs submitted that, even if the risk of occurrence were to be regarded as low, this is a case where the impact on the group of victims to be protected would be high.
[49] Judge O’Driscoll correctly identified the GPS conditions as providing a means for prompt police response in time to prevent offending when the whereabouts condition of itself is insufficient for that purpose.30 In other words, the Judge correctly found that the GPS conditions were a necessary part of a suite of conditions that aimed to prevent further offending and to protect the Muslim community. This took into account the prospect that the appellant would seek to circumvent any restrictions
29 Armstrong v Nicholas, above n 22, at [34].
30 District Court judgment, above n 1, at [141].
imposed. The Judge correctly took the same view of condition (d) which is the means by which the Department can ensure the monitoring equipment remains operational.
[50] In concluding that these were necessary and proportionate responses to the risk involved, his Honour appropriately had regard to the fact that the appellant does not live in either of the exclusion zones and that, if he is required to enter them for legitimate purposes, he can seek approval. His Honour also correctly took into account the fact that the GPS regime proposed by the Department does not serve to monitor the appellant’s whereabouts continuously (but rather operates in the event of entry into an exclusion zone).
[51]Judge O’Driscoll correctly found the GPS conditions to be appropriate.
Firearms condition
[52] Relevantly to the firearms condition, it is common ground that the appellant possesses an Airsoft gun constructed so as to be similar to a weapon used and seen on the day of the shooting in March 2019.
[53] Mr Williams submitted that the firearms condition represents an unwarranted condition when the appellant is not a holder of a firearms licence, has no reason to possess or use firearms, and would be subject to a criminal charge under the Arms Act 1983 were he to be unlawfully in possession of a firearm.
[54] Mr Williams submitted that the real import of the firearms condition is to prevent the appellant from engaging in the sport of Airsoft, a sport in which he has been involved for a significant number of years. Mr Williams suggested that it is difficult to see what risk the firearms condition is designed to prevent when there are provisions in the Arms Act which would prevent its use in an inappropriate way.31
[55] Mr Williams referred to Judge O’Driscoll’s observation that it would be highly distressing to the Muslim community to see the appellant with weaponry even if it were for the purposes of Airsoft. Mr Williams submitted that such a situation is
31 Mr Williams referred, by way of example, to s 46 Arms Act 1983.
unlikely to come about given that the only place where the appellant is likely to be seen with Airsoft equipment is at his home or on an Airsoft course.
[56] For the Department, Mr Taffs referred to the appearance of a rifle used on the day of the 15 March shooting, of which the appellant’s Airsoft gun appears to be a replica. Mr Taffs refers also to the way in which the appellant’s index offending involved the veneration of footage showing persons being shot as a result of their Muslim faith, with the appellant arranging for the modification of the video to include crosshairs and a kill-count, both trivialising and glorifying the shooting.
[57] Mr Taffs referred also to the telephone conversation which refers to the appellant yelling “Allāhu akbar” while having previously played Airsoft.
[58] All these matters, in Mr Taffs’ submission, point to a relationship between the appellant’s engaging in Airsoft and an intentional causing of distress to the Muslim community. The likelihood of the appellant’s seeking in such a way to cause distress to a particular community which he dislikes is reinforced, in Mr Taffs’ submission, by excerpts in the prison recordings of conversations in which the appellant, after reference to Corrections or other personnel, refers to shooting, “up against the wall” and target practice.
[59] Mr Taffs emphasised that, as with other conditions, there is the reservation to the appellant of the right to seek approval from a probation officer.
[60] The way in which the appellant’s thinking focusses on the involvement of firearms against those he dislikes, and his acting upon those attitudes specifically in relation to the 15 March 2019 events, made a firearms condition appropriate. Combined with the evidence of the appellant’s willingness to circumvent restrictions, it was also necessary that any firearms condition be comprehensive.
[61] I explored with counsel in the course of submissions whether, having regard to the potential to carve out an express right to possess an Airsoft rifle only on an Airsoft range, such a carve out might have been contemplated.
[62] For his part, Mr Williams responsibly accepted that were there to be a specific reservation for the appellant to engage in Airsoft specifically at a range, the appellant’s objection to the condition would fall away. Mr Taffs observed, however, that the manner in which the appellant has used video footage would leave open the significant risk that, no matter what restriction applied to the appellant’s location when playing Airsoft, objectionable footage would emerge (quite possibly through others) to retraumatise members of the Muslim community.
[63] I accept Mr Taffs’ submission in that regard. The appellant found a way, very soon after the murders and other crimes of 15 March 2019, both to trivialise and to glorify horrific crimes against a particular community. The fact that the killer’s acts are now, by virtue of his guilty pleas, able to be formally characterised as crimes, serves to reinforce conclusions earlier reached in regard to the avoidance of further trauma to members of Christchurch’s Muslim community.
[64] In the circumstances, Judge O’Driscoll correctly found the comprehensive nature of condition (e) to be appropriate.
Outcome
[65] The appellant has not demonstrated any error in the District Court’s imposition of special conditions.
Order
[66]I dismiss the appeal.
Osborne J
Solicitors:
A M S Williams, Barrister, Christchurch Raymond Donnelly, Christchurch
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