IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No Sl07 of 1987 B e t w e e n -
STANLEY YISRAEL
Applicant
and
CHAMBERLAIN JOHN DEER PTY
LIMITED
Respondent
Application for special
leave to appeal
MASON CJ DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
Yisrael TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 10 JUNE 1988, AT 10.06 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
S1T2/l/PLC 1 10/6/88
MR B.J. GROSS, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR P. DEAKIN for the applicant. (instructed by
Wallbank & Tilley)
MR A.S. MORRISON: May it please the Court I appear for the
respondent. (instructed by P.J. McGahen)
MASON CJ: Mr Gross. MR GROSS: Your Honours, if special leave were granted we would seek to rely upon amended ground of appeal which we
have formulated. Might I hand up to Your Honours copies
of those amended grounds of appeal together with copies
of those decisions which we would wish to refer to here.
MASON CJ: Thank you. Mr Gross, this does seem somewhat
unsatisfactory. As I look at paragraph l(a) of the
proposed amended grounds of appeal, that seems to be
a matter that was not given prominence in the
affidavit in support of the application for special
leave?
MR GROSS:
Your Honour, that matter is correct. There has been a change of representation both as to solicitors
and counsel since the time those proceedings were initiated. We have only just come into the case. MASON CJ: Maybe, but as far as the Court is concerned, the
Court takes the advantage of reading the papers
beforehand, gives consideration to the way in which the
case presented for special leave is put forward and it
means that there is a good deal of time wasted if, in
fact, the basis of the presentation of the case is
going to be altered.
MR GROSS: Yes, Your Honour. I apologize for the inconvenience caused to the Court.
MASON CJ: Well, you had better explain to us what the new basis for special leave is in this case.
MR GROSS:
Yes. Your Honours, the amended grounds cover a number of complaints but the special leave matters
essentially are these: in relation to ground l(a), His Honour the trial judge applied, we would suggest, the principle of LEISBOSCH V EDISON for the purpose of disentitling the plaintiff to receive damages in respect of the lost opportunity to purchase a house
which but for the accident he would have purchased with that purchase being at a particularly advantageous interest rate. Second, Your Honours - and this is covered in ground 2(a) - in calculating interest on past economic loss, His Honour allowed as a credit in
the defendant's favour the fact that the plaintiff had • .I. • ~ ~ ~,. ''i ~ "' >,- ..... ~. • • • • ' • • ~ I\ :,.-, • • . . r- • rece:i.vt:u. suc;l.ci..1. ::.e.i.v.1.;.;el:;i :i..u t.:11,;;;;, :i.::u,i:LiL o:t sickness benefits and invalid pension,…
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- Case
- [1988] HCATrans 121
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the High Court were whether the principle established in *Leisbosch* retained any operation in tort actions where a plaintiff's loss stemmed from their impecuniosity following an accident, and if so, how that operation should be defined. Additionally, the court was asked to consider whether the trial judge's calculation of interest on past economic loss, by crediting the defendant with payments received by the plaintiff from social security benefits, represented an appropriate development of the principles concerning credits for workers' compensation payments as discussed in *Batchelor v Burke*. The court also considered whether the Court of Appeal had erred in assuming that certain hospital and medical expenses had been allowed within the general damages figure when there was no express inclusion and evidence to the contrary.
In relation to the *Leisbosch* principle, the applicant argued that the trial judge had incorrectly applied it to deny damages for the lost opportunity to purchase a home at a particularly advantageous interest rate. The facts indicated that prior to the accident, the plaintiff had applied for and been accepted into a subsidized first home buyers scheme. Following the accident, he was unable to proceed with the purchase due to his financial circumstances. The applicant contended that the principle in *Leisbosch*, which generally disentitles a plaintiff to recover damages caused by their own impecuniosity, should not apply in this context, particularly where the impecuniosity arose directly from the tortious act. The court was also asked to review the approach to calculating interest on past economic loss, with the applicant arguing that the credit for sickness and invalid benefits was an overreach beyond established authority. The applicant further submitted that the Court of Appeal's assumption regarding the inclusion of medical expenses in general damages was unwarranted.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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