Young, Bronwyn Helen v Hanslow, Brett

[1997] FCA 1334

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Industrial Law - Termination of Employment - casual employment - reasonable expectation of continuing employment - valid reason - if no valid reason in circumstances not appropriate to order compensation - re employment - second period of employment not ended at the initiative of the employer.

Mahnken v Saunders Logging Proprietary Limited (1994) 57 IR 237
Johns v Gunns Limited (1995) 60 IR 258
Slifka v J W Sanders Proprietary Limited (1995) 67 IR 316
Mohazab and Dick Smith Electronics (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200

BRONWYN HELEN YOUNG  v  BRETT HANSLOW

TI-1044 AND TI-1045 OF 1996

Judicial Registrar Ryan
Hobart
21 November 1997

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	TI-1044 AND TI-1045  of   1996

BETWEEN:	BRONWYN HELEN YOUNG APPLICANT
AND:	BRETT HANSLOW RESPONDENT
JUDICIAL REGISTRAR:		RYAN
DATE OF ORDER:		21 NOVEMBER 1997
WHERE MADE:		HOBART

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Both applications be dismissed.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
TASMANIADISTRICT REGISTRY	TI01044 AND TI-1045 of 1996

BETWEEN:	BRONWYNHELEN YOUNG APPLICANT
AND:	BRETT HANSLOW RESPONDENT

JUDICIAL REGISTRAR:	RYAN
DATE:	21 NOVEMBER 1997
PLACE:	HOBART

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered Ex Tempore - revised from Transcript)

THE APPLICATIONS
On 16 September 1996 the applicant, Bronwyn Helen Young, filed a claim seeking compensation from Brett Hanslow of the Coachman's Tavern, 304 Elizabeth Street, North Hobart, on the grounds of unlawful termination on 20 August 1996 from a position of bar attendant, cleaner, waitress and cook.

The applicant claimed she had last worked for the respondent on 2 July 1996.  Ms Young signed this application, nominated Mr Roland Browne, the Director of Legal Aid, as her solicitor and claimed that she was dismissed while on a medical certificate.  This application was registered in the Australian Industrial Relations Commission as application U70249 of 1996.

On 22 October 1996, one month and six days later, another claim seeking reinstatement and compensation from Mr Hanslow was filed on behalf of the applicant.  This is a separate application.  It was signed by the applicant and dated 18 October and again, Mr Roland Browne is nominated as representing her in his capacity as Director of Legal Aid.

This second and later application refers to an earlier termination stated to have taken place on 26 May 1996.  On this occasion the applicant has given her occupation as bartender.  This application was registered in the Commission as application U70281 of 1996.

On 25 November 1996 Commissioner Leary signed certificates referring both applications to the Industrial Relations Court of Australia on the basis that the Commission had been unable to settle the matters by conciliation and that the parties had not elected to have the matters dealt with by consent arbitration.

DIRECTIONS
The certificates and a copy of the applications were filed in the court on 27 November 1996 having been delivered to the Court on that day with a letter dated 27 November from the Deputy Industrial Registrar.  On 18 December 1996 the district registrar ordered:

1. that a copy of each application be personally served on the employer;

2. the respondent file and serve an appearance;

3. that the directions hearing be adjourned to 5 February 1997.

On 17 January 1997 Wallace Wilkinson and Webster filed notices of appearances on behalf of the respondent.  In the notices the respondent was described as “publican of 304 Elizabeth Street, North Hobart”.  On 12 February the applicant was represented at a directions hearing by Lawrence Neasey of the Legal Aid Commission, and the respondent by Mr D. Wallace, of Wallace Wilkinson and Webster.

The parties were directed to file and serve brief summaries for their cases.  The district registrar also ordered mutual and formal discovery, leave to approach registry for urgent mediation, adjournment of the matters to be listed for hearing - date to be advised.  On 12 March Mr Browne filed two identical statements in respect of each application.  The statements read as follows:

“The applicant commenced employment with the respondent at the Coachman's Tavern in Elizabeth Street, North Hobart, in August 1995 as a cleaner.  By October 1995 she was working behind the bar cooking and cleaning.  She was dismissed from employment with the respondent on 26 May 1996 and re-employed on or about 2 June 1996.

At the time of being dismissed in May 1996 the respondent had no valid reason for terminating the employment of the applicant

After being re-employed on 17 June 1996 the applicant remained employed with the respondent until she was again dismissed on 20 August 1996. At the time of being dismissed in August 1996 the applicant was on sick leave, having just had major surgery. The applicant was dismissed during the currency of a medical certificate. The applicant's case is that her dismissal contravened section 170DF of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 and further that the respondent had no valid reason for terminating her employment.

The applicant seeks compensation as a result of her unlawful termination.”

CALLOVER 17 NOVEMBER
On 8 May the Director of Legal Aid notified the Court that he was no longer representing the applicant.  On 25 May the applications, being matters where the hearing of proceedings had not begun, were transferred to the Federal Court of Australia.  On 13 October the Acting District Registrar of the Federal Court advised the applicant and the respondent solicitors by letter that the matters had been listed for callover at 10 am on Monday, 17 November.  His letter concluded as follows:

“Please note that at the call over your matters may be listed for any day of the week commencing 17 November and you should be prepared to run your case from the Monday onwards.  The court notes that this advice was given one month and four days before the call over.”

On 15 October, two days later, a file note indicates that the Acting District Registrar spoke by telephone with the applicant and that she advised him that she had not been granted legal aid, intended to have further discussions with the Director for Legal Aid and "definitely intends to proceed even if she does have to represent herself" and that she would contact the registrar after she had seen the Director of Legal Aid.

On 13 November the solicitors Clerk, Walker and Stops, advised the registrar by letter that they had been instructed to act on behalf of Ms Young.  The solicitors gave notice of an application to be made on 17 November that the callover be treated as a directions hearing and foreshadowed an application to amend the applications and an application for adjournment.

At 10 am on 17 November Mr Readett appeared for the applicant at the callover.  The respondent did not appear and no one appeared on his behalf.  I stood the matter down and directed the registry to contact Mr Wallace.  He was the solicitor on the record and had appeared at the directions hearing on 12 February.  The callover proceeded later in the morning with Mr Readett appearing for the applicant and Mr Wallace appearing to announce that his firm had closed the file in May 1997.

Apparently, the respondent's solicitors were unable to contact the respondent who no longer holds the licence for the Coachman's Tavern.  Mr Wallace advised that he had information suggesting the respondent now resided at 44 Bay Street, New Town, and that he intended to file a notice of ceasing to act.  Mr Wallace was still on the record as solicitor for the respondent on 17 November and may still be on the record in that capacity.  He was advised of the callover and apologised for his failure to appear initially. He described this as an oversight.

Mr Readett unsuccessfully applied to have the matters adjourned while he took instructions on the possibility of amending the applications to include an application for unpaid wages pursuant to section 179 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996. The two applications were filed in the Australian Industrial Relations Commission on 16 September and 22 October 1996. More than 12 months has elapsed. Indeed it is only four days short of 12 months since the applications were referred to the Court.

Applicants should pursue applications of this kind with reasonably expedition. Delay in proceedings of this type is not in the interests of the parties and it is not in the public interest, see Mahnken v Saunders Logging Proprietary Limited (1994) 57 IR 237.

I directed the district registrar to notify the respondent at 44 Bay Street, New Town, of the callover and the hearing listed for 19 November and of the fact that the hearing would proceed even if the respondent was not present.

THE HEARING
On 19 November both the applicant and the respondent appeared on their own behalf.  Apparently for reasons best known to the solicitors for each party neither firm of solicitors was prepared to continue or had instructions to continue to represent the parties albeit both firms seemed to be still on the record as appearing.

In applications under section 170EA the applicant bears the onus of establishing that there was a termination at the initiative of the employer such as attracts the jurisdiction of the Court.  Slifka v J W Sanders Proprietary Limited (1995) 67 IR 316, Mohazab and Dick Smith Electronics (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200. The applicant's statement filed 12 March 1997 asserts that the respondent dismissed her on 26 May 1996. She must establish that she was employed in a capacity which vests the Court with jurisdiction. If she succeeds in that regard she must satisfy the Court that there was a termination of employment at the initiative of the employer such as might lead to a finding of unlawful termination.

Her statement indicates in the first paragraph that she was re-employed within seven days on 2 June.  Her statement indicates in the third paragraph that she was re-employed on 17 June, some 22 days after the first termination.  Her sworn evidence at trial is that she was re-employed on Friday 7 June, 12 days after the termination.

Section 170CC and Regulation 30B provide for exclusion of specified employees from the operation of specified provisions of Division 3, Termination of Employment. Such an exclusion has effect only if it is permitted under paragraphs (2), (4) and (5) of Article 2 of the Termination of Employment Convention.  One such permitted exclusion are workers engaged on a casual basis for a short period. Regulation 30B(1)(d) excludes a casual employee, engaged for a short period, within the meaning of subregulation (3). Subregulation (3) of Regulation 30B states:

“Casual employees engaged for a short period:  For the purposes of paragraph 1(d) a casual employee is taken to be engaged for a short period unless:

(a)the employee is engaged by a particular employer on a regular and systematic basis for a sequence of periods of employment during a period of at least six months; and

(b)the employee has, or but for a decision by the employer to terminate the employee's employment, would have had a reasonable expectation of continuing employment by the employer.”

The nature of the employment in this case was casual in several senses of that word.  The applicant had worked for the respondent in his Mystery Bus Tours business for at least 12 months before the respondent took the licence at the Coachman's Tavern.  She contends that from August 1995 for about six months, say to February 1996, she worked primarily in a voluntary capacity.  First she performed onerous cleaning duties preparing the hotel for a re-opening, then she worked in the kitchen with the respondent’s partner, Tania Watson;  she also worked in the bar, particularly on Tuesday nights.  Later again she appears to have worked in the bar on Saturday nights.

Indeed, the general tenor of the evidence is that the applicant spent a lot of time in and around the bar, and that from time to time she performed the duties of a bar attendant without any payment and, clearly, she was not employed by the respondent when working in a voluntary capacity.  However, both the applicant and Ms Watson gave evidence of the applicant performing cleaning duties from 9.30 am to 11.30 am on Mondays and Fridays.  Ms Watson states that the respondent took over the hotel on 28 August 1995 and that from early September 1995 the applicant was expected to perform cleaning duties as outlined above.

Both the applicant and the respondent refer to an agreement to pay the applicant money to cover the expense of baby-sitting fees because of the time the applicant was spending working at the hotel in a voluntary capacity.  Mr Hanslow said:

“she required money for baby-sitting.  She raised the question of payment for baby-sitting.  It was costing her money.  She ended up being paid to work with the paid work equated to baby-sitting fees.” 

At one stage the applicant stated that she was never paid to work at the hotel but received money from the respondent for baby-sitting fees.  She also stated that she was not aware her employment had been terminated on the first occasion on 26 May 1996 until conciliation proceedings began in the Industrial Relations Commission in respect of the alleged second termination on 20 August 1996.  The applicant stated that she only lodged the second application in respect of the first alleged termination of employment after being advised to do so by her advisers in the Legal Aid Commission.
EMPLOYMENT IN A CASUAL CAPACITY
I have concluded that the applicant was employed in a casual capacity to clean for two hours on Monday and Friday mornings and that no matter what the history of the initial payments she was paid $70.80 a week from the week ending 4 September 1995 to the week ending 6 May 1996, was not working in the week ending 13 May 1996, was paid $70.80 for the week ending 20 May 1996, was not paid for the weeks ending 27 May, 3 June, 10 June and 17 June 1996 but was paid $90 for the week ending 24 June 1996. 

I accept the evidence of Ms Watson that the applicant did not always or even often perform the cleaning duties during the designated hours on Mondays and Fridays but did perform the duties often at times which were convenient to her.  I also accept the evidence of Mr Hanslow that he did not mind  when the applicant performed the cleaning duties provided that she did perform these duties. 

There is no evidence to suggest that the applicant did not perform the cleaning duties effectively and well.  Indeed, there is evidence from Mr Hanslow that, in the early stages, the applicant performed very arduous and unpleasant cleaning duties and performed them very well indeed.  The wages record sheet for the year ending 30 June 1996, exhibit R1, and evidence from Mr Hanslow, suggest that occasionally the applicant was paid a little extra for some specific relieving bar duties, examples being, payment of $100 in the weeks ending 22 January 1996 and 12 February 1996 and probably the payment of $90 in the week ending 24 June 1996.

According to the applicant she was also paid $90 on three occasions before she went to hospital on 1 July 1996.  This may or may not be so.  She states that the third $90 payment was made on 1 July.  If that be so, it would not be recorded in exhibit R1 which ends at 30 June 1996.  However, there is no evidence of payment to the applicant for most bar duties and for cooking and kitchen duties and I have concluded that the applicant performed these duties not as an employee but as a volunteer and this was part and parcel of a loose arrangement whereby the applicant was provided with a room at the hotel, estimated value $80 a week, and that she and her two children had access to free food and drink and snacks such as potato chips and peanuts.

The modest weekly payments to the applicant need to be seen in the light of Ms Watson's evidence in respect of reports to the Social Security Department.  Ms Watson stated that every three months she provided the Social Security Department with a statement of the applicant's earnings.

There is no doubt that the relationship between the applicant and the respondent was casual, often friendly, sometimes volatile and included two separate and informal employment arrangements. One employment arrangement began a year before the hotel cleaning and continued throughout that period.  This was the conduct of mystery bus tours by the applicant for the respondent.  This arrangement was separate from the casual employment of the applicant on cleaning duties in the hotel.  The cleaning duties in the hotel was the second employment arrangement.  The provision of and access to what amounted to free board and lodging for the applicant, and sometimes her two children, was related, no doubt, to the applicant's employment in separate capacities as a tour operator and a cleaner, and to her voluntary assistance in cooking and in performing bar duties.

It is also possible that the arrangements were designed to deflate income earned and maintain maximum Social Security benefits.  There is no evidence that the applicant and her children stayed at the hotel all the time but there is uncontradicted evidence that the applicant and her children did stay at the hotel from time to time and used the room on a regular basis.

Not without some difficulty,  I have concluded that the applicant was engaged as a casual employee by the respondent at the Coachman's Tavern on a regular and systematic - albeit informal - basis for a sequence of periods of employment during a period in excess of six months.

THE FIRST ENDING OF EMPLOYMENT
With even more difficulty I have concluded that on 26 May 1996 the applicant would have had a reasonable expectation of continuing employment as a casual cleaner.  The result is that I have concluded that the applicant has jurisdiction to pursue the claim for relief in respect of what is asserted to be unlawful termination of her employment on 26 May 1996.  Despite the applicant's curious evidence that she was not aware her employment was terminated on 26 May 1996, and did not consider herself as paid as an employee at any time at the Coachman's Tavern, I have concluded that her very informal employment relationship as a cleaner at the hotel and occasional paid bar attendant was terminated by Mr Hanslow on 26 May.

He gave sworn evidence that he did terminate her services at the hotel after he had concluded that she had been involved in inappropriate conduct with a customer.  The applicant herself admits that while one or more sailors held down a sailor companion known as Kiwi, and after Kiwi had been partially undressed, she wrote on his stomach with a marker pen.  She also concedes the result was that Kiwi chased her through the hotel, around the outside of the hotel and at the front of the hotel, in the midst of noise and screaming and laughter, Kiwi had sprayed her with pressure pack cream taken from a refrigerator in the bar of the hotel.

Mr Hanslow seems to have been concerned primarily with preventing the applicant from working in future with or without pay in the bar, but his own evidence has convinced me that on 26 May he terminated the informal paid arrangement whereby the applicant received $70.80 a week for cleaning duties.  However, I am not disposed to order any relief in respect of this ending of the employment relationship.

Firstly, it seems likely that the respondent had a valid reason to terminate the employment relationship, given the conduct of the applicant. I accept the evidence of Ms Watson that she had asked the applicant to relieve her behind the bar.  I have concluded that the applicant was involved in boisterous, relatively harmless and good-natured horseplay, while responsible, albeit briefly, for the conduct of the bar.  However, the behaviour, while hardly heinous, was inappropriate in licensed premises while the applicant held a role of some responsibility.  

Secondly, should it be held that the respondent did not have a valid reason for termination, reinstatement would be entirely impracticable.  Mr Hanslow no longer runs the hotel.

Thirdly, the applicant was reinstated in a few short weeks.  Indeed, on her evidence, the applicant states she was reinstated within 12 days on Friday 7 June.  In my view the reinstatement came a little later in June.  In that respect I prefer the evidence of Mr Hanslow and Ms Watson, and reinstatement later in June is consistent with the applicant's own evidence on timing of certain events prior to her admission to hospital on 1 July.  Be that as it may, the applicant was reinstated and in the week ending 24 June was paid $90. 

Fourthly and finally, even if I had reached the conclusion that the termination on 26 May was unlawful and not for valid reason - and I have not reached such conclusion - I would not have considered it appropriate in all the circumstances of this case to make an order requiring the respondent to pay compensation.  That is a discretion open under section 170EE.  The application in respect to termination of employment on 26 May 1996 is dismissed.

THE FINAL PARTING OF THE WAYS
I turn now to the first application filed by the applicant.  This is the claim of unlawful termination of employment allegedly occurring on Tuesday 20 August 1996.  There is no evidence of any intention on the part of the respondent to once more bring the cleaning duties or the mystery bus tour duties to an end prior to a telephone conversation on Tuesday, 20 August.  The respondent had taken the applicant to hospital on Monday, 1 July. The respondent brought the applicant back from hospital to the hotel to recuperate on Saturday, 6 July. 

The applicant agrees that before the respondent took her to hospital they had a discussion about a bus tour scheduled for Friday, 26 July and that she indicated that if she was fit she would work on that night.  Some friction seems to have developed between the respondent and the applicant in the six days the applicant was recuperating at the hotel.  The respondent claims this was because the applicant appeared from time to time in the bar during trading hours in slippers and dressing gown and was upbraided and resented the attitude taken by Mr Hanslow.  The applicant claims that she left the hotel because Mr Hanslow was being nasty to her and to Ms Watson.

Exhibit A2 contains notes which the applicant states she wrote on Tuesday, 20 August on the advice of a lawyer at the Legal Aid Commission.  These notes contain the following comment:

“The reason I left the hotel after my operation was Brett was being nasty to me and also you -”

the "you" was a reference to Tania Watson:

“I am not going to put up with it any more.”

The applicant left the hotel on Thursday, 11 July.  It was her decision to do so.  She went and stayed in Launceston with her mother.  This was a sensible step to take in recuperation.  Between that date, Thursday 11 July, and Tuesday, 20 August, the respondent heard nothing from the applicant.  There may have been one telephone conversation between the applicant and Ms Watson.  The applicant claims that while she was in Launceston for about two weeks, say, 7 to 21 July, Ms Watson telephoned to obtain a tax file number for the 1996 Group Certificate, and that in the course of the conversation the applicant told Ms Watson that she had a medical certificate.

Ms Watson's evidence is not clear on whether such a conversation took place.  Certainly she did not deny such a conversation but she was adamant that at no stage had the applicant mentioned a medical certificate and both the respondent and Ms Watson gave evidence that they knew nothing of medical certificates until the conciliation conference in the Industrial Relations Commission.

The court notes that the applicant admits that at no stage did she provide a certificate to the respondent and at no stage did she tell the respondent directly of the existence of a certificate.

The applicant tendered two medical certificates, exhibit A3.  That exhibit comprises a certificate from Dr Rod Watkins of 141 Hampden Road, Hobart, which certifies that Bronwyn Young of 21 Napoleon Street, Richmond, is suffering from a medical condition and will not be fit for duty from 8 July 1996 to 26 August 1996.  The certificate is not dated but was presumably issued on or before 8 July.  The applicant was recuperating at the hotel from 6 to 11 July.  She could have given the certificate to the respondent before she left on 11 July.  She could have told him about the certificate.  She did neither.

The second certificate was issued by Dr G. Peacock of 254 Main Road, Derwent Park 7009.  It is of less moment because it certifies unfitness for a shorter period, namely 31 July to 21 August.  It too is undated. Presumably it was issued on or about 31 July.  Again the applicant admits she did not give the certificate to the respondent and she never spoke to the respondent directly about either certificate.

True it is that she claims that she came back home to Richmond from Launceston after about two weeks.  This would put her at Richmond about Monday, 22 July.  She also claims that on Tuesday, 23 July or Wednesday, 24 July she tried to contact the respondent and spoke twice to Mr Scott Cordwell, a barman at the hotel, and about a week later to another barman, Dardie. 

She also claims that Mr Cordwell suggested she try to get the respondent on his mobile phone but that there was no response.  She claims that in both telephone conversations with Scott Cordwell on 23 or 24 July and in the telephone conversation with Dardie about 30 July she left messages for the respondent to contact her.  She further claims that she did not leave any message on a mobile pager service for the respondent because it was notorious that he did not access messages left on his message bank.  This is in direct conflict with the note the applicant wrote on 20 August, that is exhibit A2.  She wrote:

“I contacted the hotel on two occasions and spoke to staff, Scott and Dardie, asking for Mr Hanslow to return my call, also including a message on his mobile service.”

When questioned by the court the applicant denied that she ever left a message on the applicant's mobile service and was unable to explain why she wrote this comment in her notes of 20 August.

The respondent gave evidence that he never received any message on his mobile service and he never received a message from Scott or Dardie to the effect that the applicant had told them of a medical certificate and her unfitness to work and of her request that he contact her.

It is observed that the applicant did not call Scott or Dardie to give evidence and an inference can be drawn that their evidence would not support her claims.  Indeed, the respondent called Mr Scott Cordwell.  He had no recollection of the telephone calls described by the applicant allegedly occurring on 23 or 24 July.  In other words, he did not support her claim.  He gave evidence of arranging with the applicant prior to 1 July for her to work for him in the bar on 26 July while he went on the bus tour with the eight-ball team. 

The direct conflict between the applicant's sworn evidence and the note about the message on the mobile service, exhibit A2, the lack of support for the applicant's version of events from Mr Cordwell, Mr Hanslow and Ms Watson, and the applicant's failure to call Dardie to support her version, leaves the court unsatisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant ever tried to get messages to the respondent through Scott or Dardie.

Certainly she admits she never informed the respondent personally or in writing of the medical certificates.  Even on her version of events she was expecting the respondent to contact her.  She did not persist after 30 July in attempts to contact him.

While it is always very difficult for a respondent to prove a negative when an employee alleges a prohibited termination under section 170DF, see Johns v Gunns Limited (1995) 60 IR 258, I am not satisfied that the respondent was ever in a position of knowledge of a medical certificate of the applicant's unfitness to work until 26 August 1996, although he clearly knew the applicant was unfit to work on 11 July.

I am not satisfied that the respondent took any action or initiative to terminate the applicant's employment on the basis of temporary absence through illness.  I do not accept that he was told anything by the applicant from 11 July to 20 August.  On that date he admits he telephoned the applicant and asked for the master keys.  I do not accept that, as the applicant asserts, he immediately responded that the applicant was dismissed when asked by the applicant why he wanted the keys. 

He had not heard from the applicant from 11 July when she left the hotel.  She admitted that she had agreed to work on 26 July if fit to do so.  He took the initiative to ring her at Richmond and to ask for the keys.  She then alleged sexual harassment on the part of the respondent.  He took umbrage at that allegation and it is noted that neither application lodged by the applicant asserts sexual harassment as associated with either alleged termination. 

In my view, the applicant had left or abandoned the informal casual cleaning arrangement.  She may well have intended to return to that arrangement but she had not kept the respondent informed from 11 July to 20 August.  If the casual arrangement was still on foot on 20 August it might be said that the respondent's reaction to the allegation of sexual harassment and the applicant's refusal to return the keys could have constituted an initiative of the employer bringing the employment to an end - Mohazab at 200. However, in my view, that casual employment arrangement was no longer on foot.  The applicant had brought it to an end by failing to contact the respondent and failing to inform him of her condition and inability to work on 26 July and by failing to provide him with either medical certificate.  She could have given or delivered the certificate of Dr Watkins to the respondent on 8 July or at any time from then to 20 August.  She could have given or delivered the certificate of Dr Peacock to the respondent at any time from 31 July to 20 August. 

While the relationship between the applicant and the respondent had been volatile it appears to have been a relationship with considerable benefit to both parties.  There is nothing in the way in which the respondent treated the applicant which suggests that he would have refused to consider a resumption of the cleaning arrangement if she had provided him with the medical certificates within a reasonable time-frame.

This is particularly important in respect to the certificate of Dr Watkins. The applicant was presumably in a position to personally inform the respondent of that certificate between 8 and 11 July.  She did not do so.  If I am wrong, and for some reason the undated certificate was issued after 11 July but certified unfitness from 8 July, no reason was given for a post-dated certificate.

Having found that the applicant and not the respondent ended the renewed arrangement in respect of paid cleaning, a little paid bar work and other voluntary bar work and cooking, I must likewise dismiss the second application.

ORDERS
The order of the court is that both applications be dismissed.

I certify that this and the preceding fourteen (14) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of Judicial Registrar Ryan

Associate:

Dated:            21 November 1997

The applicant appeared in person.
The respondent appeared in person.
Date of Hearing:	19 and 20 November 1997
Date of Judgment:	21 November 1997