Yousefi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

[2000] FCA 1364

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Yousefi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1364

MOHAMMAD TAGHI YOUSEFI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

W 51 of 2000

CARR J
22 SEPTEMBER 2000
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	W 51 OF 2000

BETWEEN:	MOHAMMAD TAGHI YOUSEFI Applicant
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS Respondent
JUDGE:	CARR J
DATE OF ORDER:	22 SEPTEMBER 2000
WHERE MADE:	PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed

2.        The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	W 51 OF 2000

BETWEEN:	MOHAMMAD TAGHI YOUSEFI Applicant
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS Respondent

JUDGE:	CARR J
DATE:	22 SEPTEMBER 2000
PLACE:	PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an application for an order of review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 6 March 2000 by which the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant a protection visa to the applicant.  The applicant, who is a citizen of Iran, arrived in Australia by boat on 3 September 1999 without a passport.  He had used a false passport for at least part of his journey from Iran, but threw it into the sea on the last leg of his journey.  On 11 November 1999 the applicant lodged his application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.  On 12 January 2000 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant him a protection visa.  On 14 January 2000 the applicant sought review of the delegate’s decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal. 

   THE APPLICANT’S CLAIMS AND THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION

2. The applicant’s claims to refugee status are summarised and its findings are set out at pp 19 to 24 of its reasons for decision dated 6 March 2000, which are annexed to and incorporated by reference into these reasons.  The Tribunal said that it considered that there was an element of embellishment in the applicant’s evidence at the hearing before it.  It did not accept, for example, the applicant’s claim to have spent the last three or four months before he left Iran in hiding.  However, it accepted that his account of his past experiences in Iran was true, but it did not accept the construction which he placed upon those experiences.  Relevantly the Tribunal did not accept that the various things that had happened to him were connected or that he was perceived as being opposed to the ruling clerical regime in Iran.  As can be seen from the above-mentioned pages of its reasons, the Tribunal found that there were other reasons for the various incidents upon which the applicant relied.  I shall refer briefly to some of those incidents. 

3. The first was in 1979 when the applicant, having completed high school in Iran, was refused permission to go to England for tertiary studies.  On the applicant’s own evidence the Tribunal found that he had not been singled out by the Iranian government by reason of any perception it may have had of his political or religious beliefs.  The ban on such travel was a general one. 

4. In relation to the incident, in June 1981, when the applicant was detained by a mob in the street and subsequently arrested, the Tribunal found it implausible that, if the authorities had suspected him of any involvement with the Mujahideen-i-Khalq, they would have released him or allowed him to resume his military services, as they did.  The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had been regarded, since that incident, as having some involvement with the Mujahideen.

5. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had been refused entry to university in 1983 because he had failed the religious character test.  The Tribunal referred to the internationally recognised rights to education expressed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention of the Rights of the Child.  The Tribunal did not consider that the denial of an opportunity to go to university constituted such a significant detriment or disadvantage as amounted to persecution for the purposes of the Refugees’ Convention. 

6. The Tribunal accepted that, in 1984, the applicant had been detained for a month, given 35 lashes for being disrespectful to a government officer and accused of being against the Revolution.  However, the Tribunal did not accept, on the basis of the applicant’s own evidence, that this had any long term consequences for him.

7. Next the Tribunal accepted that the applicant had been refused government employment in 1985 and that in 1997 he had been refused a licence to own a mechanic shop.  The Tribunal noted that the applicant had said, in his original application, that the licence had been awarded to a “martyr’s” family.  The Tribunal expressed the opinion that government policies which gave preferences to war veterans, or to the families of those killed in wars, did not amount to persecution for a Convention reason.  The Tribunal found, on the applicant’s own evidence, that he was able to secure employment as a mechanic in his father’s business and that if he were to return to Iran he would be able to continue to work in that business.

8. The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s evidence that he had received a telephone call from his brother in Iran on 5 January 2000 informing him that two shops he leased (it is not clear whether this was a reference to the applicant or his brother) have been confiscated and shut down by the authorities.  The Tribunal referred to the applicant’s own evidence that his father’s business had been closed down for five or six months before the applicant had left Iran due to the need to relocate it outside the town boundaries of Mashhad.  The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would be unable to obtain employment if he returned to Iran or that he would be limited to jobs that were so dangerous or demeaning or so out of keeping with his qualifications as to constitute persecution for the purposes of the Refugees’ Convention.

9. As to the applicant’s claim based on his home being searched in 1998, uncensored material being seized, and the fact that he was subsequently fined 35,000 tomans for possessing an uncensored video film, the Tribunal held that this was an example of the enforcement of a law of general application and that the applicant had not been singled out or treated differently from any other person charged with this type of morals offence by reason of any political or religious beliefs attributed to him.

10. The Tribunal accepted that in about March 1999 the applicant had been injured (a scalp wound) but did not accept that either the Ansar-e-Hezbollah or the Basiji in fact identified him as having attended that meeting, or the other meetings referred to by the applicant, nor that the Iranian authorities viewed him as someone who is opposed to the regime by reason of such attendances.  The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had been arrested by the authorities in Iran by reason of his political or religious views since 1984. 

11. The Tribunal accepted that, at some time before or after the meeting at which he was injured, he and his wife were in a car when they were pulled over and detained by a group of the Disciplinary Forces (which I shall refer to as the police).  His wife had correctly told the police that they had four children.  The applicant told the police that they had three children.  The Tribunal found that the police suspected that the applicant and his wife were not married.  The applicant was released a few hours later when his father brought his marriage certificate to the police station.  The applicant rejected the applicant’s assertion that the police had used a pretence for detaining them.

12. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was likely to be penalised on return to Iran because he had departed that country illegally.  The Tribunal had regard to country information which did not suggest that the applicant would be treated differently (as he claimed) because he used a falsified passport on leaving Iran.  It also used that information to infer that the applicant would be fined for an illegal departure rather than imprisoned.  The Tribunal then reviewed all of the claims cumulatively and found that there was not a real chance, as distinct from a remote chance, that the applicant would be persecuted by reason of his real or imputed political or religious opinions, whether by the government of Iran, the Ansar-e-Hezbollah, the Basiji or local religious fanatics, if he returned to Iran now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

    APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

13. On 29 March 2000, the applicant lodged an application in this Court for an order of review.  The applicant was unrepresented.  His application is in a form common to several other applications recently lodged by applicants from the Port Hedland Detention Centre.  The grounds of the application were stated as follows:

    “(a)The decision involved an error of law, being an error involving the incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal or both.

    (b)The decision involved an error of law in that the Tribunal made findings of fact upon which its decision was based that were not rationally supported by probative evidence and it failed to rationally consider the probative evidence that was before it.”

    DID THE TRIBUNAL ERR IN LAW?

14. On 4 September 2000 I caused a Referral Certificate to be issued to the applicant pursuant to Order 80 sub-rule 4(3) of the Federal Court Rules.  By that certificate I referred the applicant for legal assistance of all of the kinds referred to in Order 80 rule 5.  I was informed that a member of the Western Australia Bar Association (Inc) accepted the referral and later applied to the Registrar to be released from the referral.  The Registrar granted that permission.  Quite properly, I have not been informed of the reason for the request or the reason why it was granted.  The applicant was unrepresented at the hearing today.  The applicant does not speak English.  In those circumstances he was, not surprisingly, unable to identify the legal errors which, in his application, he asserted had been made by the Tribunal.  However, he addressed me on some matters which I shall mention briefly.

15. The applicant submitted that the Tribunal had at one stage accepted what he described as “his political statements and belief” but had later said that it did not believe that he was politically active.  The applicant said that this was a contradiction.  The submission probably goes to the merits of the matter.  But a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons shows, in my opinion, that it accepted the applicant’s evidence about his political activities in Iran.  It noted that he had not had any contact or involvement with the Mujahideen and formed the view, as I consider it was entitled to do, that he was not the sort of person whose activities would have attracted the attention of the authorities in Iran.  The Tribunal can be seen to have had regard both to the applicant’s past activities and the likely level of his future involvement in political activities if he returns to Iran.

16. Then the applicant submitted that the Tribunal had not distinguished between his political beliefs and his religious beliefs.  Again, I do not think that a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons bears that out.  It referred, where appropriate, to the applicant’s political or religious beliefs in the alternative.  Where it was appropriate to focus on his political beliefs, for example, his attendance to hear the speech given by the liberal journalist Akbar Ganji, the Tribunal did so (see the last paragraph on p 21 of its reasons).  The same applied to its assessment of the significance of the circumstances of his departure.  When it took into consideration the cumulative effect of everything that had happened to the applicant it specifically referred to real or imputed political or religious opinions.  I do not accept the applicant’s submission that the Tribunal erred in this respect.

17. After a short adjournment, the applicant made some further submissions.  They comprised either attempts to canvass the merits of the Tribunal’s decision or to give evidence about other matters, for example, that his licence as a mechanic was cancelled.  It is not, strictly necessary to consider those matters.  I will, however, refer briefly to two of the points raised by the applicant.  The first was that the Tribunal had only considered his safety from the point of view of persecution from the Government of Iran, not in terms of persecution from the Ansar-e-Hezbollah or the Basiji.  That submission is not correct – see the second last paragraph on p 24 of the Tribunal’s reasons.  Secondly the applicant submitted that the Tribunal did not take into account the full circumstances of his illegal departure.  It is clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that it did so – see the last paragraph on p 22 of its reasons extending over on to p 23.

18. I have scrutinised the Tribunal’s reasons to see whether they disclose legal error.  In my view, they do not disclose any legal error. 

19. I do not consider that there was any legal error in the manner in which the Tribunal assessed the applicant’s various claims either singly or cumulatively.  The Tribunal correctly set out the relevant law in its reasons.  In my view, the Tribunal’s reasons demonstrate that it applied the law correctly to the facts as found by it when it concluded that the applicant was not a person to whom Australia had protection obligations.  There was ample evidence to support the Tribunal’s findings of fact.  If Ground (b) is a ground of review (which I doubt) then it has not been made out.  The Tribunal's reasons show, contrary to the allegation made in Ground (b), that it did consider, rationally, the evidence before it. In my view, the Tribunal did not err in law.  For those reasons, the application for review will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding nineteen (19) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Justice Carr.

Associate:

Dated:             22 September 2000

The applicant appeared for himself.
Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr A A Jenshel
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing:	22 September 2000
Date of Judgment:	22 September 2000

FINDINGS AND REASONS FOR DECISION

I consider that there was an element of embellishment in the Applicant's evidence at the hearing before me. I do not accept that he spent the last three or four months before he left Iran in hiding, as he asserted for the first time at the hearing before me.  I accept that, as Gummow and Hayne JJ remarked in Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 162 ALR 1 at 52, 'the fact that an applicant for refugee status may yield to temptation to embroider an account of his or her history is hardly surprising', and that this does not mean that the remainder of the Applicant's evidence should not be believed. In the present case the Applicant has been consistent in the essential elements of his account and I accept that he is telling the truth with regard to his past experiences in Iran. However I do not accept the construction he places upon his experiences.

In essence the Applicant's claim is that everything that happened to him is connected and that he is perceived as being opposed to the ruling clerical regime in Iran.  I do not accept that that is the case.  I accept that he was refused permission to go overseas to study immediately after the Islamic revolution in Iran but, as he himself acknowledged, he was not being singled out by reason of this refusal.  When he was interviewed by a Departmental officer he said that at the time the authorities were not issuing passports and the borders were closed.  Both at that interview and at the hearing before me he said that the regime had been afraid that if people went to the West to study they would come back with Western values.  I do not accept, therefore, that the Applicant was being singled out by the Iranian Government by reason of any perception it may have had of his political or religious beliefs.

I accept that the Applicant was detained by the local Komiteh in Mashhad when he was on leave from his military service in June 1981.  Having regard to the Applicant's own evidence in relation to this incident I consider that he was detained purely by chance, having apparently been denounced by the mob in the street, and while I accept that the authorities tried to find evidence of his involvement in the Mujahideen-i-Khalq, I do not accept that they believed that he had had any such involvement at the time they released him.  If they had done so I do not accept that they would have released him nor that they would have allowed him to resume his military service.  I do not accept, therefore, that the Applicant has been regarded ever since as having some involvement in the Mujahideen.

I accept that the Applicant was refused entry to university because he failed the religious character test. However the right to education expressed in the International Covenant on

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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child only extends to primary education.  In the present case the Applicant had access to secondary education.  As I put to the Applicant in the course of the hearing before me, I do not consider that the fact that he was denied the opportunity to go to university constitutes such a significant detriment or disadvantage as to amount to 'persecution' for the purposes of the Convention (compare Fu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, unreported, Federal Court, Carr J, 24 Apri11996, at page 17 of the pamphlet copy).

I accept that in 1984 the Applicant was detained for a month and accused of being against the revolution.  I accept that he was also given 35 lashes for being disrespectful to a government officer. However once again I do not accept, having regard to the Applicant's own evidence, that this had any long term consequences for him. I accept that he was refused a job in government employment in 1985 and I accept that in 1997 he was refused a licence to own a mechanic's shop.  However in his original application he said that the licence had gone to a martyr's family.  At the hearing before me he said that this was the reason they had given but the main reason had been that he was not a member of the Ansar- e-Hezbollah or the Basiji.  I do not accept that government policies which give preference to war veterans or to the families of those killed in wars necessarily amount to 'persecution , for a Convention reason.  In any event, the Applicant was able to secure employment as a mechanic in his father's business and I consider that if he returns to Iran now or in the reasonably foreseeable future he will be able to continue to work in his father's business.

I do not accept the suggestion made in his representatives' submission dated 14 February 2000 that the Applicant received a telephone call from his brother in Mashhad on 5 January 2000 informing him that two shops he leased have been confiscated and shut down by the authorities.  The Applicant made no reference to this in the course of the hearing before me.  As set out above, although he said that his father's business had been closed down for five or six months before he had left Iran he said that this had been because of the need to relocate it outside the town boundaries and that his father was now running the shop outside the town.  I therefore do not accept that the Applicant will be unable to obtain employment if he returns to Iran or that he will be limited to jobs that are so dangerous or demeaning or so out of keeping with his qualifications as to constitute 'persecution' for the purposes of the Convention: see Prahastono v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 77 FCR 260.

I accept that the Applicant's home was searched in 1998 and that he was subsequently fined 35,000 tomans for possessing an uncensored video film.  As I put to the Applicant in the

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course of the hearing before me, this would appear to be an example of the enforcement of a law of general application which will not, without more, amount to persecution for a Convention reason: see Applicant A, referred to above, per Dawson I at 244-5, approving what was said by Beaumont, Hill and Heerey JJ in the Full Court of the Federal Court in that case, and per McHugh J at 258-9. In order to come within the terms of the Convention the prosecution would have to be selective on one of the Convention grounds or, for example, a person would have to be punished more harshly for a Convention reason than others convicted of the same offence: see Z v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Federal Court, Katz J, 11 December 1998) .

In the present case I do not accept that any significance attaches to the fact that the Applicant's house was searched pursuant to a search warrant. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such searches are triggered by information supplied by neighbours and that the authorities are just as likely to arrive without a search warrant and to demand to be let in, relying on the fact that householders are unlikely to refuse them entry (see 'Bully-Boys At Work', The Economist, 18 January 1997, CX23065).  Equally I do not accept that any particular significance attaches to the fact that the Applicant was detained for six days rather than being freed on bail and summoned to appear in court.  As the Applicant himself indicated, the administration of justice in Iran is arbitrary (see US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1998 in relation to Iran, sections l.d, Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile, and l.e, Denial of Fair Public Trial).  I do not accept that the evidence establishes that the Applicant was singled out or treated differently from anyone else charged with this type of morals offence by reason of any political or religious beliefs attributed to him.

I accept that around March 1999 the Applicant went to a lawful meeting to hear a speech given by the liberal journalist Akbar Ganji which was disrupted by the Ansar-e-Hezbollah.  I accept that the Applicant himself sustained a scalp wound.  I accept that, as the Applicant himself said at the hearing before me, he went to the meeting because of his political beliefs.  However I do not accept that the Ansar-e-Hezbollah or the Basiji in fact identified him as having attended the meeting, as he suggested, nor that the regime in Iran views him as someone who is opposed to the regime as a result of his attendance at this meeting or at the other clandestine meeting with Dr Abdol Karim Soroush which the Applicant said at the hearing before me he had attended.  I do not accept that the Applicant has been arrested by the authorities in Iran by reason of his political or religious views since 1984 and as I have said I do not accept that, as he suggested at the hearing before me, he remained in hiding after his attendance at the meeting addressed by Akbar Ganji.

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I accept that at some time before or after the meeting addressed by Akbar Ganji -the Applicant said at the hearing before me he could not be sure which -he and his wife were pulled over when they were driving from his sister's house to their own home.  Although the Applicant has suggested that they were detained because someone.had informed the officers that they were not married he also said that the number plate or anything could have aroused the suspicion of the investigation group of the Disciplinary Forces who he said were responsible for pulling them over.  I consider that the authorities formed the suspicion that the Applicant and his wife might not be married on the basis of their differing answers as to the number of children they had.  I accept that the Applicant was released after a few hours when his father brought his marriage certificate to the police . station.  Once again, I do not accept the construction that the Applicant places on this incident: that the police had just been pretending that this was the reason for their detaining him and that the regime arranged for accidents to happen to people opposed to them.  As I have said, I consider that the suspicion of the officers was aroused simply by the differing answers which the Applicant and his wife gave and that as soon as the officers' suspicions were allayed the Applicant was released.

The question which I have to address is whether the Applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason if he returns to Iran now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.  I do not accept that the Applicant was perceived as an opponent of the regime before he left Iran. I do not accept that he was under surveillance nor that he spent the last few months before he left Iran in hiding.  I accept that there is a real chance that the Applicant will be penalised if he returns to Iran because he departed that country illegally.  Once again, I consider that if he is punished it will be for the breach of a criminal law of general application. I do not consider that he will be singled out, or treated differently (for example by being punished more harshly) from anyone else accused of the same offence, by reason of any political or religious belief attributed to him.  As noted above, I consider that the previous decisions of this Tribunal (differently constituted) referred to by the Applicant's representatives in their submission dated 14 February 2000 are clearly distinguishable on their facts from the present case.

As I put to the Applicant, the law regarding illegal departure applies to him irrespective of his reasons for leaving Iran.  The most likely penalty is a fine.  The information available to me suggests that a prison sentence would only be used if a person failed to pay the fine or if the person's illegal exit was prompted by a desire to evade justice (DFA T Country Profile -Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1996, paragraph 1.7.6.1).  That is not the case here.  The Applicant did not face any charges at the time he left the country. There is

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nothing in the information available to me to suggest that, as the Applicant claimed, he will be treated differently because he departed Iran using a falsified passport rather than, for example, by making an unauthorised crossing at some part of the border which is net controlled.  I do not accept that the fact that the Applicant was detained in 1981 in the mistaken belief that he was involved with the Mujahideen-i-Khalq, that he was detained for a month in 1984 for having spoken out against the regime, and that he has been detained twice more recently and on one occasion fined 35,000 tomans for a morals offence will lead the authorities to attribute such a political profile to him as would lead them to impose a greater penalty than normal on him for his illegal departure for a Convention reason (see DFAT Country Profile -Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1996, paragraph 3.3.4).

As I have said, I consider that if the Applicant returns to Iran now or in the reasonably foreseeable future he will be able to continue to work in his father's business.  I accept that the Applicant will continue to express his political and religious views at social gatherings and gatherings of friends.  I accept that he will also from time to time attend political meetings of the sort addressed by Akbar Ganji.  However I consider it relevant that he only claims to have attended the one large meeting of 2,000 to 3,000 people and some other small gatherings in the past.  As I put to him in the course of the hearing before me I do not consider that the Applicant is the sort of person whose activities would have attracted the attention of the authorities in Iran.  The information available to me suggests that the authorities are not concerned with people grumbling about the regime: they are concerned with people who are, or who they perceive to be, attempting to coordinate, or participating in, organised political opposition to the regime (DFAT Country Profile -Islamic Republic of Iran, March 1996, paragraphs 1.10.10.3 and 2.6.2).

As I have said, on the only occasion on which the Applicant was suspected of being involved in organised political opposition to the regime - in 1981 - it would appear to have been by mistake and I do not accept that the authorities would have released him nor that they would have allowed him to resume his military service if they had believed that he had any involvement in the Mujahideen-i-Khalq.  I do not accept that, as the Applicant said at one point in the hearing before me, it was because of his beliefs that he was accused of supporting the Mujahideen.  As I have said, I consider that he was detained purely by chance, having apparently been denounced by the mob in the street, and while I accept that, as his representatives stated in their written responses to questions put by the primary decision-maker, the Applicant supports the views of the Mujahideen, I also accept that, as was acknowledged in those written responses, he has never had any contact or involvement in the Mujahideen.  I do not consider that the evidence before me suggests that there is a

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real chance that the Iranian authorities will regard the Applicant as a person attempting to coordinate or to participate in organised political opposition to the Iranian regime.

As I have said, I do not accept that the Applicant was under surveillance or that he was in hiding before he left Iran.  I accept that the Applicant feels that everything that has happened to him is connected but for the reasons given above I do not accept that this is the case.  I consider that the last two occasions on which the Applicant was detained -after his house was searched and when his car was pulled over - are readily explicable and do not bear the sinister significance which the Applicant attaches to them.  When he was interviewed by a Departmental officer the Applicant referred to a recent wave of assassinations in Iran and he suggested that even if a person's life was not in danger from the Government of Iran as such, if the Basiji in the local area or religious fanatics wanted to kill you even the security office would not accept responsibility.  He said that he was very well known to the Basiji in his area as an opponent.  However, despite such claims by the Applicant, his own evidence suggests that apart from the morals offences and his being caught up in the meeting addressed by Akbar Ganji which was violently disrupted by the Ansar-e-Hezbollah, nothing really happened to him between 1984 and 1999.

Having regard to the findings I have made above as to the likely level of the Applicant's future involvement in political activities, I do not accept that if the Applicant returns to Iran there is a real chance that he will be detained, physically abused or killed, whether by the security forces, the Ansar-e-Hezbollah or the Basiji, by reason of his real or imputed political or religious opinions.  Even taking into consideration the cumulative effect of everything that has happened to the Applicant in the past in Iran I do not consider that there is a real chance, as distinct from a remote chance, that the Applicant will be persecuted by reason of his real or imputed political or religious opinions, whether by the Government of Iran, the Ansar-e-Hezbollah, the Basiji or local religious fanatics, if he returns to Iran now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.

I am not satisfied that the Applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason if he returns to Iran. It follows that he is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Consequently the Applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in subsection 36(2) of the Migration Act for the grant of a protection visa.

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