Young and Rees v Quaine

Robert Young, Daniel Rees, Thomas Pease, and eight other individuals were prosecuted in the Industrial Court of New South Wales for offences under section 42 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1908. The informations alleged that the defendants unlawfully instigated coal miners and other employees to discontinue work in a certain industry, describing this discontinuance as an act in the nature of a strike, and that such discontinuance was not for a cause not constituting a strike. The defendants were convicted and fined, with imprisonment ordered in default of payment. They subsequently obtained rules nisi for habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of New South Wales, arguing their detention was illegal due to convictions being bad for duplicity, uncertainty, or disclosing no offence. The Supreme Court discharged these rules nisi, and the defendants sought special leave to appeal to the High Court.

The High Court was required to determine whether the informations sufficiently disclosed an offence under section 42 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1908, and whether the convictions were valid. A key issue was whether the informations, by alleging instigation to an act in the nature of a strike and then defining that act in a manner that could be interpreted as redundant or contradictory, were duplicitous or uncertain, thereby rendering the convictions invalid. The defendants contended that the informations were fundamentally flawed and disclosed no offence, meaning the convictions were coram non judice.

The High Court refused special leave to appeal. A majority of the Court (Griffith C.J., Barton J., O'Connor J., and Isaacs J.) held that the informations sufficiently charged an offence under section 42. While acknowledging the potential for technical argument regarding the precise wording, the Court found that the information, read as a whole, clearly alleged instigation to an act in the nature of a strike, which was an offence under the Act. The Court also noted that, in any event, this was a criminal case, and special leave to appeal is generally not granted in such circumstances, particularly when the point raised is considered a matter of extreme technicality. Higgins J. concurred specifically on the ground that special leave should not be granted in a criminal matter.