A v Police HC Auckland CRI 2010-404-145
[2010] NZHC 1364
•22 June 2010
This case has been anonymized
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CRI 2010-404-145
A
Appellant
v
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 21June 2010
Appearances: M E Read for the Appellant
K V Mills for the Respondent
Judgment: 22 June 2010 at 2:00 pm
RESERVED JUDGMENT OF COURTNEY J
This judgment was delivered by me on 22 June 2010
at 2:00 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………………….
Solicitors: Crown Solicitors, PO Box 2213, Auckland 1140
Counsel: M E Read, Level 8, Hobson Chambers, 28 Hobson Street, Auckland 1140
A V POLICE HC AK CRI 2010-404-145 22 June 2010
[1] Mr A was disqualified from driving for one year and one day following conviction in the District Court at Manukau on his third charge of driving with excess blood alcohol under s 56(2) Land Transport Act 1998 (LTA). Judge Clapham refused his application under s 94 LTA for the disqualification to be substituted with a community based sentence. Mr A appeals that decision.
[2] As is apparent from the Judge’s memorandum 28 April 2010, Mr A ’s application was dealt with on a very busy list day in the District Court which gave little time for reflection by the sentencing Judge. The Judge’s essential reasons are captured at [9] of his decision:
[9] In my view the overriding interests here are those of the public. It is inappropriate for a third offender in my view to have the advantage of this section when the level is so high that at 600, where there is no urgency or other requirement relating to the circumstances of the driving, that a straight forward requirement, as it is on all members of the public, not to drink and drive and particularly not to drive in excess of the permitted limits.
[3] Mr Read submitted that there were two errors of fact made by the sentencing Judge. The first was that he described the appellant as having acknowledged consuming “three bottles of beer”. In the appellant’s affidavit, however, his concession was to having consumed no more than “four pints”. This error does not, however, appear to have had any material effect on any aspect of the decision because whatever amount Mr A consumed is reflected in the breath alcohol level.
[4] The second error of fact the Judge is said to have made was to have described the breath alcohol reading of 612 micrograms of alcohol per litre of breath as being “so high”. Mr Read submitted that when the level was considered alongside the level required for confiscation under s 95 (650) and the breath alcohol limit under s 56 (400) a reading of 612, whilst not low, was not high either. I do not consider that the description used constituted an error by the Judge. A reading of 612 against the permitted level of 400 is high.
[5] I do, however, accept Mr Read’s submission that there were errors of law made. The first was not taking proper account of the evidence as to the effect of
disqualification on Mr A . The major plank of Mr A ’s application under s 94 was the likely risk to his employment if an order for disqualification was made because driving formed an important part of his work. Mr A submitted an affidavit by him and one by his employer in support of this ground. However, at [4] the Judge referred only to the “affidavit”. Although the Judge did not identify which affidavit he was referring to, the lack of any reference at all to the evidence about Mr A ’s employment strongly suggests that the employer’s affidavit was overlooked.
[6] Secondly, although the Judge referred to the decision in Clotworthy v Police[1] and Mr Read also relied on that decision in his written submissions, it is apparent that Clotworthy has no direct relevance to an application under s 94; it was concerned with the relevant factors in sentencing for multiple excess breath alcohol offences. The factors to be considered for s 94 application are those identified at s 94(1)(b). Although there is, as might be expected, some overlap between the factors identified in Clotworthy and those identified in s 94(1)(b), to the extent that the Judge relied on Clotworthy as opposed to referring specifically to the factors identified in s 94(1)(b), he was in error.
[1] Clotworthy v Police HC Wanganui CRI-2003-483-13, 25 September 2003, Wild J.
[7] Because of these errors, I turn to consider the merits of the application afresh. Section 94 permits substitution of a commonly based sentence of disqualification where the prerequisites sets out in s 94(1) are satisfied:
(1) This section applies if—
(a) The offender has previously been ordered on conviction for an offence to be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence; and
(b) The court, having regard to—
(i) The circumstances of the case and of the offender; and
(ii) The effectiveness or otherwise of a previous order of disqualification made in respect of the offender; and
(iii) The likely effect on the offender of a further order of disqualification; and
(iv) The interests of the public,—
considers that it would be inappropriate to order that the offender be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence; and
(c) court considers that it would be appropriate to sentence the offender to a community-based sentence in accordance with Part
2 of the Sentencing Act 2002
[8] Section 94(1)(a) was, of course, satisfied. But the Judge had to be satisfied under s 94(1)(b) that disqualification would be inappropriate. Only if satisfied on that score would it be possible to go on to consider whether a community based sentence would have been appropriate.
[9] Mr A relied on s 94(1)(b)(ii), namely that disqualification would have a disproportionately harsh effect on him because it would jeopardise his employment. Mr A and his employer, Mr Mortensen, both swore affidavits in which they state that as a part of Mr A ’s employment he is required to attend to the regular pick-up and delivery of products and also deliver samples and materials to the company’s trade shows and exhibitions. There is, apparently, no capacity within the company for someone else to assume these responsibilities and if Mr A were unable to attend to them, then the company would need to employ another person. That would be regarded with disfavour because of the present economic environment.
[10] However, Mr Mortensen stops short of giving any firm indication that Mr A ’s job would be jeopardised by disqualification. He describes having to employ another person to attend to the duties as “an unwelcome cost” on the business, but does not go further to suggest that there might be consequences for Mr A himself. I do note that in a similar case Tipping J perceived that there might be a reason connected with potential exposure for the employer were such an outcome to be signalled. However, notwithstanding that possible reason in this case, the evidence falls short of satisfying me that the likely effect of an order for disqualification would be to jeopardise Mr A ’s present employment. This is all the more so because, as Ms Mills submitted, Mr A is able to apply for a limited licence which should be able to be couched in terms that accommodate his current work commitments.
[11] There are no other grounds on which it could be said that a period of disqualification would be inappropriate in this case. In the District Court Mr A did raise as a secondary issue the effect on his partner who had recently had surgery. However that was nearly a year ago. There was no updating medical evidence and Mr Read did not rely on this aspect on the appeal.
[12] I do not consider that disqualification was inappropriate. Therefore the prerequisite in s 94(1)(b) was not satisfied and the question whether a community
based sentence would have been appropriate does not arise. The appeal is dismissed.
P Courtney J
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