FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Zhang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2000] FCA 1682ZAI JIE ZHANG V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 233 OF 2000
NORTH J
6 OCTOBER 2000
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 233 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
ZAI JIE ZHANG
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 OCTOBER 2000
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 233 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
ZAI JIE ZHANG
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE:
6 OCTOBER 2000
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is an application by Zai Jie Zhang, the applicant, to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 15 March 2000. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa.
BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS
The applicant, who is a citizen of the People's Republic of China, arrived in Australia on 24 June 1998. The Tribunal set out the claims and evidence in its decision. In light of the limited grounds of review argued, it is only necessary to give a brief outline of this part of the Tribunal's decision.
The applicant claimed that he and his family suffered during the Cultural Revolution on account of his parents' religion and status as landlords. His parents owned property and were Christian.
The major focus of his claims related to a claimed fear of persecution as a result of China's one-child policy and on account of his religious beliefs. The applicant and his wife had more than one child, contrary to the policy of the Chinese government. They were fined heavily after the birth of their second and third children. The applicant claimed that if he returned to China, he would face punishment and restriction of access to government services because he had openly opposed the one-child policy. He feared that he might even be jailed. It was submitted that the applicant's father had been detained as a result of the applicant violating the one-child policy.
The other major basis for the applicant's claimed fear of persecution was his membership of an underground church in China and the fact that he claimed the government restricted the operation of unregistered churches. The applicant claimed that he belonged to a church called the Church of Hope. He was not, however, able in the Tribunal hearing to recall the address in Australia of the church.
TRIBUNAL DECISION – ONE CHILD POLICY
I turn now to the decision of the Tribunal. Under the heading “Findings and Reasons”, the Tribunal dealt with…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 1682
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the Tribunal had erred in its decision that Zhang's claims were not persecution within the meaning of the Convention. Specifically, the court considered whether the Tribunal failed to address whether Zhang's opposition to the one-child policy constituted persecution due to his religious beliefs. The court found that the Tribunal did address Zhang's claims in the context of his religious beliefs and concluded that the enforcement of the one-child policy was not persecution for reasons of religion. The Tribunal reasoned that the policy was a generally applicable law designed to protect the general welfare of society and that its enforcement was not discriminatory.
The court further held that even if the policy had a differential impact on Zhang because of his religious beliefs, this did not render the policy persecutory. The court concluded that the Tribunal's reasoning was sound and that it correctly applied the relevant legal principles. Therefore, the court dismissed Zhang's application for judicial review and ordered him to pay the respondent's costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: NORTH J
Put in a slightly different way, the argument under s 476(1)(e) was that the Tribunal committed an error of law by failing to address the substance of the case put by the applicant in that it did not address the question whether the treatment of the applicant, resulting from his views concerning the one‑child policy, amounted to persecution for reason of his religious beliefs.CONSIDERATION – ONE CHILD POLICY There is, in my view, no doubt that the Tribunal did consider the one‑child policy matter in the context of the claim of feared persecution for reasons of religion. In the concluding part of the findings on the question, the Tribunal expressly said:“The Tribunal finds that the claims related to the ‘one‑child policy’ are not Convention related.” There is express reference in the concluding three paragraphs of the Tribunal’s decision (extracted in par 10 of these reasons) to the ground of persecution for reasons of religion. The Tribunal did determine the substantive case put by the applicant that the alleged persecution concerning his opposition to the one‑child policy was persecution for reasons of his religion. The next question is whether the Tribunal came to that conclusion in a way which satisfied the requirements of s 430. Again in my view, the Tribunal made no error in this respect. It comprehensively discussed the nature of the one‑child policy and the several authorities that have considered the nature of this policy and its enforcement. There is no difficulty in understanding the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal on the question. It found that the policy was enforced by non‑discriminatory means generally applicable which were designed to protect the general welfare of Chinese society. That reasoning process was the basis of the conclusion that the consequences which might be visited upon the applicant as a result of his views were not "for reasons of" his religion. Mr Krohn, who appeared as counsel for the applicant, contended that the enforcement of a law of general application may still amount to persecution if, because of the religious beliefs of a particular person, that law bears down more heavily upon the particular person. However in Applicant A, McHugh J said at 258:“Nor is the enforcement of laws designed to protect the general welfare of the State ordinarily persecutory even though the laws may place additional burdens on the members of a particular race, religion, nationality or social group.” It was therefore open to the Tribunal to find in this case that the enforcement of the one-child policy was not persecutory, even though it may have had a differential impact on the applicant because of his own religious beliefs. TRIBUNAL DECISION - CLAIM OF RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION I now turn to the question of the claims by the applicant of persecution feared for reasons of religion. Under a separate heading “Religion” in the Findings and Evidence section of the Tribunal's decision, the Tribunal dealt comprehensively with the claims of the applicant concerning persecution feared for reasons of religion. The Tribunal commenced with some observations demonstrating that it was not particularly impressed with the evidence of the applicant. It said:“The Tribunal finds his evidence about the existence and therefore his involvement in the ‘Church of Hope’ in China to be contradictory and implausible, a fact part explained by his witness in terms of the applicant utilising the name Church of Hope to describe the church he belongs to in China because ‘the principle is the same’. In addition, in his evidence to the Tribunal he states that he only ‘officially joined’ this church after his arrival and was unable to give the address of the church he attends here. The applicant, however, provided sufficient information on his beliefs and activities for it to be feasible that he has a rudimentary knowledge of the Christian faith and that he spent some time as a member of an unregistered congregation which itself was part of the Protestant church.”