Zander and Banfield

[2016] FCCA 1119

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ZANDER & BANFIELD [2016] FCCA 1119

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW − Whether registration in Australia of a New Zealand order should be cancelled − whether order for child to live six months about in Australia and New Zealand with each parent made in accordance with established principles − whether substantial grounds exist for court to exercise jurisdiction.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.4, 11F, 60CA, 68, 70G, 70H, 70K

Family Regulations (Cth), r.23

Cases cited:
Leggart v Domroese [1996] FamCA 72, FLC 92-666
Trnka (1984) FLC 91-535

Applicant: MR ZANDER

Respondent: MS BANFIELD

File Number: DGC 2337 of 2015

Judgment of: Judge Phipps

Hearing date: 18 March 2016

Date of Last Submission: 18 March 2016

Delivered at: 18 May 2016

Delivered on: 18 May 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Macfarlane

Solicitors for the Applicant: Chris Woods & Associates

The Respondent: Appearing on their own behalf

ORDERS

1. The fathers Initiating Application filed 24 July 2015 as amended 26 October 2015 and 24 November 2015 is dismissed.

2. The father deliver the child X born (omitted) 2006 to the mother on 1 July 2016 in accordance with the order made by consent of the parties in the Family Court of New Zealand on 28 February 2015 and registered with the Family Court of Australia on 10 November 2015 pursuant to s.70G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and r.23 of the Family Regulations 1984 (“the New Zealand order”)

3. The mother meet the cost of the child’s transport to New Zealand in accordance with the New Zealand order.

4. Otherwise the father and the mother comply with the New Zealand order.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Zander & Banfield is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DANDENONG

DGC 2337 of 2015

MR ZANDER

Applicant

And

MS BANFIELD

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. The parties have one child, X born (omitted) 2006. She is currently living with her father in Australia. The mother lives in New Zealand. The child is the subject matter of an order made by consent of the parties in the Family Court of New Zealand on 28 February 2015 (“the New Zealand order’’). On 10 November 2015 the New Zealand order was registered with the Family Court of Australia pursuant to s.70G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and r.23 of the Family Regulations 1984 (Cth) and is enforceable in Australian Courts. By reason of s.70H a registered order has the same force and effect as an order of the Family Court of Australia. The father’s Initiating Application applies for the registration to be cancelled under s.70K and for orders, both interim and final, that the child live with him in Australia and spend time during school holidays with the mother in New Zealand. He proposes to pay the cost of travel. The mother proposes that the father’s application be dismissed and the New Zealand order enforced.

2. The father was represented by counsel.  The mother, unrepresented, appeared by telephone from New Zealand.  By agreement the hearing was conducted without cross-examination.  The material facts are not disputed.  The hearing was for the purpose of determining whether or not the court should exercise jurisdiction and make an interim order as proposed by the father.  If this order was made, that necessarily involved an order cancelling the registration of the New Zealand order.

3. The New Zealand order, made by consent on 28 February 2015 provides:

   a)X shall be in the care of her father Mr Zander (“Mr Zander”) in Melbourne, Australia, at the following times;

   (i)from the first week in January 2015 until 1 July 2015 and  for the same dates in subsequent years unless varied by agreement;

   (ii)for alternate Christmases commencing 2015; and

   (iii)At other times as agreed between the parties.

   b)The parties shall agree to dates in regard to (a)(i) and 1(b) no later than 16 weeks prior to Christmas day;

   c)While in Mr Zander’s care:

   (i)X shall attend (omitted) Primary School;

   (ii)Ms Banfield shall have telephone, text and skype contact with the X as agreed.

   d)At all other times the child should be in the care of the mother Ms Banfield (“Ms Banfield”) in New Zealand;

   e)Whilst in Ms Banfield’s care:

   (i)X shall attend (omitted) School, (omitted), New Zealand;

   (ii)Mr Zander shall have telephone text and skype contact with X as agreed.

   f)The parties shall share the cost of transport.  Mr Zander shall meet the cost of transport when X is due to come into his care and Ms Banfield shall meet the cost of transport when X is due to into her care.

4. Attached to the order is a document headed “Understandings 28 February 2015”.  It provides:

   a)The parties shall review the arrangement prior to X commencing High School;

   b)If, on reviewing the care arrangements for X, the parties are unable to reach agreement, the parties will use the New Zealand jurisdiction including the Family Justice System and Family Court to determine outstanding care or guardianship issues.

5. The child currently lives with the father in Australia and except for the period over Christmas 2015 has lived with the father since the beginning of 2015.  If the New Zealand order had been complied with, the child would have lived in New Zealand with the mother in New Zealand from July 2015 until January 2016.

6. The parties began living together in 2003 and separated in 2014.  The mother has two children from a previous relationship, Y aged 19 and Z aged 17.  Y lives with the father and Z lives with her father in (omitted).  The father and the child live in (omitted).

7. The mother is originally from New Zealand.  Her mother is dead and she does not communicate with her father who lives in Sydney.  She has uncles, aunts and cousins living in New Zealand.  She lives with one of her aunts, the aunt’s husband and their 15-year-old son.  She is a New Zealand citizen with a New Zealand passport.

8. In mid-2014, the time the parties separated, they agreed that the mother could take the child for a holiday to New Zealand to introduce her to and spend time with the mother’s family.  The agreement was that the mother and child would go for about six months.  The mother puts it as her asking the father’s permission and the father having given it.  The mother and the child left for New Zealand on 6 June 2014.

9. On 6 September 2014 the mother called the father and told him that she was not returning to Australia and was staying in New Zealand with the child.  The mother proposed to the father that the child visit the father on holidays.  The father proposed that there be a 50/50 care arrangement and the mother agreed.

10. In October 2014 the mother sent the father an email saying she had contacted a lawyer in New Zealand who will draw up the paperwork for X to spend six months in Australia and six months in New Zealand.  The paperwork was sent to the father and he signed.  He said he did so under duress in order to have the child back in Australia.

11. Prior to leaving for New Zealand in June 2014 the child attended (omitted) School in (omitted).  While she was in New Zealand she attended (omitted) School.  She returned to Australia at the beginning of 2015 during the long summer school holidays and has since returned to (omitted) School where she remains.

12. Under the terms of the New Zealand order the child should have returned to New Zealand on 1 July 2015.  The father did not return the child but kept her in Australia and commenced this proceeding by filing an initiating application on 24 July 2015.  When the application initially came before me the mother advised that she had made an application to the Central Authority for New Zealand under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.  I adjourned the application pending the outcome of the Hague application.  The Central Authority for New Zealand submitted the application to the Central Authority for the Commonwealth of Australia.  The Central Authority in Australia rejected the application and advised so by letter dated 30 October 2015.

13. On 3 December 2015 I fixed the application for hearing on 18 March 2016.  I ordered that the mother and father to all things necessary to obtain the immediate renewal of the Australian Passport of the child and made these orders:

    a)That upon renewal of the Passport the Father return the child to the Mother in New Zealand in accordance with the order of the District Court of New Zealand Family Division at Nelson made 28 February 2015 registered in the Family Court of Australia on 10 November 2015 (“New Zealand Order”);

    b)That the Mother return the child to the Father in Australia in the first week of January 2016 in accordance with the New Zealand order.

14. These orders were in accordance with the New Zealand order and were made without opposition from the parties.  In particular, the mother agreed that the New Zealand order required that the child be returned to the father in Australia for the first half of the year in 2016.

15. The time in between this order and the hearing of the application permitted a child inclusive conference to be conducted pursuant to s.11F of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). That took place on 29 February 2016. The mother attended by telephone.

16. The father’s case is that living six months in New Zealand and six months in Australia cannot be in the best interests of the child and meets the requirement of substantial grounds for believing that the child’s welfare requires that the court exercise jurisdiction.  The child attends different schools with different education systems.  He says she is in a different grade in each country.  There will be a six-month periods in each year when she will not spend time with one of her parents.  He argues that this constitutes substantial grounds.

17. He argues that if the court determines that it should exercise jurisdiction interim orders be made for the child to live with him and spend school holidays with the mother.

18. The parties commenced living together in 2004 and separated on 6 June 2014.  The father has filed two affidavits and the mother three.  Until separation the mother and father and the child resided in Australia.  The mother and the child then went to New Zealand by agreement to stay six months.  She decided she wished to stay there and subsequently the six months with each parent was agreed and the child returned to Australia in January 2015.

19. The mother was born in New Zealand and the father says she has lived most of her life in Australia.  The mother does not dispute this.  Her mother has passed away and she does not speak to her father.  He lives in Sydney.  The mother’s remaining family live in New Zealand.  She has two aunts, three uncles and 10 cousins.  She lives with one of her aunts and has employment as a (occupation omitted) on a permanent part-time basis working a seven-day fortnight.  Her hours are 6.30am until 2.30pm and she says she has a well trusted support system of family and friends to help her.

20. The mother has two children from a previous relationship, Y aged 19 and Z 17.  Y lives with the father and the child.  Z lives with her father close to where the father, the child and Y live.  The father says that he, Y and Y’s father are friends and he comes with Z to the father’s house frequently.

21. Ms O, Family Consultant in her memorandum of 29 February 2016 notes that because the mother was interviewed by telephone her body language and facial expressions could not be observed.  Ms O says the mother sounded guarded, her tone flat at times and she was condescending.  The mother confirmed she considered the Child Inclusive Conference unnecessary as the matter should be heard in the New Zealand Family Law system.  She confirmed she had no intention of returning to Australia.  The mother told Ms O she has a diagnosis of clinical depression and she is currently treated with antidepressant medication.

22. The family consultant said that the child initially considered she would have to decide which parent she should live with was relieved to learn that the Judge would decide.  She highlighted a number of preferences about living in Australia, such as her school, her siblings, her family and her new puppy.  She described sharing an equally positive relationship with both parents.  She felt frustrated because it seemed as though her parents were pulling her towards them and in different directions.

23. Relevantly s.70J of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) provides:

    (1)  A court in Australia that is aware that an overseas child order is registered under section 70G must not exercise jurisdiction in proceedings for the making of a Subdivision C parenting order in relation to the child concerned unless:

    (b)the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the child's welfare requires that the court exercise jurisdiction in the proceedings.

    (2) If a court exercises jurisdiction in proceedings for a Subdivision C parenting order in relation to a child who is the subject of an overseas child order, the court must not make a Subdivision C parenting order in relation to the child unless it is satisfied:

    --   (a) that the welfare of the child is likely to be adversely affected if the order is not made; or

    (b)  that there has been such a change in the circumstances of the child since the making of the overseas child order that the Subdivision C parenting order ought to be made.

24. Section 70K provides:

    If a court:

    (a)  is aware that an overseas child order is registered under section 70G; and

    (b)  makes a Subdivision C parenting order in relation to the child concerned;

    the court must cancel the registration of the overseas child order.

25. “Subdivision C parenting order” is defined in s.4(1):

    "Subdivision C parenting order " , when used in Division 13 of Part VII, means a parenting order to the extent to which it deals with:

    (a)  whom a child is to live with; or

    (b)  whom a child is to spend time with; or

    (c)  who is to be responsible for a child's day-to-day care, welfare and development.

26. Sections 70G, 70H, 70J and 70K are contained in Subdivision C, Division 13 of Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

27. For the father’s application to be successful the court must be satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the child's welfare requires that the court exercise jurisdiction in the proceedings, the requirement in s.70J.

28. In Leggart v Domroese [1996] FamCA 72, FLC 92-666 at [46]-[49] the Full Court discussed the then s.68 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), a section in substantially the same terms as s.70J:

    The general policy behind s.68 was discussed by the Full Court in Trnka (1984) FLC 91-535. At 79,341 the Court said:

    “Section 68 is one example of a series of international and national provisions aimed at preventing parties from abducting children across State boundaries, and entering into a multiplicity of forum shopping and litigation in the battle for custody. Where the Court of relevant jurisdiction has determined the custody issue in accordance with generally recognised principles, these provisions aim to secure the recognition and enforcement of the custody order so obtained in the Courts of other countries or States which apply similar principles to custody issues ...The international recognition of orders made in the child's home State is a significant step in preventing abduction and avoiding further litigation in respect of the child."

    47. In Mentor (1982) FLC 91-210 Wood S.J. said at 77,112

    -3: “The policy considerations behind these provisions are fairly apparent and sound. It is intended that the Family Court of Australia give recognition to overseas custody orders made in reciprocating countries where those orders have been made after an appropriate judicial hearing. It is fair and just that, as between the parties to the proceedings, the person having the benefit of such an order should not have to submit to the jurisdiction of this Court unless he or she so consents. However, because the overriding consideration in child-placement cases is what the best interests of the child requires, then the Court has the power to exercise jurisdiction in relation to the children and thus in effect to vary or alter the terms of such an order if it is satisfied on substantial grounds that the child will be adversely affected unless it does exercise jurisdiction."

    48. Major policy purposes behind the legislation include the discouragement of international child abduction and the discouragement of international forum shopping by placing a barrier before an unsuccessful litigant who wishes to disregard a judicial decision or relitigate the same issue in a different jurisdiction, together with the promotion of judicial comity by recognising decisions of the relevant courts.

    49. However, the policy and the effect of the legislation is wider than that as it also proceeds on the basis that the original court should continue to exercise jurisdiction unless the other court is satisfied that there are "substantial grounds" for believing that the welfare of the child will be adversely affected if jurisdiction is not exercised by it. In family law the most appropriate forum in which to determine matters relating to a family, especially issues which centre upon the welfare of a particular child, may change over time. Unlike other areas of law, in which litigation usually involves the resolution of legal issues arising out of a particular past transaction, family law deals with the continuing lives of families and individuals, central aspects of which are not necessarily confined over time to a particular geographic location. Thus, further hearings in such cases in family law do not involve the questioning of the initial decision but seek a fresh determination based upon a new state of affairs. Whilst the length of residence of the child in the other jurisdiction may not itself be sufficient to enable one to conclude that the threshold issue in s.68(3) would be satisfied, nevertheless that circumstance, combined with other factors, may indicate that the welfare of the child is substantially better served by the new jurisdiction making the then appropriate orders. This may be especially so if the issue is one of custody. This represents no disrespect or lack of comity towards the original court. It is the recognition of the factor which is central to the jurisdiction of both courts, namely the welfare of the child at that point in time and having regard to the issues then in question. Relevant factors to take into account in those circumstances may also include the circumstance, such as here, that the overseas orders contemplated the child's permanent residence in the other jurisdiction and that that residence has continued over a significant period of time.

    50. This point is made clear in the judgment of the Full Court in Trnka, supra, where it said at 79,342 that:

    "...an apparent significant change in the circumstances of the child since the making of the overseas order may, depending on the circumstances, amount to "substantial grounds" at this prima facie level." 51. However, as it went on to say: "The test, in subsec. (3) is not, however, to be taken lightly; it is a weighty matter to entertain jurisdiction in the face of a registered overseas order."

29. The relevant New Zealand law is in the Care of Children Act 2004 (NZ).  Sections 4 and 5 provide:

    Child's welfare and best interests to be paramount

    4.(1) The welfare and best interests of a child in his or her particular circumstances must be the first and paramount consideration—

    (a) in the administration and application of this Act, for example, in proceedings under this Act; and

    (b) in any other proceedings involving the guardianship of, or the role of providing day-to-day care for, or contact with, a child.

    (2) Any person considering the welfare and best interests of a child in his or her particular circumstances—

    (a) must take into account—

    (i)the principle that decisions affecting the child should be made and implemented within a time frame that is appropriate to the child's sense of time; and

    (ii)the principles in section 5; and

    (b) may take into account the conduct of the person who is seeking to have a role in the upbringing of the child to the extent that that conduct is relevant to the child's welfare and best interests.

    (3) It must not be presumed that the welfare and best interests of a child (of any age) require the child to be placed in the day-to-day care of a particular person because of that person's gender.

    (4) This section does not—

    (a) limit section 6 or 83, or subpart 4 of Part 2; or

    (b)prevent any person from taking into account other matters relevant to the child's welfare and best interests.

    Principles relating to child's welfare and best interests

    5. The principles relating to a child's welfare and best interests are that—

    (a) a child's safety must be protected and, in particular, a child must be protected from all forms of violence (as defined in section 3(2) to (5) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995) from all persons, including members of the child's family, family group, whānau, hapū, and iwi:

    (b) a child's care, development, and upbringing should be primarily the responsibility of his or her parents and guardians:

    (c) a child's care, development, and upbringing should be facilitated by ongoing consultation and co-operation between his or her parents, guardians, and any other person having a role in his or her care under a parenting or guardianship order:

    (d) a child should have continuity in his or her care, development, and upbringing:

    (e) a child should continue to have a relationship with both of his or her parents, and that a child's relationship with his or her family group, whānau, hapū, or iwi should be preserved and strengthened:

    (f) a child's identity (including, without limitation, his or her culture, language, and religious denomination and practice) should be preserved and strengthened.

1. To make the orders proposed by the father I have to be satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the child's welfare requires that the court exercise jurisdiction in the proceedings.  From the Full Court cases the considerations in this case are these:

   a)Whether the order has been made in accordance with generally accepted principles similar to those which apply in Australia;

   b)Whether the order was made after proper consideration by the New Zealand Court;

   c)Whether there has been a change in circumstances; and

   d)Whether the matter is best decided in the New Zealand courts.

2. Section 4 of the The Care of Children Act 2004 (NZ) provides that the welfare and best interests of the child in his or her particular circumstances must be the first and paramount consideration. This is the paramount principle contained in s.60CA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth);

   In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.

3. The applicant argues that the New Zealand order cannot have been made in accordance with this paramountcy principle.  In particular counsel for the father referred to:

   a)Section 4(2)(a) of the New Zealand Act that the court must take into account the principle that decisions affecting the child should be made and implemented within the time frame that is appropriate to the child’s sense of time;

   b)The principles relating to child’s welfare and best interests in s.5:

   (d) a child should have continuity in his or her care, development, and upbringing;

   (e) a child should continue to have a relationship with both of his or her parents, and that a child’s relationship with his or her family group, whānau, hapū or iwi should be preserved and strengthened.

4. The father argues that the order that the child spend six months with the mother in New Zealand in six months with the father in Australia cannot have been made in accordance with the requirements of the New Zealand Act.  Such an order, the father argues, cannot be in the best interests of the child.  The argument is the timeframe, not seeing a parent for the six months, is not appropriate to a 10-year-olds sense of time.  The child will have not continuity in care and will not maintain the necessary relationships.  The child’s education will be disrupted every six months.

5. The documents before the New Zealand Court when the judge made the order were:

   a)A document headed “Caring for Children General Application pack.  This consisted of the application, and an information sheet.  The information sheet contained particulars of the parties and the child with information similar to that set out in the Initiating Application in the Federal Circuit Court;

   b)The mother’s affidavit that had been prepared by a lawyer which sets out in the circumstances of each of the parties and the parties’ agreement.  The last paragraph of the affidavit states:

   I believe the arrangements Mr Zander and I have agreed upon are safe for X and are in her best interests.  They minimise X’s travel and the disruption to X’s schooling while maintaining a relationship with Mr Zander and I, our extended families and X’s older siblings.

   c)The Memorandum of Consent dated the 11 February 2015 signed by both the mother and father setting out the agreed terms of the parenting order.

6. The order of Judge Russell is in a form familiar to a court in Australia.  The operative part is “Orders in terms of Consent Memorandum filed”.  The order is contained in a document entitled “Minute of Russell DCJ”.  The Consent Memorandum signed and dated by each party is attached.  The order reads:

   I have read and considered the Consent Memorandum signed by both parties.

   I note the parties have agreed to what is proposed and Section 5 gives them the primary responsibility for making appropriate care agreements for X.

   Orders in terms of Consent Memorandum filed.

7. Counsel for the father submitted that I should not assume that Judge Russell had read any documents other than the Consent memorandum.  I do not accept that.  The minute states that Judge Russell has read and considered the Consent Memorandum.  This necessarily means that Judge Russell has considered whether the order was an appropriate one.  That necessarily involves consideration of the filed documents.

8. The information sheet contains the details of the parties and the child, it states that the application is by consent and it says that the mother has been provided with the form by a lawyer.  It sets out the dates the parties lived together and it sets out the day-to-day care contact arrangements.

9. The affidavit of the mother sets out the names and dates of birth of her three children, that the parties were in a defacto relationship for approximately 10 years and separated in June 2014.  It states that they lived in Victoria and that when they separated they agreed that the child would come to New Zealand with the mother for six months.  It states that the mother, after remaining in New Zealand six months, decided this was where she wanted to be.  She explained this to the father and they discussed possible care arrangements for the child.

10. The mother’s affidavit sets out her living arrangements, with her aunt in a three-bedroom house on a farm.  The aunt’s husband and their 15-year-old son reside there.  It states that she has another aunt and cousin in (omitted), two uncles and a number of cousins in (omitted).  It sets out that the father is self-employed and lives in his four bedroom house in (omitted).  It states that his parents, siblings and their children live in Melbourne.  It states that the mother’s son Y lives with the father and that her daughter Z lives with her father in (omitted).

11. The mother’s affidavit sets out the proposal for six months in Australia and six months in New Zealand with alternate Christmases.  It sets out the proposals for schools and states that the father and the mother intend to review the arrangements before the child commences high school.  It states that the father and mother wish to formalise the arrangements in a Parenting Order and then goes on to state that the mother believes the arrangements agreed upon are safe for the child and in her best interests.  She states that they minimise the child’s travel and disruption to schooling while maintaining a relationship with parents, extended families and the child’s siblings.

12. From this material Judge Russell had to decide whether making the order was in the child’s best interests.  Significant is that both parents proposed the order and gave consent for the order to be made.  Judge Russell was not presented with any alternative proposal.  This was the only proposal he had before him.  It was the only proposal put forward by the parties for maintaining the child’s relationship with each parent and the extended families on each side.  He had before him an affidavit which sets out all the circumstances.

13. The father now says that he gave his consent under duress because he wanted the child back in Australia.  If this is correct Judge Russell did not have this information.  Evidence before Judge Russell was that in June 2014 the father had consented to the child spending six months in New Zealand with the mother and then both would return to Australia.  The evidence before Judge Russell was that the circumstances changed because the mother had decided not to return to Australia.  All of this is correct.

14. In the circumstances Judge Russell decided that making the order was in the child’s best interests.  The only alternative was to not make the order which would have left the child’s circumstances and the child’s relationship with each party uncertain other than by agreement of the parties.  An obvious risk if the order was not made was that one or other parent would retain the child which would mean that the child would not see the other parent.  The New Zealand order was made in accordance with generally accepted principles similar to those which apply in Australia and after proper consideration by the New Zealand Court.

15. There has not been a change in circumstances.  The mother remains living in New Zealand and the father in Australia.  The circumstances of both parents remain the same.  The child has remained in Australia when she should have returned to New Zealand for the second six months in 2015.  This was because of the unilateral action of the father in not complying with the New Zealand order.  It cannot be relied upon by the father is a change of circumstances.

16. The father’s application does not meet the requirement that the welfare of the child will be substantially affected if the registration of the New Zealand order is not cancelled.  The dispute should be decided in the New Zealand courts.  The father puts his application on the basis that the child’s best interests are served by living with him in Australia.  That cannot be decided on the material in this application.  The child has half siblings as well as a parent in Australia but that cannot be the determining consideration.  The child’s relationship with the mother must be considered.  The child’s relationship with each parent may best be maintained during primary school years with the six-month about arrangement.  I cannot predict the outcome of a case in which the mother proposes the current orders remain and the father proposes they be changed so that the child lives in Australia with him and spends school holidays with the mother in New Zealand.

17. The current orders were made in New Zealand.  The father will be inconvenienced if proposals for change are heard in New Zealand while the mother will be inconvenienced if heard in Australia.  There is no basis for saying that a New Zealand court is not the appropriate forum.  The father’s application must be dismissed.

18. The mother’s response applies for enforcement of the New Zealand order.  The appropriate order is that the father return the child to New Zealand on 1 July 2016 in accordance with the order made by consent of the parties in the Family Court of New Zealand on 28 February 2015 and registered with the Family Court of Australia.  The mother must comply with the New Zealand order by paying the cost of the child’s travel.

I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Phipps.

Date: 18 May 2016