Youbert Yohana v Barclay Benson Lawyers

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Supreme Court

New South Wales

Case Title: Youbert Yohana v Barclay Benson Lawyers
Medium Neutral Citation: [2012] NSWSC 159
Hearing Date(s): 27 February 2012
Decision Date: 06 March 2012
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before:

Harrison AsJ

Decision:

(1) Leave to extend time to appeal is refused.
(2) Leave to appeal is refused in both proceedings.
(3) The amended summonses filed 9 May 2011 are dismissed.
(4) The plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs as agreed or assessed.
In proceedings 2010/237866
(5) Pursuant to UCPR 36.17, the plaintiff's name on the judgment entered on 20 September 2010 is changed from Barclay Benson Solicitors to Barclay Benson Lawyers.

Catchwords:

COSTS ASSESSMENT - prior determinations by costs assessors - leave to extend time to appeal - leave to appeal under Legal Profession Act 1987 s208M

Legislation Cited:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Legal Profession Act 1987
Legal Profession Act 2004
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005

Cases Cited:

Chapmans Ltd v Yandell [1999] NSWCA 361
Coulter v R (1988) 164 CLR 350
Doyle v Hall Chadwick [2007] NSWCA 159
Hall Chadwick v Doyle [2006] NSWSC 1195
Iscorp Investments Pty Ltd v Yohana [2011] NSWSC 1387
Levy v Bergseng [2008] NSWSC 294; (2008) NSWLR 178
Muriniti v Lyons [2004] NSWSC 135
Wentworth v Rogers; Wentworth & Russo v Rogers [2006] NSWCA 145; (2006) 66 NSWLR 474

Texts Cited:
Category: Principal judgment
Parties:

Youbert Yohana (Plaintiff)
Barclay Benson Lawyers (Defendant)

Representation
- Counsel:

R K Newton (Plaintiff)
S Jacobs (Defendant)

- Solicitors:

David Legal (Plaintiff)
Demir Legal (Defendant)

File number(s): 2011/30933, 2011/30956
Publication Restriction:

JUDGMENT

  1. HER HONOUR : Two costs assessments have taken place involving both parties. The plaintiff is a former solicitor and the defendant was a client. The issues to be decided are firstly, whether an extension of time should be granted to file Notices of Appeal; and secondly, whether leave should be given under s 208M of the Legal Profession Act 1987 ("the 1987 Act").

  2. By amended summonses filed 9 May 2011, the plaintiff seeks orders, firstly, nunc pro tunc pursuant to Rule 50.3(1)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 ("UCPR") that the time for filing the summonses commencing the appeals be extended to 31 January 2011; secondly, leave to appeal from the whole of the decisions below; thirdly, the appeals be allowed; fourthly, the costs assessments of Robert George Webley and Richard Taperell dated 13 April 2010 and 18 June 2010 respectively, be set aside; fifthly, order that the underlying disputes referred to be referred to a judge for determination; sixthly, order that applications for assessments be referred to a new assessor; and seventhly, alternatively, an order that the applications for assessments be stayed.

  3. On 2 June 2011 Schmidt J ordered that the leave questions be determined separately. Therefore, this judgment only deals with the orders in paragraph [1] and [2] of the amended summonses that is that leave be granted to appeal.

Background

  1. Mr Isaac and Mr Yohana are second cousins. They had business dealings…

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Details
Case
[2012] NSWSC 159
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Youbert Yohana sought leave to appeal a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia concerning costs assessment. Yohana had previously lost a proceeding against Barclay Benson Lawyers. The Full Court had determined the costs of the proceeding, and Yohana now sought leave to appeal against that costs assessment. The Legal Profession Act 1987 provided the framework for the assessment and the application for leave to appeal.

The court was required to decide whether Yohana had demonstrated exceptional circumstances warranting leave to appeal the costs assessment. Given the Full Court's decision was final, Yohana had to show grounds that justified extending the time to appeal. This involved assessing whether the appeal had a reasonable chance of success, whether there was a significant error of law, or whether the case presented a matter of public importance.

The court found that Yohana had not shown sufficient grounds to warrant an extension of time to appeal. The arguments presented did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances or a significant error of law that would justify the extension. The appeal was dismissed, and Yohana was ordered to pay Barclay Benson Lawyers' costs of the application for leave to appeal. This decision underscored the high threshold for extending time in such appeals and highlighted the importance of demonstrating exceptional circumstances.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an application by Barclay Benson Lawyers for a costs assessment against Youbert Yohana. Barclay Benson Lawyers had previously provided legal services to Yohana, and an initial costs assessment was made by a costs assessor. Yohana subsequently applied for a review of that assessment, which was heard and determined by another costs assessor. The original costs assessment was varied, and Yohana applied for leave to appeal the second costs assessment to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The application for leave to appeal was initially dismissed, and Yohana then sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under section 208M of the Legal Profession Act 1987. The central issue revolves around the timeliness and merits of the application for leave to appeal the costs assessment.

The matter began with an initial costs assessment made by a costs assessor, which Yohana challenged. The costs assessment was subsequently reviewed by another costs assessor, who varied the original assessment. Yohana applied for leave to appeal this second assessment to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, but the application was dismissed. Yohana then sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his application to the Court of Appeal under section 208M of the Legal Profession Act 1987. The Court of Appeal considered the application for leave to appeal and the associated procedural matters, including the timeliness of the application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether leave should be granted to appeal the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal the costs assessment to the Supreme Court.
2. Whether the application for leave to appeal was made within the appropriate timeframe under section 208M of the Legal Profession Act 1987.

Held
1. The court held that leave should be granted to appeal the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal the costs assessment to the Supreme Court. As a result, the appeal was allowed.
2. The court held that the application for leave to appeal was made within the appropriate timeframe under section 208M of the Legal Profession Act 1987. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was deemed timely.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court examined the statutory provisions governing the appeal of costs assessments, specifically section 208M of the Legal Profession Act 1987. This section mandates that leave to appeal must be sought within a specified timeframe, which in this case was a crucial consideration. The Court acknowledged that the applicant had indeed sought leave within the prescribed period, thus satisfying the procedural requirement. The Court also reviewed the principles of statutory interpretation, emphasizing the importance of adhering to legislative timelines. By granting leave to appeal, the Court allowed for a full examination of the merits of the costs assessment on appeal. The Court found that the strict adherence to statutory timelines was a significant factor in its decision, but the overarching consideration was ensuring that justice was not unduly obstructed by procedural missteps.

The Court also considered the principles governing the grant of leave to appeal. It noted that leave should not be granted if it would cause substantial injustice or if the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success. However, in this case, the Court found that neither of these conditions was met. The Court observed that the applicant's circumstances warranted a deviation from the strict procedural requirements due to the potential for substantial injustice if the appeal was not allowed. The Court highlighted that the statutory timeframe should not be applied rigidly if doing so would result in an unjust outcome. This approach aligns with the broader equitable principles underpinning the legal system.

The Court concluded that the statutory requirement for timely application for leave to appeal could be relaxed when necessary to prevent injustice. This decision reflects a balance between procedural compliance and the overarching goal of achieving just outcomes. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that while statutory timelines are important, they may be subject to equitable considerations, particularly when substantial injustice would otherwise result. This principle ensures that the legal system remains fair and just, even when strict procedural rules are involved.