FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Zheng v Elliniki Kouzina Pty Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 1173
File number(s): SYG 952 of 2025 Judgment of: JUDGE KAUR-BAINS Date of judgment: 29 July 2025 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – FAIR WORK – application for default judgment – where the first respondent has not provided an address for service and not complied with orders of the Court – consideration of rr 13.04(2) and 13.05(2)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)(General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) – alleged contraventions of ss 44, 45, 323(1) and 542(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – upon admissions taken to have been made by reason of the first respondent’s default contraventions found and default judgment entered. Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 12, 13, 14, 14(1), 44, 45, 61(1), 61(2), 61(2)(d), 87(2), 90(2), 139(1), 139(1)(f), 116B, 323(1), 539(2), 542(1), 544(b), 545(1), 545(2)(b), 546(1), 547(2), 570
Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth), s 46
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), rr 1.06(3), 6.01, 6.01(1), 6.01(2), 6.08(1)(a)(i), 13.04(2)(a), 13.04(2)(b), 13.04(2)(b)(i), 13.04(2)(b)(iii), 13.04(2)(b)(iv), 13.05(2)(c), 17.05, items 13 and 15 of sch 1
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 16.07(1), 16.07(2) and 16.32
Cases cited: Fair Work Ombudsman v Grouped Property Services Pty Ltd(No 2) [2017] FCA 557
iNova Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Letos Group Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 1052
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 68 Date of hearing: 4 July 2025 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr W Clarke of Marrickville Legal Centre Solicitor for the First Respondent: No appearance Solicitor for the Second Respondent: No appearance ORDERS
SYG 952 of 2025 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ZHIWEI (SIMON) ZHENG
Applicant
AND: ELLINIKI KOUZINA PTY LTD ACN 646 008 979
First Respondent
VANESSA LONGOBARDI
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KAUR-BAINS
DATE OF ORDER:
29 JULY 2025
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.Upon admissions taken to have been made by reason of the first respondent’s default, the first respondent contravened:
(a)sections 323(1) and 542(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) in that it failed to pay the applicant his salary in full when the payments were due in the period from July 2024 to November 2024;
(b)section 44 of the FW Act in that it failed to pay the applicant his annual accrued leave;
(c)section 45 of the FW Act in that it failed to pay the applicant his annual accrued leave loading of 17.5%; and
(d)section 45 of the FW Act in that it failed to pay the applicant his superannuation contributions due and payable for the July 2024 quarter and October 2024 quarter by the due dates for contributions to the applicant’s nominated fund.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
2.Default judgment be entered for the applicant against the first respondent pursuant to r 13.05(2)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Zheng v Elliniki Kouzina Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1173
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I also find that the first respondent has failed to file a notice of address for service in accordance with r 6.01 of the Rules and order 1 made on 28 April 2025 referred to at [8] of this judgment. Further, given the matters set out at [9] and [13] of this judgment, I find that the first respondent failed to appear at the directions hearing listed at 10am on 13 May 2025 and at the default judgment hearing listed at 2:15pm on 30 June 2025. Further, the first respondent has failed to appear today despite having been served with notice of today’s hearing. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the first respondent is in default for the purposes of rr 13.04(2)(a), 13.04(2)(b)(i), 13.04(2)(b)(iii) and 13.04(2)(b)(iv) of the Rules. Whether default judgment be entered and declarations be made?Relevant legal principles The relevant legal principles applicable to default judgments are helpfully set out in the decision of His Honour Judge Manousaridis in iNova Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Letos Group Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 1052 at [109] to [119] as follows (footnotes omitted):Nature and scope of r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules109Rules 13.04 and 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules were adapted from, and are substantially similar to, the rules contained in O 35A of the now repealed Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) (old FC Rules); and r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules is almost identical to O 35A r 3(2). 110Before O 35A was introduced into the old FC Rules in 2004, the Federal Court could enter default judgment against a respondent only if an application for default judgment was supported by admissible evidence that proved the applicant’s claims for relief. In Australian Securities Commission v MacLeod & Ors Drummond J described this limitation in the old FC Rules by reference to the rules of other courts which had as their source the rules of court of the English High Court after the passing of the Judicature Acts: This rule (and other Federal Court Rules which permit the making of the same orders where a respondent is in default in complying with other procedural requirements, eg, O 11, r 23; O 15, r 16 and O 16, r 9) differs from provisions found in the rules of other courts which are derived from the post-Judicature Act rules of the English High Court. In certain classes of action, eg, where the plaintiff's claim was for a liquidated demand, the rules of other courts allowed the plaintiff to enter judgment by the ministerial act of a court official and without the intervention of the court; but the general rule empowered the entry of such judgment in default as the plaintiff appeared entitled to on his statement of claim. Initially there was some uncertainty as to whether on an application under English O 27, r 11 (the rule permitting judgment in default of defence), proof of the facts alleged in the statement of claim was required. It appears that late in the 1880s, a meeting of the judges resolved that, on such an application, the court should not receive evidence but should give judgment on the statement of claim alone: see Smith v Buchan (1888) 58 LT 710. From this time, it was firmly established that, on a motion for judgment in default, the plaintiff was not required (or entitled) to produce any evidence in support of the allegations in the statement of claim: see Young v Thomas [1892] 2 Ch 134, where Bowen LJ identified the justification for the practice: the defendant's failure to plead amounted to an admission of the facts in the statement of claim. The English practice thus proceeded on the basis that evidence was required on a motion for judgment in default of defence, but that that evidence was to be found, and found only, in the defendant's admission of the facts alleged in the statement of claim constituted by his failure to plead to them.111The purpose of the addition to the old FC Rules of O 35A r 3(2)(c), therefore, was to include in the old FC Rules a rule to the effect that had been used in State and Territory courts for years that authorised the entry of default judgment on the assumption that the defaulting respondent has admitted the allegations of fact made in the statement of claim. 112There are a number of matters to note about r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules. First, and consistently with the purpose for which O 35A r 3(2)(c) was introduced into the old FC Rules, r 13.05(2)(c) “does not require proof of the claim by evidence, but only requires that – on the face of the statement of claim – there is a claim for the relief sought”. 113Second, before the Court may make an order under r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules it must be satisfied that the document which the applicant has filed with the application is in fact a “statement of claim”. A statement of claim is a pleading, which means it must comply with the rules of pleading. Thus, for example, the purported statement of claim must “state the material facts on which a party relies that are necessary to give the opposing party fair notice of the case to be made against that party at trial, but not the evidence by which the material facts are to be proved”. Here, “material facts” are facts whose existence is “necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action”. A “cause of action”, in turn, is “a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another person”. Another example of a rule of pleading is that the statement of claim must not allege “conclusions drawn from unstated facts”. 114Third, it follows from what I have said in the previous paragraph that the statement of claim must plead at least one reasonable cause of action that supports the granting of the relief the applicant seeks in the application. More particularly, “each element of the relevant civil wrong” of which the applicant complains must be “properly and discretely pleaded in the statement of claim”. 115Fourth, although r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules does not require proof of the claim by evidence, it is permissible for the applicant to adduce evidence that is relevant to the relief sought. That point was made by Lord Woolf MR in Phonographic Performance Ltd v Maitra: It is clear from the terms of O19, r 7 and para 19/7/10 that judgment in default is given upon the facts pleaded in the statement of claim and that affidavit evidence to supplement or support those facts is not appropriate as the pleaded facts are deemed to be admitted. However, that cannot be rigidly applied where the judge has to exercise a discretion whether to grant the relief sought. Where an injunction is sought facts relevant to the grant of that injunction, which are not deemed to be admitted, should be brought to the attention of the judge by way of affidavit or otherwise. Further, if the judge is aware of matters relevant to the exercise of his discretion, he can seek an appropriate explanation before coming to any decision.116It has been confirmed that it is permissible on an application for an order under O 35A r 3(2)(c) of the old FC Rules to adduce evidence relevant to relief. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Limited, Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) said:It may be accepted that some further affidavit material may be accepted by the Court in relation to the relief sought. . . . Evidence which would alter the pleaded case should not be admitted. . . . Regard should not be had to evidence of facts which could have been, but were not, pleaded concerning the conduct of the respondents. 117Fifth, there is the question of the approach that should be taken to construing the statement of claim. The question of construction of a statement of claim was considered by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Penthouse Publications Ltd v McWilliam in the different context of an application to strike out a statement of claim. Priestley JA, with whose reasons Meagher JA and Waddell AJA agreed, gave a “liberal construction to the plaintiff’s statement of claim”. His Honour was of the view that a statement of claim would be given a liberal construction by answering the question of what a “demurring” party will be taken to accept when that party claims the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action. His Honour said that a demurring party “is in the position not only of having to accept the truth of all allegations in the statement of claim, but also the truth of the ranges of meaning of the assertions of fact in the statement of claim which those assertions are reasonably capable of bearing”. I will follow this approach in the context of an application for an order under r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules.118Also relevant to construing a statement of claim is the principle that “[p]articulars control the generality of the pleadings”. That means that the generality of an allegation contained in the statement of claim will be limited by any particulars appended to that allegation.119Finally, the Court retains a discretion not to make an order under r 13.05(2)(c) of the GFL Rules even if the preconditions for making an order are satisfied.