Yesilhat v Calokerinos

[2021] NSWCA 110

Court of Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

Yesilhat v Calokerinos [2021] NSWCA 110

Hearing dates:

12 April 2021; 13 April 2021

Date of orders:

28 May 2021

Decision date:

28 May 2021

Before:

Bathurst CJ at [1];
Macfarlan JA at [2];
Brereton JA at [123]

Decision:

(1)   Dismiss the Amended Notice of Motion filed on behalf of Ms Calokerinos on 11 December 2020, with costs.

(2)    Dismiss the appeal with costs.

Catchwords:

SUCCESSION – family provision – claim by alleged long-term partner of deceased – whether alleged partner an “eligible person” – whether de facto relationship, close personal relationship or dependent household member relationship – Succession Act ss 57(1)(b), (e), and (f) – requirement of “living” together and need for some common residence

APPEALS – from findings of fact – findings likely affected by impressions about credibility and reliability of witnesses – whether findings “glaringly improbable” – Fox v Percy test

Legislation Cited:

Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 21C

Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), s 4

Succession Act 2006 (NSW), ss 3, 57, 59

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (NSW), r 51.41

Cases Cited:

Bedford, In the Marriage of (1977) 29 FLR 332; (1977) FLC ¶90-287

Benney v Jones (1991) 23 NSWLR 559

Benney v Jones (Supreme Court (NSW), Young J, 13 February 1990, unrep)

FO v HAF [2007] 2 Qd R 138; [2006] QCA 555

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22

Hayes v Marquis [2008] DFC ¶95-415; [2008] NSWCA 10

Heydon v The Perpetual Executors, Trustees and Agency Company (W.A.) Limited (1930) 45 CLR 111; [1930] HCA 26

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40

Jonah & White (2011) 258 FLR 236; [2011] FamCA 221

Kingsland v McIndoe [1989] VR 273

Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; [2019] HCA 28

Light v Anderson [1992] DFC ¶95-102; NSWCA 136

Marning v Staniforth (Supreme Court (NSW), Hodgson J, 25 March 1987, unrep)

Moby &Schulter (2010) FLC ¶93-447; [2010] FamCA 748

Moloney v Goodwin (Supreme Court (NSW), Needham J, 1 August 1989, unrep)

Munro v Lake (Supreme Court (NSW), McLelland J, 8 February 1991, unrep)

NSW Trustee and Guardian v McGrath [2013] NSWSC 1894

Petersen v Gregory [2007] NSWSC 8

Piras v Egan [2008] NSWCA 59

Purnell v Tindale [2020] NSWSC 746

Roy v Sturgeon (1986) 11 NSWLR 454

Sharpless v McKibbin [2007] NSWSC 1498

Simonis v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1987) 21 NSWLR 677

Smoje v Forrester [2017] NSWCA 308

Spata v Tumino (2018) 95 NSWLR 706; [2018] NSWCA 17

Spata v Tumino [2017] NSWSC 111

Vaughan v Hoskovich [2010] NSWSC 706

Weston v Public Trustee (1986) 4 NSWLR 407

White v Redding (2019) 99 NSWLR 605; [2019] NSWCA 152

Yesilhat v Calokerinos [2015] NSWSC 1028

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Okan Yesilhat (Appellant)
Cleopatra Sclavos Calokerinos as Executor of the Estate of the late George Sclavos (Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
V Culkoff (Appellant)
M Evans / V Chan (Respondent)

Solicitors:
Russo & Partners (Appellant)
Madison Marcus Law Firm (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2017/00191844

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

Supreme Court of New South Wales

Jurisdiction:

Equity

Citation:

[2017] NSWSC 666

Date of Decision:

09 June 2017

Before:

Slattery J

File Number(s):

2013/358168; 2014/212466

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

Mr George Sclavos (the deceased) died on 13 August 2013. His purported informal will dated 16 October 2012 left his estate, valued at in the order of $6 million, to his closest living relatives, being his two nieces Ms Cleopatra Calokerinos and Ms Anna Sclavos-Lahana. Mr Okan Yesilhat, the appellant, brought proceedings challenging the will and seeking an order for provision under the Succession Act 2006 (NSW). Mr Yesilhat alleged that he was in a secret same-sex relationship with the deceased for 14 years before his death. Ms Calokerinos, the executor of the will, disputed this and claimed against Mr Yesilhat in separate proceedings for amounts that Mr Yesilhat had received from the deceased’s accounts both before and after the deceased’s death.

The primary judge upheld the validity of the informal will, dismissed Mr Yesilhat’s Succession Act claim and entered judgment against him on the executor’s money claims. Mr Yesilhat then appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The principal issues that arose on the appeal were as follows:

1. Whether the deceased’s will of which probate in common form was granted was fabricated;

2. Whether the primary judge’s findings as to the nature of the relationship between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat were glaringly improbable;

3. Whether Mr Yesilhat was an “eligible person” for the purposes of his family provision claim under the Succession Act;

4. Whether the primary judge erred in finding that Mr Yesilhat misappropriated funds from the deceased’s bank accounts after Mr Yesilhat became aware of the deceased’s death;

5. Whether funds made available by the deceased to Mr Yesilhat during the deceased’s lifetime were loans or gifts.

The Court (Bathurst CJ, Macfarlan and Brereton JJA) dismissed the appeal.

Per Macfarlan JA (Bathurst CJ and Brereton JA agreeing at [1] and [123] respectively):

1. As Mr Yesilhat was not an actual or potential beneficiary in respect of the deceased’s estate nor eligible to claim a family provision order, he had no standing to challenge the purported will. In these circumstances it was unnecessary and inappropriate for the Court to express any views concerning his case that the will was invalid: [7], [32].

2. Mr Yesilhat did not establish any error in the primary judge’s findings concerning the nature of the relationship between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat: [44]-[84].

Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; [2019] HCA 28; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22, applied.

1. In light of the primary judge’s factual findings there was no error in his Honour finding that Mr Yesilhat was not an “eligible person” for the purpose of his family provision claim under the Succession Act: [107]. There was no error in the findings that there was no de facto relationship under s 57(1)(b) ([85]-[100]); dependent household membership under s 57(1)(e) ([101]-[105]); or close personal relationship under s 57(1)(f) ([106]).

Smoje v Forrester [2017] NSWCA 308; and other cases, applied.

1. There was no error in the primary judge’s findings concerning the misappropriation claim: [108]-[121].

2. In light of the failure of Mr Yesilhat’s challenges to the primary judge’s factual findings (see (2) above), there was no error in his Honour’s finding that the payments constituted loans that Mr Yesilhat was obliged to repay: [49]-[54].

Additional observations per Brereton JA (Bathurst CJ agreeing at [1]):

1. Each of the three categories of eligibility claimed by Mr Yesilhat involves a requirement that the person be “living with” the other person; a concept which involves mutual living in a common residence, at least to some extent, though not necessarily exclusively or on a full-time basis: [125], [134]. Taking Mr Yesilhat’s evidence at its highest, it did not amount to common residence: [153].

Jonah & White (2011) 258 FLR 236; [2011] FamCA 221; NSW Trustee and Guardian v McGrath [2013] NSWSC 1894; Yesilhat v Calokerinos [2015] NSWSC 1028; and other cases, referred to.

Judgment

1. BATHURST CJ: I agree with the orders proposed by Macfarlan JA and with his Honour’s reasons. I also agree with the additional reasons of Brereton JA.

2. MACFARLAN JA: This appeal relates to the estate of the late George Sclavos who died on 13 August 2013, aged 65 years. His purported informal will dated 16 October 2012 leaving his estate to his two nieces was challenged in proceedings brought by Mr Okan Yesilhat, who also sought an order for provision under the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) on the basis that he was in a de facto or close personal relationship with, or a dependent household member of, the deceased for 14 years before his death. The deceased never married and had no children. His estate was valued at in the order of $6 million as at the time of his death.

3. In other proceedings, which are also the subject of the present appeal, the deceased’s executor, who was one of his two nieces, Ms Cleopatra Sclavos Calokerinos, claimed that Mr Yesilhat was liable to repay to the estate substantial funds which the deceased lent to him prior to his death. She also claimed amounts that she alleged Mr Yesilhat fraudulently misappropriated from the deceased’s bank accounts shortly after his death.

4. After a 21-day principal hearing in 2016 and 10 subsequent hearing days in the following years, Slattery J of the Equity Division upheld the validity of the informal will, dismissed Mr Yesilhat’s Succession Act claim and entered judgment against him on the executor’s money claims. His Honour’s first and principal judgment was delivered on 9 June 2017 ([2017] NSWSC 666). In all, his Honour delivered four judgments in the years 2017 to 2020, comprising in excess of 300 pages ([2019] NSWSC 584; [2019] NSWSC 1752; [2020] NSWSC 1044).

5. Mr Yesilhat’s first ground of appeal challenged the primary judge’s finding concerning the deceased’s informal will. His second ground, as expounded in his written submissions, alleged that his Honour’s findings (particularly as to the nature of Mr Yesilhat’s relationship with the deceased and as to whether funds provided to Mr Yesilhat were loans rather than gifts) are on eight identified bases “glaringly improbable” in the sense referred to in Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22 at [29]. His third ground of appeal specifically challenged the finding that there was no de facto, close personal or dependent household member relationship between Mr Yesilhat and the deceased and his fourth ground challenged the finding that he fraudulently misappropriated funds after the deceased’s death. The fifth ground was not pressed and the sixth related only to the second appellant, Australia’s Best Tyres Pty Ltd, which is now in liquidation and did not press its appeal.

6. On the first day of the hearing of the appeal there was also scheduled for hearing a Notice of Motion filed by the executor and originally returnable on 13 November 2017, with an amended version filed on 11 December 2020, seeking orders, inter alia, that the appeal be struck out as incompetent and that Mr Yesilhat pay the executor’s costs of the motion and appeal on the indemnity basis. The terms of the motion indicate that the claim that the appeal was incompetent was based upon allegations to the effect that the appeal was hopeless. An appeal is not incompetent simply because it is hopeless. But in any event, for the reasons that appear below, whilst not well-founded, the appeal was not hopeless. Moreover, no argument was put to the Court to support the claims for indemnity costs. In these circumstances, the notice of motion should be dismissed with costs.

7. I note at the outset that, for the reasons given below, I have concluded that the second and third grounds of appeal should be rejected (as well as the fourth). The effect of this is that Mr Yesilhat’s challenge to the primary judge’s finding that Mr Yesilhat was not eligible to make a claim for provision under the Succession Act fails. He does not therefore have standing as a person actually or potentially interested in the distribution of the estate to challenge (as he seeks to do by his first ground of appeal) the primary judge’s refusal to revoke the 5 December 2013 grant of probate in common form of the informal will. As there has been no other challenge to it, that grant must stand and the first ground of appeal must be rejected. It would be undesirable in these circumstances for this Court to make obiter observations concerning the will which, if they accepted Mr Yesilhat’s submissions, might be construed as casting doubt on the now unchallenged validity of the will.

MR YESILHAT’S CASE AT FIRST INSTANCE

8. Mr Yesilhat’s case as summarised by the primary judge was in essence as follows.

9. Mr Yesilhat was born in 1982 and is of Turkish descent. He was married in his early 20s but said that he realised at an early age that his sexual orientation was towards men. He said that same-sex attractions were repressed by his family and cultural background.

10. He met the deceased in 1999 when the deceased, who was a qualified pharmacist, was operating a pharmacy in Leppington in Sydney, as he had done since the late 1980s. Mr Yesilhat said that in the first two years after their meeting he and the deceased spent about three or four days a week together at the pharmacy after work, for anywhere between three to five hours on each of those days. Mr Yesilhat was then living at his parent’s home. He said that he and the deceased commenced a personal and intimate same-sex relationship, including a sexual relationship, by 2001, and that it was conducted entirely in secret and exclusively at the pharmacy. He knew that the deceased had two nieces but the deceased told him that he hardly ever saw them.

11. His Honour’s summary continued:

“[71] Mr Yesilhat says that the deceased would normally have dinner with him and that either the deceased or he would cook, or indeed they would cook together. Occasionally too Mr Yesilhat says that he would bring food into the pharmacy from outside and they would sit and have dinner together. Mr Yesilhat says that he would help the deceased to do the pharmacy books, stock shelves in the pharmacy and generally talk about life and how difficult it was.

[72] Mr Yesilhat says that his physical intimacy with George was very close and that George let Mr Yesilhat attend: to shaving George; to applying ointments and creams to George’s skin and to aspects of George’s personal grooming.”

12. Mr Yesilhat said the deceased was like a father to him and told him that he was the “closest thing [he had] to a son”. He said that the deceased gave him advice and cash gifts, and that their sexual relationship continued.

13. After his first marriage commenced in 2004 Mr Yesilhat was able to see the deceased less but visited him at the pharmacy on average two to three times a week, spending up to five hours with him, into the early hours of the morning. He said that the deceased would spend most of his time at work and “would sometimes go home to Stanmore [sic] and sleep for a few hours and then drive back to work but he really lived his life at the pharmacy and on many occasions he would sleep at work”. Mr Yesilhat’s reference to “Stanmore” was a mistaken reference to the home that the deceased owned at Strathfield which had been in his family for many years. Mr Yesilhat made a similar mistake when he referred to a number of properties that the deceased owned but said “the Stanmore [sic] property … was the one he lived in”.

14. Mr Yesilhat said that in the second half of 2007, when his marriage to his first wife was failing, the deceased supported his enrolment in the Police Academy, from which he subsequently graduated. Whilst working as a police officer, Mr Yesilhat also found secondary employment as a manager at a business named Australia’s Best Tyres. When Mr Yesilhat indicated to the deceased in early 2011 that he and his brother (Gokan Yesilhat) were interested in purchasing the business, the deceased gave him cheques totalling $140,000 ($130,000 of which was for the deposit, the total purchase price being $750,000). Mr Yesilhat deposed in this context to the following conversation with the deceased, which he said occurred shortly after he took possession of the business in mid 2011:

“George Don’t worry about [where you are going to get the money to buy the stock]. I told you that I would make sure that you had enough money to run the business and you have money to build up the business. What I am going to do, is that I am going to give you access to some of my accounts so that when you need to pay for stock, you will be able to pay for that stock with money I have in my account and they can be linked to your account.

Okan How am I going to do that?

George I will go to the Bank and sort out the authorities and put you down to have authority to draw money from my accounts as and when you need it. These are the passwords and Client numbers.”

15. Mr Yesilhat said that as a result of this conversation the deceased supplied him with passwords and login details for his bank accounts and also a signed authority dated 1 August 2011 to operate two specific accounts, whose numbers had the final four digits of 2401 and 2428. These were two of the pharmacy overdraft accounts. Also at about this time, on 18 July 2011, the deceased arranged for three of his personal bank accounts (with the final four digits of 7244, 5559 and 9317) to be linked via his “NetBank” account (the Commonwealth Bank’s internet banking facility) to Mr Yesilhat’s NetBank account. The linkage allowed Mr Yesilhat to make payments to and from, and view the transaction histories and account balances of, the linked accounts. Over the next two years there were multiple substantial funds transfers between the deceased’s and Mr Yesilhat’s accounts.

16. Mr Yesilhat said that in about July 2012 the deceased suggested to him that the tyre business should import tyres rather than buying them locally. Mr Yesilhat then sought to do that and said that the deceased assisted by allowing Mr Yesilhat to “just order it [a full container of tyres] and take whatever we need[ed] out of the account”.

17. As to the deceased’s bank accounts, the primary judge said:

“Finally, Mr Yesilhat says that he continued to use George’s [the deceased’s] CBA accounts with George’s consent, ‘like a running account’ in which he would deposit money and take it out and that George never raised any issue about the use of those funds and George never discussed that the funds ‘were to be repaid’ or ‘were a loan’ or that he ‘had any obligation to repay the monies at any time’.”

18. In the meantime Mr Yesilhat re-married in 2011, after meeting his second wife in 2009. He said that his secret same-sex relationship with the deceased however subsisted until the deceased’s death.

19. Following the deceased’s death on 13 August 2013 but at a time of day at which Mr Yesilhat said that he had not yet learned of the deceased’s death, Mr Yesilhat transferred to himself further monies out of the deceased’s accounts.

20. Finally, as part of Mr Yesilhat’s case at first instance, he asserted that the informal will dated 16 October 2012 was fabricated and that Ms Calokerinos, or someone associated with her, destroyed a will the deceased made in Mr Yesilhat’s favour.

MS CALOKERINOS’ CASE AT FIRST INSTANCE

21. The key elements of Ms Calokerinos’ case as summarised by the primary judge were as follows.

22. Ms Calokerinos contended that the deceased never displayed any homosexual interests, had a number of long-term sexual relationships with women and did not have any same-sex relationship with Mr Yesilhat. She asserted that the relationship between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat was, at its highest, one of friendship and only commenced in 2007 (rather than in 1999, as Ms Yesilhat asserted) after Mr Yesilhat met the deceased through Mr Yesilhat’s first wife.

23. Ms Calokerinos asserted that transfers from the deceased’s bank accounts to Mr Yesilhat (both by cheque and electronic transfer) from about March 2011 onwards constituted loans to Mr Yesilhat the deceased expected him to repay. She also asserted that, after learning of the deceased’s death on 13 August 2013, Mr Yesilhat fraudulently misappropriated funds from the deceased’s estate.

24. Ms Calokerinos said that she and her sister, Ms Anna Sclavos-Lahana, the deceased’s other niece, had a strong and loving relationship with the deceased, who stood in place of their father on important occasions in their lives (their father having died when they were aged 3 and 5 years old respectively) and who retained close family ties with them.

25. Ms Calokerinos denied that the informal will was fabricated and said that it was found near the deceased’s bed at his home in Strathfield.

THE PRIMARY JUDGMENTS

26. It is sufficient to refer at this stage to the following aspects of the primary judgments. Other aspects are referred to later in connection with the specific grounds of appeal.

Credibility findings

27. The primary judge concluded that Mr Yesilhat “was an individual upon whom no reliance could be placed, unless his evidence was corroborated by independent evidence” and that the Court “simply cannot trust a man with Mr Yesilhat’s dishonest inventive capacity”. His Honour’s reasons for forming these views were explained over a number of pages.

28. His Honour also concluded that he should approach the evidence of Mr Allen Middlebrook, the deceased’s accountant, “with great circumspection”. His Honour found that some parts of the evidence of Mr Yesilhat’s brother, Gokan, were quite credible whilst other parts were not and that he was not an objective witness.

29. His Honour found that Ms Cleopatra Calokerinos, the executor, was “both an honest and reliable witness” and there was “no substance whatsoever in any of the allegations of fraud or dishonesty against her”. His Honour “wholly accepted” her evidence and also took a favourable view of that of Ms Calokerinos’s sister, Ms Anna Sclavos-Lahana.

30. In material respects his Honour also accepted the evidence of a number of witnesses as follows who gave evidence concerning the deceased’s presence and conduct at his pharmacy in Leppington:

1. Mr Gino Elasi and Mr John Elasi, brothers who operated a takeaway and newspaper store nearby. Gino was also the landlord of the deceased’s pharmacy.

2. Mr Salman “Sam” Cameron who worked part-time at the pharmacy.

3. Ms Boguslava Wosik who worked for the deceased, at first as a sales assistant at the pharmacy and later as the deceased’s bookkeeper.

4. Ms Leanne Vassallo who operated a nearby hairdressing salon.

5. Mr Jason Loader who operated a nearby butcher shop.

6. Ms Danijela Dacic who was a young retail assistant and later manager at the pharmacy.

7. Mr Silvio Torrisi who was a long-standing friend of the deceased and worked for him part-time at the pharmacy.

31. His Honour also viewed favourably the evidence of Mr Charles Versace who was the vendor of the Australia’s Best Tyres business to the Yesilhat brothers, and of Mr Ivor Wall who was a car repairer and performed some repairs on the deceased’s car.

The challenge to the informal will

32. As explained in [7] above, it is unnecessary and inappropriate for this Court to address Mr Yesilhat’s challenge to his Honour’s finding regarding the informal will in light of this Court’s finding, which I propose be made, that Mr Yesilhat had no standing to make that challenge. It is sufficient to say that the challenge was an arguable one based principally on the evidence of an expert document examiner, Ms Michelle Novotny, who found that the deceased’s signature was placed on the relevant document before his name was typed on it.

The family provision proceedings

33. The following provisions of the Succession Act are relevant to this issue.

3   Definitions

(1)  In this Act—

…

close personal relationship is defined in subsection (3).

…

eligible person means a person who may make an application for a family provision order under section 57.

…

(3)  For the purposes of this Act, a close personal relationship is a close relationship (other than a marriage or a de facto relationship) between two adult persons, whether or not related by family, who are living together, one or each of whom provides the other with domestic support and personal care.

(4)  For the purposes of subsection (3), a close personal relationship is taken not to exist between two persons where one of them provides the other with domestic support and personal care—

(a)  for fee or reward, or

(b)  on behalf of another person or an organisation (including a government or government agency, a body corporate or a charitable or benevolent organisation).

…

57   Eligible persons (cf FPA 6 (1), definition of “eligible person”)

(1)  The following are eligible persons who may apply to the Court for a family provision order in respect of the estate of a deceased person—

(a)  a person who was the spouse [the earlier legislative description said “wife or husband”] of the deceased person at the time of the deceased person’s death,

(b)  a person with whom the deceased person was living in a de facto relationship at the time of the deceased person’s death,

(c)  a child of the deceased person,

(d)  a former spouse of the deceased person,

(e)  a person—

(i)  who was, at any particular time, wholly or partly dependent on the deceased person, and

(ii)  who is a grandchild of the deceased person or was, at that particular time or at any other time, a member of the household of which the deceased person was a member,

(f)  a person with whom the deceased person was living in a close personal relationship at the time of the deceased person’s death.

Note—

Section 60 sets out the matters that the Court may consider when determining whether to make a family provision order, and the nature of any such order. An application may be made by a tutor (within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Act 2005) for an eligible person who is under legal incapacity.

Note—

“De facto relationship” is defined in section 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987.

…

59   When family provision order may be made (cf FPA 7–9)

(1)  The Court may, on application under Division 1, make a family provision order in relation to the estate of a deceased person, if the Court is satisfied that—

(a)  the person in whose favour the order is to be made is an eligible person, and

(b)  in the case of a person who is an eligible person by reason only of paragraph (d), (e) or (f) of the definition of eligible personin section 57—having regard to all the circumstances of the case (whether past or present) there are factors which warrant the making of the application, and

(c)  at the time when the Court is considering the application, adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of the person in whose favour the order is to be made has not been made by the will of the deceased person, or by the operation of the intestacy rules in relation to the estate of the deceased person, or both.

(2)  The Court may make such order for provision out of the estate of the deceased person as the Court thinks ought to be made for the maintenance, education or advancement in life of the eligible person, having regard to the facts known to the Court at the time the order is made.

Note—

Property that may be the subject of a family provision order is set out in Division 3. This Part applies to property, including property that is designated as notional estate (see section 73). Part 3.3 sets out property that may be designated as part of the notional estate of a deceased person for the purpose of making a family provision order.

(3)  The Court may make a family provision order in favour of an eligible person in whose favour a family provision order has previously been made in relation to the same estate only if—

(a)  the Court is satisfied that there has been a substantial detrimental change in the eligible person’s circumstances since a family provision order was last made in favour of the person, or

(b)  at the time that a family provision order was last made in favour of the eligible person—

(i)  the evidence about the nature and extent of the deceased person’s estate (including any property that was, or could have been, designated as notional estate of the deceased person) did not reveal the existence of certain property (the undisclosed property), and

(ii)  the Court would have considered the deceased person’s estate (including any property that was, or could have been, designated as notional estate of the deceased person) to be substantially greater in value if the evidence had revealed the existence of the undisclosed property, and

(iii)  the Court would not have made the previous family provision order if the evidence had revealed the existence of the undisclosed property.

(4)  The Court may make a family provision order in favour of an eligible person whose application for a family provision order in relation to the same estate was previously refused only if, at the time of refusal, there existed all the circumstances regarding undisclosed property described in subsection (3) (b).

34. The following provisions of s 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) are also relevant.

21C   References to de facto partners and de facto relationships

…

(2) Meaning of “de facto relationship’” For the purposes of any Act or instrument, a person is in a de facto relationship with another person if—

(a)  they have a relationship as a couple living together, and

(b)  they are not married to one another or related by family.

A de facto relationship can exist even if one of the persons is legally married to someone else or in a registered relationship or interstate registered relationship with someone else.

(3) Determination of “relationship as a couple” In determining whether 2 persons have a relationship as a couple for the purposes of subsection (2), all the circumstances of the relationship are to be taken into account, including any of the following matters that are relevant in a particular case—

(a)  the duration of the relationship,

(b)  the nature and extent of their common residence,

(c)  whether a sexual relationship exists,

(d)  the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them,

(e)  the ownership, use and acquisition of property,

(f)  the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life,

(g)  the care and support of children,

(h)  the performance of household duties,

(i)  the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.

No particular finding in relation to any of those matters is necessary in determining whether 2 persons have a relationship as a couple.

35. His Honour noted that Mr Yesilhat claimed that he was an “eligible person” by reason of (b) (de facto relationship), (e) (dependent household member) and (f) (close personal relationship) of s 57(1) of the Succession Act.

36. Having referred to relevant case authority, his Honour addressed as follows the non-exhaustive list of indicia of a de facto relationship set out in s 21C(3) of the Interpretation Act and found that no such relationship existed between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat and that they were not residing together (or, in the language of s 57(1)(b), “living” in such a relationship):

“[750] Conclusions on De Facto Relationship. Mr Yesilhat has not established that he was in a de facto relationship with the deceased. His case is incapable of making out almost every one of the indicia of a de facto relationship. The narrative of findings above provides the overall factual basis for this conclusion. But in summary the following may be said by reference to the main indicia.

[751] The deceased and Mr Yesilhat did not have common residence. He was a regular visitor to the pharmacy, mainly in the evenings. But I do not accept he in any sense resided with George at the pharmacy. And George did not use it as a residence. Mr Yesilhat was not there often enough for it to be a common residence.   

[752] I do not believe Mr Yesilhat’s evidence that he had a sexual relationship with George.

[753] There was a high degree of financial inter-dependence between George and Mr Yesilhat, especially after March 2011. But this inter-dependence is explained by the existence of informal commercial arrangements between an older man and a younger friend where for the sake of convenience and because the older trusted the younger, the older man gave bank account linkages and other confidential information to the younger man to allow the younger to transfer and then repay funds. To more cautious individuals than the deceased this would seem imprudent. But the deceased was both generous and trusting. He conducted all his affairs with that attitude. But there was not here the financial inter-dependence to be expected of a de facto couple. And there is scanty evidence of their getting food and other small discretionary items for one another out of common funds.

[754] The advances George made provided some financial support for Mr Yesilhat. But support was really limited to giving Mr Yesilhat loans on less than fully commercial terms. The deceased was really someone in a position of a subordinated lender to the small business, Australia’s Best Tyres, rather than a broader financial supporter of Mr Yesilhat’s personal and business life.

[755] The case is remarkable for the lack of common property between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat. The deceased kept his own motor vehicles, decided how to service and care for them himself, kept the pharmacy, real estate and all his accounts in his own name, never opened a joint account with Mr Yesilhat, and did not seek to take a joint interest in any property with Mr Yesilhat, as he did with Ms Anne Sklavos [a girlfriend of the deceased]. The argument from any joint property and financial arrangement as a foundation for inferring a future life together for the pair is substantially absent in this case. The mere sharing of passwords and NetBank access through the CBA is principally consistent here with an arrangement of convenience. The deceased did not take any interest in Australia’s Best Tyres. He was a mere unsecured lender to the business.

[756] Mr Yesilhat was married to other people for the last nine years of George’s life. By his marriages, Mr Yesilhat had publicly declared a mutual commitment to a shared life with two women. It is difficult to infer from any of Mr Yesilhat’s and George’s interactions, that they had any mutual commitment to a shared life.

[757] George and Mr Yesilhat neither cared for nor supported children nor discussed the possibility of having children. This was not part of their world.

[758] The absence of performance of household duties is a curiosity in this case. Mr Yesilhat did not offer to help to clean up the Strathfield property. Nor did he regularly supply services such as laundry, clothes purchases, the acquisition of food items or other personal inventory for George; nor indeed did George for him. Mr Yesilhat did not clean, tidy up or buy furniture or other accoutrements for their supposed residence in the dispensary area of the pharmacy.

[759] Finally, this alleged relationship was totally secret from everyone except its alleged parties. It was first revealed only in correspondence after George’s death. There was no reputational or public aspect to the relationship at all.

[760] In my view the interaction between George Sclavos and Okan Yesilhat did not at any time qualify as a ‘de facto relationship’; nor were they ‘de facto partners’ within the Interpretation Act, s 21C.”

37. His Honour then concluded that Mr Yesilhat was not an “eligible person” by reason of s 57(1)(e), both because he did not establish dependency on the deceased and because he was not a member of the deceased’s household:

“[765] The question of whether an applicant was a member of the deceased’s household is, as was expressed by Young J in Markulin v Drew (1993) DFC 95-140, ‘a question of fact in each case’. In Kingsland v McIndoe [1989] VR 273, Gobbo J stated that the concept of membership of a household connoted a degree of continuity and permanency of living arrangements and a form of special familial relationship.

[766] In Benney v Jones (1991) 23 NSWLR 559, Young J found that the requirement to be a member of the same household did not mean that the applicant must have been a member of the deceased’s household at the time of his death, but rather, it had to be shown that at some time both the deceased and the applicant were members of the same household.

[767] Mr Yesilhat fails on this ground. He was never part of the deceased’s household. He does not qualify under Succession Act, s 57(1)(e).

[768] The pharmacy dispensary area was not a ‘household’ that Mr Yesilhat ‘shared’ with the deceased. Neither of them tended it, lived in it or treated it like a household which these two individuals shared.

[769] The video taken of the area in about 2010 … shows it exactly as it is: a pharmacy dispensary area occupied primarily for business purposes by a business proprietor and some associates.

[770] Nor does Mr Yesilhat establish dependency within Succession Act, s 57(1)(e). The financial relations between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat were ultimately commercial, although less rigorous than most commercial relations. The proper analysis here is that George provided to Mr Yesilhat fairly relaxed but nevertheless commercial loan support for a period after March 2011 for special purposes associated with Australia’s Best Tyres. But this did not amount to Succession Act, s 57(1)(e) dependency in my view.”

38. The primary judge also found that Mr Yesilhat had not brought himself within s 57(1)(f) by establishing that he had been living in a “close personal relationship” with the deceased, concluding:

“[776] Mr Yesilhat is not eligible under Succession Act, s 57(1)(f) to make a claim for family provision. For the reasons stated under the earlier grounds of claimed eligibility he and the deceased were not ‘living together’. Nor were they in a ‘close personal relationship’. They had a friendship with some fairly informal commercial elements to it but that was all.”

The debt/trust claims

Money paid to Mr Yesilhat before the day of the deceased’s death

39. Having earlier made more detailed findings, to some of which I will refer below when considering the grounds of appeal, his Honour stated the following conclusions:

“[787] The Court’s overall conclusions in the debt/trust proceedings may be shortly stated. The narrative of findings shows that the monies the deceased advanced to Mr Yesilhat before his death were loans. But the deceased was well aware of these advances and he agreed to make them to Mr Yesilhat. I find no basis to conclude that Mr Yesilhat went behind the deceased’s back and fraudulently procured account linkages and passwords to use the deceased’s accounts and authority to operate on those accounts, without the deceased’s knowledge. It is impossible to accept that the deceased was unaware that Mr Yesilhat was able to use the account linkage between July 2011 and July 2013. The deceased would almost certainly have become aware of the linkages. Accordingly, the estate is in a position to recover the monies the deceased advanced to Mr Yesilhat before 13 August 2013, less the repayments Mr Yesilhat made as loans due to the estate.”

40. His Honour then acknowledged that the executor bore the onus of proving that the payments made were loans not gifts (see Heydon v The Perpetual Executors, Trustees and Agency Company (W.A.) Limited (1930) 45 CLR 111; [1930] HCA 26) and continued:

“[792] In my view this is a case where the deceased’s estate has established on the balance of probabilities that all monies paid prior to the date of George’s death were loans and not gifts. The executrix establishes that [through] the many different indications that the Court has examined in the factual narrative that the advances were loans. Principal among the findings are: the October 2012 informal will which is inconsistent with the deceased having a domestic relationship with Mr Yesilhat; conversations between the deceased and third parties where he indicated they were loans; conversations between Mr Yesilhat and Ms Sclavos-Lahana and her husband in which he did not dispute that loans had been advanced; the pattern of regular repayments commencing shortly before the deceased’s death, which is a strong indicator of the repayment of a loan; and, overall the fact that the deceased was sloppy about his financial affairs with many people did not mean that he was giving money away to Mr Yesilhat. All of this is in the context that the Court accepts none of Mr Yesilhat’s evidence on which he relies to assert that these monies were gifts. The onus lies on the estate but in my view it has been discharged. In the circumstances the estate can recover all the monies proven to be advanced to Mr Yesilhat or Australia’s Best Tyres before the deceased’s death, less the monies that were repaid to the deceased.”

Money paid on and after the day of the deceased’s death

41. Having earlier found that Mr Yesilhat knew the deceased was dead when Mr Yesilhat transferred these moneys from the deceased’s bank accounts, the primary judge stated the following conclusions:

“[794] … The Court has found that Mr Yesilhat transferred all the funds on 13 August 2013 and on the separate occasions thereafter knowing the deceased was dead. In my view Mr Yesilhat could not have had any genuine belief that he had any legitimate authority to transfer those funds when he did. I do not accept he was ever told by the deceased that a will was made in his favour or that he would be the deceased’s executor. Nor did Mr Yesilhat apart from these transactions behave as though he had any authority over the deceased’s estate.

[795] The money so transferred was in my view fraudulently transferred from the estate of the deceased. In these circumstances an institutional constructive trust will ordinarily be implied in the estate’s favour in respect of the monies so transferred.”

Findings and orders regarding repayment

42. In his second judgment (of 22 May 2019: [2019] NSWSC 584) his Honour found that to the extent that money that Mr Yesilhat paid out of the deceased’s assets prior to the deceased’s death was received by Australia’s Best Tyres, and had not been repaid, that company was liable in restitution to repay the money to the estate. His Honour directed calculations to be made of the amounts so received by the company and of other drawings by Mr Yesilhat that were retained by or otherwise applied by him. By his third judgment (of 13 December 2019: [2019] NSWSC 1752) his Honour directed that further calculations be made and by the fourth judgment (of 11 August 2020: [2020] NSWSC 1044) his Honour directed the entry of judgments in the debt/trust proceedings against Mr Yesilhat in the sum of $123,600 and against Australia’s Best Tyres Pty Ltd in the sum of $95,355. As I have noted, that company did not pursue its appeal against the judgment awarded against it. These amounts did not include the $206,500 which Mr Yesilhat was found to have removed fraudulently from the deceased’s accounts between 13 August 2013 and 9 September 2013. This sum was repaid to the estate at the direction of the primary judge but is the subject of the fourth ground of the appeal.

DISPOSITION OF THE APPEAL

FIRST GROUND OF APPEAL: CHALLENGE TO THE WILL

43. For the reasons given in [7] and [32] above, this ground should be rejected on the basis of Mr Yesilhat’s absence of standing to advance it. It will therefore not otherwise be addressed.

SECOND GROUND OF APPEAL: WHETHER FINDINGS “GLARINGLY IMPROBABLE”

44. Mr Yesilhat’s case on appeal recognised that the primary judge’s findings as to the nature of the relationship between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat and as to the character of the payments made to Mr Yesilhat, as well as most if not all of the subsidiary findings, were “likely to have been affected by impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses formed by the trial judge as a result of seeing and hearing them give their evidence” (Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; [2019] HCA 28 at [55]) and that in these circumstances his success on appeal required him to surmount a high hurdle. As stated in Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22 at [28]-[29], and as summarised in Lee v Lee at [55], in order to succeed on appeal it was necessary for Mr Yesilhat to establish that the primary judge’s findings were “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences”. As noted earlier, to this end Mr Yesilhat identified eight matters that he said established this. They are addressed seriatim as follows.

First Matter: access to bank accounts

45. Mr Yesilhat submitted in relation to this matter that:

1. the primary judge “accepted that George linked 3 of his bank accounts to Okan’s and otherwise gave Okan unfettered access to all his other accounts via a signed Authority. That unfettered access continued for a period of 2 years”.

2. Mr Yesilhat’s transfers over the two year period exhibited “no pattern”, indicating that the accounts were to be treated as his own.

3. “This merger of finances was the hallmark of a de facto relationship and/or a close personal one” and indicated that the primary judge “erred in holding [that] the merging of the bank accounts indicated a debtor/creditor relationship and [that] the amounts were thus loans”.

4. if the deceased had intended the payments to be loans, he would have obtained security, or an interest in the business.

46. As the executor pointed out, the deceased did not however give Mr Yesilhat “unfettered access to all his other accounts via a signed Authority” because the signed authority related only to two of his accounts and the deceased had a number of accounts apart from these and the three linked accounts. Nevertheless, consistent with Mr Yesilhat’s submissions, there was no effective limit on Mr Yesilhat’s access to the deceased’s accounts because the deceased also gave him his bank passwords and login numbers.

Relevance to the Succession Act claim

47. When considering whether the relationship between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat was such that Mr Yesilhat was an “eligible person” for the purposes of his Succession Act claim, the primary judge did not overlook the matter presently relied upon, namely that Mr Yesilhat had access to the deceased’s bank accounts in the last two years of the deceased’s life and that that access was utilised extensively. In that context, his Honour described the relationship as involving “a high degree of financial interdependence” (Judgment at [753] quoted in [36] above).

48. There was no error in his Honour treating that financial interdependence, although relevant, as not decisive in determining the nature of the personal relationship between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat. Its existence did not render his Honour’s findings concerning that relationship “glaringly improbable”. On the contrary, as I indicate when addressing the third ground of appeal, in light of his Honour’s rejection of Mr Yesilhat’s evidence his Honour’s conclusion as to the nature of the relationship accorded with the evidence before him. No general challenge to the rejection of that evidence is made on appeal. Certainly Mr Yesilhat contends on appeal that findings should be made consistent with his evidence but he does not contend that the simple path to that result is acceptance (contrary to the primary judge’s finding) that he was a credible and reliable witnesses. Of necessity, he points to the other evidence in the case to attempt to achieve that result.

Relevance to the characterisation of the payments made to Mr Yesilhat

49. The existence of the financial links between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat did not of themselves establish that his Honour’s characterisation of payments to Mr Yesilhat as loans rather than gifts was “highly improbable”. At least implicitly involved in Mr Yesilhat’s submissions on appeal was however also the broader proposition that, taking the evidence as a whole, the primary judge’s finding that the payments were loans rather than gifts was erroneous, whether or not highly improbable. It is therefore necessary to address that broader proposition as follows.

50. As indicated in his conclusions on this issue ([792] quoted in [40] above), the primary judge relied in his reasoning, inter alia, on evidence of conversations between the deceased and others, on conversations between Mr Yesilhat and others, and on “the pattern of regular repayments”. On the basis that the general rejection of Mr Yesilhat’s evidence is to be accepted, these matters in my view provided a sufficient basis for his Honour’s conclusion that the executor established that the payments were loans.

51. So far as statements by the deceased were concerned, the primary judge accepted evidence from “credible independent witnesses”, namely Mr Torrisi, Mr Loader and Mr Wall (see [30]-[31] above) that the deceased had made statements to them indicative of payments to Mr Yesilhat and/or his tyre business being loans. In addition, his Honour accepted the executor’s evidence of conversations she had with the deceased to the same effect.

52. So far as statements by Mr Yesilhat were concerned, the primary judge accepted evidence of Mr Versace (see [31] above) that Mr Yesilhat indicated to him that funding provided by the deceased in relation to the tyre business constituted loans. His Honour also accepted evidence of Ms Sclavos-Lahana that during a conversation with Mr Yesilhat in April 2013, she said to him, “Uncle George told us that he has lent you a lot of money to help you start in business” and that Mr Yesilhat did not deny or contest her statement.

53. In relation to the “pattern of regular repayments”, the primary judge referred to evidence that Mr Yesilhat made substantial repayments to the deceased’s accounts from October 2011 to July 2013 totalling approximately $82,000 (this amount was later increased in his Honour’s fourth judgment after the parties found more repayments). From April 2013 to July 2013, the repayments were in regular instalments of $2,500 and were made from Australia’s Best Tyres’ account. One repayment (of $5,000 from Australia’s Best Tyres’ account on 10 January 2013) had the notation “pay back george ty”. Repayments prior to 2013 were made from Mr Yesilhat’s personal account. His Honour found that the repayments were “not compatible with the original advances being gifts not loans”.

54. The evidence thus indicated that, at different times, repayments were made by both Mr Yesilhat and the business. That funds were repaid tended to contradict Mr Yesilhat’s evidence that none of the payments to him or the business were loans and the fact that repayments came from both sources supported his Honour’s conclusions that there was no basis for distinguishing between payments Mr Yesilhat procured for the business and for himself, and that all the payments were therefore intended to be repaid.

Second Matter: Mr Middlebrook’s evidence

55. At first instance Mr Yesilhat read two affidavits of Mr Allen Middlebrook who was the deceased’s accountant for many years. Mr Middlebrook gave evidence that the deceased told him that Mr Yesilhat had “full access” to the deceased’s bank accounts and that he was “giving” money to Mr Yesilhat for the tyre business, that “any deposits by Sam [Mr Yesilhat] are not to be included in my returns” and that the deceased said that he had promised to look after Mr Yesilhat. Mr Middlebrook also said that the deceased “spent most of his time at the pharmacy” and “slept at the pharmacy” and described Mr Yesilhat as “like a son to me”.

56. The primary judge saw and heard Mr Middlebrook cross-examined and did not overlook his evidence. Rather, his Honour effectively rejected it. His Honour said that “[o]n the whole, Mr Middlebrook’s evidence about the deceased on any subject was unsatisfactory. The Court gave it limited weight and prefers Ms Calokerinos’ version of their communications”. Having referred to the executor’s termination of Mr Middlebrook’s services as the estate’s accountant, which would have provided a reason for Mr Middlebrook to be ill-disposed to Ms Calokerinos, the primary judge stated that he approached Mr Middlebrook’s evidence with “great circumspection”. His Honour said that Mr Middlebrook had a poor memory and “presented as strangely emotionally labile”. His Honour then identified unsatisfactory and unusual aspects of Mr Middlebrook’s evidence.

57. In his Notice of Appeal Mr Yesilhat contended that the primary judge erred in “not giving proper weight” to Mr Middlebrook’s evidence. However for the reasons that his Honour adequately explained, he did not find Mr Middlebrook’s evidence satisfactory. Mr Yesilhat was unable to point to any matter that rendered this credit-based rejection of Mr Middlebrook’s evidence “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences” (see [44] above).

Third Matter: the executor’s evidence

58. There was evidence before the primary judge as to whether the deceased, although not at any time married, had any long-term de facto relationships. The parties accepted that he had a long-term relationship with Ms Anne Sklavos (from about the early 1980s to the early 1990s) but there was a dispute as to whether he had had a later relationship with Ms Elizabeth (Liz) Curtis (from about 2005 to 2008). Ultimately his Honour found, consistently with evidence given by Ms Calokerinos, that he did and that Ms Curtis lived with him at the Strathfield property “for a few years”.

59. In so finding, his Honour said that Ms Calokerinos “inferred this relationship [between the deceased and Ms Curtis] from paperwork and handwritten notes she found amongst the deceased’s belongings mentioning the name of Ms Curtis and showing Strathfield as her home address” and that Ms Calokerinos “could not herself directly judge the nature of the deceased’s relationship with Ms Curtis” as she never saw them together.

60. On appeal Mr Yesilhat contended that in making favourable findings as to Ms Calokerinos’ evidence in the proceedings, his Honour failed to take into account cross-examination of Ms Calokerinos to the effect that in earlier proceedings she had given evidence concerning the deceased’s relationships with women which was different to that which she gave in the present proceedings. This was however but one of many topics about which Ms Calokerinos was cross-examined in the course of a lengthy cross-examination extending over some 240 pages of transcript and his Honour was well aware of it because, not only did he hear it, he himself asked Ms Calokerinos a number of questions on that topic.

61. In his written submissions on appeal Mr Yesilhat contended that the primary judge “gave no weight whatever to the inconsistencies” in Ms Calokerinos’ evidence on this topic. In the course of writing his principal judgment, already comprising some 200 pages, his Honour was not however obliged to extend it and mention every point that was raised in cross-examination, particularly one, such as this, that was at the periphery of the issues to be determined. As a result, I do not infer from the absence of mention of it that his Honour did not take proper account of the point in his overall assessment of Ms Calokerinos’ evidence. Mr Yesilhat has accordingly not identified any error in respect of the Third Matter.

Fourth Matter: the deceased’s loan card system

62. A number of witnesses gave evidence before the primary judge that the deceased maintained a loan card recording system when he made loans to a third party, which he did from time to time. Mr Yesilhat submitted on appeal that it was significant that no loans to him appeared in the deceased’s loan card system, and that there was no other record of the loans or of any security taken by the deceased for their repayment.

63. In rejecting argument put at first instance the primary judge concluded that the point did not “detract from Ms Calokerinos’ case that Mr Yesilhat’s accounts were loans”. His Honour gave a number of reasons for that conclusion, including the following referring specifically to the loan card system.

64. First, the deceased did not need to include the transactions in his loan cards because he had a complete record of them through his banking records and statements.

65. Secondly, the amounts passing between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat were “far larger than anything recorded in George’s loan card system”, indicating that there was no departure from that system.

66. Thirdly, the evidence about how the deceased kept the system was not “sufficiently direct or reliable for it to be inferred that every loan was always recorded in the system…”.

67. His Honour thus did not overlook the loan card system and the absence of any formal loan documentation but instead referred to the loan card system and decided that for identified reasons it was not of significance in the circumstances of the case. As a result, Mr Yesilhat did not identify any error arising out of the Fourth Matter he relied on.

Fifth Matter: the deceased’s diaries

68. Over many years, the deceased made daily diary entries in a cryptic form that was largely unintelligible to others. Many of the entries are in the Greek language.

69. Mr Yesilhat argued at first instance and on appeal that there were over 1,000 uses in the diaries of the letter “S”, either alone or in conjunction with other abbreviations (for example, “S.SHVE”, “S.PZA” and “TV.S”). He submitted that these should be inferred to be references to him (as he was often called Sam) and that they were in many instances records of activities of which Mr Yesilhat gave evidence: for example Mr Yesilhat gave evidence that “he routinely shaved George, ate pizza with him, watched TV with him and reviewed banking statements”.

70. The primary judge gave a number of reasons for finding the diaries to be “of limited use in resolving the matters in issue”. As the respondent submitted on appeal consistently with this finding, whether the diaries indicated what Mr Yesilhat contended is purely a matter of conjecture. Mr Yesilhat was not able to link entries in the diary to any specific events or other matters that would prove that he was referred to in the diaries by the letter “S”. In fact the contrary inference appears from an entry made by the deceased under the heading “Notes” for June 2006 that “S ≡ Strath”, clearly indicating that “S”, at least at that time, was used to refer to Strathfield, where the deceased lived. Moreover, as the primary judge pointed out, Mr Yesilhat was specifically referred to in the diaries by the name “Okan” (or “OKN”) on a number of occasions from 2007 but not before. In addition, on appeal Mr Yesilhat’s counsel was unable to explain entries which, on his interpretation, would indicate that he was in Sydney at a time (October to November 2011) when the other evidence indicated that Mr Yesilhat was overseas.

71. For these reasons, it must be concluded that Mr Yesilhat did not establish any error arising out of the Fifth Matter upon which he relied.

Sixth Matter: telephone records

72. Mr Yesilhat’s first submission on appeal concerning the telephone records was as follows:

“Telephone Records: first, the Telstra records (period limited to 2011-2013 under Order made 28 April 2016) demonstrate a pattern of contact that was inconsistent with a customer or debtor relationship, bearing in mind Okan’s evidence was that he attended the pharmacy regularly 3-4 times a week, even after his 2 marriage; and that nothing changed in their relationship. There are just under 250 mobile contacts over that 2 year period. That is an average of about 2.5 calls a week between 2 people who, on Okan’s evidence, were not phone people but who had regular face to face contact at the pharmacy… Again, that is indicative of a close and intimate relationship and not any debtor/lender relationship.”

73. The primary judge’s response as follows to this argument was well open to him to give:

“[346] But the pattern of phone calls does not show daily contact or contact every second day or for periods of time even contact at least once a week. In my view the overall pattern of telephone communication is more consistent with a friendship between the deceased and Mr Yesilhat and in which the deceased had lent Mr Yesilhat a substantial amount of money to help launch Mr Yesilhat’s business and was taking a long-term interest in how the business was going and whether the deceased would ultimately get his money back.”

74. The inability of the telephone records to indicate, as Mr Yesilhat contended, that there was “a close and intimate relationship and not any debtor/lender relationship” between the deceased and him was demonstrated by the executor in oral argument on appeal. She pointed out that many of the calls (out of the 250 calls or text messages) were of virtually no length, suggesting they were no more than messages to call back or the like. Moreover, many of the calls were grouped around the time at which the tyre business was purchased. For example, on 30 June 2011, which was the day before settlement of the purchase of the tyre business, there were seven phone contacts (five calls and two text messages) between Mr Yesilhat and the deceased. At other times, weeks went by without any telephone contact between the two.

74. For these reasons, Mr Yesilhat did not establish that the first way in which he relied on the telephone records assisted his appeal. The second way relates to the fourth ground of appeal and is dealt with where that ground is addressed below.

Seventh Matter: the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses

76. The first category of evidence given by the respondent’s witnesses to which this aspect of Mr Yesilhat’s Notice of Appeal refers concerned proof of the validity of the informal will, a matter which I have indicated it is unnecessary to address.

77. The second category of evidence comprised evidence which Mr Yesilhat alleged was to the following effect and corroborated his evidence:

1. Mr Lahana (who is married to the executor’s sister) said in evidence that the Strathfield property was like a storeroom and that the deceased slept at the pharmacy “even though there were no beds there”.

2. Mr Torrisi gave evidence that Mr Yesilhat was a regular visitor to the pharmacy and would stay there until the “early hours of the morning”.

3. The deceased did not bring any girlfriend or other companion to family occasions such as his nieces’ weddings.

4. The deceased wrote a letter dated 4 October 1991 addressed to “Dear Rev”, presumably a Greek Orthodox priest or other religious person, saying that he had had the same girlfriend for 10 years but he did not love her “to the extent where I want to marry her”.

5. Various other witnesses called by the respondent (such as Mr Wall, Ms Wosik, Mr Cameron and others) gave evidence that the deceased routinely socialised at the pharmacy, and cooked, ate and slept there.

78. Using the same numbering, I refer to that evidence as follows:

1. Mr Lahana’s evidence:

1. Mr Lahana made a police statement dated 26 August 2014 in which he stated that: “[the deceased] mostly worked … well into the early mornings and in later years he would end up on some occasions sleeping in the pharmacy even though there were no beds there or even a sofa.” In the statement Mr Lahana also said that cleaning out the deceased’s kitchen after his death was a “huge task” as the deceased had “also used his kitchen as a bit of a storeroom”.

2. Mr Lahana was cross-examined at the hearing, including on the contents of his police statement and specifically his comments about the “storeroom” and the deceased sleeping at the pharmacy. He confirmed in cross-examination that the deceased had told him that “he did sleep there occasionally, when he was too tired to drive home”.

3. The primary judge did not specifically refer to this evidence but did refer to Mr Lahana’s police statement and his cross-examination on it in relation to another topic, and so was clearly aware of it. His Honour did not need to refer in his judgment to every piece of evidence, particularly when, as in the case of Mr Lahana’s evidence, it was broadly consistent with his Honour’s findings that the deceased “was a compulsive hoarder but he mainly hoarded at Strathfield”, and that “[i]n 2013 [the deceased] did begin to stay overnight at the pharmacy more” due to him being “too tired to drive”.

2. Mr Torrisi’s evidence:

1. Mr Torrisi gave evidence that he worked at the pharmacy two days a week. He said that he first met Mr Yesilhat when the deceased introduced him “two to two and [a] half years before George died”. He agreed that Mr Yesilhat was a “regular visitor” to the pharmacy “because he did come… probably once, once out of every two times that I was there”. He also agreed that the deceased and Mr Yesilhat “would stay [at the pharmacy] until the early hours of the morning if [Mr Torrisi] [was] still there”. Mr Torrisi went on to explain, when asked about the privacy of the back dispensary area of the pharmacy, that it was “very small” and visible from the street: “even if you’re sitting down your head is visible”.

2. The primary judge referred to this evidence of Mr Torrisi in saying that “according to Mr Torrisi there was no privacy available for the deceased and Mr Yesilhat at the pharmacy, so they could conduct an intimate relationship.” His Honour went on to accept that Mr Yesilhat was a regular visitor to the pharmacy (see [751] quoted in [36] above) but rejected his Succession Act claim on other grounds.

3. The evidence of Mr Torrisi that Mr Yesilhat pointed to on appeal was entirely consistent with his Honour’s findings and Mr Yesilhat did not therefore demonstrate any error in the judgment.

3. No companion at family functions:

1. Mr Yesilhat submitted on appeal that it was significant that the deceased had not taken any girlfriend or other companion to family functions. The primary judge directly addressed this evidence as follows:

“[264] Mr Yesilhat’s case was prone to over simplifying issues of George’s sexuality. He argued in final submissions that because George did not have regular live-in girlfriends in the last 10 to 15 years of his life and did not take women that he called ‘girlfriends’ to family events, that that was evidence of his same-sex interests.

[265] Such logic ignores that some people just prefer their own company, independence and privacy and are cautious about long-term intimate relationships of any kind with other people. That George’s life could have had similar characteristics to this, rather than only being explicable on some spectrum of sexual orientation was a level of discourse largely ignored in Mr Yesilhat’s case, and to a lesser extent in Ms Calokerinos’ case. But it is not difficult to discern in the evidence many such characteristics in George, and that they may quite plausibly account for much of his observed conduct, without any deep analysis of his sexuality at all.”

2. Mr Yesilhat’s argument that the primary judge did not give “proper weight” to this evidence clearly fails as his Honour did address it but found that it did not necessarily point to the deceased having same-sex interests. This was not an unreasonable conclusion.

4. The deceased’s 1991 letter to “Rev”:

1. It was accepted before the primary judge that the deceased wrote this letter and that it referred to Ms Anne Sklavos. As well as making the statements referred to in [77(4)] above, the letter said that: “[w]e both have the same sir name (sic) but we arn’t (sic) related. I feel very depressed about this point, in that if we were married, other people would think that it was incest …”. Mr Yesilhat submitted that the fact that the deceased dated a woman for 10 years but did not want to marry her “goes to the deceased’s sexuality”. The primary judge referred to this letter and the reason the deceased gave in the letter (their common surname) for his reluctance to marry Ms Sklavos and observed that “[the deceased] does not mention any struggle with his sexuality in circumstances where the communication relates to fundamental life decisions and is made to a person, who George plainly expected to keep his confidences” (at [190]).

2. The primary judge’s views concerning this letter were in my view reasonably open to him.

5. Other witnesses for the respondent:

1. There is no need to refer to this evidence in detail. None of it demonstrates that the conclusions of the primary judge that neither the deceased or Mr Yesilhat lived at the pharmacy and that they did not have a same-sex relationship are “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences”.

79. In these circumstances, it is clear that Mr Yesilhat has not established that any error arose in relation to the Seventh Matter on which he relied.

Eighth Matter: the deceased’s interests in Greek properties

80. Mr Yesilhat submitted on appeal that the primary judge failed “to give proper weight to the obvious credit issues” arising out of what occurred at interlocutory stages of the present proceedings concerning interests that the deceased held in properties in Greece. Mr Yesilhat contended that the primary judge should have treated the executor’s credibility as adversely affected by what occurred.

81. The primary judge found that the property interests were only of “nominal or nil value” and had in fact been a financial burden on the Sclavos family. After full consideration of Mr Yesilhat’s arguments the primary judge concluded that the executor’s credibility was not affected by what was put to him.

82. This matter falls into a similar category to the Third Matter referred to above. It is a matter arguably relevant to the executor’s credit but was fully addressed by his Honour, with substantial reasons being stated. Mr Yesilhat did not identify any arguable reason for finding that his Honour erred in his credit-based conclusion.

83. In these circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the Eighth Matter supports Mr Yesilhat’s appeal.

The Eight Matters generally

84. For the reasons given above none of the eight matters that Mr Yesilhat relied on to establish that findings of the primary judge were “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences” do that. Nor, I add, do they do that when looked at cumulatively.

THIRD GROUND OF APPEAL: THE SUCCESSION ACT CLAIM

85. Mr Yesilhat appealed against the primary judge’s finding that he was not an “eligible person” for the purposes of s 57 of the Succession Act on any of the three bases as follows upon which he claimed to be eligible.

Section 57(1)(b): de facto relationship

86. As recorded in [34] above, the expression “de facto relationship” is defined in s 21C(2) of the Interpretation Act to involve “a relationship as a couple living together”. Section 21C(3) requires “all the circumstances of the relationship” to be taken into account in determining whether two persons have such a relationship but nine factors of possible relevance are then listed, with a caveat that no particular finding in relation to any of those factors is necessary in determining whether two persons have a relationship as a couple.

87. The primary judge considered these factors (see [36] above) and concluded that virtually none had been established. In particular, he concluded that there was an absence of a number of important indicia of a relevant relationship, namely, a common residence, a sexual relationship, relevant financial interdependence, relevant dependency, and relevant sharing of household duties. Having considered the whole of the circumstances, his Honour concluded that the existence of a de facto relationship had not been established. In finding that the deceased and Mr Yesilhat did not reside together, he at least implicitly found also that they were not a couple “living together” for the purposes of the definition of “de facto relationship”. His Honour made this finding explicit when he considered s 57(1)(f) (see [38] above).

88. The principal matters upon which Mr Yesilhat relied in challenging these conclusions on appeal were as follows.

89. First, he criticised the primary judge’s comment that Mr Yesilhat appeared in the witness box to be a person who “was cold” and that this was difficult to reconcile with Mr Yesilhat’s description of the warm relationship he had with the deceased. This was however a matter of impression of the witness that the primary judge was entitled to take into account.

90. Secondly, Mr Yesilhat criticised the primary judge for having regard to Mr Yesilhat’s admitted deceit of his first wife in hiding from her the existence of his alleged same-sex relationship with the deceased. This was however also a matter that his Honour was entitled to take into account on credit and as to the existence of the claimed relationship with the deceased.

91. Thirdly, Mr Yesilhat complained that the primary judge had insufficient regard to the deceased not having a female companion on various family and social occasions throughout their alleged same-sex relationship. His Honour however considered the evidence of this and for a number of identified reasons gave it little, if any, weight (see [78(3)] above). It was open to his Honour to do this.

92. Fourthly, Mr Yesilhat asserted that he and the deceased “spent up to 10 hours a night, 3-4 nights a week over a 14 year period”:

“talking about life; about property investment; about business; about how to succeed in life; about finances, cars; they grilled meat and ate together; Okan washed up and vacuumed; they watched movies and videos together; George helped Okan with his assignments to help him pass at the Police Academy; he provided him with financial assistance ongoingly.”

93. This submission considerably overstated even Mr Yesilhat’s evidence as to the time he spent with the deceased, much less that of other witnesses. As indicated in [10] and [13] above Mr Yesilhat gave evidence that in the first two years of their relationship he and the deceased spent about three or four days a week together after work, for anywhere between three to five hours on each occasion and that after Mr Yesilhat’s first marriage he visited the deceased at the pharmacy two to three times a week, spending up to five hours with him, into the early hours of the morning. Mr Yesilhat gave evidence that in the last three months of the deceased’s life they were seeing each other “at the minimum” three nights a week for over five hours each time. Undoubtedly they had a close relationship but even on Mr Yesilhat’s evidence it could not be concluded that they were at any time a couple living together.

94. As well as the matters emphasised by his Honour as of particular significance is the absence at the pharmacy premises of a bed or shower. Although there was evidence that the deceased slept at the pharmacy at different times (usually by putting his head down on the desk), that he might do this was understandable as the pharmacy was usually open for business until the early hours of the morning and as the deceased grew older and his health deteriorated he became less inclined to travel back to his home at Strathfield. The absence at the pharmacy of the deceased’s clothes and other personal possessions (apart from a change of clothes) and his retention of his house at Strathfield were other matters supporting his Honour’s conclusions.

95. The evidence would not have justified a conclusion that the deceased lived at the pharmacy, much less one that Mr Yesilhat also lived there. As the primary judge concluded, Mr Yesilhat was a visitor to the pharmacy who was not said to have slept there, at least not on any regular basis, and not kept his clothes and other personal possessions there.

96. Moreover the primary judge’s finding that no sexual relationship existed between Mr Yesilhat and the deceased was a strong indication, even if not decisive, that they did not have a “relationship as a couple” as referred to in the definition of de facto relationship in s 21C(2) of the Interpretation Act. His Honour’s conclusion that there was no sexual relationship was a finding of fact that was heavily dependent upon his views as to the credibility of witnesses, particularly Mr Yesilhat. Nothing was advanced by Mr Yesilhat on appeal that indicated that that conclusion was “glaringly improbable” or otherwise deficient.

97. His Honour’s finding that a de facto relationship did not exist was dependent on credit findings in a number of respects and was an evaluative finding taking account of “matters of opinion, impression, speculation and estimation”, analogous to the exercise of discretion. It was therefore a finding to which the principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 apply. An appellate challenge to such a finding fails unless the appellant demonstrates that “the judge has in some way mistaken the facts or the legal principles to be applied or otherwise demonstrated error, which may be discernible only on the basis that the result is outside a reasonable range” (White v Redding (2019) 99 NSWLR 605; [2019] NSWCA 152 at [61], [87]-[88]).

98. None of these grounds were established on appeal in the present case. In particular I consider that his Honour’s conclusions fell within the range of those reasonably open on the evidence.

99. I add that his Honour’s findings are consistent with the observations of this Court in Smoje v Forrester [2017] NSWCA 308 at [42] that:

“Whilst the state of living ‘together’ does not require that the living occur at and from a single place, or that the two adults spend all of their time together at the same place, it will ordinarily include elements of interaction and sharing whilst engaging in activities associated with occupying the same place. Repeated visits for a singular purpose, without more, do not satisfy that description.”

100. In Smoje, this Court held that it was not reasonably open on the evidence to find that the deceased and respondent were, for the purposes of identifying whether there was a “close personal relationship” under the Succession Act, “living together” in a hotel room in which the deceased had been living in the months preceding her death. Significant matters relevant to that conclusion were that the respondent did not regard the hotel room as “home” and acknowledged that after he had visited and provided care to the deceased there, sometimes spending the night sleeping on the floor, he would return to his “home” to shower and have breakfast, and did not keep any clothing or other possessions in the hotel room (see [34]). The facts of the present case similarly require the conclusion that Mr Yesilhat and the deceased were not “living together” at the pharmacy.

Section 57(1)(e): dependency and member of household

101. So far as it might apply to Mr Yesilhat, s 57(1)(e) of the Succession Act requires that the person who claims to be eligible was both dependent on the deceased and “a member of the household of which the deceased person was a member”.

102. The primary judge found that Mr Yesilhat did not establish that he was dependent on the deceased. As recognised by his Honour in Judgment [754] and [770] quoted in [36] and [37] above, the deceased gave some financial support to Mr Yesilhat but, on the evidence, this to a significant extent related to the purchase and subsequent operation of the Australia’s Best Tyres business. Whilst Mr Yesilhat came to use funds he withdrew from the deceased’s account for personal purposes, the evidence did not indicate that he was reliant on the deceased for his day to day living expenses and it appeared that he had other sources of income including as a police officer and, subsequently, from the tyre business that he and his brother conducted.

103. On appeal, Mr Yesilhat did not raise any matter that arguably indicated that the primary judge was in error in rejecting Mr Yesilhat’s allegation that he was in a relevant sense dependent on the deceased.

104. Mr Yesilhat also failed at first instance to establish the other matter that s 57(1)(e) required him to establish, that is, membership of the same household as the deceased. At least in ordinary circumstances, membership of a household involves the persons concerned living together, and as summarised by the primary judge (at [765]) citing Kingsland v McIndoe [1989] VR 273, “a degree of continuity and permanency of living arrangements and a form of special familial relationship”. Other relevant authorities to similar effect were recently summarised by Henry J in Purnell v Tindale [2020] NSWSC 746 at [157]-[162].

105. For the reasons given above when considering whether there was a de facto relationship, there was no error in the primary judge’s conclusion that Mr Yesilhat and the deceased were not living together. In the absence of any evidence indicating that they might nevertheless have been members of the same household, the challenge to the primary judge’s decision on this issue should be rejected.

Section 57(1)(f): close personal relationship

106. An element of eligibility under s 57(1)(f) is that the persons concerned were “living together” (see the definition of “close personal relationship” in s 3(3) quoted in [33] above). For the reasons given above when addressing s 57(1)(b), Mr Yesilhat’s challenge to the primary judge’s conclusion that he and the deceased were not living together must be rejected.

“The circumstances of human affairs are so various that the courts should refrain from attempts to define more precisely than the legislature the kind of relationship regulated by Pt 19 of the PLA. Nevertheless, as this Court said in KQ v HAE, it will be an exceptional case where two people who have not lived in a common residence, and who have not made actual provision for their mutual support, can be said to have been “living together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis”. A case is not rendered exceptional in this context merely because the parties intend, eventually, to live together as a couple. That is simply a case where an existing courtship has not matured into the kind of commitment in which the parties have so merged their lives that they were, for all practical purposes, a married couple. Just as people who are affianced cannot be confused with people who are married, so people who intend to live together as a couple should not be confused with people who do live together as a couple.”

12. Yesilhat v Calokerinos [2015] NSWSC 1028.

13. [2007] 2 Qd R 138 at 149-150 [26] (Keane JA; McMurdo P and White J agreeing); [2006] QCA 555.

136. White J then observed:[14]

“[40] In this paragraph the Queensland Court of Appeal acknowledged that there may be an exceptional case where two people who had not lived in a common residence and had not made actual provision for their mutual support might nonetheless be said to have been “living together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis”.

[41] I think it arguable that this may be such an exceptional case. It would not be appropriate for me to express any view on the strength of that case. There is a variety of circumstances relevant to a decision as to whether or not two persons are living together as a couple…”

14. Yesilhat v Calokerinos [2015] NSWSC 1028 at [40]-[41] (White J).

137. So far as I can ascertain, no such “exceptional case”, where two people who have never lived in a common residence have nonetheless been held to be in a de facto relationship or a close personal relationship, or to be members of the same household, has ever occurred, and while not completely foreclosing the possibility, I doubt that there is one. The cases go no further than accepting that full-time cohabitation is not essential.

138. In Weston v Public Trustee, the relationship was one in which the deceased stayed with the plaintiff in her home on weekends, but return to his flat for two or three days during the week; in the words of the judge:[15]

“A typical week, the plaintiff told me, would mean that the deceased would stay at the weekend with her at Homebush and then, after he retired, he would go back to his flat at Bondi for two to three days through the week but he would always ring her to let her know whether he was coming back to Homebush or staying at Bondi. Before that when he was at work if he was staying the night that he left for work at Homebush and the next night at Bondi, she would give him a container of curry or stew to heat up the following night ...”

15. (1986) 4 NSWLR 407 at 410 (Young J).

139. Young J (as he then was) held that it was a borderline case, but that the parties were properly classified as de facto spouses. Notably, there was an element of common residence, with the parties living and sleeping under the same roof for several nights a week on an ongoing basis.

140. In Hayes v Marquis, in the first three years of their relationship the man stayed in the woman’s home on average three times per week, and later four times a week, following which he moved in and they lived together full-time for about three years. McColl JA, with whom Beazley JA substantially agreed, held that the primary judge was correct to hold that the concept of "living together" did not require the parties to live together full-time:[16]

“[78] … The definition of “close personal relationship” does not require the two adults to live together fulltime. The language of s 5(1)(b) does not require such co-habitation. Further a s 5 “close personal relationship” may be contrasted with a s 4 de facto relationship. A de facto relationship is one which might ordinarily be expected to emphasise common residence. However, while the definition of a de facto relationship requires a relationship between two adult persons who live together as a couple, s 4(2) makes it plain that sharing a “common residence” full-time is not essential to a conclusion that a de facto relationship exists: see also PY v CY [2005] QCA 247 (at [7]) per De Jersey CJ. Rather the significance of a common residence, in determining whether a de facto relationship exists, turns on its nature and extent.

[79] Similarly, in my view, the question whether a couple are “living together” for the purposes of s 5(1)(b) will turn on an evaluation of the nature and extent to which they share a household. Having regard to the fact, however, that they do not have to live together as a couple to satisfy s 5(1)(b), it might be thought the requirement of a common residence might be somewhat more attenuated than in s 4.

[80] Further, the concept of “living together” is only one of the three indicia of the relationship in s 5(1)(b). The decision as to whether the statutory definition is satisfied will, like the decision about whether a de facto relationship exists, ultimately be a value judgment which has regard to the three indicia to determine whether there is a relationship which fulfils the definition as a whole.”

16. [2008] DFC ¶95-415; [2008] NSWCA 10 at [78] (McColl JA; Beazley JA agreeing) (“Hayes v Marquis”).

141. Her Honour referred with approval to what Barrett J (as he then was) had said in Petersen v Gregory, [17] that the concept of "living together as a couple" involves "a personal commitment that is mutually acknowledged and of an emotional kind transcending the mere fact of the shared residential setting". That nonetheless assumes a shared residential setting, at least to some extent.

     17. [2007] NSWSC 8 at [11] (Barrett J).

142. Einstein J said that cohabitation, though not necessarily on a full-time basis, was essential: [18]

“Upon its proper construction the expression “living together” in the context of the instant legislation is to be understood as referring to the sharing of a home: that is to say to co-habit/to dwell together. The test is an objective one. It involves assessing the nature and extent of the claimed common residence. To live together requires that the two adult persons be seen as regarding the place or places in which they live as ‘their home’. Both of them might not always be found in that home because from time to time family or business requirements or similar may require one or both to spend some time elsewhere cf: Re Fagan Deceased [1980] 5 FamLR 813 where Jacobs J observed [at 822] that “there may be states of cohabitation where (the partners) see as much of each other as they can”, to which I would add – “in the circumstances”. But the dominant parameter will be whether or not the individuals concerned may be discerned to regard the premises in question as their home and in so doing to be acting reasonable.”

18. Hayes v Marquis at [166] (Einstein J).

143. In Moby & Schulter,[19] Mushin J, of the Family Court of Australia, after reviewing a number of authorities on the approach to be taken under the PR Act, [20] said that the element of “living together” required that the parties have lived together at some time, though not necessarily on a full time basis (emphasis added):

“[139] While I respectfully agree with the approach of their Honours, before the definition may be considered as constituting “a single composite expression of a comprehensive notion or concept” there are two specific elements of that definition which require individual considerations. The first of those is the concept of “a couple”. For the purposes of the definition, “a couple” is constituted by two people whether of the same or opposite sexes.

[140] The second specific element is the concept of “living together”. In my view, if a couple do not live together at any time, they cannot be seen as being in a de facto relationship. However, the concept of “living together” does not import any concept of proportion of time. In particular, it does not require that a couple live together on a full time basis. On the basis that one or both members of the couple may also be legally married or in another de facto relationship at the same time as they are in the subject relationship, it must follow that it is feasible that the subject relationship might involve the parties living together for no more than half of the time of that relationship. Further, there is nothing to suggest that it must be even as much as half of the time.

[141] Subject to the above, the question of whether the parties were in a de facto relationship must be considered on a case-by-case basis without circumscribing any particular factor.”

19. (2010) FLC ¶93-447; [2010] FamCA 748 at [139]-[141] (Mushin J); see also Jonah & White at [47] (Murphy J).

20. Including Light v Anderson [1992] DFC ¶95-102; NSWCA 136; Simonis v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1987) 21 NSWLR 677; and Roy v Sturgeon (1986) 11 NSWLR 454.

144. In Vaughan v Hoskovich, White J held that the parties were in a de facto relationship even though they shared a common residence only on two or three days a week. His Honour referred with approval to the statement of Einstein J in Hayes v Marquis, and in the context of the definition of de facto relationship in the PR Act, said:[21]

“What is clear from subs 4(3) is that satisfaction of the requirement that the persons live together as a couple does not require that they share a common residence on a full time basis. There are of course many examples of people who can be said to live together, although one or the other is away for long periods. A partner who takes an overseas posting, or who goes to sea in the course of his or her occupation for long periods, will not cease to live with his or her partner because of extended absences. …”

21. [2010] NSWSC 706 at [51] (White J).

145. There was, nonetheless, an element of common residence for some days every week on an ongoing basis.

146. In Jonah & White, Murphy J reviewed and analysed the authorities to conclude that the key to the definition (of a de facto relationship, in the Queensland legislation, which was substantially the same as that in the PR Act) is the manifestation of a relationship where the parties have so merged their lives that they are, for all practical purposes, living together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis. It is the manifestation of “coupledom”, which involves the merger of two lives as just described, that is the core of a de facto relationship as defined and to which each of the relevant factors referred to in PR Act, s 4(3) (and now Interpretation Act, s 21C(3)), are directed. [22] His Honour described the evidence in that case as showing two people who each sought to, and did in fact, maintain separate lives, but who came together, on a regular basis, for periods of time during which they enjoyed a loving, sexual relationship. However, there was no “merger of two lives into one”, or the “coupledom” earlier mentioned, so that it was not shown that the relationship was a de facto relationship as defined. [23]

     22. Jonah & White at [60] (Murphy J).

     23. Jonah & White at [66]-[67], [71] (Murphy J).

147. In NSW Trustee and Guardian v McGrath, Young AJ adopted Murphy J’s notion of “coupledom”. [24] In a factual situation where the deceased and the claimant had made a conscious decision not to formally live together, but she was a regular guest at his home, staying most weekends and enjoying an intimate relationship, and having referred to Weston v Public Trustee (which his Honour described as a borderline case), his Honour said: [25]

“Looking at Mr McGrath's statement it would seem to me that although this is another borderline case the factors favour him being, in law, a de facto spouse of the deceased.”

24. [2013] NSWSC 1894 at [18]-[19] (Young AJ) (“McGrath”).

25. McGrath at [23] (Young AJ).

148. It might be said that that was an extreme case, and it was an application by the administrator of the estate for judicial advice as to whether it would be justified in distributing the estate on the basis that Mr McGrath was the deceased’s de facto spouse. His Honour said that “the evidence just gets over the barrier to show that there was a de facto relationship”. Even so, there was at least common overnight residence for one night each week.

149. In Yesilhat v Calokerinos, White J, acknowledging that persons may be in a de facto relationship even though they do not live together all the time, said that it was arguable that a couple may live together even though they do so only for limited periods in a place which is not their common residence. In response to the submission on behalf of Mr Yesilhat that it was an open question as to whether a shared residence or a shared household was necessary to establish a de facto relationship, and that if it were, it was satisfied in the present case because Mr Yesilhat’s evidence was that he and the deceased shared a residential setting at the pharmacy, albeit of an unconventional kind, his Honour said:[26]

“[35] … Section 21C(2)(a) requires that for a person to be in a de facto relationship with another person they must have a relationship as a couple “living together”. However, s 21C(3) provides that in determining whether two persons have a relationship “as a couple” for the purposes of subs (2) all the circumstances of the relationship are to be taken into account, including “the nature and extent of their common residence”, but that no particular finding in relation to any of the matters listed in s 21C(3) is necessary in determining whether two persons have a relationship “as a couple”.

[36] Having regard simply to the text of s 21C I think it is arguable that persons may have a relationship “as a couple living together” (s 21C(2)(a)) even if they do not share a “common residence”. This is because under s 21C(3) the nature and extent of a couple’s common residence is not a matter the determination of which is necessary for deciding whether two persons have a relationship as a couple. Thus two persons may be a couple having regard to other matters, without regard to the nature and extent of their common residence. It is a requirement of s 23C(2) that the parties to a de facto relationship have a relationship “as a couple living together” and hence it is necessary that they “live together”. It is arguable that a couple may live together even though they do so only for limited periods in a place which is not their common residence.”

26. [2015] NSWSC 1028 at [35]-[36] (White J).

150. His Honour’s conclusion goes no further than to hold that there is arguably such an exceptional case.

151. This Court’s latest pronouncement on the issue is to be found in Smoje v Forrester, where it was said:[27]

“[39] These observations made at various times in the period from March to October, when considered with that of the police officer on the night the deceased died (see [16] above) show that no one was sleeping, or could have slept, on either of the beds in the room, and that there was no sign that anyone was doing so. Further, none of this evidence supported a finding that someone other than the deceased was using, or could have used, the room as a place at and from which they conducted their daily or nightly routine of living, as one might if sharing a common residence, even if only for irregular periods. The respondent’s evidence did not suggest otherwise. At its highest, that evidence was that in the course of providing care and support to the deceased, the respondent occasionally stayed overnight when he fell asleep on the floor. However, at the time the deceased died the respondent’s daily routine included his living in the Herbert Street property which he regarded as “home”. This evidence did not support the primary judge’s finding of “living together”.

…

[42] Whilst the state of living “together” does not require that the living occur at and from a single place, or that the two adults spend all of their time together at the same place, it will ordinarily include elements of interaction and sharing whilst engaging in activities associated with occupying the same place. Repeated visits for a singular purpose, without more, do not satisfy that description.”

27. [2017] NSWCA 308 at [39], [42] (Meagher JA; Basten JA and Macfarlan JA agreeing).

152. None of the cases to which I have referred holds that parties lived together, or were members of a common household, in circumstances where there was no element of common residence. Given the plain meaning of the words “living together”, that is hardly surprising. Overwhelmingly, the cases support the view that there must be some element of common residence, though it need not be full-time. Visiting, even frequently and repeatedly, not for the purpose of residing, is insufficient.

153. Taking Mr Yesilhat’s evidence at its highest – and assuming that there was a sexual relationship – it did not amount to common residence, to any degree. While that evidence would show that he and the deceased had a close, affectionate, and enduring relationship, it could not be said to establish that they were “living together” at the pharmacy, nor anywhere else. There is not a dichotomy, as the appellant’s submissions appeared to assume, between a relationship of debtor/creditor, and a de facto relationship. Mr Yesilhat’s evidence was that in the first two years of the relationship he and the deceased spent about three or four days a week together after work, for anywhere between three to five hours on each occasion; that after Mr Yesilhat’s first marriage, he visited the deceased at the pharmacy two to three times a week, for up to five hours, into the early hours of the morning; and that in the last three months of the deceased’s life, they were seeing each other “at the minimum” three nights a week, for over five hours each time. There was no evidence of Mr Yesilhat treating the pharmacy as a place of residence, nor that he kept or left any personal items or clothes there, let alone that he treated it as his residential address. His evidence does not establish that he ever “stayed over” at the pharmacy, let alone “moved in” or “resided” there. There was no bed there, nor any shower, and he did not sleep there overnight. Pressed on this question, counsel said (emphasis added): [28]

“BRERETON JA: Is there any evidence he kept any personal items there?

CULKOFF: Your Honour, he went there; they ate there; they cooked there together; he washed up.

…

CULKOFF: Your Honour, there wasn't a bed there, and they didn't sleep there overnight.

MACFARLAN JA: Was there any evidence of your client leaving any possessions at the pharmacy; that was the question.

CULKOFF: No, your Honour. His evidence was that he would come home; he would shower; and then he would spend his time there; and he would spend sometimes from 7, sometimes from 10 until the early hours of the morning when he would then come home.”

28. Tcpt, 13 April 2021, p 77.25-47.

154. Counsel’s concluding statement, that “he would then come home”, unintentionally but understandably and eloquently captures what is redolent from the evidence: that Mr Yesilhat did not live at the pharmacy, or with the deceased, but elsewhere, at his own “home”. At the pharmacy, his status was that of a visitor, albeit a welcome and frequent one, but he did not live there.

155. Counsel submitted that Mr Yesilhat and the deceased had “no choice” but to conduct their relationship in the way they did, secretly at the pharmacy. Assuming that to be so, it is irrelevant: the question is not why they so conducted themselves, but whether objectively it amounted to “living together”. Two people do not live together by reason that they secretly use a workplace after hours to conduct a sexual relationship over a sustained period, even on a daily basis. However, it is not the circumstance that, on Mr Yesilhat’s case, their relationship was conducted at the pharmacy, that is crucial; the result would be no different if he had attended at the deceased’s Strathfield home to the same extent, for the same periods of time, and for the same purposes as he attended the pharmacy: it did not amount to “living together”.

154. For that matter, the evidence did not establish that the deceased lived at the pharmacy. He did not keep personal effects or clothes there, and his diaries show that he plainly continued to regard Strathfield as his home. The diaries also show, consistently with other evidence such as that of Ms Dacic, that the deceased would sometimes stay there late at night, as the pharmacy remained open until the early hours of the morning, and in later years occasionally sleep over there rather than returning to his home at Strathfield, resting his head in his hands on a desk while sitting on a chair or stool. That does not amount to residing or living there.

155. For those reasons, even if there was a sexual relationship between them, Mr Yesilhat and the deceased were not “members of the same household”, nor were they “living together”, either as a couple or in a close personal relationship. Unlike some of the cases to which reference has been made, this was not a borderline case, even taking Mr Yesilhat’s case at its highest.

156. It follows that Mr Yesilhat was not an “eligible person”, and that his claim for a family provision order was rightly rejected as he was not an eligible applicant.

157. Mr Yesilhat’s standing to seek revocation of probate of the deceased’s informal will depended on either his being a beneficiary under a competing will, or his being a de facto spouse of the deceased. No other will naming him as a beneficiary has been identified, and the conclusion that he was not in a de facto relationship with the deceased removes the only other basis on which he could have standing to contest the will. In those circumstances, he has no standing to propound his first ground of appeal, which impugns the primary judge’s refusal to revoke the grant of probate of the deceased’s informal will to the respondent, and, as Macfarlan JA explains, it is undesirable for this Court to make obiter observations concerning the will in such circumstances.

158. I agree with Macfarlan JA, for the reasons given by his Honour, that Ground 4, which impugns his Honour’s conclusion that the sum of $170,500 withdrawn from the deceased’s accounts on the day of his death was fraudulently appropriated by Mr Yesilhat, fails. Ground 5, which impugned the conclusion that $218,955 drawn by Mr Yesilhat from the deceased’s accounts during his lifetime were loans and not gifts, which were therefore repayable with interest, was not pressed.

159. For those reasons, and for the reasons given by Macfarlan JA, the appeal should be dismissed. I agree with the orders proposed by Macfarlan JA.

**********

Endnotes

Amendments

01 June 2021 - Correction of error in headnote.

Decision last updated: 01 June 2021