Zhang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Zhang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2000] FCA 1682

ZAI JIE ZHANG V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V 233 OF 2000

NORTH J
6 OCTOBER 2000
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 233 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

ZAI JIE ZHANG
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 OCTOBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 233 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

ZAI JIE ZHANG
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE:

6 OCTOBER 2000

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application by Zai Jie Zhang, the applicant, to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 15 March 2000.  In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa. 

    BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS

  2. The applicant, who is a citizen of the People's Republic of China, arrived in Australia on 24 June 1998.  The Tribunal set out the claims and evidence in its decision.  In light of the limited grounds of review argued, it is only necessary to give a brief outline of this part of the Tribunal's decision. 

  3. The applicant claimed that he and his family suffered during the Cultural Revolution on account of his parents' religion and status as landlords.  His parents owned property and were Christian. 

  4. The major focus of his claims related to a claimed fear of persecution as a result of China's one-child policy and on account of his religious beliefs.  The applicant and his wife had more than one child, contrary to the policy of the Chinese government.  They were fined heavily after the birth of their second and third children.  The applicant claimed that if he returned to China, he would face punishment and restriction of access to government services because he had openly opposed the one-child policy.  He feared that he might even be jailed.  It was submitted that the applicant's father had been detained as a result of the applicant violating the one-child policy. 

  5. The other major basis for the applicant's claimed fear of persecution was his membership of an underground church in China and the fact that he claimed the government restricted the operation of unregistered churches.  The applicant claimed that he belonged to a church called the Church of Hope.  He was not, however, able in the Tribunal hearing to recall the address in Australia of the church.

    TRIBUNAL DECISION – ONE CHILD POLICY

  6. I turn now to the decision of the Tribunal.  Under the heading “Findings and Reasons”, the Tribunal dealt with…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1682
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Zai Jie Zhang sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal, which affirmed the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' refusal to grant him a protection visa. Zhang, a Chinese citizen, had arrived in Australia in 1998 and claimed refugee status, citing persecution due to his family's involvement in the Cultural Revolution and his religious beliefs. He also claimed persecution due to China's one-child policy, under which he and his wife had been fined for having more children than permitted. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal correctly assessed Zhang's claims of persecution under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

The court examined whether the Tribunal had erred in its decision that Zhang's claims were not persecution within the meaning of the Convention. Specifically, the court considered whether the Tribunal failed to address whether Zhang's opposition to the one-child policy constituted persecution due to his religious beliefs. The court found that the Tribunal did address Zhang's claims in the context of his religious beliefs and concluded that the enforcement of the one-child policy was not persecution for reasons of religion. The Tribunal reasoned that the policy was a generally applicable law designed to protect the general welfare of society and that its enforcement was not discriminatory.

The court further held that even if the policy had a differential impact on Zhang because of his religious beliefs, this did not render the policy persecutory. The court concluded that the Tribunal's reasoning was sound and that it correctly applied the relevant legal principles. Therefore, the court dismissed Zhang's application for judicial review and ordered him to pay the respondent's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application by Zai Jie Zhang, the applicant, to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 15 March 2000. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa. BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS The applicant, who is a citizen of the People's Republic of China, arrived in Australia on 24 June 1998. The Tribunal set out the claims and evidence in its decision. In light of the limited grounds of review argued, it is only necessary to give a brief outline of this part of the Tribunal's decision. The applicant claimed that he and his family suffered during the Cultural Revolution on account of his parents' religion and status as landlords. His parents owned property and were Christian. The major focus of his claims related to a claimed fear of persecution as a result of China's one-child policy and on account of his religious beliefs. The applicant and his wife had more than one child, contrary to the policy of the Chinese government. They were fined heavily after the birth of their second and third children. The applicant claimed that if he returned to China, he would face punishment and restriction of access to government services because he had openly opposed the one-child policy. He feared that he might even be jailed. It was submitted that the applicant's father had been detained as a result of the applicant violating the one-child policy. The other major basis for the applicant's claimed fear of persecution was his membership of an underground church in China and the fact that he claimed the government restricted the operation of unregistered churches. The applicant claimed that he belonged to a church called the Church of Hope. He was not, however, able in the Tribunal hearing to recall the address in Australia of the church.TRIBUNAL DECISION – ONE CHILD POLICY I turn now to the decision of the Tribunal. Under the heading “Findings and Reasons”, the Tribunal dealt with the one‑child policy under a specific subheading. This part of these reasons is restricted to the decision of the Tribunal concerning the one‑child policy. The Tribunal noted that the non‑discriminatory enforcement of a generally applicable criminal law or law designed to protect the general welfare of society does not constitute persecution for the purposes of the Convention. The Tribunal cited Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996-7) 190 CLR 225 as authority for this proposition in the context of the one‑child policy in China. The Tribunal dealt with the effect of the application of laws of general application by reference to the following passage in the judgment of Brennan CJ at 233:“The persecution must be ‘for reasons of’ one of those categories … The qualification […] excludes persecution which is no more than punishment of a non-discriminatory kind for contravention of a criminal law of general application. Such laws are not discriminatory and punishment that is non-discriminatory cannot stamp the contravener with the mark of ‘refugee’.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

NORTH J
The other major basis for the applicant's claimed fear of persecution was his membership of an underground church in China and the fact that he claimed the government restricted the operation of unregistered churches. The applicant claimed that he belonged to a church called the Church of Hope. He was not, however, able in the Tribunal hearing to recall the address in Australia of the church.TRIBUNAL DECISION – ONE CHILD POLICY I turn now to the decision of the Tribunal. Under the heading “Findings and Reasons”, the Tribunal dealt with the one‑child policy under a specific subheading. This part of these reasons is restricted to the decision of the Tribunal concerning the one‑child policy. The Tribunal noted that the non‑discriminatory enforcement of a generally applicable criminal law or law designed to protect the general welfare of society does not constitute persecution for the purposes of the Convention. The Tribunal cited Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996-7) 190 CLR 225 as authority for this proposition in the context of the one‑child policy in China. The Tribunal dealt with the effect of the application of laws of general application by reference to the following passage in the judgment of Brennan CJ at 233:“The persecution must be ‘for reasons of’ one of those categories … The qualification […] excludes persecution which is no more than punishment of a non-discriminatory kind for contravention of a criminal law of general application. Such laws are not discriminatory and punishment that is non-discriminatory cannot stamp the contravener with the mark of ‘refugee’.” The Tribunal then referred to further authorities which supported the proposition that:“The one‑child policy were laws of general application to the general population. Their origins had no application to any specific person or group of persons; they did not at the time of their introduction, attack any person who could be said to be a member of a particular social group; nor did they say that a future identifiable social group would be the subject of some measure of discriminatory conduct that would amount to persecution. Rather the laws extended to the general populace.” The Tribunal then concluded this section of its decision as follows:“The Tribunal is satisfied that the conduct complained of relates to the enforcement of a law that is applied generally and not in a way that is discriminatory. The applicant's evidence claims that this policy contravenes ‘human rights’. The applicant does not claim and there is no information to suggest that the law was applied differently to the applicant for reasons of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The applicant's claim that he fears persecution on the ground of his religion is dealt with separately. The Tribunal finds that the claims related to the ‘one‑child policy’ are not Convention related. There are several aspects of the applicant's particular claims that appear unsatisfactory, such as his father continuing to be in detention, the applicant being in hiding for three to four years on account and still being sought by the authorities because of the applicant's contravention of this policy. The applicant may have been fined a number of times, his home looted and his wife sterilised, but as discussed above, this was not persecution in the sense of the Convention in that it was not for reasons of his political opinion or religion. Nor does the Tribunal accept that the applicant would face a real chance of persecution now or in the reasonably foreseeable future for contravention of the family planning policies of China, based on the above.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NORTH J

Put in a slightly different way, the argument under s 476(1)(e) was that the Tribunal committed an error of law by failing to address the substance of the case put by the applicant in that it did not address the question whether the treatment of the applicant, resulting from his views concerning the one‑child policy, amounted to persecution for reason of his religious beliefs.CONSIDERATION – ONE CHILD POLICY There is, in my view, no doubt that the Tribunal did consider the one‑child policy matter in the context of the claim of feared persecution for reasons of religion. In the concluding part of the findings on the question, the Tribunal expressly said:“The Tribunal finds that the claims related to the ‘one‑child policy’ are not Convention related.” There is express reference in the concluding three paragraphs of the Tribunal’s decision (extracted in par 10 of these reasons) to the ground of persecution for reasons of religion. The Tribunal did determine the substantive case put by the applicant that the alleged persecution concerning his opposition to the one‑child policy was persecution for reasons of his religion. The next question is whether the Tribunal came to that conclusion in a way which satisfied the requirements of s 430. Again in my view, the Tribunal made no error in this respect. It comprehensively discussed the nature of the one‑child policy and the several authorities that have considered the nature of this policy and its enforcement. There is no difficulty in understanding the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal on the question. It found that the policy was enforced by non‑discriminatory means generally applicable which were designed to protect the general welfare of Chinese society. That reasoning process was the basis of the conclusion that the consequences which might be visited upon the applicant as a result of his views were not "for reasons of" his religion. Mr Krohn, who appeared as counsel for the applicant, contended that the enforcement of a law of general application may still amount to persecution if, because of the religious beliefs of a particular person, that law bears down more heavily upon the particular person. However in Applicant A, McHugh J said at 258:“Nor is the enforcement of laws designed to protect the general welfare of the State ordinarily persecutory even though the laws may place additional burdens on the members of a particular race, religion, nationality or social group.” It was therefore open to the Tribunal to find in this case that the enforcement of the one-child policy was not persecutory, even though it may have had a differential impact on the applicant because of his own religious beliefs. TRIBUNAL DECISION - CLAIM OF RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION I now turn to the question of the claims by the applicant of persecution feared for reasons of religion. Under a separate heading “Religion” in the Findings and Evidence section of the Tribunal's decision, the Tribunal dealt comprehensively with the claims of the applicant concerning persecution feared for reasons of religion. The Tribunal commenced with some observations demonstrating that it was not particularly impressed with the evidence of the applicant. It said:“The Tribunal finds his evidence about the existence and therefore his involvement in the ‘Church of Hope’ in China to be contradictory and implausible, a fact part explained by his witness in terms of the applicant utilising the name Church of Hope to describe the church he belongs to in China because ‘the principle is the same’. In addition, in his evidence to the Tribunal he states that he only ‘officially joined’ this church after his arrival and was unable to give the address of the church he attends here. The applicant, however, provided sufficient information on his beliefs and activities for it to be feasible that he has a rudimentary knowledge of the Christian faith and that he spent some time as a member of an unregistered congregation which itself was part of the Protestant church.”