ZJXK and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration)

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ZJXK and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 4682 (22 October 2019)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2019/4954

Re:ZJXK

APPLICANT

AndMinister for Home Affairs

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member D. J. Morris

Date:22 October 2019

Date of written reasons:        6 November 2019

Place:Sydney

At the conclusion of the hearing of this matter on 22 October 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.

...........................[SGD].............................................

Senior Member D. J. Morris

CATCHWORDS

MIGRATION – mandatory cancellation of Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa – substantial criminal record – delegate decides not to revoke mandatory cancellation – consideration of Ministerial Direction No. 79 – primary considerations – other considerations – acquittal of certain offences – certain uncharged matters – crimes against women – whether Tribunal can consider matters where Court has acquitted – decision affirmed – oral decision – written reasons provided

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 33A, 35, 43, 62

Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 53
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 499, 501, 501CA

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 2.52

CASES

Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 33

FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185
Gaspar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 153 ALD 338
Lam and Minister for Immigration [1999] AATA 56
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele [1981] FCA 212; (1982) 5 ALD 135; 102 ALR 19
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor [1982] FCA 99; (1982) 4 ALD 575
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT [1999] FCA 1197; (1999) 91 FCR 234
R v GG [2017] ACTSC 137
Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 22

Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Migration Act 1958 – Direction made under s 499 – Direction No. 65 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA (made 22 December 2014/commenced 23 December 2014)

Migration Act 1958 – Direction made under s 499 – Direction No. 79 - Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA (made 20 December 2018/commenced 28 February 2019)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member D. J. Morris

6 November 2019

  1. In this matter, owing to the nature of the offences of which the Applicant has been convicted, the Tribunal made an order under section 35 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act) prohibiting the publication of his name or information that would tend to identify him. The anonym assigned to the Applicant is ‘ZJXK’ and certain other persons referred to will be de-identified.

  2. ZJXK is aged 58 and is a citizen of New Zealand. He was born in Samoa. He arrived in Australia to settle in 2011, and on arrival was granted a Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa (the visa). The visa is one granted to…

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Details
Case
[2019] AATA 4682
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by ZJXK against the mandatory cancellation of his Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa. The cancellation was based on ZJXK having a substantial criminal record. The delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs had decided not to revoke the cancellation, a decision that was subsequently reviewed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal was required to consider Ministerial Direction No. 79, which outlines primary and other considerations relevant to revocation decisions.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal erred in its consideration of the relevant factors when deciding not to revoke the mandatory visa cancellation. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Tribunal correctly applied Ministerial Direction No. 79, particularly concerning the weight given to primary considerations versus other considerations, and whether it was permissible to consider matters for which ZJXK had been acquitted. The court also considered the impact of uncharged matters and allegations of crimes against women in the assessment.

The court reasoned that while the Tribunal must comply with Ministerial Direction No. 79, it is not limited to the considerations stipulated within it. The Tribunal may consider other reasons for revocation. The court affirmed that the Tribunal was entitled to consider information about a trial where ZJXK was acquitted, citing precedent that such acquittals do not preclude the consideration of the underlying conduct as relevant to general conduct, even if not resulting in a conviction. The court noted that the Tribunal gave no weight to uncharged matters. The Tribunal found that ZJXK failed the character test due to his substantial criminal record and then considered whether there was another reason to revoke the cancellation, applying the principles outlined in the Direction.

The Tribunal affirmed the decision not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of ZJXK's visa. The court found no error in the Tribunal's approach to considering the evidence, including acquitted and uncharged matters, in its assessment of whether there was another reason to revoke the cancellation.

Background

Background to the litigation

Other considerations set out in paragraph 14(1) of the Direction are: ‘International non-refoulement obligations;’ ‘Strength, nature and duration of ties;’ ‘Impact on Australian business interests;’ ‘Impact on victims;’ and ‘Extent of impediments if removed.’ The Direction states that primary considerations should generally be given more weight than the other considerations and that one or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations (see paragraphs 8(4) and 8(5) of the Direction). The Tribunal considered each of the primary considerations and, as relevant, the other considerations.Background to the Applicant’s offending At G4, p 24-33 was the sentencing remarks of Mossop J on 18 May 2017 in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in R v GG [2017] ACTSC 137. The Court assigned the anonym ‘GG’ to the Applicant in those proceedings. His Honour said:The offender is the cousin of the victim’s mother. In mid-2011, the victim moved in with the offender and his wife. She was about to or had just turned 19 years old. She had a young child who was at that time, two or three months old. The victim had a somewhat disrupted childhood. Her evidence was that she had been adopted when very young by her aunt and uncle and lived with them in New Zealand until they moved back to Samoa. She then lived with her biological mother and father. Her mother was the victim of domestic violence and was ultimately murdered by her father. She moved to live with her mother’s cousin in Auckland. After the birth of her child she moved to live with the offender and his wife.The offender and his family took her in to help look after her baby boy. The offender’s wife had four teenage sons from a previous marriage. The offender and his wife also had an 11-year-old daughter. They resided in New Zealand. In 2011 the offender and his wife decided to move the family to Australia. Before the whole family moved, the offender travelled to Australia to set things up before the rest of the family joined him. He decided that his stepson QG and the victim would go with him, leaving the victim’s son behind with the extended family. The victim did not want to travel to Australia but the relationship with the offender was such that she had no choice but to go. She found him scary. Her child remained in New Zealand in the care of the offender’s wife. In Australia they stayed with two Pastors of the Samoan Independent Seventh Day Adventist Church at a house in Weetangera.The offender was very controlling towards the victim. He told her what to do and how to act. She was required to stay at home and do household tasks. He told her how to dress. She was prevented from looking for or securing a job. She was prohibited from talking to any males including those who she met at the church which they attended. The offender would even get angry if she spent too long talking to women at the church. If he was unhappy with how she behaved, he would get angry and slap her across the face. I note the offender’s controlling behaviour was not contested at the trial, indeed it was part of the offender’s case. In the house at Weetangera, the victim shared a room with another woman, VU.Victim’s evidenceThe victim’s evidence was that the sexual assault took place when the offender and his son were at work. The offender had established a tree lopping business. The other people in the house had left to take the elder of the pastors who lived in the house, who was sick and elderly, to hospital. It was around late morning or early afternoon. She was hanging out the washing. The offender came around the side of the house and through the large fence. She was a little frightened because it was not usual for him to come home at that time of the day. He said that they needed to talk inside. He said that she had been behaving weirdly and not listening. He said that she “…had to have sex with him.” Her reaction, as she described it, was “freaking out and scared” and she said “I don’t want to.” He told her that she had to remove her clothes. She refused, so he hit her with his right hand across her face. The victim said she was taking her time to undress and the offender was telling her to hurry up. She took off her T-shirt and jeans. He was standing and continued to shout at her to hurry up. She was hit a second time when she was on the bed with her clothes off. He said to her “Look what I have done. I am going to do this because you don’t listen to me.” He took his clothes off while she was sitting on the bed and lay on top of her. She struggled, but if she didn’t keep still, he hit her. She couldn’t recall how many times she was hit but more than once. He wanted her to kiss him but she refused and turned her head. She continued to struggle but he was too strong. She described him holding her arms down with his legs sitting on her. While she would have been able to cry out, she was scared to do so. She couldn’t recall how long sex went on but it stopped when VU arrived home in her car, which they both heard. He grabbed his clothes and went out the back door. She said that he said to her that she had to “…keep quiet otherwise [she] would find out what he is capable of.” She said that he indicated that the threat was to kill her. She went straight to have a shower when VU arrived. She was left with a lovebite on her neck which she observed when in the shower.The bed was a single bed. Afterwards the sheets and pillows were left everywhere on the floor.She told VU everything that had happened. She showed her the mark on her neck and was visibly shaking when she was telling her. She told VU that the accused had forced her to have sex. VU asked “Are you sure?” She showed her the mark on her neck and the room and VU just stood there.Afterwards, the offender acted normally, like nothing had happened.Evidence was also given by VU, the woman with whom the victim shared a bedroom and who arrived home at the end of the incident. She gave evidence through an interpreter. She said that the victim made a complaint to her as soon as she got home. The complaint was that the offender “forced her”. This was explained as the offender was “trying to have sex with her”. She was asked whether the victim had said in any detail if he actually did have sex with her. VU said “not really at the time”. In cross examination it was suggested to her that in that conversation she didn’t say whether the offender and the complainant had sex. VU agreed with that proposition. VU’s evidence was credible.TQ, the wife of the younger pastor who lived in the house, also gave evidence. While her evidence did shed some light on the meaning of “forced” in Samoan, she did not give evidence of any complaint relating to this incident as opposed to other incidents led as context evidence. Her evidence was that the word translated as “forced” meant forced her to kiss him and touch his private parts.The offender did not give evidence.Consistency of the verdictIn the trial he was found guilty on the charge of assault with intent to engage in sexual intercourse. He was found not guilty of the charge of sexual intercourse without consent. He was found guilty of the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm relating to hitting the victim.The explanation for the difference between the verdict on the first count and the second count must be that the jury accepted the victim’s evidence but could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that what had occurred was sexual intercourse. That was consistent with the examination in chief of VU who had given evidence that she had been told that the offender tried to have sex with her. In cross examination it was put to her that the victim had not said that the offender had had sex with her and she agreed. The explanation for the difference between the verdict on the first count and the second count must be that the jury accepted the victim’s evidence, but in the light of the absence of a specific complaint of actual intercourse made to VU, could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that what had occurred was sexual intercourse, in the sense of penile penetration. Thus the jury’s verdict is consistent with the sexual assault in the third degree having occurred and that there was an attempt to have sexual intercourse but, notwithstanding the evidence of the complainant, the existence of a reasonable doubt as to whether or not that intercourse actually occurred.ConclusionI accept the evidence of the complainant in regard to the assault. I found her evidence to be very convincing, coherent, not overstated, consistent with the other evidence in the case, and given in an unaffected manner. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the incident occurred as described by the victim up until the victim was naked on the bed. Specifically I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that she was struck twice by the offender with the intent of engaging in sexual intercourse with her. In the light of the jury’s verdict I must proceed on the basis that there was no actual intercourse in the sense of penetration of the victim’s genitalia. However I am satisfied in the light of the evidence that there was an intention and attempt to engage in sexual intercourse. It is not possible to determine why the intention was not carried through to actual penetration. The interaction was interrupted when VU arrived home in a car…

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At G4, p 24-33 was the sentencing remarks of Mossop J on 18 May 2017 in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in R v GG [2017] ACTSC 137. The Court assigned the anonym ‘GG’ to the Applicant in those proceedings. His Honour said:The offender is the cousin of the victim’s mother. In mid-2011, the victim moved in with the offender and his wife. She was about to or had just turned 19 years old. She had a young child who was at that time, two or three months old. The victim had a somewhat disrupted childhood. Her evidence was that she had been adopted when very young by her aunt and uncle and lived with them in New Zealand until they moved back to Samoa. She then lived with her biological mother and father. Her mother was the victim of domestic violence and was ultimately murdered by her father. She moved to live with her mother’s cousin in Auckland. After the birth of her child she moved to live with the offender and his wife.The offender and his family took her in to help look after her baby boy. The offender’s wife had four teenage sons from a previous marriage. The offender and his wife also had an 11-year-old daughter. They resided in New Zealand. In 2011 the offender and his wife decided to move the family to Australia. Before the whole family moved, the offender travelled to Australia to set things up before the rest of the family joined him. He decided that his stepson QG and the victim would go with him, leaving the victim’s son behind with the extended family. The victim did not want to travel to Australia but the relationship with the offender was such that she had no choice but to go. She found him scary. Her child remained in New Zealand in the care of the offender’s wife. In Australia they stayed with two Pastors of the Samoan Independent Seventh Day Adventist Church at a house in Weetangera.The offender was very controlling towards the victim. He told her what to do and how to act. She was required to stay at home and do household tasks. He told her how to dress. She was prevented from looking for or securing a job. She was prohibited from talking to any males including those who she met at the church which they attended. The offender would even get angry if she spent too long talking to women at the church. If he was unhappy with how she behaved, he would get angry and slap her across the face. I note the offender’s controlling behaviour was not contested at the trial, indeed it was part of the offender’s case. In the house at Weetangera, the victim shared a room with another woman, VU.Victim’s evidenceThe victim’s evidence was that the sexual assault took place when the offender and his son were at work. The offender had established a tree lopping business. The other people in the house had left to take the elder of the pastors who lived in the house, who was sick and elderly, to hospital. It was around late morning or early afternoon. She was hanging out the washing. The offender came around the side of the house and through the large fence. She was a little frightened because it was not usual for him to come home at that time of the day. He said that they needed to talk inside. He said that she had been behaving weirdly and not listening. He said that she “…had to have sex with him.” Her reaction, as she described it, was “freaking out and scared” and she said “I don’t want to.” He told her that she had to remove her clothes. She refused, so he hit her with his right hand across her face. The victim said she was taking her time to undress and the offender was telling her to hurry up. She took off her T-shirt and jeans. He was standing and continued to shout at her to hurry up. She was hit a second time when she was on the bed with her clothes off. He said to her “Look what I have done. I am going to do this because you don’t listen to me.” He took his clothes off while she was sitting on the bed and lay on top of her. She struggled, but if she didn’t keep still, he hit her. She couldn’t recall how many times she was hit but more than once. He wanted her to kiss him but she refused and turned her head. She continued to struggle but he was too strong. She described him holding her arms down with his legs sitting on her. While she would have been able to cry out, she was scared to do so. She couldn’t recall how long sex went on but it stopped when VU arrived home in her car, which they both heard. He grabbed his clothes and went out the back door. She said that he said to her that she had to “…keep quiet otherwise [she] would find out what he is capable of.” She said that he indicated that the threat was to kill her. She went straight to have a shower when VU arrived. She was left with a lovebite on her neck which she observed when in the shower.The bed was a single bed. Afterwards the sheets and pillows were left everywhere on the floor.She told VU everything that had happened. She showed her the mark on her neck and was visibly shaking when she was telling her. She told VU that the accused had forced her to have sex. VU asked “Are you sure?” She showed her the mark on her neck and the room and VU just stood there.Afterwards, the offender acted normally, like nothing had happened.Evidence was also given by VU, the woman with whom the victim shared a bedroom and who arrived home at the end of the incident. She gave evidence through an interpreter. She said that the victim made a complaint to her as soon as she got home. The complaint was that the offender “forced her”. This was explained as the offender was “trying to have sex with her”. She was asked whether the victim had said in any detail if he actually did have sex with her. VU said “not really at the time”. In cross examination it was suggested to her that in that conversation she didn’t say whether the offender and the complainant had sex. VU agreed with that proposition. VU’s evidence was credible.TQ, the wife of the younger pastor who lived in the house, also gave evidence. While her evidence did shed some light on the meaning of “forced” in Samoan, she did not give evidence of any complaint relating to this incident as opposed to other incidents led as context evidence. Her evidence was that the word translated as “forced” meant forced her to kiss him and touch his private parts.The offender did not give evidence.Consistency of the verdictIn the trial he was found guilty on the charge of assault with intent to engage in sexual intercourse. He was found not guilty of the charge of sexual intercourse without consent. He was found guilty of the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm relating to hitting the victim.The explanation for the difference between the verdict on the first count and the second count must be that the jury accepted the victim’s evidence but could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that what had occurred was sexual intercourse. That was consistent with the examination in chief of VU who had given evidence that she had been told that the offender tried to have sex with her. In cross examination it was put to her that the victim had not said that the offender had had sex with her and she agreed. The explanation for the difference between the verdict on the first count and the second count must be that the jury accepted the victim’s evidence, but in the light of the absence of a specific complaint of actual intercourse made to VU, could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that what had occurred was sexual intercourse, in the sense of penile penetration. Thus the jury’s verdict is consistent with the sexual assault in the third degree having occurred and that there was an attempt to have sexual intercourse but, notwithstanding the evidence of the complainant, the existence of a reasonable doubt as to whether or not that intercourse actually occurred.ConclusionI accept the evidence of the complainant in regard to the assault. I found her evidence to be very convincing, coherent, not overstated, consistent with the other evidence in the case, and given in an unaffected manner. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the incident occurred as described by the victim up until the victim was naked on the bed. Specifically I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that she was struck twice by the offender with the intent of engaging in sexual intercourse with her. In the light of the jury’s verdict I must proceed on the basis that there was no actual intercourse in the sense of penetration of the victim’s genitalia. However I am satisfied in the light of the evidence that there was an intention and attempt to engage in sexual intercourse. It is not possible to determine why the intention was not carried through to actual penetration. The interaction was interrupted when VU arrived home in a car…

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 501CA of the Act relevantly provides that:1This section applies if the Minister makes a decision (the original decision) under subsection 501(3A) (person serving sentence of imprisonment) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.…4The Minister may revoke the original decision if:(a)the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation; and(b)the Minister is satisfied:(i)that the person passes the character test (as defined by section 501); or(ii)that there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked. If the Tribunal finds that ZJXK fails the character test, the sole issue before the Tribunal is then whether there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked. In Gaspar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 153 ALD 338, North ACJ stated, at [38]:The preferable conclusion is that s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) requires the Minister to examine the factors for and against revoking the cancellation. If satisfied, following an assessment and an evaluation of those factors, that the cancellation should be revoked, the Minister is obliged to act on that view. There is a single, not a two stage, process and the Minister does not have a residual discretion to refuse to revoke the cancellation if satisfied that it should be revoked… On the evidence before it the Tribunal was satisfied that ZJXK has a ‘substantial criminal record’ as defined in section 501(7)(c) of the Act because he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. On the facts of the convictions made against him and the sentences imposed on 18 May 2017 (G4, p 33), the Tribunal found that the Applicant fails the character test under section 501(3A)(a)(i) of the Act. ZJXK did not dispute this. The Tribunal then went on to consider whether there is another reason why the mandatory cancellation of the visa should be revoked.The Ministerial Direction Section 499(1) of the Act provides that the Minister may give written directions about the exercise of functions or powers under the Act. The delegate who refused to revoke the cancellation of ZJXK’s visa consulted Direction No. 79 (the Direction), made under section 499. The Tribunal must, under section 499(2A) of the Act, comply with the Direction in considering this matter. Paragraph 6.1 of the Direction states, in part:6.1Objectives(1)The objective of the Act is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens.…(3)Under subsection 501(3A) of the Act, the decision-maker must cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if the decision-maker is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of paragraph (6)(a) (on the basis of paragraph (7)(a), (b) or (c) or paragraph (6)(e)) and the non-citizen is serving a sentence of imprisonment on a full-time basis in a custodial institution, for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory. A non-citizen who has had his or her visa cancelled under section 501(3A) may request revocation of that decision under section 501CA of the Act. Where the discretion to consider revocation is enlivened, the decision-maker must consider whether to revoke the cancellation given the specific circumstances of the case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

GX said he understood his father had been convicted of ‘raping GH’. He was then told by the Respondent of the convictions of ZJXK (outlined above) made by the Court. He said he had not discussed the offences with his father but ‘I know my Dad didn’t do something like that.’ He said he was aware of other allegations made by his sister but ‘I didn’t believe her, because she is a liar.’ He said he believed his sister had made the allegations because she knew she would be ‘grounded’ and wanted to go out with her friends.CONSIDERATION The Tribunal is not limited to the considerations stipulated in the Direction. They are not exhaustive. The Tribunal may consider, more broadly, whether there is any other reason why the mandatory cancellation of the visa should be revoked. In this matter, as mentioned above, the Tribunal did not have regard to uncharged matters put before it by the Respondent. It was not even clear on the papers for what reason the police or the prosecution authorities did not take those matters further; in this case no weight is given to these uncharged matters. In relation to the first trial that ZJXK faced (for a range of offences against his daughter, GV), the Respondent submitted that the Tribunal could have regard to information about this trial in this merits review, notwithstanding that ZJXK was acquitted of all the offences, submitting that they are relevant to the Applicant’s general conduct. In support of this contention, the Respondent handed up to the Tribunal two judgments of the Full Court of the Federal Court, Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 33 (Brown) and Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 22 (Taulahi). Taulahi concerned judicial review of a decision by the Minister to cancel Mr Taulahi’s visa. Relevantly, in the course of his decision the Minister stated, under a heading ‘Other Serious Conduct’:I considered the information provided by the ACIC which confirms that Mr TAULAHI’s former girlfriend, Stephanie Mill, obtained three Apprehended Violence Orders against Mr Taulahi on 4 October 2011, 14 October 2011 and 2 February 2012 following a number of intimidation and assault incidents. I noted that Mr TAULAHI’s conduct did not result in any criminal charges, however I find Mr TAULAHI’s behaviour is a further indication of his propensity to engage in intimidating conduct. Counsel for Mr Taulahi argued before the Court that the Minister’s decision was infected with legal unreasonableness because the Minister took into account irrelevant material, or based his decision on a fact that did not exist. Counsel went on to say that charges were never laid and Mr Taulahi was entitled to the presumption of innocence in relation to allegations of committing an offence or committing offences. Mr Taulahi’s counsel cited Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462, at [481-482], per Viscount Sankey LC, where his Lordship said:Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to provide the prisoner’s guilt subject to what I have said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained.