| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI |
| SC 5/2022 [2022] NZSC 40 |
| BETWEEN | ALEXANDRA JOHNSTON AND GRAHAM WESLEY JOHNSTON |
| AND | AUCKLAND COUNCIL |
| Court: | William Young, Glazebrook and O’Regan JJ |
Counsel: | Applicants in person |
Judgment: | 6 April 2022 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
The applicants were convicted after a Judge‑alone trial in the District Court on two charges under s 57(2) of the Dog Control Act 1996 (the Act).[1] Section 57(2) provides that the owner of a dog that attacks a person, stock, poultry, domestic animal, or protected wildlife commits an offence.
[1]Auckland Council v Johnston [2021] NZDC 6929 (Judge Munro). Judge Munro fined the applicants $750 and ordered reparation totalling $300, as well as making an order under s 57(3) of the Act for the destruction of the dog.
The incident that led to the charges involved the applicants’ dog entering two private properties and killing a chicken and a guinea pig.
The applicants unsuccessfully appealed to the High Court.[2]
[2]Johnston v Auckland Council [2021] NZHC 3363 (Wylie J) [HC judgment].
They now seek leave to bring a leapfrog appeal to this Court against the High Court decision. Under s 75 of the Senior Courts Act 2016, this Court must not grant leave for a leapfrog appeal unless satisfied not only that the appeal standard in s 74 is met but also that there are exceptional circumstances justifying taking the proposed appeal directly to this Court.
The applicants say they wish to seek answers to the following questions of law if leave to appeal is granted:
(a)What is the mental element (or mens rea) of the offence created by s 57(2) of the Dog Control Act?
(b)Does s 5(1)(g) of the Act impose liability and negligence in respect of the offences under s 57(2)?
(c)Is strict liability for the offences under s 57(2) of the Act inconsistent with the right to be presumed innocent guaranteed by s 25(c) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990?
These are not suitable questions for the granting of leave because they are abstract and not tied to the facts of the case. But it is clear they are directed to the essence of the applicants’ dissatisfaction with the District Court and High Court decisions, namely that both Courts found the applicants had committed the s 57(2) offence on the basis of strict liability.
The applicants wish to argue that the s 57(2) offence is not a strict liability offence and that the Crown should be required to prove mens rea. This explains their first question. A similar point was raised in a recent application for leave to appeal to this Court, Newlands v Nelson City Council, in respect of which leave was refused.[3] In Newlands, this Court referred to the observation made by the Court of Appeal in Epiha v Tauranga City Council that…
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- Case
- [2022] NZSC 40
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Supreme Court held that the applicants' questions were not suitable for the granting of leave because they were abstract and not tied to the facts of the case. The court observed that the applicants' dissatisfaction stemmed from the finding that the s 57(2) offence was one of strict liability. The court referred to the settled law that offences under s 57(2) are strict liability offences. The court did not see the applicants' argument that the s 57(2) offence was not one of strict liability and that the Crown should be required to prove mens rea as having sufficient prospect of success. The court also held that s 5(1)(g) of the Act did not impose criminal liability or qualify the scope of the offence created by s 57(2). The court found that the applicants' argument that s 57(2) should be interpreted in light of s 25(c) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act did not raise a point of public importance or was sufficiently arguable to justify a further appeal.
The Supreme Court held that it was not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal. The court found that none of the requirements of s 74 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 was made out, let alone the "exceptional circumstances" requirement set out in s 75 of the Senior Courts Act in relation to leapfrog appeals. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
The Supreme Court did not make any final orders in this case. The applicants' convictions and sentences remained in place.
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