| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA |
| SC 105/2023 [2023] NZSC 130 |
| BETWEEN | STEPHEN GILBERT ANDERSON |
| AND | NZI INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCES LIMITED, NZI SECURITIES LIMITED |
| Court: | Glazebrook, O’Regan and Kós JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 2 October 2023 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
This is the applicant’s third application for leave to appeal to this Court.[1] All three applications essentially concern the 1988 mortgagee sale of the applicant’s farm by the respondent lenders, following the applicant’s default under instruments of loan. Thereafter the applicant was adjudicated bankrupt and the respondents were restructured and liquidated.
[1]Anderson v NZI International Acceptances Ltd [2022] NZSC 85 (O’Regan, Ellen France and Kós JJ) [First application]; and Anderson v NZI International Acceptances Ltd [2023] NZSC 64 (O’Regan, Ellen France and Kós JJ) [Second application].
The first application was for leave to appeal the 2022 refusal of the Court of Appeal to recall its 2006 decision declining to give directions to reactivate proceedings brought by the applicant in the High Court in 1987. The 1987 proceedings are long extinct.[2]
[2]Second application, above n 1, at [12].
The second application was in substance an application to bring an appeal direct from a 1999 High Court judgment striking out a second set of proceedings brought by the applicant that year, challenging the 1988 mortgagee sale. The 1999 judgment was not appealed at the time. The respondents have long ago been liquidated in the ordinary course of a commercial restructuring. The land was acquired by a bona fide third-party purchaser 35 years ago, in 1988. The 1999 proceedings were struck out, rather than discontinued, and any appeal therefrom was long out of time.[3]
[3]At [13].
This third application for leave to appeal concerns yet another attempt by the applicant to breathe life into the extinct 1987 proceedings. He applied in the High Court for damages arising from the grant of an interim injunction in the course of those proceedings. Dunningham J struck the application out as an abuse of process.[4] The Court of Appeal struck out the applicant’s appeal for similar reasons.[5] It involved a continued attempt by the applicant, relying on a 1987 interim injunction that briefly stopped the mortgagee sale, to contend that the predatory behaviour of the respondents led to a disadvantageous sale and resulted in his creditors remaining unpaid.[6] It said:[7]
We are satisfied that this appeal is yet another attempt to relitigate a closed proceeding. As such it is a plain abuse of process. It is struck out.
[5]Anderson v NZI International Acceptances Ltd [2023] NZCA 463 (Miller and Brown JJ).
[6]At [6].
[7]At [7].
The applicant’s fundamental argument in the present application is that the 1988 mortgagee sale infringed the terms of the 1987 interim injunction because that was made in terms “until further…
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- Case
- [2023] NZSC 130
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the 1988 mortgagee sale infringed the terms of the 1987 interim injunction, and whether the proposed appeal involved any matter of general or public importance. The court had to determine if the injunction's terms were breached and if the proposed appeal was necessary in the interests of justice. The court also had to consider if the appeal involved a matter of general or public importance, and if there was a likelihood of a substantial miscarriage of justice if the appeal was not heard.
The Supreme Court found that the applicant's argument was misconceived. The injunction restrained the respondents from executing their power of sale pursuant to the two defective notices under the Property Law Act dated August 14, 1987. The court noted that the 1987 judgment recognised the possibility that fresh Property Law Act notices might be issued, giving the applicant time to remedy the breach. The court was satisfied that it was not necessary in the interests of justice to hear and determine the proposed appeal as it did not involve any matter of general or public importance, and there was no likelihood that a substantial miscarriage of justice would arise if the proposed appeal was not heard. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
The final orders of the court were that the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and no award of costs was made because no submissions were required of the respondents.
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