IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA42/06
BETWEENAOTEAROA KIWIFRUIT EXPORT LIMITED
First ApplicantANDIAN MCNAUGHTON & ORS
Second ApplicantANDMANUAL MORGAN, HAAKA MORGAN AND RITA MORGAN AS TRUSTEES OF TE HAUAURU LANDS TRUST
Third ApplicantANDKAIWAI KIWIFRUIT CORPORATION LIMITED
Fourth ApplicantANDMAPU KIWIFRUIT CORPORATION LIMITED
Fifth Applicant
ANDSOUTHLINK LIMITED
First RespondentANDZESPRI GROUP LIMITED
Second Respondent
Hearing:7 August 2006
Court:William Young P, Robertson and Arnold JJ
Counsel:G J Christie for Applicants
B D Gray QC for Respondents
Judgment:23 August 2006 at 11am
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A Leave to appeal is granted.
B The time for lodging the appeal is 13 October 2006.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Robertson J)
Introduction
[1] The applicants seek special leave to appeal out of time under r 29(4) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005.
Facts
[2] Zespri, the second respondent, is a statutory body that was created to be a single-desk purchaser and marketer of New Zealand Kiwifruit. It is the only entity permitted to export kiwifruit to overseas markets, except Australia.
[3] The second to fifth applicants are kiwifruit growers who supplied kiwifruit to the first applicant, Aotearoa Kiwifruit Export Ltd (AKE). AKE organised the sale of the growers’ kiwifruit for export. AKE could sell to Australia, but had to sell fruit to Zespri if they wanted the fruit to go to other export markets. Sales by AKE to Zespri were effected through Southlink (the first respondent), a logistics company. AKE contracted with Southlink and Southlink contracted with Zespri.
[4] In 2001, Zespri discovered that fruit initially exported to Australia from New Zealand was being on-shipped to the lucrative Asian markets. Some of this fruit was AKE fruit. In July 2002 Zespri instructed Southlink to stop collecting kiwifruit from AKE. This lock-down occurred at the height of the export season. Much of the fruit not picked up spoiled. The applicants brought proceedings in the High Court for damages arising from this loss.
[5] On 3 February 2006, Winkelmann J found that Zespri breached r 9 of the Kiwifruit Export Regulations 1999 by unjustifiably discriminating against the growers for punitive and disciplinary reasons. However, the Judge found that the applicants were not entitled to recover damages for this breach of the statutory duty. She also held that the growers were not entitled to damages for breach of contract as AKE had a contract with Southlink not Zespri.
[6] The applicants filed an appeal within the required 20 working days, however, because of an oversight, they failed to serve notice on the respondents within that period. Under r 31 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules, an appeal is not “brought” until the notice of appeal has been filed and served.
[7] Accordingly, special leave is required before the applicants can appeal Winkelmann J’s decision.
Contentions of the parties
[8] The applicants submit that special leave to appeal should be granted because:
(a)Notice was not served on the respondents because of an oversight by the serving solicitor;
(b)The…
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- Case
- [2006] NZCA 225
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the applicants were entitled to special leave to appeal out of time and whether the substantive grounds of appeal were hopeless. The applicants submitted that special leave to appeal should be granted because notice was not served on the respondents because of an oversight by the serving solicitor, the notice of appeal was served only six working days after the expiry of the twenty working day period, and the respondents did not suffer any significant prejudice as a result of the delay. The respondents submitted that leave should not be granted as the substantive grounds of appeal were hopeless. The court concluded that the applicants had an arguable case and that the merits of the case ought to be assessed in an appeal. The court was persuaded that there was an argument that the Judge may have misunderstood some of the accounting evidence, overlooked the effect of the audits conducted and misunderstood the loss claimed. Even on her assessment, she appeared to acknowledge justification for at least a modest amount of damages. The court concluded that the matter was not hopeless, even on the question of causation and loss. Leave to appeal should therefore be granted.
The court granted leave to appeal out of time and ordered that the appeal be lodged by 13 October 2006. There was no order as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicants filed an appeal within the required 20 working days but failed to serve notice on the respondents within that period due to an oversight by the serving solicitor. Under rule 31 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules, an appeal is not considered "brought" until the notice of appeal has been filed and served. As a result, the applicants needed special leave to appeal out of time under rule 29(4) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether leave to appeal should be granted out of time under rule 29(4) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005.
2. Whether the substantive appeal has merit, specifically regarding the interpretation of statutory duties, enforceability of contracts, causation, and quantum of damages.
Held
1. Leave to appeal should be granted out of time under rule 29(4) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005. The Court of Appeal determined that the applicants had an arguable case and that the merits of the case should be assessed in an appeal. Therefore, leave to appeal was granted.
2. The substantive appeal has merit regarding the interpretation of statutory duties, enforceability of contracts, causation, and quantum of damages. The Court found that there was an argument that the Judge may have misunderstood some of the accounting evidence, overlooked the effect of the audits conducted, and misunderstood the loss claimed. The Court could not conclude that the matter was hopeless, even on the question of causation and loss.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal considered the application for special leave to appeal out of time under rule 29(4) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005. The applicants sought leave because of an oversight by the serving solicitor, which caused the notice of appeal to not be served within the required period. The Court noted that leave is likely to be granted in the absence of significant prejudice to the other party and if the appeal does not appear hopeless. In this case, the Court found that the respondents did not suffer any significant prejudice and that the substantive grounds of appeal were not hopeless. The Court was persuaded that there was an argument that the Judge may have misunderstood some of the accounting evidence, overlooked the effect of the audits conducted, and misunderstood the loss claimed. Therefore, the Court concluded that the applicants had an arguable case and that the merits of the case ought to be assessed in an appeal. The ratio decidendi of this case is that leave to appeal out of time may be granted if the appeal is not hopeless and significant prejudice to the other party is absent, even where the grounds of appeal challenge findings of fact. The Court followed the principles established in Havanaco Ltd v Stewart and RPNZ Ltd v Real Estate Institute of New Zealand Inc, applying them to the specific circumstances of this case.