Young, in the matter of Macryannis (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Young, in the matter of Macryannis (No 2) [2012] FCA 175

Citation: Young, in the matter of Macryannis (No 2) [2012] FCA 175
Parties: GEOFFREY DAVID MCDONALD AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF THE LATE CHRISTOPHER JOHN MACRYANNIS AND KATHRYN ANNE YOUNG  
File number: NSD 1955 of 2006
Judges: STONE J
Date of judgment: 2 March 2012
Catchwords: COSTS – principles relevant to an award of costs – Court has unfettered discretion – Trustee to be treated as an ordinary litigant – consideration given to what would be just in the circumstances
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) Part XI, s 179
Cases cited:

Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225
Cummings v Lewis [1992] FCA 334
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Wily [1999] FCA 881
Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397
Re Bryant, Ex parte Gordon (1889) 6 Mor 262
Re Nader, T. Ex Parte; Official Trustee in Bankruptcy and Anor [1991] FCA 394

Re Skase; ex parte Donnelly (1992) 37 FCR 509

Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 225
Young, in the matter of Macryannis (2011) 124 ALD 28

Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Date of last submissions: 6 December 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 25
Counsel for the Applicant: T Alexis SC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Rockliffs Solicitors
Counsel for the Trustee: B Skinner
Solicitor for the Trustee: Parry Carroll

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1955 of 2006

YOUNG, IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF THE LATE CHRISTOPHER JOHN MACRYANNIS

KATHRYN ANNE YOUNG
Applicant

GEOFFREY DAVID MCDONALD
Trustee

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 MARCH 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.There be no order as to costs with the intent that Kathryn Anne Young and Geoffrey David McDonald bear their own costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1955 of 2006

YOUNG, IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF THE LATE CHRISTOPHER JOHN MACRYANNIS

KATHRYN ANNE YOUNG
Applicant

GEOFFREY DAVID MCDONALD
Trustee

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE:

2 MARCH 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 8 November 2011 I gave judgment disposing of interim applications filed respectively by Geoffrey David McDonald, as trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of the late Christopher John Macryannis and by Kathryn Anne Young, the sister of Mr Macryannis: Young, in the matter of Macryannis (2011) 124 ALD 28 (earlier reasons).  I made no order as to costs of these applications and gave leave to Mrs Young and the Trustee to provide draft orders on costs in respect of each of the applications the subject of my reasons as well as submissions in support of those draft orders. 

  2. The parties were allowed time…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 175
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Macryannis (No 2), the parties involved are Kathryn Anne Young, a beneficiary of the estate of the deceased, and Geoffrey David McDonald, the Trustee. The dispute revolves around the costs associated with two separate applications: the Trustee's application for his remuneration and Mrs Young's application for an enquiry under section 179. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining the principles relevant to the award of costs in this context.

The primary legal issues that the court needed to decide included the appropriate basis for awarding costs in this case, given that both parties had fault and contributed to the delay and confusion in the proceedings. The court also had to consider the Trustee's unprofessional conduct and whether it warranted an indemnity award of costs. Furthermore, the court had to weigh the interests of all concerned in finalising the administration of the estate as soon as possible.

In its reasoning, the court noted that while the usual position is that the successful party is awarded costs, this case did not reflect a usual situation. The court had serious reservations about some aspects of the Trustee's conduct but concluded that an enquiry under section 179 would not be of utility or in the interests of the orderly administration of the estate. The court found that the greater fault lay with the Trustee despite his greater success in the proceeding. Given the circumstances, the court deemed it appropriate that Kathryn Anne Young and Geoffrey David McDonald bear their own costs. This decision reflects the court's exercise of its unfettered discretion, treating the Trustee as an ordinary litigant, and considering what would be just in the circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. There be no order as to costs with the intent that Kathryn Anne Young and Geoffrey David McDonald bear their own costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Trustee further submits that if the Court does not accept his submissions, as set out above, the Court should fix payment of a fixed percentage of his costs of the entire proceeding. REASONING AND CONCLUSION Although there are two separate applications to be considered here, that of the Trustee and that of Mrs Young, the two are closely connected: They relate to the same substratum of facts and were prompted by the same dispute between the parties. The Trustee sought to have the Court determine his remuneration because of Mrs Young’s failure to approve his recommendations in that regard. Mrs Young refused to approve the Trustee’s remuneration because she regarded the Trustee as not entitled by reason of his conduct. It was that conduct which, in Mrs Young’s view, warranted an enquiry under s 179. It would be artificial to award costs in respect of the separate applications and, for that reason, I propose to treat them as one for the purpose of determining costs. The Trustee submits that as Mrs Young was unsuccessful in her application for an enquiry under s 179, his costs of that application should be paid on an indemnity basis. While the usual position is that the successful party is awarded costs this is not a usual situation. In my earlier reasons I made clear that while I had “serious reservations about some aspects of the Trustee’s discharge of his obligations as trustee” I did not think that an enquiry under s 179 would be of utility or that it would be “in the interests of the orderly administration of the deceased estate”. As I said at [141]:There remains little to do to finalise the administration and, I understand, limited funds are available for any additional work in connection with the administration. In the circumstances it is in the interests of all concerned that it be finalised as soon as possible. This conclusion did not reflect a rejection of all Mrs Young’s complaints about the Trustee. I have referred above, at [11], to the Trustee’s unprofessional behaviour. I might add that this extended beyond his dealings with Mrs Young, to his relations with Mr Macryannis’ children and Mr Findlay. I do not doubt that had he behaved in a more professional manner the litigation might well have been avoided or considerably shortened. As such it is appropriate that the Trustee’s conduct be taken into account in considering his application for costs. This is not to deny that Mrs Young also had some responsibility for the debacle surrounding the administration of Mr Macryannis’ estate. In so far as the Trustee’s interim application in relation to his remuneration is concerned, my earlier reasons explain why, in my view, the issue could have been dealt with simply and with more expedition by following the statutory procedure outlined in my reasons. Both the Trustee and Mrs Young in their submissions point to ways in which things might have been done differently and, if this had been so, the litigation might have been avoided. There is some merit in each case. It is not necessary for me to respond to these submissions point by point. It is clear from my earlier reasons that there was fault, delay and confusion on each side. I repeat, however, that in my view the greater fault lay with the Trustee despite him perhaps having greater success in the proceeding.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established