Yisrael v Chamberlain John Deer Pty Limited

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Sydney No Sl07 of 1987

B e t w e e n -

STANLEY YISRAEL

Applicant

and

CHAMBERLAIN JOHN DEER PTY

LIMITED

Respondent

Application for special
leave to appeal

MASON CJ DAWSON J

TOOHEY J

Yisrael

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 10 JUNE 1988, AT 10.06 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

S1T2/l/PLC 1 10/6/88
MR B.J. GROSS, QC:  May it please the Court, I appear with

MR P. DEAKIN for the applicant. (instructed by

Wallbank & Tilley)
MR A.S. MORRISON:  May it please the Court I appear for the

respondent. (instructed by P.J. McGahen)

MASON CJ:  Mr Gross.
MR GROSS:  Your Honours, if special leave were granted we would

seek to rely upon amended ground of appeal which we

have formulated. Might I hand up to Your Honours copies

of those amended grounds of appeal together with copies

of those decisions which we would wish to refer to
here.

MASON CJ: Thank you. Mr Gross, this does seem somewhat

unsatisfactory. As I look at paragraph l(a) of the

proposed amended grounds of appeal, that seems to be

a matter that was not given prominence in the

affidavit in support of the application for special

leave?

MR GROSS: 

Your Honour, that matter is correct. There has been a change of representation both as to solicitors

and counsel since the time those proceedings were
initiated. We have only just come into the case.

MASON CJ: Maybe, but as far as the Court is concerned, the

Court takes the advantage of reading the papers

beforehand, gives consideration to the way in which the

case presented for special leave is put forward and it

means that there is a good deal of time wasted if, in

fact, the basis of the presentation of the case is

going to be altered.

MR GROSS:  Yes, Your Honour. I apologize for the inconvenience

caused to the Court.

MASON CJ:  Well, you had better explain to us what the new basis

for special leave is in this case.

MR GROSS: 

Yes. Your Honours, the amended grounds cover a number of complaints but the special leave matters

essentially are these: in relation to ground l(a),

His Honour the trial judge applied, we would suggest, the principle of LEISBOSCH V EDISON for the purpose of disentitling the plaintiff to receive damages in respect of the lost opportunity to purchase a house

which but for the accident he would have purchased with
that purchase being at a particularly advantageous
interest rate. Second, Your Honours - and this is
covered in ground 2(a) - in calculating interest on
past economic loss, His Honour allowed as a credit in
the defendant's favour the fact that the plaintiff had • .I. • ~ ~ ~,. ''i ~ "' >,- ..... ~. • • • • ' • • ~ I\ :,.-, • • . . r- •
rece:i.vt:u. suc;l.ci..1. ::.e.i.v.1.;.;el:;i :i..u t.:11,;;;;, :i.::u,i:LiL o:t sickness
benefits and invalid pension,…
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Details
Case
[1988] HCATrans 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before the High Court of Australia on an application for special leave to appeal by the applicant, Yisrael, against the respondent, Chamberlain John Deer Pty Limited. The dispute concerned the assessment of damages following an accident. The applicant sought to challenge the decision of the lower courts on several grounds, including the application of the principle in *Leisbosch Dredger in Ownership v Ediston Shipping Co Ltd* to disentitle the plaintiff to damages for a lost opportunity to purchase a house at a favourable interest rate, the calculation of interest on past economic loss by allowing a credit for sickness and invalid benefits, and the exclusion of certain hospital and medical expenses.

The primary legal issues before the High Court were whether the principle established in *Leisbosch* retained any operation in tort actions where a plaintiff's loss stemmed from their impecuniosity following an accident, and if so, how that operation should be defined. Additionally, the court was asked to consider whether the trial judge's calculation of interest on past economic loss, by crediting the defendant with payments received by the plaintiff from social security benefits, represented an appropriate development of the principles concerning credits for workers' compensation payments as discussed in *Batchelor v Burke*. The court also considered whether the Court of Appeal had erred in assuming that certain hospital and medical expenses had been allowed within the general damages figure when there was no express inclusion and evidence to the contrary.

In relation to the *Leisbosch* principle, the applicant argued that the trial judge had incorrectly applied it to deny damages for the lost opportunity to purchase a home at a particularly advantageous interest rate. The facts indicated that prior to the accident, the plaintiff had applied for and been accepted into a subsidized first home buyers scheme. Following the accident, he was unable to proceed with the purchase due to his financial circumstances. The applicant contended that the principle in *Leisbosch*, which generally disentitles a plaintiff to recover damages caused by their own impecuniosity, should not apply in this context, particularly where the impecuniosity arose directly from the tortious act. The court was also asked to review the approach to calculating interest on past economic loss, with the applicant arguing that the credit for sickness and invalid benefits was an overreach beyond established authority. The applicant further submitted that the Court of Appeal's assumption regarding the inclusion of medical expenses in general damages was unwarranted.

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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