YBFZ and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration)
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YBFZ and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2025] ARTA 570 (15 May 2025)
Applicant/s: YBFZ
Respondent:Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
Tribunal Number: 2020/4781
Tribunal:Senior Member T Tavoularis
Place:Brisbane
Date:15 May 2025
Decision:
The Tribunal affirms the reviewable decision dated 8 July 2020 and finds that:
(1)having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, the Applicant is a danger to the Australian community within the meaning of ss 36(1C)(b) and s 36(2C)(b)(ii) of the Act; and
(2)the Applicant is not eligible for a Protection visa pursuant to s 36(1A) of the Act.
MIGRATION – whether Applicant meets the criterion for a Protection visa in section 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 – whether Applicant engages s 36(2C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 – whether Applicant has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime – whether the Applicant is a danger to the Australian community – decision under review affirmed
Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Ministerial Direction 75 – Refusal of Protection visas relying on ss 36(1C) and 36(2C)(b) Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
Statement of Reasons
THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW
On 8 July 2020, the Applicant (“YBFZ”) was refused the grant of a Protection (subclass 866) (Class XA) visa (“the visa”). This refusal decision (hereinafter referred to as “the decision under review”) was made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (“the Respondent” or “the Minister” or “the Respondent Minister”) and was based on a finding that the Applicant did not satisfy the criterion in s 36(1C) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). Legislative power behind the decision under review rests in s 65 of the Act. Legislative imprimatur for this Tribunal’s determination of the instant application derives from s 500(1) (c)(i) of the Act. This section relevantly facilitates this Tribunal’s review of applications seeking merits review of a decision refusing the grant of a protection visa pursuant to s 36(1C) of the Act.
BACKGROUND
There is tension in the written material about the citizenship of the Applicant. In the Respondent’s Statement…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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YBFZ, an applicant for a Protection visa, challenged the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs’ refusal to grant the visa. The dispute centred on whether YBFZ met the criteria for a Protection visa under section 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 and whether he was a danger to the Australian community under section 36(2C)(b). The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was tasked with determining these legal issues based on the evidence presented.
The primary legal issues revolved around the interpretation of sections 36(1C)(b) and 36(2C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958. The Tribunal examined whether YBFZ had been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime and whether this conviction made him a danger to the Australian community. The Tribunal also had to consider the statutory definition of "particularly serious crime" and the criteria for assessing danger to the community.
In addressing these issues, the Tribunal concluded that YBFZ had indeed been convicted of several serious crimes involving violence, which met the definition of a "particularly serious crime." The Tribunal found that these convictions, coupled with the nature of the crimes and the likelihood of reoffending, established that YBFZ posed a danger to the Australian community. The Tribunal relied on the four assessments outlined in WKCG to substantiate this finding, emphasizing that the risk of reoffending and the potential consequences of such conduct were significant factors.
Ultimately, the Tribunal affirmed the Minister's decision to refuse the grant of a Protection visa to YBFZ. The Tribunal found that YBFZ met the criteria for exclusion under section 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958, and his history of serious criminal conduct made him a danger to the community under section 36(2C)(b).
Background
Background to the litigation
On 8 July 2020, the Applicant (“YBFZ”) was refused the grant of a Protection (subclass 866) (Class XA) visa (“the visa”). This refusal decision (hereinafter referred to as “the decision under review”) was made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (“the Respondent” or “the Minister” or “the Respondent Minister”) and was based on a finding that the Applicant did not satisfy the criterion in s 36(1C) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). Legislative power behind the decision under review rests in s 65 of the Act. Legislative imprimatur for this Tribunal’s determination of the instant application derives from s 500(1) (c)(i) of the Act. This section relevantly facilitates this Tribunal’s review of applications seeking merits review of a decision refusing the grant of a protection visa pursuant to s 36(1C) of the Act. BACKGROUND There is tension in the written material about the citizenship of the Applicant. In the Respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (“SFIC”), it is contended “The applicant [is a citizen of Iraq,….]”.[1] In his Form 866 (Application for a protection visa) lodged with the Respondent’s Department in December 2019, the Applicant said that his citizenship at birth was “Eritrean”[2]. He then said in this Form 866 that his current citizenship status was “stateless Eritrean Jehovah’s Witness”.[3] He sought to explain this asserted statelessness in these terms: “I am Jehovah’s Witness and on 25 October 1994 the president of Eritrea….removed Eritrean Citizenship off all Jehovah’s Witnesses by presidential Decree as they would not participate in the referendum for independence from Ethiopia and conscription.”[4][1] R2, p 2, [4].[2] R1, p 29.[3] R1, p 29.[4] R1, p 29. The decision under review records the Applicant’s country of birth as “Eritrea”[5] but records his country of citizenship as “Stateless”[6]. The decision under review then records the receiving country of the Applicant as “Eritrea”[7] and goes on to record the following finding: “I accept….that the applicant’s family are Jehovah’s Witnesses and that he was a Jehovah’s Witness. Therefore, I accept that the Applicant had his Eritrean citizenship revoked and that he is now stateless”.[8] The Applicant’s SFIC says “the Applicant is not a citizen of Eritrea and is stateless. His Eritrean citizenship was revoked in October 1994, following presidential decree, because his family were Jehovah’s Witnesses.”[9][5] R1, p 496[6] R1, p 496.[7] R1, p 496.[8] R1, p 499.[9] A1, p 1, [5]. The parties agree that the Applicant arrived in Australia on 7 February 2002 after having fled Eritrea and gone to Ethiopia. There is further tension in the material about the Applicant’s date of birth. In his Check Results Report (“criminal history”), his birth date is recorded as “09/01/1988”[10]. This would make the Applicant’s current age 37 years, turning 38 in January of next year. Yet the learned author of the decision under review noted the evidence around the two competing dates of birth of the Applicant comprising 9 January 1988 and 1 September 1987 and concluded as follows: “In the absence of probative evidence to the contrary, I accept the explanation provided by the applicant’s sister….After consideration of this explanation, in conjunction with the Australian Government issued Document for travel to Australia, I accept the applicant’s date of birth is 1 September 1987.”[11] This would mean the Applicant is currently 37 years of age, turning 38 on 1 September this year. [10] R1, p 396.[11] R1, p 499.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
The language appearing in, respectively, Articles 33(1) and (2) of the Refugees Convention requires a two-step determinative process when addressing the question of whether someone could be found to be a refugee. First, there had to be a determination of whether a person ‘has been convicted by final judgment of a particularly serious crime’. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, a second determination must then be made about whether that person constitutes a danger to the community. An identical two-step approach now appears in s 36(1C) in the determination of whether a person is excluded from the grant of a protection visa.OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCEThe evidence of the Applicant The Applicant’s most recent statutory declaration appears in the material and was made on 18 September 2024.[38] He describes himself as “….not a very talkative person and I find legal proceedings difficult to engage with.”[39] In this statutory declaration the Applicant says he is “currently living”[40] with his mother. As will be noted from the following review of his oral evidence the Applicant has since moved out of his mother’s home and now lives with his brother. He makes reference to his engagement with the therapeutic process in these terms: “I get help from Freddie at Mercy Health and some of the workers at Ermha365. Liem, from Life Without Barriers, used to take me to appointments. He was really good but left a while ago. The new guy is alright too, though I’ve forgotten his name.The medical help I’ve gotten has been good for me. I feel better than when I came out in November last year. The voices in my head have calmed down and are easier to control. I used to get anxious, upset and confused when the voices in my head were going on. That really doesn’t happen anymore.”[41][38] A3, pp 1-2.[39] A3, p 2, [2].[40] A3, p 2, [3].[41] A3, p 2, [4]-[5]. He does not recall much of his offending although he does recall that he “….used to be….in and out of jail.”[42] He adds that “I was never out for more than….a month and then I went back to prison.”[43] He attributes his pattern of offending to his abuse of alcohol. He notes “I used to drink alcohol everyday and that would get me in trouble.”[44] He further notes that “I drink a little bit now but don’t get as drunk as I used to. I’m not interested in it anymore and I know its dangerous to drink too much because it gets me in trouble. I don’t want to do that.”[45] In terms of his recidivist risk, he says “I’m doing my best not to offend….I just want to snap out of it. I want to change my life and move on with my life.”[46][42] A3, p 3, [8].[43] A3, p 3, [8].[44] A3, p 3, [9].[45] A3, p 3, [11].[46] A3 ,p 3, [12]. In this statutory declaration the Applicant refers to his early life and notes that when he “….was young, my life wasn’t easy. I saw a lot of bad things. It was tough for me. I think it effected me. It used to make me angry. I’m dealing with that now better than when I was younger.”[47] He refers to his schizophrenic symptoms and how he says he consumed alcohol to assuage those symptoms: “The voices in my head started in around 2009 or 2011. I can’t quite remember but I was young when they started. I didn’t know what it was or that I could get help. I didn’t know I needed help. I feel better now I’m getting it. My life is more stable now. I think I was drinking a lot as a way to deal with this. I used to stay out a lot, I would go outside an drink. If I wasn’t doing that I would be in jail.”[48][47] A3, p 3, [14].[48] A3. p 3, [15]-[16].
Decision
Reasons for decision
I will consider each question in turn.Sub-Issue 1: Has the Applicant been convicted by a final judgment of a serious crime? This Applicant has a multiplicity of convictions for particularly serious crimes. Paragraph [28] of the Respondent’s SFIC[70] particularises four[71] offences of which the Applicant was respectively convicted (as an adult) in October 2006, January 2009, February 2015, May 2016 and November 2017. I am firstly satisfied that each of these convictions involve offending against a law in force in Australia where the offence involves violence against a person. I am secondly satisfied that these offences are punishable by either imprisonment for a fixed term of not less than three years or imprisonment for a maximum term of not less than three years. These offences therefore satisfy the definitional requirements of “serious Australian offence” contained in s 5 of the Act. [70] R2, p 7, [28]. [71] Note to Reader: this group of five convictions involved two convictions for the same offence. Section 5M of the Act relevantly provides: “For the purposes of the application of this Act…..paragraph 36(1C)(b) has effect as if a reference in that paragraph to a particularly serious crime included a reference to a crime that consists of the commission of: (a) a serious Australian offence……” It can thus be safely and cumulatively found that the Applicant has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime for the purposes of ss 36(1C)(b) and 36(2C)(b)(ii). I will now turn to the second question contained in ss 36(1C)(b) and 36(2C)(b)(ii). Sub-Issue 2: Whether the Applicant is a danger to the Australian community? In SZOQQ and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2012) 200 FCR 174, the Full Court said 36(1C) of the Act does not facilitate a ‘balancing exercise’. I cannot, for example, weigh the consequences of refoulement for an applicant to the country of origin against whatever danger that applicant might pose to the Australian community:‘[…] we see the language of Art 33(2), construed in the context of the Refugees Convention as a whole, as intractable. The ordinary meaning of Art 33(2) (subject to one matter) is clear. The benefit of the duty against refoulement in Art 33(1) cannot be claimed by a refugee if the circumstances specified in Art 33(2) are present. The structure and text of the provisions do not permit any balancing exercise.’[72][72]SZOQQ [49] (Jagot and Barker JJ), [27] (Flick J, agreeing). For reasons that follow, I am of the view that an application of the four abovementioned considerations in WKCG to the instant facts necessarily results in a finding that this applicant represents a danger to the Australian community. This finding will be principally based on an application of the four assessments stipulated in WKCG even though this list is not exhaustive. The concept of “danger” should, for present purposes, carry its ordinary meaning. Danger should be regarded as a function of (1) probability and (2) consequence. In terms of the former, the Tribunal must determine whether there exists a sufficient risk, possibility or probability of harm. In terms of the latter, it is necessary to assess the consequential outcomes resulting from the danger, most usually comprising physical or psychological injury. When assessed together, the Federal Court has found these two concepts mean that the higher the probability of a person re-committing unlawful conduct, the less severe the consequences of that conduct might need to be for the purpose of assessing the extent to which that person now represents a danger to the Australian community.[73][73] DMQ20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 297 FCR 550 at [106]-[107]; [109], [111], [114]. Cited with approval by the Fill Court in SLGS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 104.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the Applicant's eligibility for a Protection visa by assessing whether the Applicant met the exclusion criteria outlined in sections 36(1C) and 36(2C) of the Migration Act 1958. The court began by determining whether the Applicant had been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime. The Applicant had multiple convictions for serious Australian offences involving violence against a person and each offence carried a penalty of imprisonment for a fixed term of not less than three years or a maximum term of not less than three years. This satisfied the definitional requirements of a "serious Australian offence" under section 5 of the Act. Therefore, the court found that the Applicant had indeed been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime.
Next, the court assessed whether the Applicant engaged section 36(2C)(b) of the Migration Act 1958. Section 36(2C)(b) of the Act states that a person is excluded from the grant of a protection visa if they have been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The court had already found that the Applicant had been convicted of such a crime, thus engaging section 36(2C)(b) of the Act.
The court then considered whether the Applicant is a danger to the Australian community. The court noted that under section 36(1C) of the Act, a "balancing exercise" is not permitted, meaning that the potential danger the Applicant might pose to the Australian community cannot be weighed against the consequences of refoulement. The court applied the four assessments stipulated in WKCG to determine the Applicant's danger to the community. These assessments include the probability and consequence of harm, with the higher the probability of re-committing unlawful conduct, the less severe the consequences of that conduct might need to be for the purpose of assessing the extent to which the Applicant represents a danger to the Australian community. The court found that the Applicant does represent a danger to the Australian community.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the court applied the two-step approach in determining the Applicant's eligibility for a Protection visa under the Migration Act 1958. The court found that the Applicant met the exclusion criteria and thus was ineligible for the visa. The decision under review was affirmed.