YFNF and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2025] ARTA 2058 (3 October 2025)
Applicant/s: YFNF
Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
Tribunal Number: 2025/1347
Tribunal:Senior Member A Suthers
Place:Perth
Date:3 October 2025
Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and remits the matter to the Respondent for reconsideration with a direction that the Applicant satisfies the criterion in s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and is not ineligible for the grant of a protection visa pursuant to s 36(2C)(b)(ii) of that Act.
Statement made on 03 October 2025 at 4:16pm
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – decision refusing to grant Applicant a Protection (subclass 866) visa under s 65 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether offences committed by the Applicant meet the definitions ‘serious Australian offence’ in s 5(1) Migration Act 1958 and ‘particularly serious crime’ in s 5M Migration Act 1958 – whether reference to subsidiary definitions in definition of ‘particularly serious crime’ are inclusive or exhaustive – relevant legal principles – whether Applicant is a ‘danger to the Australian community’ – decision set aside and remitted.
LEGISLATION
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
CASES
Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225
Betkhoshabeh v MIMA (1998) 84 FCR 463
Betkhoshabeh v MIMA [1999] FCA 16
CCYW and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2022] AATA 4452
Daher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 77 FCR 107
Director of Liquor Licensing v Kordister Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 207
DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 63
Hamidy v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 164 ALD 149
MIMA v Betkhoshabeh [1999] FCA 980
Minister for Home Affairs v G and Another [2019] FCAFC 79
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Ali [2000] FCA 1385
Powell v The Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Anor (1998) 89 FCR 1
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Scott and the Commissioner for Superannuation (1986) 9 ALD 491
Vabaza v MIMIA (Federal Court of Australia, Goldberg J, 27 February 1997)
WKCG and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 512
WKBF and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2023] AATA 3728
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 September 2014, 20547-8 (Scott Morrison, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection).
Convention Relating to the…
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- Case
- [2025] ARTA 2058
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the definitions of "serious Australian offence" and "particularly serious crime" within the Migration Act and considered whether these definitions were inclusive or exhaustive. It found that the definition of "particularly serious crime" included subsidiary definitions that were not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. The court also considered the nature of the Applicant's offences and concluded they were very grave punishable acts, thus qualifying as "particularly serious crimes." The court found that the Applicant's past convictions did not automatically disqualify her from a protection visa, but the broader evaluative judgment was required. The court determined that the Applicant was not a danger to the Australian community, as there was no evidence to support such a conclusion.
The court set aside the decision and remitted the matter to the Minister for reconsideration, directing that the Applicant satisfy the criterion in s 36(1C)(b) and that she is not ineligible for the grant of a protection visa pursuant to s 36(2C)(b)(ii). The court highlighted the need for a high threshold in determining whether a crime is "particularly serious" and whether an individual poses a danger to the community, ensuring that the principles of non-refoulement are upheld. The decision underscored the importance of considering the individual circumstances of each applicant to ensure fair and just outcomes.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Respondent submits that the Tribunal should similarly find in this case; that the Applicant has been convicted by final judgment of a ‘particularly serious crime’ in factual circumstances similar to CCYW.CONSIDERATION AS TO ‘PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIME’ There is no evidence before me to suggest that the Applicant is a danger to Australia’s security or has committed a serious foreign offence. I am satisfied that those provisions are not engaged. To the extent that it is necessary to decide, I agree with the Respondent that the offence of sexual penetration without consent is analogous to rape. However, I think it would be wrong to conclude that this is a necessary finding in determining whether the Applicant has been convicted of a ‘particularly serious crime’. Rather, I think the answer to that question, if it is to be determined without reference to whether a ‘serious Australian offence’ has been committed, involves a broad, but not unconstrained, evaluative judgement. I agree with the Applicant’s submission that regard may be had to the sentiment expressed in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures,[14] which states that ‘a “serious” crime must be a … very grave punishable act. Minor offences punishable by moderate sentences are not grounds for exclusion under Article 1F(b) even if technically referred to as “crimes” in the penal law of the country concerned.’ In my view, the fact that the ‘particularly serious crime’ exemption applies to permit expulsion or return to a person’s former home country, despite their need for protection, makes the need for setting a ‘high bar’[15] in the evaluative judgement self-evident.[14] UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection, (Handbook), reissued 2019, [155].[15] Referred to in Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR Global Consultation on International Protection 139 ¶ 186 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003). Ultimately, though, I am satisfied that the offences committed by the Applicant were very grave punishable acts. The sexual violation of the body of another person without their consent, however described or defined, should properly be understood as particularly serious. The available punishment for like offences throughout Australia recognises that fact. Nothing in respect of the way the Applicant offended sets her apart from that. The Applicant has been convicted by a final judgment of a ‘particularly serious crime’. IS THE APPLICANT A DANGER TO THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY? The second element reflected in ss 36(1C)(b) and 36(2C)(b)(ii) is that the person constitutes a danger to the Australian community. It has been judicially considered and the former AAT has expressed views about its application. In WKCG[16] the AAT explained (in comments I agree with) at [25]:The question whether a person constitutes a danger to the Australian community is one of fact and degree. It is not necessary to paraphrase the language of Article 33(2) of the Refugees Convention because the words are plain and simple English. In deciding the question, regard must be had to all the circumstances of each individual case.[16] WKCG and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 512.