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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA324/07
[2007] NZCA 598BETWEENWIREMU PIKITEKAHA ABRAHAM
Appellant
ANDDISTRICT COURT AT AUCKLAND
First RespondentANDCOMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE
Second Respondent
Hearing:11 October 2007
Court:Arnold, Ronald Young and Fogarty JJ
Counsel:P Davey for Appellant
A Markham and N Malarao for Commissioner of Inland Revenue
Judgment:21 December 2007 at 12 pm
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The appeal is allowed.
BThe decision of the District Court is quashed. The appellant’s application for leave to withdraw his guilty plea is referred back to the District Court for reconsideration in the light of this judgment.
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Arnold J)
Table of Contents
Para No.
Introduction [1]
Background [4]THE DECISIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW [16]
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK [27]Discussion [33]
Nullity [41]
Miscarriage of justice [61]
Decision [68]Introduction
[1] The appellant pleaded guilty to 18 charges under the Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA) relating to the filing of false tax returns. Prior to being sentenced, however, he applied under s 42 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (SPA) to withdraw his guilty pleas. Judge Gittos refused the application: DC AK CRI-2004-034-000201 6 November 2006. The appellant sought judicial review of the Judge’s decision. Stevens J dismissed that application: HC AK CIV 2006-404-007599 15 June 2007. The appellant now appeals against that dismissal.
[2] Although the charges were laid summarily, they carry a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. As a consequence, under s 66(1) of the SPA and s 24(e) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), the appellant was entitled to elect trial by jury.
[3] It was common ground in the Courts below that, prior to entering his guilty pleas, the appellant was not advised by the District Court of his right to elect trial by jury, as required by s 66(2) of the SPA. The issue is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the District Court’s refusal of leave to withdraw the guilty pleas was unlawful (using that as a compendious expression to cover the grounds of judicial review). That depends, in part at least, on the effect of s 204 of the SPA.
Background
[4] The appellant is a truck driver. He incorporated a company, W Abrahams Holdings Ltd, for the purpose of carrying on his trucking business. He was the sole director of the company, which was registered for goods and services tax (GST).
[5] On 1 April 2004 the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) initiated prosecutions against the appellant and the company. The charges against the company were that it had knowingly filed false GST returns (income from the business was omitted) with the intent to evade the payment of GST, contrary to s 143B(1)(c) and (f) of the TAA. (These charges were not pursued as the company ceased trading and was removed from the Register.) The charges against the appellant were that he had aided the company in filing the…
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- Case
- [2007] NZCA 598
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the District Court's refusal to allow the appellant to withdraw his guilty pleas was unlawful. The Court examined whether the non-compliance with section 66(2) of the SPA rendered the guilty pleas a nullity or constituted a miscarriage of justice.
The Court concluded that the District Court's failure to inform the appellant of his right to elect a trial by jury did not result in a nullity, but rather, the question was whether there was a miscarriage of justice. The Court emphasised that an accused's decision to plead guilty may be influenced by their understanding of the mode of trial available to them, and in this case, the failure to give the appellant the opportunity to exercise his right to a jury trial was capable of constituting a miscarriage of justice. The Court allowed the appeal, quashed the District Court's decision, and directed the District Court to reconsider the appellant's application in light of this judgment.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi