FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Zha & Wun [2021] FamCA 143
File number(s): SYC 4269 of 2020 Judgment of: WATTS J Date of judgment: 19 March 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION – Where the applicant wife has commenced proceedings in China, Hong Kong and Australia – Where the respondent husband applied, pursuant to s 114(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), for an order restraining the wife from continuing proceedings against the husband in Australia – Where it is agreed that Australia was not a clearly inappropriate forum – Where the husband has failed to provide full and frank disclosure – Where the wife has validly commenced proceedings in Australia pursuant to s 79 of the Act – Where it is not vexatious or oppressive to require the husband to involve himself in the Australian proceedings – Where on the balance of convenience the proceedings in Australia should continue – Application for an anti-suit injunction dismissed.
FAMILY LAW – INTERIM – LITIGATION FUNDING – Where the wife seeks for the husband to pay to her an amount of $500,000 by way of either an interim property order (s79;80(1)(h) of the Act) or an order as to costs (s117 of the Act), subject to certain conditions – Where the wife is entitled to an order on either basis.
FAMILY LAW – PROCEDURAL – Where there was no basis for discharging earlier injunctions made in the wife’s favour – Where the wife did not press for an undefended hearing.
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4, 21, 75, 79, 80, 114, 117
Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) s 124
Cases cited: Antonarkis v Delly (1976) 10 ALR 251
CSR Limited v Signa Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345
Harris and Harris (1993) FLC 92-378
In the Marriage of J U and T Poletti (1990) 15 Fam LR 794
Lan & Hao (No. 2) (2017) FLC 93-795
R v Ross-Jones; Ex parte Green (1984) 156 CLR 185
Salvage & Fosse (2020) FLC 93-966
Sieling and Sieling (1979) FLC 90-627
Strahan & Strahan (interim property orders) (2011) FLC 93-466
Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1
Teo & Guan (2015) FLC 93-653
Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538
Zschokke and Zschokke (1996) FLC 92-693
Number of paragraphs: 136 Date of hearing: 11 December 2020 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Campton SC Solicitor for the Applicant: Lander & Rogers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Lloyd SC with Mr Livingstone Solicitor for the Respondent: Sunfield Chambers Solicitors & Associates ORDERS
SYC 4269 of 2020 BETWEEN: MS ZHA
Applicant
AND: MR WUN
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
WATTS J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 MARCH 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The husband’s Response to Initiating Application filed 17 August 2020 is dismissed.
2.The husband’s application for an injunction under s 114(3) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) is dismissed.
3.The husband’s application for an order that the ex parte orders made 7 July 2020 be set aside…
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- Zha & Wun [2021] FamCA 143
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- [2021] FamCA 143
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether to grant the husband's application for an anti-suit injunction under s 114(3) of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth). Additionally, the court had to consider the wife's entitlement to interim litigation funding, either by way of an interim property order under s 79 and s 80(1)(h) of the Act, or an order as to costs under s 117 of the Act. The court also addressed the wife's application for an undefended hearing and the discharge of earlier injunctions.
Watts J dismissed the husband's application for an anti-suit injunction, finding that Australia was not a clearly inappropriate forum and that it was not vexatious or oppressive to require the husband to participate in the Australian proceedings. The court reasoned that the husband had failed to provide full and frank disclosure, particularly regarding his overseas assets, and that on the balance of convenience, the Australian proceedings should continue. The court also found that the wife was entitled to an order for litigation funding, either as an interim property order or an order as to costs, noting the importance of a "level playing field" in ensuring a fair opportunity for each party to present their case.
The court ordered that the husband's response to the initiating application and his application for an injunction be dismissed. The husband was restrained from preventing the wife's receipt of rental income from specified properties in New South Wales and China. Furthermore, the husband was ordered to pay $500,000 to the wife's solicitors within twenty-one days, to be applied towards the wife's costs and disbursements, including litigation funding. The wife's application for the proceedings to proceed on an undefended basis was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
SYC 4269 of 2020
BETWEEN:
MS ZHA
Applicant
AND:
MR WUN
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
WATTS J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 MARCH 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The husband’s Response to Initiating Application filed 17 August 2020 is dismissed.
2. The husband’s application for an injunction under s 114(3) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) is dismissed.
3. The husband’s application for an order that the ex parte orders made 7 July 2020 be set aside is dismissed.
4. In respect to the wife’s Amended Application in a Case filed 13 November 2020:
(a) The wife’s applications 2.2 and 2.3 (noting the husband’s failure to comply with orders and that the matter proceed to an undefended hearing) is dismissed.
(b) By consent, that as between the husband and the wife and pending further order, the husband shall be and is hereby restrained from doing any act or thing to prevent the Wife's receipt of rental income from the following properties:
(i) C Street, Suburb D in the State of New South Wales (with folio identifier …);
(ii) L Street, Suburb M in the State of New South Wales (with folio identifier …);
(iii) MM Street, Suburb NN (with folio identifier …);
(iv) PP Street, City R, China;
(v) QQ Street, City SS, China; and
(vi) RR Street, Suburb TT, City VV, China.
5. Within twenty-one (21) days of the date of these Orders and pending further Order, the Husband pay or cause to be paid to the trust account of the Solicitors for the Applicant Wife, Lander & Rogers Lawyers, pursuant to s 79 and s 80(1)(h) of the Act, the sum of $500,000 with that money to be applied towards the Wife's costs and disbursements as set out in Order 6 herein.
6. The sum referred to in Order 5 above shall be applied by the Solicitors for the Wife in payment of the costs and disbursements incurred or to be incurred by the Wife in the conduct of these proceedings, including but not limited to the reasonable costs and disbursements:
(a) Rendered by the Solicitors for the Wife pursuant to their Costs Agreement with the Wife including but not limited to the payment of Counsel's fees;
(b) Rendered by Accountants appointed by the Court or engaged by the Wife or the Solicitors for the Wife to report on and/or value taxation matters, including but not limited to capital gains tax and any interests of the Husband and/or the Wife in any business, company, superannuation fund, trust or entity; and/or
(c) Rendered by Valuers appointed by the Court and/or engaged by the Wife or the Solicitors for the Wife to report on or value any real and/or personal property in which the Husband and/or the Wife may have an interest, and of any business, company, trust or entity in which the Husband and/or the Wife have an interest.
7. The wife’s application that the proceedings instituted by her for a property settlement order pursuant to s 79 of the Act to proceed on an undefended basis be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As explained by the Full Court in Strahan, s 80(1)(h) of the Act is a wide enabling provision for interim property decisions, and there is no reason to limit it, by requiring a finding of “compelling circumstances”. All that is required before the power to make an interim property order is exercised, is an assessment of whether it would be “appropriate” to make an interim order, with the “over arching consideration” being the interests of justice. There may need to be evidence of the likely cost of litigation, but only if that is the reason or part of the reason that is propounded as to why it is appropriate that the order be made.Considerations about making an interim property order in “the interests of justice” The notion of a “level playing field” is one which almost axiomatically is in the interests of justice and an important matter to consider when deciding whether it would be appropriate to make an interim property order. In In the Marriage of J U and T Poletti (1990) 15 Fam LR 794, Ellis, Strauss and Butler JJ quoted Ngyh J with approval at [796]:…It is rather, as it certainly was in Wilson and Wilson [(1989) 13 Fam LR 205], a situation where one party to the marriage controls almost exclusively what might be described as the patrimony of the parties and has control of the bulk of the assets and funds of the parties, where an order may be made to ensure that the other party, who does not have the fortune of controlling those funds, at least has an equal or near equal opportunity to present his or her case... The second step As was discussed in Harris and confirmed in Strahan, the second step in making an interim property order is to have regard to the usual matters in a s 79 order (ss 79(2) and 79(4) of the Act). A detailed inquiry is not required, but there must be some assessment of s 79 factors. Given it is an imprecise exercise, the interim property order has to be “conservative” so that the final outcome of property settlement will not be compromised by the interim property order. Either the remaining property needs to be sufficient to meet the legitimate expectations of both parties at the final hearing, or the order that is contemplated needs to be capable of being reversed or adjusted if it is subsequently considered necessary to do so. Being a preliminary property order, the wife ordinarily would be able to choose how to spend the money however she wishes. However in this case, she has limited her application by seeking that monies provided pursuant to the order be earmarked for spending on the particular purpose of litigation funding.Principles in relation to interim costs orders In Salvage & Fosse (2020) FLC 93-966 (“Salvage & Fosse”), the Full Court considered principles relevant to the making of a litigation funding order pursuant to s 117 of the Act. At [8] of that judgment, the plurality said:…it is accepted by the appellant, as it must be, that s 117 of the Act empowers the Court to make such orders as to costs and is of sufficient width to empower the making of the order sought by the respondent in the proceedings.