Ye v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Ye v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 961

File number(s): MLG 2856 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE MANSINI
Date of judgment: 26 September 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision that it had no jurisdiction to review a partner visa refusal because the prescribed filing fee was not paid within a reasonable period – where applicant also complained that the Tribunal officer’s fee refusal decision was incorrect – no jurisdictional error established, application is dismissed with costs.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss.5CB, 5F, 347, 348, 375A

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) rr .4.10, 4.13

Cases cited:

Braganza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 318

Commissioner of Taxation v Addy [2020] FCAFC 135

Fairy v Minister For Immigration & Anor (No 2) [2017] FCCA 3095

Fairy v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 729

Parmar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 502

Purnama v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 619

Tanto v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2013] FCCA 282

Tanto v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 853

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 56
Date of hearing: 17 April 2024
Date of last submissions:  29 August 2024
The Applicant: Appearing in person
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

MLG 2856 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

CUIXIAN YE

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE MANSINI

DATE OF ORDER:

26 SEPTEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the First Respondent be amended in the title of the proceeding to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

2.The application filed 24 September 2018 is dismissed.

3.The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $5,500.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Judge Mansini         

IN SUMMARY

  1. These proceedings relate to 2 administrative decisions made in the course of the Applicant’s attempt to seek review of a delegate’s decision to refuse her a partner visa.

  2. The application before the Court seeks judicial review of the tribunal member’s decision that there was no jurisdiction to conduct the review because the tribunal’s prescribed filing fee was not paid in full within a reasonable period after the tribunal declined to reduce the fee. The grounds of the application also complain that the tribunal…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 961
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ye v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved Ms. Cuixian Ye, the Applicant, who sought a judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that it lacked jurisdiction to review her partner visa refusal. The AAT's decision stemmed from the Applicant's failure to pay the prescribed filing fee within the required period. Additionally, the Applicant argued that the AAT officer's decision to refuse her fee waiver application was incorrect. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the AAT's jurisdictional finding was correct and if the decision regarding the fee waiver was legally sound.

The primary legal issues before the court were twofold: first, whether the AAT correctly determined it had no jurisdiction to review the partner visa refusal due to the Applicant's failure to pay the filing fee within the stipulated period; and second, whether the AAT officer's decision to refuse the fee waiver was legally unreasonable. The court examined whether the AAT's exercise of discretion in refusing the fee waiver was rational, logical, and reasonable, considering the evidence provided by the Applicant.

In examining the AAT's jurisdictional decision, the court found that the prescribed period for the Applicant to lodge her review application and pay the fee had indeed expired. The Applicant was notified of the fee waiver refusal and was given a reasonable period to pay the balance of the fee, which she failed to do. Consequently, the court upheld the AAT's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction. Regarding the fee waiver refusal, the court noted that while the Applicant had submitted some financial information, she had not provided supporting documents such as bank statements or payslips. The court held that the AAT officer's decision was not irrational or unreasonable, as the Applicant had not demonstrated any error in the exercise of discretion by the officer.

The court dismissed the Applicant's application for judicial review, finding no jurisdictional error in the AAT's decision. The Applicant's complaint about the fee waiver refusal was also rejected as the court found no basis to conclude that the AAT officer had acted unreasonably. Consequently, the application was dismissed with costs awarded to the Minister.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 22 August 2018, the Tribunal sent an email to the Applicant at the email address the Applicant had nominated on the application form. Attached was a letter from the Tribunal with the subject line “Notification of decision – Ms Cuixian Ye”. That letter attached a decision record prepared by a Member of the Tribunal dated 22 August 2018 (No Jurisdiction Decision). By that decision record, the Tribunal concluded that it had no jurisdiction to determine the Applicant’s review application lodged 2 May 2018. The Tribunal’s reasons were briefly outlined in some 7 paragraphs as follows:STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONSAPPLICATION FOR REVIEW1. This is an application for review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, dated 20 April 2018 (the decision), to refuse to grant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).2. On 2 May 2018, the applicant lodged the review application form and half of the application fee with the Tribunal. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has found that it has no jurisdiction to review the decision as the application was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation.3. Pursuant to s.347(1) of the Act and r.4.13 of the Migration Regulations 1994, this application had to be given to the Tribunal within the prescribed period, as specified in s.347(1)(b) and r.4.10, and accompanied by the prescribed fee unless a determination has been made under r.4.13(4) that the fee should be reduced on the basis of financial hardship.4. The prescribed period is set out in r.4.10 of the Regulations and starts when the applicant is notified of the decision. In the present case, the prescribed period ended on 11 May 2018. The fee must be paid within the prescribed period: Kirk v MIMA (1998) 87 FCR 99, or if a determination has been made under r.4.13(4), within a reasonable period after that determination: Braganza v MIMA (2001) 109 FCR 364.5. On 2 May 2018, before the prescribed period expired, the applicant asked the Tribunal to reduce the prescribed application fee. An authorised officer decided to refuse the request for a fee reduction and the applicant was advised of this decision by letter dated 15 May 2018. The applicant was asked to pay the remainder of the application fee by 29 May 2018—that is, within 14 days of receiving the Tribunal’s letter.6. The Tribunal considers the applicant has been given a reasonable period to pay the fee since being notified of the authorised officer’s decision; however the fee has not been paid. The application for review is therefore not a valid application and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in this matter.DECISION7. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in this matter. The Applicant filed evidence by which she claimed to have never received communications from the Tribunal about the application fee by phone call or post to her nominated postal address. Further, that her brother (her money lender) could have paid the balance of the fee and the Tribunal should have charged him.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The First Respondent accepted the jurisdiction of the Court to review the Fee Waiver Refusal Decision and that it were appropriate to join the Commonwealth of Australia as a respondent to the proceedings. The First Respondent (supported by the Third Respondent) submitted that the Filing Fee Refusal Decision was open to the Tribunal officer to make, for the reasons stated in their letter of 15 May 2018. Further, that there was nothing irrational or illogical in concluding that their discretion under reg 4.13(4) was not enlivened because the Applicant had not submitted supporting documents for the financial claims that has been made by the Applicant.Consideration In Fairy v Minister For Immigration & Anor (No 2) [2017] FCCA 3095 (per Mansouridis J, not overturned on appeal in Fairy v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 729), it was acknowledged that a Registrar’s decision not to waive the remaining 50% of the prescribed fee may be invalid and amenable to judicial review were it found to be irrational or (legally) unreasonable. Where the power exercised was discretionary, there are limits to the kinds of error that might arise. The Court’s role is not to ascertain whether the matter in respect of which the identified person is required to form an opinion actually existed, but rather whether the person had formed the required state of mind as to its existence: Commissioner of Taxation v Addy [2020] FCAFC 135 per Davies, Derrington and Steward JJ as cited in Purnama at [28]. In the present case, the Applicant had submitted information about her financial hardship to the Tribunal in support of her fee waiver application – amounts of her fortnightly income, fortnightly expenses, a debt owed and that she had a dependent mother-in-law. The Applicant had not submitted copies of bank statements, loan agreements, payslips or utility bills in support. The claim that the Applicant had shown the Tribunal officer her bank balance and was, for that reason, encouraged to make application for a fee waiver does not render the Tribunal’s decision legally unreasonable because it was for the Applicant to put documents to the Tribunal in support of her fee waiver application and she did not do so (whether upon submitting the fee waiver application, in the 13 days after submitting the fee waiver application or after receiving notice of the Fee Waiver Refusal Decision but before the No Jurisdiction Decision was made). It is not for this Court to revisit the merit of the Tribunal officer’s decision and replace it for one that this Court would have made. The Tribunal officer gave clear and cogent reasons for the Filing Fee Refusal Decision which expressly paid regard to the information that was before it. The Tribunal officer was entitled to proceed as they did in the exercise of their discretion and did not act irrationally, illogically or unreasonably in this respect. Taking the Applicant’s case about the representation made by the Tribunal officer at its highest, the Tribunal officer did no more than encourage her to apply for a waiver of the balance of the prescribed filing fee. The Applicant then proceeded to complete and submit an application form and understood there would be follow up communications (as apparent by the contentions in respect of the third ground, addressed below). The very next day after the fee waiver application form was submitted, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant by which it clearly communicated that a decision on the fee waiver application was yet to be made and a valid application had not been accepted and provided an information sheet in her first spoken language which gave details about where to get assistance. For completeness, for the reasons explained in relation to ground 3, it was reasonable that the communication of 3 May 2018 was sent to the Applicant’s nominated email address. On what is before the Court, I am unable to find any unreasonableness in this respect.