Young and Rees v Quaine - [1910] HCA 1

Frederick Pollock in his work on Torts, 6th ed., p. 40, gives it as

his opinion that such an action would doubtless be treated as an action of contract if it became necessary for any purpose to assign it to one or the other class.

I agree that the appeal of the husband should be allowed.

Appeal of Agnes Brown dismissed. Appeal

of Duncan Brown allowed. Solicitors, for appellants, Atthow &McGregor. Solicitors, for respondent, Bouchard &Holland.

YOUNG AND REES. QUAINE

PEASE AND OTHERS QUAINE

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Criminal law-Information-Conviction-Duplicity-No - offence disclosed-Special

leave to appeal to High Court-Industrial - Disputes Act 1908 (N.S. W.) (No. 3 of 1908), secs. 42,* * 45. MELBOURNE,

*Sec. 42 of the Industrial Disputes

he shall be liable to a penalty not Act 1908 provides that :-

exceeding one thousand pounds, or in 'If any person-

default to imprisonment not exceeding (a) does any act or thing in the nature of a lock-out or strike, or takes

"Provided that nothing in this sec- part in a lock-out or strike, or suspends

tion shall prohibit the suspension or or discontinues employment or work in

discontinuance of any industry or the any industry; or

working of any persons therein for any " (b) instigates to or aids in any of

cause not constituting a lock-out or the above-mentioned acts,

10 CLR 111

Certain defendants were proceeded against in the Industrial Court of New South Wales upon informations charging them with instigating other persons " to do an act in the nature of a strike, to wit, to discontinue work in the said industry, such discontinuance not being for a cause not constituting a strike," &. They were convicted and fined, the convictions following the words of the informations, and in default of payment were imprisoned. Rules nisi for habeas corpus were obtained on the ground that their detention was illegal inasmuch as the convictions were bad either for duplicity or uncertainty or disclosed no offence. The orders nisi having been discharged,

Held, that special leave to appeal to the High Court should be refused on the ground that the case being a criminal one was not one in which special leave should be granted; and

Per Griffith C.J., Barton J., O'Connor J., and Isaacs J., on the further ground that the information sufficiently charged an offence under sec. 42 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1908 (N.S.W.), and that the conviction was good.

APPLICATIONS for special leave to appeal from decisions of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

Robert Young, Daniel Rees, Thomas Pease and eight other persons were proceeded against in the Industrial Court of New South Wales for offences under sec. 42 of the Industrial Dis- putes Act 1908.

The information in each case alleged that the defendant did unlawfully instigate certain coal miners and other persons being employés in a certain industry "to do an act in the nature of a strike, to wit, to discontinue work…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Young and Rees v Quaine

Details

AGLC: Young and Rees v Quaine [1910] HCA 1
Case: [1910] HCA 1
Decision Date: 1 March 1910

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Robert Young, Daniel Rees, Thomas Pease, and eight other individuals were prosecuted in the Industrial Court of New South Wales for offences under section 42 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1908. The informations alleged that the defendants unlawfully instigated coal miners and other employees to discontinue work in a certain industry, describing this discontinuance as an act in the nature of a strike, and that such discontinuance was not for a cause not constituting a strike. The defendants were convicted and fined, with imprisonment ordered in default of payment. They subsequently obtained rules nisi for habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of New South Wales, arguing their detention was illegal due to convictions being bad for duplicity, uncertainty, or disclosing no offence. The Supreme Court discharged these rules nisi, and the defendants sought special leave to appeal to the High Court.

The High Court was required to determine whether the informations sufficiently disclosed an offence under section 42 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1908, and whether the convictions were valid. A key issue was whether the informations, by alleging instigation to an act in the nature of a strike and then defining that act in a manner that could be interpreted as redundant or contradictory, were duplicitous or uncertain, thereby rendering the convictions invalid. The defendants contended that the informations were fundamentally flawed and disclosed no offence, meaning the convictions were coram non judice.

The High Court refused special leave to appeal. A majority of the Court (Griffith C.J., Barton J., O'Connor J., and Isaacs J.) held that the informations sufficiently charged an offence under section 42. While acknowledging the potential for technical argument regarding the precise wording, the Court found that the information, read as a whole, clearly alleged instigation to an act in the nature of a strike, which was an offence under the Act. The Court also noted that, in any event, this was a criminal case, and special leave to appeal is generally not granted in such circumstances, particularly when the point raised is considered a matter of extreme technicality. Higgins J. concurred specifically on the ground that special leave should not be granted in a criminal matter.

Orders