Yolla Holdings Pty Ltd v Aion Corporation Pty Ltd

Yolla Holdings Pty Ltd appealed against a decision of the Queensland Planning and Environment Court that declared a strip of land, including a lot now owned by Yolla, to be "primary thoroughfare" within the meaning of the Integrated Resort Development Act 1987. The lot had been identified as a primary thoroughfare in an approved scheme but was not transferred to the primary thoroughfare body corporate upon the scheme’s approval and was not sub-divided by the initial plan of subdivision, contrary to the Act. The local government and registrar of titles approved that plan, and no subsequent plan designated the lot as primary thoroughfare. Yolla subsequently purchased the lot as a third party. The primary judge found the lot to be “primary thoroughfare” and Yolla its “registered proprietor” under section 33 of the Act.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in declaring the lot to be "primary thoroughfare" and whether the lot was ever "shown on the plan as primary thoroughfare" within the meaning of section 33 of the Act. The court considered the meaning of the term "primary thoroughfare" and whether it was sufficient for the lot to be identified as such in an approved scheme for it to be considered a primary thoroughfare regardless of subsequent actions or omissions. The court also considered the implications of the local government and registrar of titles approving the plan that did not conform to the Act.

The court found that the primary judge erred in declaring the lot to be "primary thoroughfare" and setting aside the orders made in the Trial Division. The court held that the term "shown on the plan as primary thoroughfare" within the meaning of section 33 of the Act required more than identification in an approved scheme. The court held that the lot had to be sub-divided by the initial plan of subdivision and transferred to the primary thoroughfare body corporate upon the scheme’s approval. As these requirements were not met, the lot was not "shown on the plan as primary thoroughfare" within the meaning of section 33 of the Act. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made in the Trial Division, ordered that the application be dismissed with costs, and ordered that the first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.