Zabusky v Tucker and Cowen Solicitors

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

 Zabusky v Tucker & Cowen Solicitors [2021] QSC 71

PARTIES:

HARVEY ZABUSKY

(applicant)

v

TUCKER & COWEN SOLICITORS

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 5288 of 2015

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Hearing

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland

DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON:

3 March 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

1 March 2021

JUDGE:

Ryan J

ORDERS:

1.   I declare that the applicant and respondent did not, between 12 July 2016 and 6 September 2016, enter into a binding agreement.

2.   The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent of, and incidental to, the hearing on the standard basis.

3.   The matter is to be listed for further review either before the Caseflow Review Judge or in the alternative, on the Supervised Case List.

4.   Liberty to apply.

CATCHWORDS:

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – FORMATION OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS – OTHER – where the respondent acted for the applicant – where the parties fell into dispute over costs agreements – where the applicant contends that the parties reached a binding agreement to settle legal proceedings – whether the parties entered into a binding agreement

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 658(1)

ABC v The XIVTH Commonwealth Games Limited (1988) 18 NSWLR 540

Sinclair, Scott & Co Ltd v Naughton (1929) 43 CLR 310

Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353

COUNSEL:

The applicant appeared for himself.

G Dietz appeared for the respondent.

SOLICITORS:

The applicant appeared for himself.

Tucker & Cowen Solicitors appeared for the respondent.

  1. The question for me at this hearing was whether a binding contract (to settle legal proceedings) existed between the parties after an exchange of the emails in August and September of 2016.[1]

    [1] That question was referred to the Court for hearing by his Honour Justice Boddice without an application or initiating document from either of the parties. 

    After making my finding, I discussed with the parties the need for an application or equivalent so as to formalise my finding in such a way as to allow it to be acted upon or appealed – otherwise it was just my opinion. 

    After that discussion, the respondent prepared an application for a declaration to the effect that there was no binding agreement between the parties.  Ultimately, I made such a declaration (and other orders).

    Background    

  2. Mr Tucker, of Tucker & Cowen Solicitors, acted for Mr Zabusky and interests associated with him in protracted commercial litigation which commenced in the mid-2000s. I’ll refer to that litigation as the substantive action. 

  3. Ultimately, Mr Zabusky and Mr Tucker’s firm fell into dispute over the firm’s fees. 

  4. By 2016, there were three actions on foot arising out of that dispute: one in the Supreme Court, an appeal in the District Court and another in the Magistrates Court.

  5. The Supreme Court action, file number 5288 of 15, was originally an application by Mr Zabusky for an assessment of his legal costs (the “fee dispute”). 

  6. It was amended and became, additionally, an application for…

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Details
Case
[2021] QSC 71
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Zabusky v Tucker and Cowen Solicitors came before the court to determine whether a binding contract existed between the parties after an exchange of emails in August and September 2016. The applicant, Mr Zabusky, argued that a binding agreement had been reached to settle legal proceedings. The respondent, Tucker & Cowen Solicitors, contended otherwise. The case was referred to the court by his Honour Justice Boddice without any application or initiating document from either party. Following a discussion with the parties, the respondent prepared an application seeking a declaration that there was no binding agreement. The court was tasked with deciding whether the parties had indeed entered into a binding agreement based on their email exchanges.

The legal issues before the court revolved around the formation of a contractual relationship between the parties. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the parties had reached a consensus on the terms of a settlement and if they intended to be immediately bound by those terms. The court had to consider the language used by the parties, the context of their communications, and the importance they placed on having a detailed written agreement. Additionally, the court had to assess whether any conditions precedent to the compromise of the disputes had been met, such as obtaining signed authority from Amalia Zabusky to transfer her share of the trust account funds to Mr Zabusky.

The court concluded that, even if the parties had reached a broad consensus by 6 September 2016, the terms of their agreement were not sufficiently certain and complete to be capable of having contractual effect. The court emphasised that the parties intended to be bound only by a written contract containing the precise terms of their agreement. The evidence indicated that the parties had been exchanging draft documents that explicitly stated there would be no binding agreement until executed. Furthermore, the nature of the agreement, which involved the discontinuance of actions in three courts, called for precision and written acknowledgement by both parties. The court found that the parties intended their agreed terms to be reduced to writing and signed or executed, consistent with their previous drafts and Mr Zabusky's email of 25 August 2016. Therefore, the court held that no binding agreement was in place in 2016.

The court made several orders, including a declaration that the applicant and respondent did not enter into a binding agreement between 12 July 2016 and 6 September 2016. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the hearing on the standard basis. The matter was listed for further review either before the Caseflow Review Judge or on the Supervised Case List. The court also granted liberty to apply for further orders if necessary.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. I declare that the applicant and respondent did not, between 12 July 2016 and 6 September 2016, enter into a binding agreement.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent of, and incidental to, the hearing on the standard basis.

3. The matter is to be listed for further review either before the Caseflow Review Judge or in the alternative, on the Supervised Case List.

4. Liberty to apply.

Background

Background to the litigation

The question for me at this hearing was whether a binding contract (to settle legal proceedings) existed between the parties after an exchange of the emails in August and September of 2016.[1][1] That question was referred to the Court for hearing by his Honour Justice Boddice without an application or initiating document from either of the parties. After making my finding, I discussed with the parties the need for an application or equivalent so as to formalise my finding in such a way as to allow it to be acted upon or appealed – otherwise it was just my opinion. After that discussion, the respondent prepared an application for a declaration to the effect that there was no binding agreement between the parties. Ultimately, I made such a declaration (and other orders).Background Mr Tucker, of Tucker & Cowen Solicitors, acted for Mr Zabusky and interests associated with him in protracted commercial litigation which commenced in the mid-2000s. I’ll refer to that litigation as the substantive action. Ultimately, Mr Zabusky and Mr Tucker’s firm fell into dispute over the firm’s fees. By 2016, there were three actions on foot arising out of that dispute: one in the Supreme Court, an appeal in the District Court and another in the Magistrates Court. The Supreme Court action, file number 5288 of 15, was originally an application by Mr Zabusky for an assessment of his legal costs (the “fee dispute”). It was amended and became, additionally, an application for the setting aside of costs agreements (known as the First and Second Costs Agreements); and amended further by way of including an application for damages for negligence or breach of the Cost Agreements. The Magistrates Court proceedings were instituted by the respondent firm, seeking to recover outstanding invoices from Mr Zabusky. Mr Zabusky filed an application in the Magistrates Court proceedings for certain itemised bills which was unsuccessful. He appealed from that decision to the District Court, and the District Court proceedings to which I’ve referred are appeal proceedings. On 15 June 2016, Mr Zabusky was required to give security for costs in those proceedings, which was not provided. I understand that the appeal proceedings have now been dismissed. In the Supreme Court action 5288 of 15, in a document filed on 15 July 2016, the respondent firm sought, among other things, directions that Mr Zabusky provide points of claim for his several claims in his further amended application.Settlement Negotiations Initiated At around the same time in July 2016, Mr Zabusky raised the prospect of the parties settling their disputes. Mr Zabusky believed that the substantive action could settle, and that certain monies held in a bank account, under the control of Mr Tucker and another, could be applied in settlement of his fee dispute with Mr Tucker’s firm. Monies were paid into that bank account by an order of the Supreme Court in 2010 in proceeding 4405 of 2010. The parties to proceeding 4405 of 2010 were Mr Zabusky and Virgtel Limited on the one hand, and Henrick Van Leeuwen (or HVL) and James Conomos Lawyers on the other. In accordance with the order, Mr Zabusky was to pay into a bank account a sum of $326,000-odd, and once that sum was paid, the second respondent, James Conomos Lawyers, would instruct the Sherriff of Queensland to take no further step to enforce the sale of property pursuant to an enforcement warrant.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

And, as stated in Masters v Cameron, the answer as to the choice between those options depends on the intention disclosed by the language employed by the parties. No special form of words is essential in order that there shall be no contract binding upon the parties before the execution of their agreement in its ultimate shape. I have taken all of that into account.Signposting of ultimate conclusion As will emerge below in my reasons, even if Mr Zabusky and Mr Tucker might be said to have reached a broad consensus by way of offer and acceptance as at 6 September 2016 – and I reach no final conclusion about that – the terms upon which they agreed were not then sufficiently certain and complete as to be capable of having contractual effect. Further, and most significantly in my view, having regard in particular to the details which each party was concerned to ensure were spelt out in an agreement, it was not their intention to be immediately bound by the terms of their broad consensus, even if they were sufficiently certain as to be capable of having contractual effect. Even apart from inferences which are available on the evidence of the parties intention that their final agreement would be one reduced to detailed written form, paragraph 5 of the purported agreement was nothing more than a proposal that the parties would, at some stage in the future, agree on the steps to take pending the conclusion of the litigation and the signing of mutual releases. Also, I am not persuaded that conditions precedent to the compromise of the relevant disputes had been performed – in particular, the need for signed authority from at least Amalia Zabusky that she would hand over her share of the trust account funds upon settlement to Mr Zabusky so that he could pay $150,000 to the respondent firm.Whether the parties intended to be immediately bound by the terms of the agreement alleged by Mr Zabusky As I have indicated, even if the parties agreed on the terms contained in the five numbered paragraphs of Mr Zabusky’s email, dated 25 August 2016 – and as I’ve said, I’ll make that assumption without reaching a conclusion about it – I infer that they did not agree to be bound until a written contract containing the terms of their agreement was executed by them both setting out with precision the terms upon which they agreed. In other words, I conclude that no binding agreement was in place in 2016. At best, the parties got to the point where they were ready to prepare a contract for execution which would set out the “ultimate shape” of their agreement, not yet at the point of a binding agreement. I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons: · Most obviously, paragraph 5 itself contemplates the parties reaching agreement on certain matters; · The evidence clearly reveals the importance to the parties of the reduction of their settlement agreement to writing, for signature by them both, acknowledging acceptance of detailed terms; · Until 25 August 2016, the parties had been exchanging draft documents which provided for their execution by each of them, including those drafted by Mr Tucker, which explicitly stated that there would be no binding agreement until it was executed;· Mr Zabusky’s email of 25 August 2016 was sent in the context of the parties being unable to settle upon the terms of a much more detailed written agreement. In that context I find it extremely unlikely that the parties would agree on the broad and imprecise terms of the five paragraphs contained in Mr Zabusky’s 25 August 2016 email when they could not reach agreement on precise terms; · The nature of the agreement was one which called for precision in its terms and written acknowledgement by each of the parties that they agreed with those terms;· The agreement in contemplation was one which would lead to the discontinuance of actions in three courts. It was an agreement in contemplation in the context of ongoing cost disputes between the parties, against the background of older cost disputes between the parties and allegations of negligence by Mr Zabusky against the respondent. I infer that the parties were on professional rather than collegiate terms; It is reasonable to infer that, in that context, each party wished to ensure that the other was pinned down to a written agreement;· That the parties intended that their agreed terms be reduced to writing and signed or executed is consistent with their duelling drafts and indeed consistent with Mr Zabusky’s email of 25 August 2016 itself, which required, in paragraph 2, the execution of his letter of 19 July 2016.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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