IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2023-404-2773
[2024] NZHC 1165
BETWEEN A-WARD LIMITED
Applicant
AND
RAW METAL CORP PTY LIMITED
Respondent
Hearing: On the papers Appearances:
S D Campbell for Applicant
C Jiang and M K Brady for Respondent
Judgment:
10 May 2024
JUDGMENT OF O’GORMAN J
[as to costs]
This judgment was delivered by me on 10 May 2024 at 3 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
…………………………………
Solicitors:
Wynn Williams, Christchurch Tompkins Wake, Auckland
A-WARD LIMITED v RAW METAL CORP PTY LIMITED [2024] NZHC 1165 [10 May 2024]
Overview
[1] In a judgment dated 9 April 2024, I declined an application by A-Ward Ltd seeking an anti-suit injunction to prevent the continuation of a claim against it by an Australian company, Raw Metal Corp Pty Ltd, commenced before the Federal Court of Australia, Queensland Registry.
[2] Given that result, I determined that the respondent is entitled to costs and made a timetable for memoranda to be filed if agreement could not be reached between them.
Party positions
[3] The parties have filed a joint memorandum as to costs dated 3 May 2024 recording agreement on the calculation of scale costs on a 2B basis, being $7,648 for steps opposing the application and attending the hearing, plus disbursements of $160.
[4]However, the parties are in dispute in respect of the following:
(a)The timing of payment:
(i)The applicant’s position is that, even if the amount can be fixed now, costs should not be payable until the conclusion of the substantive matter. This is because the applicant takes the position that the costs will be claimable under the substantive causes of action, including indemnity entitlements.
(ii)In contrast, the respondent says that there are no special circumstances justifying any departure from the general principle in r 14.8 that costs of interlocutory applications are fixed when the application is determined, and payable when fixed. Even if the applicant ultimately establishes a contractual indemnity entitlement, it does not follow that this will include an ability to recoup costs for the unsuccessful interlocutory application. The respondent’s position is that an application for an anti-suit injunction that is simply not available under the
TTPA regime does not fall within the scope of any indemnity. The assessment of whether the Court has jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction is not something that will be reassessed in the substantive proceeding, so this distinguishes the rationale for deferring costs in summary judgment and other similar interim contexts.
(b)The respondent also seeks additional costs for the memorandum of costs in the sum of $956 on the basis that costs on costs awards can be made.1
Legal principles
[5] Rule 14.8 of the High Court Rules 2016 creates a presumption that costs on opposed interlocutory applications are to be fixed by the court when the application is determined. In Chapman v Badon Ltd the Court of Appeal said:2
[12]… Apart from applications…
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- Case
- [2024] NZHC 1165
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the High Court Rules 2016, which establish a presumption that costs on opposed interlocutory applications are fixed when the application is determined and payable when fixed. The Court of Appeal in Chapman v Badon Ltd reinforced that the merits of interlocutory applications and substantive proceedings are distinct matters. The court noted that while costs on costs are uncommon, they can be awarded in certain circumstances. The applicant argued that costs should be deferred until the substantive matter concludes, suggesting that any costs could be claimed under the substantive causes of action. In contrast, the respondent maintained that there were no special circumstances justifying a departure from the general principle and that the rationale for deferring costs in summary judgment and similar interim contexts did not apply.
The court ruled that deferring payment of costs was inappropriate in this case. It concluded that awarding costs now did not preclude the applicant from seeking to recover them in the substantive causes of action. The court also found that the merits of any indemnity claim were separate from the general principle of costs. It declined to award additional costs for the memorandum of costs. Consequently, the court awarded the respondent costs in the agreed amounts, totalling $7,648 plus disbursements of $160, as outlined in the joint memorandum dated 3 May 2024. The court did not award costs for the joint memorandum.