YFNF and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration)

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YFNF and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2025] ARTA 2058 (3 October 2025)

Applicant/s:  YFNF

Respondent:  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Tribunal Number:                2025/1347

Tribunal:Senior Member A Suthers

Place:Perth

Date:3 October 2025

Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the matter to the Respondent for reconsideration with a direction that the Applicant satisfies the criterion in s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and is not ineligible for the grant of a protection visa pursuant to s 36(2C)(b)(ii) of that Act.

Statement made on 03 October 2025 at 4:16pm

CATCHWORDS

MIGRATION – decision refusing to grant Applicant a Protection (subclass 866) visa under s 65 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether offences committed by the Applicant meet the definitions ‘serious Australian offence’ in s 5(1) Migration Act 1958 and ‘particularly serious crime’ in s 5M Migration Act 1958 – whether reference to subsidiary definitions in definition of ‘particularly serious crime’ are inclusive or exhaustive – relevant legal principles – whether Applicant is a ‘danger to the Australian community’ – decision set aside and remitted.

LEGISLATION

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)

Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)

Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

CASES

AFF20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1564

Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225

Betkhoshabeh v MIMA (1998) 84 FCR 463

Betkhoshabeh v MIMA [1999] FCA 16

CCYW and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2022] AATA 4452

Daher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 77 FCR 107

Director of Liquor Licensing v Kordister Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 207

DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 63

FSKY v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services, and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 541

G v MIBP [2018] FCA 1229

GWRV v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 602

Hamidy v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 164 ALD 149

MIMA v Betkhoshabeh [1999] FCA 980

Minister for Home Affairs v G and Another [2019] FCAFC 79

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Ali [2000] FCA 1385

Powell v The Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Anor (1998) 89 FCR 1

Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634

Scott and the Commissioner for Superannuation (1986) 9 ALD 491

SLGS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1055

SLGS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 104

Vabaza v MIMIA (Federal Court of Australia, Goldberg J, 27 February 1997)

WGKS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1060

WKCG and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 512

WKBF and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2023] AATA 3728

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 September 2014, 20547-8 (Scott Morrison, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection).

Convention Relating to the…

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Details
Case
[2025] ARTA 2058
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Applicant, a transgender female of Sri Lankan nationality, sought review of the Minister's decision to refuse her application for a Protection (subclass 866) visa. The decision was made under s 36(1C)(b) and s 36(2C)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958, which disqualify applicants convicted of a "particularly serious crime" who are considered a danger to the Australian community. The Applicant argued that her convictions did not meet the threshold of a "particularly serious crime" and that she did not pose a danger to the community. The central issue before the court was whether the Applicant's convictions met the statutory definitions of "serious Australian offence" and "particularly serious crime" and whether these definitions were inclusive or exhaustive. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the Applicant was a danger to the Australian community.

The court examined the definitions of "serious Australian offence" and "particularly serious crime" within the Migration Act and considered whether these definitions were inclusive or exhaustive. It found that the definition of "particularly serious crime" included subsidiary definitions that were not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. The court also considered the nature of the Applicant's offences and concluded they were very grave punishable acts, thus qualifying as "particularly serious crimes." The court found that the Applicant's past convictions did not automatically disqualify her from a protection visa, but the broader evaluative judgment was required. The court determined that the Applicant was not a danger to the Australian community, as there was no evidence to support such a conclusion.

The court set aside the decision and remitted the matter to the Minister for reconsideration, directing that the Applicant satisfy the criterion in s 36(1C)(b) and that she is not ineligible for the grant of a protection visa pursuant to s 36(2C)(b)(ii). The court highlighted the need for a high threshold in determining whether a crime is "particularly serious" and whether an individual poses a danger to the community, ensuring that the principles of non-refoulement are upheld. The decision underscored the importance of considering the individual circumstances of each applicant to ensure fair and just outcomes.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The delegate was, however, satisfied that the Applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as provided for in s 36(2)(a). Further, the delegate decided that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the Applicant being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there is a real risk she will suffer significant harm, as provided for in s 36(2)(aa). Consequently, the Applicant would have satisfied the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) except that s 36(2C)(b)(ii) applied to her.BACKGROUND The Applicant identifies as a transgender female and is a Sri Lankan national who first arrived in Australia as the holder of a Student visa on 7 February 2001. The Applicant last arrived in Australia on 27 June 2008 as the holder of a Skilled Independent (subclass 136) visa. The Applicant is now 55 years of age. From a young age, she says that her identity was female but neither the Sri Lankan culture nor her family accepted that. The Applicant indicated that her mother would allow her to wear dresses in the home but if her father found out she was ‘physically and mentally tortured’. The Applicant says that because of her effeminate manner, her family said that she was born intersex, although in recent years medical testing has disproved this. The Applicant indicates that she suffered significant bullying at school. As a young adult she says that she was arrested by the Police and that her father had to pay police officers to prevent her from being jailed for dressing differently to her gender. The Applicant indicates that there was a short period of time where she had a relationship with a male when she was a young adult. However, when her father found out about it, the relationship had to stop, and the family required her to marry someone they deemed suitable. The Applicant says that she found a suitable woman from a family of a similar socio-economic status and, when her family approved, they got married. The Applicant’s wife understood the Applicant’s gender identity issues, but they had wanted to remove themselves from their controlled home-lives and saw the marriage as an opportunity to do so. To escape her situation in Sri Lanka, the Applicant and her wife decided to move to Australia. By that time, the Applicant and her wife had a one-year-old child, and they came together to Australia for an initial period between 2001 and 2003. After an unsuccessful return to Sri Lanka, the Applicant and her family, including her brother, returned to Australia in 2008. The adult family members worked in the beauty treatment industry. During that time, because her wife and brother were not accepting of the Applicant presenting as female, the Applicant’s public appearance and presentation remained as male. Over time, because there was no ongoing sexual relationship between the Applicant and her wife, the wife formed a romantic relationship with the Applicant’s brother. The Applicant and her wife remain married but have no intimate relationship.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Applicant has casual work assisting in undertaking research in academia but has no formal academic qualifications in that regard. She is well regarded by her supervisors.[2] [2] Exhibit 1, pp 601-602.THE HEARING AND THE EVIDENCE I heard the matter on 16 and 17 June 2025. The Applicant and Respondent were legally represented. I took oral evidence from the Applicant, Ms Paige, and Dr Phil Watts, Adjunct Associate Professor in Clinical Psychology. Dr Watts had prepared an independent expert report relied upon by the Applicant. The following documents were marked as exhibits:(a)Joint Hearing Book, containing pp 1-614 (‘Exhibit 1’);(b)Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (‘ASFIC’) (‘Exhibit 2’);(c)Respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (‘RSFIC’) (‘Exhibit 3’);(d)Applicant’s submissions in reply (‘Exhibit 4’). For the reasons set out below, I have decided that the Reviewable Decision should be set aside and remitted to the Respondent for reconsideration with a direction that the Applicant satisfies the criterion in s 36(1C)(b), and that she is not ineligible for the grant of a protection visa pursuant to s 36(2C)(b)(ii).LEGAL FRAMEWORK By judicial determinations before the establishment of this Tribunal by enactment of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (‘ART Act’), the AAT was found not to have authority to review the aspects of the Reviewable Decision mentioned in [2], above, when conducting a review of this nature.[3] In part, those determinations relied on the structure of the AAT, which has been varied in the ART Act. To the extent necessary, having regard to those changes, the parties are agreed, and I am satisfied that I should limit the scope of the review to the issues described at [1], above.[4] [3] Daher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 77 FCR 107; Powell v The Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Anor (1998) 89 FCR 1, [12] (French J); Hamidy v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 164 ALD 149, [31]- [32]; GWRV v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 602; SLGS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1055.[4] ART Act, s 53. The Applicant is seeking a protection visa. Section 36 sets out the criteria for the protection visa. Section 36(1C) relevantly provides:A criterion for a protection visa is that the Applicant is not a person whom the Minister considers, on reasonable grounds:(a)is a danger to Australia’s security, or(b)having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, is a danger to the Australian community. Section 36(2C)(b) substantially mirrors s 36(1C), and relevantly provides:A non-citizen is taken not to satisfy the criterion mentioned in paragraph (2)(aa) if...(b)the Minister considers, on reasonable grounds, that(i) the non-citizen is a danger to Australia’s security, or(ii) the non-citizen, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime (including a crime that consists of the commission of a serious Australian offence or serious foreign offence), is a danger to the Australian community

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Applicant seeks review of a decision of a delegate of the Respondent Minister dated 12 December 2024 (‘Reviewable Decision’), that refused her Protection (subclass 866) visa application (‘Visa’) because the Applicant was found not to meet the requirements of ss 36(1C)(b) and 36(2C)(b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’), in that there were reasonable grounds for considering that the Applicant was a person who had been ‘convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime’ and ‘is a danger to the Australian community’.[1] [1] All references to legislative provisions in this statement of reasons are to the Act, unless otherwise stated. The delegate was, however, satisfied that the Applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as provided for in s 36(2)(a). Further, the delegate decided that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the Applicant being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there is a real risk she will suffer significant harm, as provided for in s 36(2)(aa). Consequently, the Applicant would have satisfied the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) except that s 36(2C)(b)(ii) applied to her.BACKGROUND The Applicant identifies as a transgender female and is a Sri Lankan national who first arrived in Australia as the holder of a Student visa on 7 February 2001. The Applicant last arrived in Australia on 27 June 2008 as the holder of a Skilled Independent (subclass 136) visa. The Applicant is now 55 years of age. From a young age, she says that her identity was female but neither the Sri Lankan culture nor her family accepted that. The Applicant indicated that her mother would allow her to wear dresses in the home but if her father found out she was ‘physically and mentally tortured’. The Applicant says that because of her effeminate manner, her family said that she was born intersex, although in recent years medical testing has disproved this. The Applicant indicates that she suffered significant bullying at school. As a young adult she says that she was arrested by the Police and that her father had to pay police officers to prevent her from being jailed for dressing differently to her gender. The Applicant indicates that there was a short period of time where she had a relationship with a male when she was a young adult. However, when her father found out about it, the relationship had to stop, and the family required her to marry someone they deemed suitable. The Applicant says that she found a suitable woman from a family of a similar socio-economic status and, when her family approved, they got married. The Applicant’s wife understood the Applicant’s gender identity issues, but they had wanted to remove themselves from their controlled home-lives and saw the marriage as an opportunity to do so. To escape her situation in Sri Lanka, the Applicant and her wife decided to move to Australia. By that time, the Applicant and her wife had a one-year-old child, and they came together to Australia for an initial period between 2001 and 2003. After an unsuccessful return to Sri Lanka, the Applicant and her family, including her brother, returned to Australia in 2008.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Respondent submits that the Tribunal should similarly find in this case; that the Applicant has been convicted by final judgment of a ‘particularly serious crime’ in factual circumstances similar to CCYW.CONSIDERATION AS TO ‘PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIME’ There is no evidence before me to suggest that the Applicant is a danger to Australia’s security or has committed a serious foreign offence. I am satisfied that those provisions are not engaged. To the extent that it is necessary to decide, I agree with the Respondent that the offence of sexual penetration without consent is analogous to rape. However, I think it would be wrong to conclude that this is a necessary finding in determining whether the Applicant has been convicted of a ‘particularly serious crime’. Rather, I think the answer to that question, if it is to be determined without reference to whether a ‘serious Australian offence’ has been committed, involves a broad, but not unconstrained, evaluative judgement. I agree with the Applicant’s submission that regard may be had to the sentiment expressed in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures,[14] which states that ‘a “serious” crime must be a … very grave punishable act. Minor offences punishable by moderate sentences are not grounds for exclusion under Article 1F(b) even if technically referred to as “crimes” in the penal law of the country concerned.’ In my view, the fact that the ‘particularly serious crime’ exemption applies to permit expulsion or return to a person’s former home country, despite their need for protection, makes the need for setting a ‘high bar’[15] in the evaluative judgement self-evident.[14] UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection, (Handbook), reissued 2019, [155].[15] Referred to in Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR Global Consultation on International Protection 139 ¶ 186 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003). Ultimately, though, I am satisfied that the offences committed by the Applicant were very grave punishable acts. The sexual violation of the body of another person without their consent, however described or defined, should properly be understood as particularly serious. The available punishment for like offences throughout Australia recognises that fact. Nothing in respect of the way the Applicant offended sets her apart from that. The Applicant has been convicted by a final judgment of a ‘particularly serious crime’. IS THE APPLICANT A DANGER TO THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY? The second element reflected in ss 36(1C)(b) and 36(2C)(b)(ii) is that the person constitutes a danger to the Australian community. It has been judicially considered and the former AAT has expressed views about its application. In WKCG[16] the AAT explained (in comments I agree with) at [25]:The question whether a person constitutes a danger to the Australian community is one of fact and degree. It is not necessary to paraphrase the language of Article 33(2) of the Refugees Convention because the words are plain and simple English. In deciding the question, regard must be had to all the circumstances of each individual case.[16] WKCG and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 512.