Yvette Zaal v Terra Schwartz Pty. Ltd
[2023] FWC 1647
•20 JULY 2023
| [2023] FWC 1647 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.365—General protections
Yvette Zaal
v
Terra Schwartz Pty. Ltd.
(C2023/2639)
| COMMISSIONER WILSON | MELBOURNE, 20 JULY 2023 |
Application for the Commission to deal with a dismissal dispute under s.365 of the Act –jurisdictional objection that there was no dismissal – jurisdictional objection upheld – substantive application dismissed.
This decision deals with the question of whether Ms Yvette Zaal (the Applicant) was “dismissed” within the meaning of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) from her employment with Terra Schwartz Pty. Ltd. (Terra Schwartz, or the Respondent) and thus eligible to make a general protections application involving dismissal to the Fair Work Commission (the Commission).
Terra Schwartz objects to Ms Zaal’s application on the basis that there was no dismissal as defined. With such objection having been made the Commission is required to determine whether the applicant was dismissed before it can proceed any further.
The objection was the subject of a hearing before me on Monday 17 July 2023 at which Ms Zaal gave evidence and submissions on her own behalf. Mr John Nicholl, a Contract Manager employed by Terra Schwartz represented the Respondent, and Mr Sven Pekarsky, a Terra Schwartz General Manager, gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent.
For the reasons set out below, I find Ms Zaal was not dismissed within the meaning of the Act.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
Section 365 of the Act outlines when the Commission can deal with a general protections application involving dismissal:
“365 Application for the FWC to deal with a dismissal dispute
If:
(a) a person has been dismissed; and
(b) the person, or an industrial association that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the person, alleges that the person was dismissed in contravention of this Part;
the person, or the industrial association, may apply to the FWC for the FWC to deal with the dispute.”
The term “dismissed” is defined in s.12 of the Act by reference to s.386, which provides this definition:
“386 Meaning of dismissed
(1) A person has been dismissed if:
(a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer’s initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.
(2) However, a person has not been dismissed if:
(a) The person was employed under a contract of employment for a specified period of time, for a specified task, or for the duration of a specified season, and the employment has terminated at the end of the period, on completion of the task, or at the end of the season; or
(b) the person was an employee:
(i)to whom a training arrangement applied; and
(ii)whose employment was for a specified period of time or was, for any reason, limited to the duration of the training arrangement; and the employment has terminated at the end of the training arrangement; or
(c) the person was demoted in employment but:
(i)the demotion does not involve a significant reduction in his or her remuneration or duties; and
(ii)he or she remains employed with the employer that effected the demotion.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to a person employed under a contract of a kind referred to in paragraph (2)(a) if a substantial purpose of the employment of the person under a contract of that kind is, or was at the time of the person’s employment, to avoid the employer’s obligations under this Part.”
Section 365 states that if a person has been dismissed, and the person alleges that the dismissal was in contravention of Part 3-1, he or she may apply to the Commission to ‘deal with the dispute’.
The Commission’s usual process with general protections matters is to deal with the dispute by conducting a conciliation conference by a staff conciliator. If it is satisfied that all reasonable attempts to resolve the dispute have been or are likely to be unsuccessful, the Commission will issue a certificate that allows the applicant to commence proceedings in a court (s.368(3)) or by arbitration in the Commission if consent is given by each party (s.369). However, in an application where the respondent denies that it dismissed the applicant and objects to the application on this basis, the Commission is required to determine whether the applicant was dismissed.[1]
Consistent with the Commission’s usual practice on these matters[2], this matter has been allocated to me to determine whether or not there was a dismissal. A person must have been dismissed to be entitled to make a general protections dispute application and before the Commission can exercise powers under s.368 to deal with a dispute.[3]
BACKGROUND
Ms Yvette Zaal made a general protections application involving dismissal to the Commission pursuant to s.365 of the Act on 10 May 2023. She had earlier made an application for unfair dismissal remedy, on 21 April 2023, however discontinued the application on 11 May 2023.
The Respondent to Ms Zaal’s general protections application is Terra Schwartz which provides “business management support to government clients, primarily in procurement and contract management, and project management. Its personnel are assigned to a client project for a period of time and may be allocated to work with different clients or projects from time to time.”[4]
Ms Zaal commenced working for Terra Schwartz on 10 January 2022. There is a minor dispute between the parties about the precise nature of Ms Zaal’s position and title which is not necessary for me to resolve in this decision, although it is agreed she was working as a Senior Manager working remotely to provide services to the Australian Government Department of Defence (the Client).[5] Ms Zaal performed her role working remotely from her home in Melbourne.
On 19 April 2023, Mr Pekarsky contacted Ms Zaal by telephone to discuss likely changes the Department of Defence sought from Terra Schwartz in considering renewal of its contract from 1 July 2023.[6] Ms Zaal had not expected to discuss her work location and instead had expected to discuss her application for a higher security clearance which had been under consideration for some time. Mr Pekarsky gave evidence that he advised Ms Zaal in the conversation on 19 April 2023 that:
“our Client had sought the possibility for personnel to work on site at a Client office location in Canberra, Melbourne, or other location rather than a work-from-home arrangement. For her position this would mean attending an office, of which the location was yet to be discussed and agreed, on a regular basis. There were 2 months to prepare and negotiate a satisfactory arrangement for both the Applicant and the Client.”[7]
Mr Pekarsky recalls the conversation with the Applicant as follows:
“The Applicant told me she did not want to move to Canberra and I said that we can explore alternatives. These alternatives included formally requesting the Client to consider the Applicant continue to provide service via remote working in Melbourne or remote working from a Defence facility in Melbourne. Another possibility was if this approach was not successful, the Respondent could look to find an alternative position in Melbourne with a different Client. The Applicant stated she was not preferable to move to Canberra but would like to discuss further options to continue working with the Client or on another project based in Melbourne.”[8]
Ms Zaal disputes she was told the position could be located to “Canberra, Melbourne, or other location rather than a work-from-home arrangement”.
The above conversation took place, on Ms Zaal’s account at about 10:11 AM on 19 April 2023. In the evening on the same day, 19 April 2023, Mr Pekarsky was provided with an email from a Director in the Department of Defence requesting Ms Zaal cease providing services under the contract between the Respondent and the Client. I do not detail the allegations as they are highly general, not particularised and have not been investigated; they are though described by the email’s author as pertaining to “serious error”.[9] The email is dated 19 April 2023 at 1:39 PM and was addressed to a person within Terra Schwartz other than Mr Pekarsky, who then later provided it to Mr Pekarsky.
Mr Pekarsky and Ms Zaal spoke by phone again the following day on 20 April 2023 at about 3:30 PM. Ms Zaal expected the call would discuss her security clearance, however Mr Pekarsky instead spoke to her about the email received from the Department of Defence and discussed with her the possible next steps including the Department investigating the alleged activities and the possible outcomes.[10] He also discussed that if disciplinary action was taken the Respondent may be obligated to report the action to the Australian Government Security Vetting Agency since the Applicant held a Security Clearance with the Australian Government.[11] Ms Zaal’s evidence is that she asked Mr Pekarsky to provide her with a copy of the email, however he refused. Shortly after the phone call on 20 April 2023 at 3:46 PM Ms Zaal sent an email to Mr Pekarsky which consisted of the following:
“Hello Sven
Further to our discussion, please accept my resignation with immediate effect.
Regards,
Yvette Zaal
Senior Manager”.[12]
CONSIDERATION
The matter for determination in this decision is whether Ms Zaal has been “dismissed” within the meaning given to that word by s.386 of the Act. The enquiry to be made in that regard is whether Ms Zaal’s employment with Terra Schwartz was “terminated on the employer’s initiative” (s.386(1)(a)), or whether she resigned from her employment “but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by” Terra Schwartz (s.386(1)(b)).
In Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2)[13] it was recognised that a termination will be at the initiative of the employer where the act of the employer results directly or consequentially in the termination of employment – that is had the employer not taken the action, the employee would have remained in employment; and the employment is not voluntarily left by the employee.
After an extensive analysis of the law surrounding s.386(1) the Full Bench in Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd t/a Bupa Aged Care Mosman v Shahin Tavassoli[14] held that the Commission needed to distinguish whether it was argued the dismissal was not legally effective, such as for reason of a “heat of the moment” communication or incapacity of some kind or whether it had been “forced” through conduct or a course of conduct by the employer with an intentional purpose of procuring a resignation:
“[47] Having regard to the above authorities and the bifurcation in the definition of “dismissal” established in s.386(1) of the FW Act, we consider that the position under the FW Act may be summarised as follows:
(1) There may be a dismissal within the first limb of the definition in s.386(1)(a) where, although the employee has given an ostensible communication of a resignation, the resignation is not legally effective because it was expressed in the “heat of the moment” or when the employee was in a state of emotional stress or mental confusion such that the employee could not reasonably be understood to be conveying a real intention to resign. Although “jostling” by the employer may contribute to the resignation being legally ineffective, employer conduct is not a necessary element. In this situation if the employer simply treats the ostensible resignation as terminating the employment rather than clarifying or confirming with the employee after a reasonable time that the employee genuinely intended to resign, this may be characterised as a termination of the employment at the initiative of the employer.
(2) A resignation that is “forced” by conduct or a course of conduct on the part of the employer will be a dismissal within the second limb of the definition in s.386(1)(b). The test to be applied here is whether the employer engaged in the conduct with the intention of bringing the employment to an end or whether termination of the employment was the probably result of the employer’s conduct such that the employee had no effective or real choice but to resign. Unlike the situation in (1), the requisite employer conduct is the essential element.
[48] It is necessary for an applicant for an unfair dismissal remedy whose employment has terminated because the employer has acted on a communication of resignation on the part of the employee to articulate whether they contend they were dismissed in the first or the second scenario above (although it may be possible for both scenarios to arise in a particular factual situation). Where the applicant is self-represented or inadequately represented, it may be necessary for the member of the Commission hearing the matter to clarify with the applicant the precise basis upon which it is contended that the applicant was dismissed. If this is not done, it may lead to the wrong test being applied to the matter.”
The acts committed or undertaken by an employer in relation to a termination of employment are not the only points of consideration. It is also necessary to consider the circumstances giving rise to the termination; the seriousness of the issues involved; and the respective conduct of the employer and employee.[15]
An employer is generally able to treat a clear and unambiguous resignation as a resignation. However, where a resignation is given in the heat of the moment or under extreme pressure, special circumstances may arise. The Commission accepts that in special circumstances an employer may be required to allow a reasonable period of time to pass and may have a duty to confirm the intention to resign if, during that time, they are put on notice that the resignation was not intended.[16]
Assessment of Terra Schwartz’s objection will be assisted by the summary of the general principles enunciated recently by Deputy President Hampton in Tao Yang v SAL HR Services Pty Ltd (Tao Yang):
“• The question as to whether there was a dismissal within the meaning of the FW Act is a jurisdictional fact that must be established by the Applicant;
· A termination at the initiative of the employer involves the conduct (or course of conduct) engaged in by the employer as the principal constituting factor leading to the termination. There must be a sufficient causal connection between the conduct and the resignation such that it “forced” the resignation;
· The employer must have engaged in some conduct that intended to bring the employment relationship to an end or had that probable result;
· Conduct includes an omission;
· Resignations that are clear and unambiguous may be treated on face value unless special circumstances are present which warrant the employer confirming the intention of the employee;
· Considerable caution should be exercised in treating a resignation as other than voluntary (forced) where the conduct of the employer is ambiguous and it is necessary to determine whether the employer’s conduct was of such a nature that resignation was the probable result such that the employee had no effective or real choice but to resign; and
· In determining the question of whether the termination was at the initiative of the employer, an objective analysis of the parties’ conduct is required.”[17]
Terra Schwartz argues that the Commission has no jurisdiction to deal with Ms Zaal’s claim because no dismissal occurred. It argues that the written resignation provided by Ms Zaal was just that.
Ms Zaal claims that she did not willingly resign from her employment, rather her written resignation from her full-time position was provided due to a fear of her security clearance being affected and that she was forced to resign in order to protect her reputation.[18] Whilst the Applicant resigned from her employment by email on 20 April 2023, she submits it was forced and that the Respondent took adverse action against her because she exercised a workplace right raising complaints/enquiries in relation to her employment regarding the possible relocation.[19]
Shortly stated, the following is a distillation of the submissions of both parties.
The Applicant’s case
Ms Zaal submits that on 19 April 2023 she was notified by Terra Schwartz of a change in her work location, which was not suitable to her due to the distance involved.[20] She argues that she then raised an enquiry pertaining to the change in employment and possible alternatives. Ms Zaal accepts that she was advised in the discussion of the client’s request that she “change work location from Melbourne home office to Canberra Client office” however does not recall a Melbourne office location being mentioned, saying that “no client alternatives were offered by Respondent”.[21] She also says Mr Pekarsky was asked by her to discuss Melbourne clients and Canberra clients flexible work options yet his only comment was to the effect that “Applicant can resign or ring team recruitment colleagues”.[22] On 20 April 2023 Ms Zaal received a call from the General Manager advising that there were allegations of serious misconduct made against her. She was overwhelmed with shock and requested reasons; however, none were particularised. She heard Mr Pekarsky to say that the Department of Defence had drawn its conclusions based on audit findings against her, which were not elaborated upon. Later the same day she resigned with immediate effect.
Ms Zaal submits that she felt forced to resign in order to protect her reputation[23] and security clearance status.[24] Further, there was no attempted contact from the Respondent following her resignation.[25] She says that her intention with the communication “please accept my resignation with immediate effect” was that it was notice of her resignation with immediate effect in accordance with her contract of employment which required her to give four weeks’ notice of resignation and to work out that notice.
The Respondent’s case
Terra Schwartz submits it neither asked Ms Zaal to resign or suggested to her that she should resign. The discussion on 19 April 2023 was in the context of discussions the firm’s client had sought in order to renew the Respondent’s contract. Mr Pekarsky says he told Ms Zaal that the client had sought the possibility for people working on the contract to work from its Canberra or Melbourne or other location offices and not to work from home. Mr Pekarsky says that Ms Zaal said she did not want to move to Canberra and that he replied by saying alternatives could be explored,[26] a statement which is agreed by Ms Zaal.[27] On 20 April 2023 the Respondent received Ms Zaal’s notice of resignation by email which requested it take immediate effect. Mr Pekarsky attempted to contact Ms Zaal on several occasions by phone after receiving her resignation but without success,[28] a contention which is rejected by Ms Zaal.
Terra Schwartz also submits that it took Ms Zaal’s resignation “with immediate effect”, as being precisely that; she intended to communicate she would not be performing further work for the company. Terra Schwartz also submit that Ms Zaal did not attend work following her notice of resignation and that it suffered a loss due to Ms Zaal’s resignation.
As set out above, Ms Zaal bears the burden of establishing she was dismissed. She does not argue her dismissal was in the “heat of the moment” of the type that would satisfy the first limb of the definition of “dismissed” in s.386(1)(a). I am not satisfied with respect to the second limb in s.386(1)(b) that she has established on the balance of probabilities that her resignation was because she was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by Terra Schwartz.
The onus of proof in respect of s.386(1)(b) pertinent to forced dismissals is not insignificant and many who assert they have been forced to resign will struggle to meet the onus. The section requires an objective analysis of the parties’ conduct, delving deeper than the simple assertion. The conduct or course of conduct pointed to must be such as to overcome the additional hurdle that the employee resigned “but was forced to” do so. As referred to in Tao Yang above, there must be a sufficient causal connection between the conduct and the resignation such that the employer “forced” the resignation and at least some of the conduct must have been intended to bring the employment relationship to an end.
Ms Zaal argues that the relevant conduct was two events, a day apart; on 19 April 2023 she was told her job had to move from Melbourne to Canberra and on 20 April 2023 she was told the Department of Defence had complained about her and requested she be taken off the services contract to which she had been assigned. She sees this as conduct designed to unseat her from her job; her inability to move to Canberra coupled with her being removed from the work she was performing meant her situation was untenable. What happened was probably at the instigation of the Department, with the complaint letter being template and a common tactic used by the Department when a disaffinity with a contractor arose.
Mr Pekarsky and Terra Schwartz more generally reject these constructs. Mr Pekarsky points to the conversation about work location as being the product of a general requirement of the Department of Defence. He concedes he asked Ms Zaal if she would move to Canberra and was prepared to discuss alternatives when she said that was not possible. In relation to the Department of Defence’s complaints the evidence shows the relevant email was not provided to Mr Pekarsky until after the conversation with Ms Zaal on 19 April 2023. In his evidence Mr Pekarsky said the complaint would need to be investigated by the Client and that alternative work could be found for Ms Zaal either on other contracts within the Department of Defence or within other clients for whom Terra Schwartz performed work.
On these matters at least I prefer the evidence given by Mr Pekarsky to that given by Ms Zaal where there is an inconsistency.
While the evidence of neither is without blemish or minor inconsistency, the answers to questions given by Ms Zaal lead me to conclude she may not have heard all things said by Mr Pekarsky, causing her to believe, with adamance, that things that might have been said were not said. In short, her active listening may have let her down in these critical conversations. Despite referring to her hand-written notes in the hearing, said to be contemporaneous, Ms Zaal did not provide the notes in her evidence, and where she did refer to them has provided them as a high-level, tendentious summary only. Terra Schwartz did not call for the notes to be produced to the Commission.
For his part, Mr Pekarsky’s explanations to Ms Zaal both on the matter of relocation and the content and consequences of the Department of Defence’s complaints were likely restrained and not full, and certainly not with a problem-solving nature of “how do we get you beyond this difficult situation”. Mr Pekarsky has no contemporaneous notes of the conversations which, at their lowest, would be of great concern to any employee and which reasonably could be the subject of further dispute. Mr Pekarsky contends as well that he unsuccessfully attempted to contact Ms Zaal after her resignation email to discuss the matter, however, offers no evidence of the number and dates of the calls and I note that Ms Zaal rejects that calls were made to her by Mr Pekarsky at any time following the resignation email.
I also take into account that Mr Pekarsky withheld from Ms Zaal the Department of Defence’s email to his colleague. Its contents are innocuous and not inflammatory, and it raises no issues of defence or other security. He was wrong to withhold it, with the fact that he did allowing Ms Zaal to believe it demonstrated some sort of conspiracy on the Department’s part. That in itself does not taint his evidence generally to such a point that it cannot be accepted.
Having regard to all the evidence before me and the demeanour of each witness I am satisfied it is likely that on 19 April 2023 Mr Pekarsky indicated to Ms Zaal that home-based work could not continue for her; that the Department wanted her to work from Canberra; and that when she declined, he suggested locations other than Canberra could be considered. There is no question on the evidence of either Mr Pekarsky or Ms Zaal that the subject of Ms Zaal’s work location after 1 July 2023 had been concluded; no direction had been given, and it is plain the subject was going to be discussed again.
I am satisfied as well that the phone discussion between the two on 20 April 2023 did not involve a statement or direction from Mr Pekarsky to Ms Zaal either that she should resign, or that it would be better if she did resign. However, it is likely Mr Pekarsky discussed with Ms Zaal that one response to the situation might be for her to resign; however, in context of all the evidence as well as my impression of each person I am not satisfied that this could reasonably be viewed as a direction to her. I am though satisfied that Mr Pekarsky explained to Ms Zaal that the Department of Defence’s complaints would have to be investigated by the department, however it is likely he did not give an especially comprehensive explanation of how the investigation would be conducted or what may occur depending on its findings. I am not satisfied that Mr Pekarsky explained to Ms Zaal what alternative work could be found for her; while his evidence to the Commission about those possibilities answered the question posed, it does not stand as evidence that he told Ms Zaal those things.
Following these assessments, the question needs to be asked: when Ms Zaal submitted her resignation no more than a few minutes later, at 3:46 PM, was it her intention to actually resign and no longer work for Terra Schwartz?
I am satisfied that such was her intention. Reasonably, the things said by Mr Pekarsky could not be construed as “you must resign”. The evidence of the parties does not support such a conclusion. In fact, Ms Zaal’s written documents do not go as far as to claim that she was told she must resign; her application form says that she “felt forced to resign in order to protect her reputation”[29] and her written witness statement/response document says only that Mr Pekarsky gave verbal advice to resign “in order to maintain a reputable security clearance”[30]
Ms Zaal assumed that the resignation would take effect four weeks later; however, the words she chose to use in the email let her down and were taken by Terra Schwartz as meaning she was finishing her employment then and there. No enquiries were made of Ms Zaal by Terra Schwartz about what she intended in the days after 20 April 2023, and I do not accept Mr Pekarsky’s evidence that he attempted to contact Ms Zaal on several occasions by phone after receiving her resignation but without success; the evidence he gives on the subject is no more than an assertion, with no phone or other records provided that would support the assertion. On the other hand, Ms Zaal did not contact Terra Schwartz again until 10 May 2023 when she requested a payslip be provided. The product of these considerations is two-fold; a finding is not open to me that Ms Zaal had second thoughts about whether she had or should have resigned; and no finding is available that Ms Zaal queried whether she was expected to work out her period of notice.
In the context of all the evidence before me the only findings I can make lead to the conclusion that Ms Zaal resigned of her own volition and was not dismissed having been forced to resign because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by Terra Schwartz. She may well have acted in haste, she may be uncomfortable with its result and may regret her actions, however those matters are not synonymous with being forced to resign because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by Terra Schwartz.
Returning to the summary of relevant considerations given by Deputy President Hampton in Tao Yang:
The above analysis approaches the question as one of jurisdictional fact and concludes there is no jurisdiction for the reasons stated;
There is no or no sufficient causal connection between Terra Schwartz’s conduct and Ms Zaal’s resignation;
The evidence does not support a finding that Terra Schwartz engaged in conduct with the intention or the probable result of bringing the employment relationship to an end;
There are no relevant omissions to be considered;
The resignation is clear and unambiguous and may be treated on face value as being a resignation. There are no special circumstances that would have required Terra Schwartz to check her intention;
The conduct of Terra Schwartz is not established as ambiguous;
The above conclusions have been drawn on the basis of an objective analysis.
On the material before me, I am satisfied that the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection has been made out. I find the Applicant resigned from her employment and was not forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by her employer within s.386(1).
CONCULSION
Having determined Ms Zaal was not dismissed, she is not entitled to apply under s.365 of the Act for the Commission to deal with her dismissal dispute.
The jurisdictional objection is upheld. The application is dismissed.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
Ms Y. Zaal for herself
Mr J. Nicholl for the Respondent
Hearing details:
2023.
Melbourne (via video conference);
17 July.
[1] Coles Supply Chain Pty Ltd v Milford [2020] FCAFC 152, [67]; Lipa Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Marouche[2023] FWCFB 101, [23].
[2] Following the decision in Lipa Pharmaceuticals Ltd v Marouche[2023] FWCFB 101 the Commission changed its case management practices from 1 June 2023 for General Protections cases involving dismissal where certain jurisdictional issues arise.
[3] Coles Supply Chain Pty Ltd v Milford [2020] FCAFC 152, [54].
[4] Exhibit R2, Witness Statement of Sven Pekarsky, 21 June 2023, [1].
[5] Ibid, [2].
[6] Ibid, [3].
[7] Ibid, [3].
[8] Ibid, [4].
[9] Ibid, [6].
[10] Ibid, [7]-[8].
[11] Ibid, [9].
[12] Ibid, Attachment A.
[13] (1995) 62 IR 200, 205.
[14] [2017] FWCFB 3941.
[15] Pawel v Advanced Precast Pty Ltd (unreported, AIRCFB, Polites SDP, Watson SDP and Gay C, 12 May 2000).
[16] Ngo v Link Printing Pty Ltd Print R7005 (AIRCFB, McIntyre VP, Marsh SDP, Harrison C, 7 July 1999), [12].
[17] [2023] FWC 1325, [53].
[18] Form F8, General protections application involving dismissal, item 3.3.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Exhibit A1, Applicant’s response to Witness Statement of Sven Pekarsky, 28 June 2023, Attachment Applicant Impact Statement.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Form F8, General protections application involving dismissal, item 3.3.
[24] Exhibit A1, Applicant’s response to Witness Statement of Sven Pekarsky, 28 June 2023, Attachment Applicant Impact Statement.
[25] Exhibit A1, Applicant’s response to Witness Statement of Sven Pekarsky, 28 June 2023, [13].
[26] Exhibit R2, Witness Statement of Sven Pekarsky, 21 June 2023, [3] – [4].
[27] Exhibit A1, Applicant’s response to Witness Statement of Sven Pekarsky, 28 June 2023, [4].
[28] Exhibit R2, Witness Statement of Sven Pekarsky, 21 June 2023, [13].
[29] Form F8, General protections application involving dismissal, item 3.3.7.
[30] Exhibit A1, Applicant’s response to Witness Statement of Sven Pekarsky, 28 June 2023, Applicant Impact Statement, p. 4 of 8.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Print
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