| NOTE: ANY REPORT OF THIS PROCEEDING MUST COMPLY WITH |
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI O AOTEAROA |
| SC 122/2023 [2024] NZSC 3 |
| BETWEEN | IAN ADAMSON AND KATE JONES |
| AND | JAMES ROBINSON |
| Court: | Glazebrook, Ellen France and Kós JJ |
Counsel: | Applicants in person |
Judgment: | 5 February 2024 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
BThe applicants must pay the respondent one set of costs of $2,500.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
The applicants seek leave to appeal a decision of Gilbert J in the Court of Appeal declining review of a decision of a Deputy Registrar not to extend time to apply to dispense with security for costs.[1] The underlying claim in the High Court was an application for habeas corpus, purportedly on behalf of a child subject to an interim parenting order made by the Family Court.[2] The order gives day-to-day care of the child to Ms Jones and some weekend and holiday contact to Mr Robinson.
[1]Adamson v Robinson [2023] NZCA 531 [CA judgment].
[2]Adamson v Robinson [2023] NZHC 2115 (Gwyn J).
The proposed appeal does not meet the criteria for leave. As Miller J had earlier observed in the Court of Appeal, the appeal there was an attempt to relitigate a parenting order made by the Family Court when the applicants had a remedy in that Court.[3] The proposed appeal in this Court would turn on its own facts and involves no matter of general or public importance.[4] The Treaty of Waitangi argument now advanced by the applicants does not alter that conclusion where there is nothing to suggest security for costs was set here without due (and therefore equal) regard to economic capacity. There is no apparent substantial miscarriage of justice arising from the decision below.[5] It is not therefore necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear and determine the appeal.[6]
Result
[3]See CA judgment, above n 1, at [3].
[4]Senior Courts Act 2016, s 74(2)(a).
[5]Section 74(2)(b).
[6]Section 74(1).
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
The applicants must pay the respondent one set of costs of $2,500.
Solicitors:
Chris Nicholls, Lower Hutt for Respondent
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- Case
- [2024] NZSC 3
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Supreme Court considered whether the appeal met the criteria for leave under the Senior Courts Act 2016. The Court found that the appeal did not involve a matter of general or public importance, nor did it present a substantial miscarriage of justice. The Court noted that the applicants had an available remedy in the Family Court and that the proposed appeal was an attempt to relitigate a parenting order. Additionally, the Court found that the applicants' Treaty of Waitangi argument did not change the outcome. The Court concluded that it was not necessary in the interests of justice for the Supreme Court to hear and determine the appeal. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicants to pay the respondent one set of costs amounting to $2,500. The Court emphasised that the applicants had a remedy available to them in the Family Court and that the proposed appeal did not meet the criteria for leave to appeal under the Senior Courts Act 2016. The Court also found that there was no substantial miscarriage of justice arising from the decision of the Court of Appeal. As a result, the applicants were not granted leave to appeal, and they were ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
This decision underscores the importance of the criteria for leave to appeal and the Court's reluctance to allow appeals that merely seek to relitigate issues already decided by a lower court. The Court's decision also highlights the need for parties to pursue available remedies within the appropriate court rather than attempting to circumvent the process through an appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter has previously been heard by Gwyn J in the High Court where an interim parenting order was made. Adamson and Jones appealed the decision of the Deputy Registrar not to extend time to apply to dispense with security for costs to the Court of Appeal, which was dismissed by Gilbert J. Adamson and Jones now seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand against the Court of Appeal's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the applicants are granted leave to appeal the Court of Appeal's decision declining review of the Deputy Registrar's decision.
2. Whether the appeal involves a matter of general or public importance.
3. Whether there is a substantial miscarriage of justice arising from the decision below.
Held
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The appeal does not involve a matter of general or public importance.
3. There is no substantial miscarriage of justice arising from the decision below.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed the application for leave to appeal the Court of Appeal's decision declining review of a Deputy Registrar's decision. The applicants sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeal's decision, which had declined to review a decision by a Deputy Registrar not to extend time to apply to dispense with security for costs. The underlying claim was an application for habeas corpus on behalf of a child subject to an interim parenting order made by the Family Court.
The Court found that the proposed appeal did not meet the criteria for leave. The applicants had a remedy in the Family Court and the appeal would merely be an attempt to relitigate a parenting order made by that Court. The Court noted that the appeal in the Court of Appeal had been similarly dismissed, as observed by Miller J. The Supreme Court held that the proposed appeal would turn on its own facts and involve no matter of general or public importance.
The Court also determined that the Treaty of Waitangi argument advanced by the applicants did not change the conclusion that the appeal did not meet the criteria for leave. The Court found no evidence to suggest that security for costs had been set without due regard to economic capacity. Additionally, the Court found no apparent substantial miscarriage of justice arising from the decision below. Consequently, it was not necessary in the interests of justice for the Court to hear and determine the appeal.
The Court's reasoning was based on the criteria for leave to appeal as set out in the Senior Courts Act 2016, specifically sections 74(2)(a) and (b), and section 74(1). The Court departed from granting leave to appeal as it did not find the appeal to be of general or public importance or to involve a substantial miscarriage of justice. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that leave to appeal will not be granted if the appeal does not meet the criteria set out in the Senior Courts Act 2016, even if the applicant argues that the decision below may have been influenced by the Treaty of Waitangi.