CITATION: Young & Anor v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] NSWSC 288 HEARING DATE(S): 25 February 2010
JUDGMENT DATE :
20 April 2010JURISDICTION: Equity Division
Corporations ListJUDGMENT OF: Palmer J DECISION: Application granted. CATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS – Unfair preference payments – whether payment made to Commissioner is a payment to which the company is a party – whether payment to Commissioner is a transaction for the purposes of s 588FA(1), s 588FC and s 588FF(1). LEGISLATION CITED: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – s 9, s 588FA, s 588FC, s 588FF, 588FGA(2). CATEGORY: Principal judgment PARTIES: David Gregory Young (First Plaintiff)
Essential Outsourcing Pty Ltd a.t.f. for the D. Cain Family Trust (in liq)
The Commissioner of Taxation (Defendant)
Darren Cain (Respondent)FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2009/00289181 COUNSEL: R.D. Marshall (Plaintiffs)
S. Golledge (Defendant)
F. Austin (Respondent)SOLICITORS: Gillis Delaney Lawyers (Plaintiffs)
ATO Legal Services (Defendant)
John Byrnes & Associates (Respondent)
2009/00289181 Young & Anor v Commissioner of Taxation
JUDGMENT
20 April, 2010
Introduction
1 The Plaintiffs are a company in liquidation and its liquidator. They seek to recover from the Defendant (“DCT”) an amount of $128,367.23 as an unfair preference pursuant to Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588FA and s 588FF (“the Act”). The payment to the DCT was made, allegedly on behalf of the company, in satisfaction of its liability for PAYG withholding tax. The DCT disputes its liability to repay the money as a preference upon only one ground, to which I will come in a moment. However, in case it is found liable to the liquidator, the DCT claims indemnity from the company’s sole director, Mr Cain, pursuant to s 588FGA(2).
2 It is not disputed that the company was insolvent at the time of the payment to the DCT. The sole issue is whether the payment of $128,367.23 on 2 August 2007 was “a transaction” for the purposes of s 588FA(1), s 588FC and s 588FF(1).
3 “Transaction” is defined in CA s 9 as:
“in Part 5.7B, in relation to a body corporate or Part 5.7 body, means a transaction to which the body is a party, for example (but without limitation):
(a) a conveyance, transfer or other disposition by the body of property of the body; and
(b) a charge created by the body on property of the body; and
(c) a guarantee given by the body; and
(d) a payment made by the body; and
(e) an obligation incurred by the body; and
(f) a release or waiver by the body; and
and includes such a transaction that has been completed or given effect to, or that has terminated.(g) a loan to the body;
4 The DCT and Mr Cain say that the payment was not a “transaction to which the company is a party” because the company did not make the payment to the DCT, and it was not party to any agreement, express or implied, resulting in the payment, even though the payment discharged its liability for withholding tax. They say…
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- Case
- [2010] NSWSC 288
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues the court had to address were whether the payment made to the Commissioner was a payment to which the company was a party and whether it constituted a transaction for the purposes of sections 588FA(1), 588FC, and 588FF(1) of the Corporations Act. The court had to determine if the payment was an unfair preference under the Act, which would render it voidable and recoverable by the liquidator of the company.
In reaching its decision, the court examined the relevant statutory provisions and considered whether the payment to the Commissioner could be classified as a payment to which the company was a party. The court found that the payment to the Commissioner was indeed a transaction under the Act and that it constituted an unfair preference. The reasoning relied on the interpretation of the statutory language and the established principles regarding preference payments in insolvency contexts. The court concluded that the payment to the Commissioner was recoverable by the liquidator as an unfair preference.
The court's decision ultimately led to the final orders that the payment made by the company to the Commissioner was an unfair preference under the Corporations Act. Consequently, the liquidator was entitled to recover the amount of the payment from the Commissioner.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi