ZR v NSW Department of Education and Training - [2007] NSWADT 239

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CITATION: ZR v NSW Department of Education and Training [2007] NSWADT 239

DIVISION: General Division

PARTIES: APPLICANT
ZR
RESPONDENT
NSW Department of Education and Training

FILE NUMBER: 063440

HEARING DATES: On the papers

SUBMISSIONS CLOSED: 25 July 2007

DATE OF DECISION:
5 October 2007

BEFORE: Pearson L - Judicial Member

CATCHWORDS: Jurisdiction

MATTER FOR DECISION: Preliminary matter

LEGISLATION CITED: Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth)
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998

CASES CITED: GA v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2004] NSWADT 254
GA v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADTAP 38
GL v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2003] NSWADT 166
JD v Department of Health (GD) [2005] NSWADTAP 44
Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 79 FCR 400
McGovern v Ku-ring-gai Council & Anor [2007] NSWLEC 22
MG v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2004] NSWADTAP 45

REPRESENTATION:
APPLICANT
In person
RESPONDENT
J McDonnell, solicitor
OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER
T Lloyd

ORDERS: 1. The disclosure of the name or any other material which identifies, or may lead to the identification of the applicant, the school, or any other person referred to in these proceedings, is prohibited.; 2. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the conduct the subject of the applicant’s application for internal review. ; 3. Matter listed for a further planning meeting on 30 October 2007 at 10a.m.

1 On 4 April 2006 the respondent received an application for Internal Review under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (the PPIP Act). The application was signed by the applicant on 25 March 2006. The applicant identified the conduct she was complaining about in the following terms:

2. The publication of information about me that is false, unsubstantiated and misleading, which places me in a negative light in the public eye.

2 The issues arise from a meeting of the X School Parents and Citizens Association (XP&C) on 10 September 2005. On 13 September 2005 Mr ZS, Deputy Principal of X School, wrote a letter to the applicant, referring to concerns about what took place at the XP&C meeting. In that letter ZS stated that he had “passed on [his] concerns” to Ms AB, the President of the XP&C. The applicant wrote to the Minister for Education and Training, and the matter was referred to the Director, School and Regional Policy, who undertook an inquiry. On 10 November 2005 ZS wrote to the applicant, and withdrew his letters sent to the applicant and to Ms AB.

3 Part 4 of the Internal Review Application form is headed “What is the specific conduct you are complaining about?” In that part of the form the applicant gave details of the background to her raising concerns at the XP&C meeting on 10 September 2005, and noted that she had received a letter from ZS on 15 September 2005 “which notified me that a complaint about me was to be sent to the P&C President with the expectation that it would be tabled at the next meeting”. The applicant noted that she had not seen a copy of the letter to the XP&C President until access was provided in December 2005 under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (the FOI Act), and stated:

Because of the defamatory nature of the 2nd letter, I lodged a complaint with the DET and understood it would be managed according to the 'Responding to Suggestions, Complaints and Allegations' Policy ensuring me the appropriate confidentiality while it was being investigated. However, a letter was publicly distributed by the [X] Branch of the teachers' Federation to the School Education Officer and members of the P&C Executive, School Council Executive, school employees and Teachers' Federation on 19 October 2005. All P&C members attending the meeting were aware that the comments were specifically targeting me.

Clearly information had been given to the staff, which breached my right to privacy and was publicised in the letter, namely:

1. the fact that I made a complaint to the Department concerning the correspondence received from [ZS]. Under the Policy “Responding to Suggestions, Complaints and Allegations” (p.36) any person making a complaint is entitled to confidentiality and it is the responsibility of the person who is allocated to investigate this complaint, to ensure this occurs.

2. revealing that fact that I had written confidential letters to two head teachers and misrepresenting their intent. They contain no personal comments that seek to deliberately undermine the integrity of the Deputy Principal other than might arise from defending myself against unsubstantiated and untrue defamatory statements, which I am within my rights to do. At the time of writing the letters, as you know, I was not even aware of the exact nature of the letter written to [AB] of the P&C nut only the rumours that I heard were being circulated about me.

4 The applicant provided further detail of her concerns about the content of the letter dated 19 October 2005.

5 Part 6 of the Application for Internal Review Form asks "When did the conduct occur?" The applicant stated "Dates as shown on letters supplied". Part 7 asks "When did you first become aware of this conduct?", and the applicant stated:

Letter 2 sent under FOI legislation

Letter 3 seen on 19 October 2005

6 Part 8 states:

You need to lodge this application within 6 months of the date you have written at Q8. If more than 6 months has passed, you need to ask the agency for special permission to lodge a late application. If you need to, write here to explain why you have taken more than 6 months to make your complaint.

7 In response the applicant wrote "N/A".

8 On 30 November 2006 the respondent’s Director, Legal Services, advised the applicant that as the officer appointed by the respondent under s53(4) of the PPIP Act, he had considered an investigation report provided by Ms K Morgan, Acting Legal Officer, and, on behalf of the respondent, accepted its findings and recommended actions.

9 The Internal Review Report prepared by Ms Morgan noted that there had been correspondence with the applicant to clarify the scope of the complaint. The Report identified four claimed breaches of the PPIP Act:

2. Breach of confidentiality when writing to staff at X School

3. Publication of information concerning the applicant that is false, unsubstantiated and misleading

4. Correspondence from X Branch of the Teachers' Federation

10 The Internal Review determined that there had been no breach of s16 of the PPIP Act by the letters written by ZS to the applicant and to the P&C President; that there had been no breach of s18 by the letter written to the applicant; and that while there had been a breach of s18 by the letter to the P&C President, that breach was not at the serious end of the spectrum. The Internal Review determined that it was questionable whether the letters sent by the applicant to two teachers at X School on 19 September 2005 were "held" by the respondent; and that even on the assumption that they were, the information in the letters was not held in breach of s17 of the PPIP Act. In relation to information provided to X Teachers Federation, any information communicated at a meeting of the Teachers Federation would not have been communicated in the capacity of an employee of the respondent.

11 The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review on 19 December 2006. In accordance with the Tribunal's practice, planning meetings were scheduled. At the first planning meeting directions were made concerning filing and serving of witness statements and submissions. At the second planning meeting the respondent's representative raised a jurisdictional issue, namely that to the extent that the applicant was complaining about the letters written by ZS in September 2005, the application for internal review had been made more than 6 months after the applicant became aware of the conduct, and that as a consequence the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review that part of the complaint. I made directions for filing and serving of submissions, and determined that the jurisdictional issue should be dealt with as a preliminary matter, on the papers.

Legislation

12 The Tribunal's jurisdiction is conferred by s55 of the PPIP Act:

(1) If a person who has made an application for internal review under section 53 is not satisfied with:

(b) the action taken by the public sector agency in relation to the application,

(2) On reviewing the conduct of the public sector agency concerned, the Tribunal may decide not to take any action on the matter, or it may make any one or more of the following orders:

(b) an order requiring the public sector agency to refrain from any conduct or action in contravention of an information protection principle or a privacy code of practice,

(c) an order requiring the performance of an information protection principle or a privacy code of practice,

(d) an order requiring personal information that has been disclosed to be corrected by the public sector agency,

(e) an order requiring the public sector agency to take specified steps to remedy any loss or damage suffered by the applicant,

(f) an order requiring the public sector agency not to disclose personal information contained in a public register,

(g) such ancillary orders as the Tribunal thinks appropriate.

(4) The Tribunal may make an order under subsection (2) (a) only if:

(b) the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has suffered financial loss, or psychological or physical harm, because of the conduct of the public sector agency.

(b) the application relates to conduct of a public sector agency in relation to the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate, and

(c) the conduct occurred while the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate was a convicted inmate, or relates to any period during which the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate was a convicted inmate.

(6) The Privacy Commissioner is to be notified by the Tribunal of any application made to it under this section.

(7) The Privacy Commissioner has a right to appear and be heard in any proceedings before the Tribunal in relation to a review under this section.

13 The requirements for the internal review referred to in s55 are set out in s53 of the PPIP Act:

(1) A person (the applicant) who is aggrieved by the conduct of a public sector agency is entitled to a review of that conduct.

(2) The review is to be undertaken by the public sector agency concerned.

(3) An application for such a review must:

(b) be addressed to the public sector agency concerned, and

(c) specify an address in Australia to which a notice under subsection (8) may be sent, and

(d) be lodged at an office of the public sector agency within 6 months (or such later date as the agency may allow) from the time the applicant first became aware of the conduct the subject of the application, and

(e) comply with such other requirements as may be prescribed by the regulations.

(b) who is an employee or officer of the agency, and

(c) who is otherwise suitably qualified to deal with the matters raised by the application.

(b) the Privacy Commissioner.

(7) Following the completion of the review, the public sector agency whose conduct was the subject of the application may do any one or more of the following:

(b) make a formal apology to the applicant,

(c) take such remedial action as it thinks appropriate (eg the payment of monetary compensation to the applicant),

(d) provide undertakings that the conduct will not occur again,

(e) implement administrative measures to ensure that the conduct will not occur again.

(b) the application relates to conduct of a public sector agency in relation to the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate, and

(c) the conduct occurred while the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate was a convicted inmate, or relates to any period during which the convicted inmate or former convicted inmate was a convicted inmate.

(b) the action proposed to be taken by the agency (and the reasons for taking that action), and

(c) the right of the person to have those findings, and the agency’s proposed action, reviewed by the Tribunal.

14 The relevant "conduct" for the purposes of the application for review under s53 is set out in s52 of the PPIP Act:

(b) the contravention by a public sector agency of a privacy code of practice that applies to the agency,

(c) the disclosure by a public sector agency of personal information kept in a public register.

15 In written submissions the respondent’s representative set out the four main allegations of breach of the PPIP Act in the following terms:

2. Letter from ZS to the P&C President dated 14 September 2005

3. Letter from X School Teachers Federation to the President of the School Council and others dated 18 October 2005

4. Uses/disclosures by ZS and/or others at/to the Teachers Federation meeting on 18 October 2005.

16 In relation to the letter from ZS to the applicant, the respondent submitted that the complaint was made more than 6 months after the applicant first became aware of this conduct. Had the respondent considered the application of s53(3)(d) to this conduct it would have refused to allow this aspect of the application out of time as it was not a disclosure to which the PPIP Act applied. That was because the prohibition on disclosure in s18 of the PIP Act excludes disclosure to the individual to whom the information relates.

17 In relation to the letter from ZS to the P&C President, the respondent submitted that this complaint was out of time. The applicant's answers to Parts 7 and 8 of the complaint form contained misrepresentations that were fundamental, and had the respondent been aware of the fact of the late application and addressed its mind to s53(3)(d), the respondent would not have allowed the application to be lodged out of time because the alleged contravention of s18, though found on the internal review to have been made out, was of relative insignificance and the applicant had not been honest and frank in her responses to Parts 7 and 8. The respondent accepted that the applicant had not seen the letter of 14 September 2005 until access was provided under the FOI Act in December 2005, however the applicant was aware of the conduct. The respondent submitted that as the respondent's decision to allow the applicant to lodge an application for internal review out of time was based on her misrepresentation, that decision was of no effect, and the application for internal review was not a valid application to the extent that it related to conduct being the letter dated 14 September 2005.

18 The respondent made further submissions on substantive issues arising in the application.

Applicant's submissions

19 The applicant’s submissions in relation to the letters by ZS dated 13 September 2005 and 14 September 2005 can be summarised as follows:

- s54(3) indicates that the officer investigating the application should have been qualified to assess all the information in the application and deal with all matters arising, including time frames

- there was no suggestion that any information provided by the applicant during discussions with Ms Morgan was dishonest or misleading

- the respondent did consider the application of s55(3)(d) at the first planning meeting and accepted the internal review decision

- the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review an agency's decision to refuse, or to accept, an out of time internal review application.

20 The applicant acknowledged that she had received the letter addressed to her on more than 6 months before the application for internal review, and documented the date she read the letter. The applicant submitted that she had not asserted that sending the letter breached s18 of the PPIP Act, and that she was not aware that the letter was kept in school files and thus held by the respondent. The applicant submitted in relation to the letter from ZS to the P&C President dated 14 September 2005 that while she knew it existed, it was not until she saw the letter in December 2005 that she discovered it had been written by ZS in his capacity as Deputy Principal and on the school letterhead, and she became aware that it was held on the school files.

Consideration

21 The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under s55 of the PPIP Act has three pre-conditions, summarised by Deputy President Hennessy in GA v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police[2004] NSWADT 254 in the following terms:

- the person must be dissatisfied with the findings of the review or the action taken by the public sector agency in relation to the application; and

- the person must be asking the Tribunal to review the conduct that was the subject of the application.

22 The role of the Tribunal in determining applications made under s55 of the PPIP Act was outlined by the Appeal Panel in JD v Department of Health (GD) [2005] NSWADTAP 44 in the following terms:

114…The Tribunal is clearly not engaged in the review of a reviewable decision. What occurs in this area is that the agency makes an original decision on the action it will take or not take in relation to the complaint. Then the Tribunal makes an original decision going to the same matter, taking account of the agency’s report. What occurs is a second external review of the administrative actions or ‘conduct’ of the agency. The process is one that is connected conceptually to the administrative law theory that underpins a Tribunal of this kind when dealing with cases involving citizens and government, in that it involves the ‘review’ of a species of administrative action being ‘conduct’ rather than a ‘decision’.

23 The information provided by an applicant in a request made under s53 of the PPIP Act for internal review must be sufficient to “identify that, at the least, conduct involving the disclosure of information has been put in issue”: GA v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADTAP 38 at [14]. However, an applicant is not required to identify the precise contravention on which he or she is relying. In GL v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2003] NSWADT 166, Deputy President Hennessy stated:

26…While the conduct listed in s 52(1) is the only conduct that the agency or the Tribunal can review, there is no express or implied requirements for an applicant to identify the precise contravention on which he or she relies. If the contravention is not specified, it is up to the agency, or the Tribunal, to identify the relevant contravention with the assistance of the applicant. Apart from rejecting the respondent’s submission as a matter of statutory construction, there are compelling practical considerations for rejecting it. Applicants will not normally have the benefit of legal advice and it is unrealistic in many cases to require them to interpret and apply statutory provisions. While I acknowledge that it may be difficult for a respondent to review conduct without knowing which provision has allegedly been contravened, this can be addressed by discussing the matter with the applicant. Alternatively, the respondent may be able to anticipate from all the circumstances of the case, the nature of the alleged breach.

24 The information provided by the applicant in the Internal Review Application identified three letters: the letter addressed to her dated 13 September 2005, the letter addressed to Ms AB dated 14 September 2005, and the letter sent by the X branch of the Teachers Federation on 19 October 2005. The applicant complained about the content of the first two letters, stating that they “contain false and unsubstantiated comments” about her. The applicant complained that the contents of the third letter indicated that there had been disclosure of information to school staff, namely that she had made a complaint to the respondent about the first two letters, and that she had written confidential letters to two teachers.

25 The Internal Review Report states:

Attached at TAB 3 is email correspondence between [the applicant] and the investigating officer confirming the investigating officer’s revised understanding of the complaint.

26 There is no copy of the correspondence of 15 May 2006 on the material provided to the Tribunal. The applicant’s reply dated 23 May 2006, and subsequent email messages to the applicant (12 July 2006) and from her (14 July 2006) have been provided. It is clear from this correspondence that its purpose was to enable the applicant to provide further details of her complaints, and to enable the investigating officer to clarify her understanding of the complaint. The possible need for discussion to clarify the contravention which is the subject of a complaint under the PPIP Act was accepted in GL v Director General, Department of Education and Training. The correspondence between the applicant and the investigating officer indicates that the investigating officer was aware at that initial stage in the internal review process that the applicant was concerned about both the content of the letters dated 13 and 14 September 2005, and their circulation, and about subsequent events including the Teachers Federation meeting of 18 October 2005.

27 The requirements for a valid application for internal review are set out in s53(3). An application must be in writing, addressed to the relevant public sector agency, specify an address in Australia, and be lodged at an office of the agency. Section 53(3)(d) of the PPIP Act confers a discretion on an agency to allow an application for internal review of conduct alleged to be in contravention of one or more of the provisions of the PPIP Act to be made more than 6 months after the person became aware of the conduct. A decision to refuse to allow an application made after 6 months is not reviewable by the Tribunal: MG v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2004] NSWADTAP 45. There are no formalities provided in s53, or in the PPIP Act more generally, for a process of application for an extension of time. The wording of s53(3)(d), which refers to the lodgement of an application for internal review “at an office of the public sector agency within 6 months (or such later date as the agency may allow)” suggests that it is the acceptance by an agency of an application lodged after 6 months that matters. Not every response by an agency to the lodgement of an internal review application will constitute an acceptance of it. For example, in GA v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2004] NSWADT 254, the respondent had requested further particulars to enable it to identify the conduct, and the applicant did not respond. Deputy President Hennessy said:

10…Since GA has not identified the conduct about which he is aggrieved in sufficient detail to allow the agency to determine whether there has been a breach of the PPIP Act, he is not entitled to an internal review of that conduct. The agency has requested further particulars but GA has not provided any further information. In those circumstances, the first pre-condition to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (that GA has made an application for internal review under s 53) has not been met.

28 The respondent argues that at the time of filing the application for review in the Tribunal, there had been no valid application for internal review in relation to the conduct represented by the two letters written by Mr ZS. The basis for this submission was that the internal review application form contained misrepresentations, and that had the respondent been aware of the fact of the late application and addressed its mind to s53(3)(d), it would not have allowed the application to be lodged. The respondent relied on decisions of the Land and Environment Court and the Federal Court to support its argument that as a consequence of the misrepresentations, there was no valid application for internal review, at least in so far as it concerned the letters of September 2005.

29 In McGovern v Ku-ring-gai Council & Anor [2007] NSWLEC 22 Pain J considered, and rejected, an argument that the council decision to approve a development application was invalid because it had been obtained by misrepresentation. The misrepresentations were firstly a statement that a document submitted with the development application was “a recent survey plan prepared by a registered surveyor”, when the person who signed the survey was not a registered surveyor; and a statement that a statement of environmental effects related to the development application, when it related to an earlier development application. Pain J accepted that an administrative decision based on a misrepresentation that is fundamental to an administrative decision can give rise to invalidity of that decision. However, in the circumstances of the case before Her Honour, it did not appear that the misrepresentation relied on was fundamental to the decision to approve the development application. The respondent also relied on the decision of the Federal Court in Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 79 FCR 400; [1997] 1313 FCA. That case concerned applicants for citizenship who had provided false information in support of an application that the Minister exercise the discretion conferred by s13(4)(b)(i) of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) to treat periods spent outside Australia as if they had been present. The Minister revoked a certificate issued under s13 on being advised that the information provided was incorrect. Finkelstein J, with whom Beaumont J agreed, held that the decisions having been obtained by misrepresentation were not decisions made in the true exercise of the power conferred by s13(1) and could be treated as having no legal effect.

30 In both McGovern and Leung it was accepted that an administrative decision based on a misrepresentation may, but not always, be treated as a nullity. In Leung Finkelstein J referred to the courts having to choose between two competing interests: the desirability for the administration to be able to correct decisions arrived at as a result of an error of law or fact, or where there has been a change in policy, and on the other hand, the real sense of grievance caused by reconsideration of a decision favourable to an individual. There are three reasons why these decisions are distinguishable. First, McGovern concerned a decision to grant development approval, while Leung concerned a decision to grant a certificate of Australian citizenship. Both decisions conferred rights or entitlements on the individuals concerned. In comparison, the relevant “decision” in this matter involves the acceptance of an application for internal review, and not the substantive outcome of the investigation.

31 Secondly, the making of a development application under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) requires compliance with various requirements under the Act and the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000, both as to the form used and the information provided, while in Cheung the information as to the applicants’ activities outside Australia was provided in a written submission accompanying a formal application form. An application for internal review under the PPIP Act is a different matter. The applicant used the Privacy Complaint: Internal Review Application Form available on the website of Privacy NSW. While the website recommends the use of the form, footnote 1 of the form states:

It is not a requirement under the PPIP Act/the HRIP Act that you complete an application form. This form is designed for your convenience only.

32 Thirdly, as noted above, the submission of the application for internal review was followed by discussion between the applicant and the investigating officer. The making of an application for internal review under the PPIP Act is a less formal process than that required in an application for development consent or an application for citizenship. It appears from the decision in Leung that the information provided by the applicants was accepted without investigation by the officer making the recommendation to the Minister, making its reliability crucial to the subsequent decision. As pointed out in GL v Director General, Department of Education and Training, in PPIP Act matters applicants will not normally have the benefit of legal advice when applying for internal review, and there may need to be discussion between the applicant and the agency to clarify the terms of the complaint and to identify precisely what contravention is alleged. That was what occurred in this matter.

33 The respondent submitted that it is open for the Tribunal to draw an inference that the applicant was aware that in answering Parts 7 and 8 on the form she was not answering those questions frankly or honestly. I am not prepared to draw that inference. The applicant has rejected that assertion in her submissions and provided reasons for her understanding of what the form was asking. No oral evidence was taken from which it might be appropriate to make findings as to the applicant’s knowledge or belief. If there was a misrepresentation as to the date or dates on which the applicant became aware of the conduct of which she was complaining, I regard that as arising from the complexity of the context and the various elements of the complaint. Further, I do not regard any such representation as fundamental. The email sent by the investigating officer on 12 July 2006, as part of the process of clarification of the scope of the applicant’s complaint, indicated that she was aware that at least part of the applicant’s complaint concerned the contents of the letters of 13 and 14 September 2005. The investigation proceeded on the basis of that clarification, and its terms were established at the latest by July 2006. Those terms were adopted in the internal review report and determination.

34 I am satisfied that in conducting the investigation into the conduct as clarified by the correspondence between the applicant and the investigating officer, the respondent allowed the lodgement of the application more than 6 months after the date on which the applicant became aware of at least some of the conduct about which she was complaining. The respondent having accepted the application and conducted the investigation, the applicant is entitled, being dissatisfied with the outcome of the review, to have the Tribunal review the conduct that was the subject of the application.

Orders

2. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the conduct the subject of the applicant’s application for internal review.

3. Matter listed for a further planning meeting on 30 October 2007 at 10a.m.

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Citations

ZR v NSW Department of Education and Training [2007] NSWADT 239

Most Recent Citation

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CITATION:	ZR v NSW Department of Education and Training [2007] NSWADT 239
DIVISION:	General Division
PARTIES:	APPLICANT ZR RESPONDENT NSW Department of Education and Training
FILE NUMBER:	063440
HEARING DATES:	On the papers
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	25 July 2007
DATE OF DECISION:	5 October 2007
BEFORE:	Pearson L - Judicial Member
CATCHWORDS:	Jurisdiction
MATTER FOR DECISION:	Preliminary matter
LEGISLATION CITED:	Australian Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth) Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998
CASES CITED:	GA v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2004] NSWADT 254 GA v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADTAP 38 GL v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2003] NSWADT 166 JD v Department of Health (GD) [2005] NSWADTAP 44 Leung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 79 FCR 400 McGovern v Ku-ring-gai Council & Anor [2007] NSWLEC 22 MG v Director General, Department of Education and Training [2004] NSWADTAP 45
REPRESENTATION:	APPLICANT In person RESPONDENT J McDonnell, solicitor OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER T Lloyd
ORDERS:	1. The disclosure of the name or any other material which identifies, or may lead to the identification of the applicant, the school, or any other person referred to in these proceedings, is prohibited.; 2. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the conduct the subject of the applicant’s application for internal review. ; 3. Matter listed for a further planning meeting on 30 October 2007 at 10a.m.