SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeal: Criminal)
ZEFI v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
[2024] SASC 42
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Blue
27 March 2024
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT – GROUNDS
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - GROUNDS - GENERALLY
The appellant appeals against his conviction of driving a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding a relevant speed limit by 45 kilometres per hour or more in contravention of subsection 45A(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA).
The conviction was based on evidence given by affidavit by Senior Constable Greenwood that he operated a LIDAR traffic speed analyser in respect of a Holden Commodore driven by the appellant on Seacombe Road, Seacliff Park, which indicated a speed of 111 kilometres per hour.
The appellant appeals on two grounds:
1the Magistrate erred in finding that the evidence of Senior Constable Greenwood was sufficient evidence to establish the speed limit that applied to his vehicle;
2the Magistrate erred in reversing the onus of proof onto the defendant to prove that the speed detection device was not in proper order and/or operated properly.
Held (allowing the appeal):
1There was sufficient evidence to establish the speed limit that applied to the appellant’s vehicle: ground 1 is not established (at [44]).
2The Magistrate erroneously reversed the onus of proof onto the defendant to prove that the traffic speed analyser was not properly operated: ground 1 is not established (at [57]).
3There was no evidence as to the operation or proper operation of the traffic speed analyser and it was not open to the Magistrate to find the charge proved (at [70]).
4An acquittal must be substituted for the conviction rather than remittal to the Magistrates Court for a fresh trial (at [60], [72]).
ZEFI v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
[2024] SASC 42Criminal Appeal: Single Judge
BLUE J: Kristian Zefi appeals against his conviction of driving a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding a relevant speed limit by 45 kilometres per hour or more in contravention of subsection 45A(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) (the Act).
The conviction was based on evidence given by affidavit by Senior Constable Greenwood that he operated a LIDAR traffic speed analyser in respect of a Holden Commodore driven by Mr Zefi on Seacombe Road Seacliff Park, which indicated a speed of 111 kilometres per hour.
Mr Zefi appeals on two grounds:
1the Magistrate erred in finding that the evidence of Senior Constable Greenwood was sufficient evidence to establish the speed limit that applied to his vehicle;[1]
2the Magistrate erred in reversing the onus of proof onto the defendant to prove that the speed detection device was not in proper order and/or operated properly.[2]
[1] Ground 1 of the Grounds of Appeal.
[2] Ground 2 of the Grounds of Appeal.
Background
On 26 October 2022 Senior Constable…
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- Case
- [2024] SASC 42
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the first ground of appeal, which related to the evidence provided by Senior Constable Greenwood. The court examined the procedure followed by Senior Constable Greenwood in conducting a field test on the LIDAR traffic speed analyser, including checking for damage, intact calibration seals, and the device being within 12 months of the last calibration. The court also reviewed the tests conducted by Senior Constable Greenwood, such as the self-test, fixed distance zero velocity test, and scope alignment test, all of which were passed by the device. The court concluded that the evidence provided by Senior Constable Greenwood was sufficient to establish the speed limit that applied to Mr Zefi's vehicle.
The court also considered the second ground of appeal, which related to the onus of proof. The court examined the legal principles surrounding the onus of proof in cases involving speed detection devices and concluded that the Magistrate did not err in reversing the onus of proof onto the defendant. The court found that the evidence provided by Senior Constable Greenwood, including his training, competence, and precise operation of the device, was capable of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the use of the device on the particular occasion was appropriate.
In conclusion, the appeal was allowed, and Mr Zefi's conviction was quashed and an acquittal substituted. The court found that the evidence provided by Senior Constable Greenwood was sufficient to establish the speed limit that applied to Mr Zefi's vehicle, and the Magistrate did not err in reversing the onus of proof onto the defendant.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first ground is not established.Proper operation Ground 2 is that the Magistrate erred in reversing the onus of proof onto the defendant to prove that the speed detection device was not in proper order and/or operated properly. Although the ground of appeal is expressed to refer both to the question of proper order and proper operation, on the hearing of the appeal Mr Zefi confines his contention to the question of proper operation. In the first paragraph reproduced at [24] above, the Magistrate referred to the decision of Peek J in Police v Young.[4] In that case, Peek J said:A matter that may be very important in circumstances such as the present is the skill with which the police officer operated the device during the speed detection process. The obvious analogy is that a rifle may be perfectly made and accurate within itself, but if it is not skilfully used on a particular occasion the target will likely be missed.Further, it is critical to appreciate that the certificate procedure does not enact any presumption as to the expertise with which the device was used on any particular occasion. To pursue the rifle analogy, the certificate procedure may assist the prosecution to prove that the rifle is accurate within itself but it says nothing as to the person using it. Appropriate use of the device on the particular occasion had to be proven by the prosecution to the normal standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt. Constable Hand gave evidence-in-chief that he had received training in the use of speed detection devices including training in relation to this particular device, the Ultralyte 100 LR laser speed gun in 2006, that he used the device very regularly and that he was competent in its use. He also described his precise operation of the unit during the timing of the appellant’s vehicle. The appellant did not ask Constable Hand any questions as to these matters and did not refer him to any documents relevant thereto.On my analysis of the evidence, the evidence given by Constable Hand, including as to his training (unchallenged in this context), was capable of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the use of device on the particular occasion was appropriate. I am not prepared to disturb the Magistrate’s finding in that regard.[5] [4] [2012] SASC 210.[5] At [103]-[106]. Earlier cases had established that the prosecution must prove that a device relied upon to prove a fact in issue (such as a breath analysis instrument or photographic detection device) was in proper order and was operated properly. In relation to breath analysis instruments, in Evans v Benson[6] King CJ (with whom Jacobs, Bollen and Olsson JJ agreed) said:A breath analysis instrument can only indicate a blood alcohol concentration if it is in proper order and is properly operated. If an instrument is not in proper order or is not properly operated, it cannot be said to indicate any concentration of alcohol. For that reason it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the instrument was in proper order and was properly operated.[7][6] (1986) 46 SASR 317.[7] At 323.