Yates I.F. v City Loan and Credit Corp Pty Ltd

Case

[1988] FCA 203

17 Feb 1988

No judgment structure available for this case.

3UDGFX?-!T No. 203'-

LIMITED CIRCULATION

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Motion for extens ion of stay of

proceedings and for leave to appeal - whether orders subject

of app l i ca t ion for leave to appeal were f i n a l o r d e r s .
Federal Cour t of Austral ia Act 1976: S. 24(1A)

SCAREL PTY. LIMITED v. CITY LOAN & CREDIT CORPORATION PTY. LIMITED

G513 of 1986

IAN FRANCIS YATES V . CITY LOAN & CREDIT CORPORATION PTY. LIMITED

G277 of 1987

LOCKHART, SHEPPARD and MORLING JJ.

IAN FRANCIS YATES V. CITY LOAN & CREDIT CORPORATION PTY. LIMITED

B371 of 1987

c

LIMITED CIRCULATION

JN THE FEOERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

)

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY 1 No. G513 of 1986

1

G- DIVISION )
BETHEEN:  SCAREL PTY. LIMITED

Applicant

m:  CITY LOAN & CREDIT CORPORATION PTY.
LIMITED

Respondent

No. G277 of 1987

IAN FRANCIS YATES

Applicant

CITY LOAN & CREDIT CORPORATION PTY.

LIMITED

Respondent

No. B371 of 1987

RE: IAN FRANCIS YATES

Debtor

AND:  CITY LOAN & CREDIT CORPORATION PTY.
LIMITED

Creditor

COURT:  Lockhart, Sheppard and Morling JJ.
DATE:  17 February 1988
PLACE :  Sydney

MINUTE OF ORDER

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The order made by this Court on 11 December 1987 dismissing
I proceeding G513 of 1986 and the order as to costs made on
that date be stayed until the determination of the appeal

from the judgment of Gummow J. of 10 February 1988 ln proceedings G513 of 1986, G277 of 1987 and B371 of 1987 or until further order of the Court;

2. The hearing of the appeal from the ~udgment of Gummow J. of
10 February 1988 be expedited; and
3. Costs of the motion shall be costs in the appeal.
m:  Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of
the Federal Court Rules.

L

2.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

n5xmZ

The Court has before it a motion by Ian Francis Yates in
proceeding G513 of 1986 to which the parties are Scarel Pty. Limited
("Scarcl") as applicant and City Loan & Credit Corporation Pty.

Limited ("City Lorn") as respondent. Mr. Yates is not a party to that proceeding. Mr. Yates seeks two orders in his motion: first, that a stay of proceedings granted by a single Judge of this Court (Gummow

J . ) on 11 December 1987 be extended until the determination of the
substantive motion for leave to appeal which is before us today. The
second order sought by Mr. Yates is an order that leave be granted to
appeal from the judgment of Gummow J. given on 10 February 1988 In
matters numbers G513 of 1986, G277 of 1987 and B371 of 1987. In the
two last-mentioned matters the parties are Mr. Yates and City Loan.

Gummow J. had before him on 10 February 1988 motions seeking

an order that the orders of the Court of 11 December 1987 be set aside

and that in lieu thereof there be substituted orders consolidating the

three proceedings to which reference hs been made; an order granting
leave to Hr. Yates to continue the consolidated proceedings in the
name of the company Scarel and an order granting him leave to be
substituted as applicant in proceeding G513 of 1986. Gummow J. ' S
previoum order of 11 December 1987 had been that proceeding G513 of
1986 be dismissed, the applicant Scarel to pay the costs of the

respondent City Loan in the proceedings as agreed or as taxed. That order warn made by consent. Gummow 3. also ordered on that occasion

that the order then made not be entered before 4.00 p.m. on 17

c

3.

December 1987. The motions which were before Gummow J. were filed
prior to the date on which the order for dismissal made on 11 December

).

could be entered and no steps have since been taken to enter that

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order.

On 10 February Gummow J. considered the various motions
~ before him ahd ordered that the application by Mr. Yates for leave to continue proceeding G513 of 1986 on behalf of and in the name of Scare1 be dismissed. His Honour observed that it followed that the
balance of the application6 a160 failed. In the result, his Honour
said that the previous order of the Court for dismissal of proceeding
G513 of 1986 made on 11 December should proceed to entry. His Honour
also made orders as to costs.

At the outset of the hearing of the motion before us for

leave to appeal and for a stay, counsel for Mr. Yates, although

seeking leaw to appeal from Gummow J.'s judgment, submitted that

there is no necessity for that leave to be granted because the orders

of Gummow J. are final orders. The solicitor appearing for City Loan
submitted to the contrary.
With the consent of the parties, the Court first heard
argument as to whether or not the orders the subject of the
application for leave to appeal were final orders. Sub-section 2 4 ( 1 A )
of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 provides that an appeal
shall not be brought from a judgment that is an interlocutory judgment

unless the Court or a Judge gives leave to appeal. The questlon

whether a judgment is final or interlocutory 1s one which has been the
subject of considerable judicial comment and has been productive of
difficulty.
The test to be applied to determine whether a ~udgment 1s

final or not is whether it finally determines the rights of the parties. That teat requires the Court to have regard to the legal

rather than the practical effect of the judgment. This was the

essence of the decisions of the High Court in Licul v. Cornev (1976) 50 A.L.J.R. 439; Port of Melbourne Authoritv V. Anshun Ptv. Limited (1981) 147 C.L.R. 35 and v. Finance Corporation of Australia

Limited CNo . 13 (1981) 147 C.L.R. 246.

Mr. Yates is not a party to proceeding G513 of 1986, but he has sought an order of the Court that he be given leave to continue that proceeding on behalf of Scarel. As Gummow J. pointed out in his reasons for judgment of 10 February, the result of the refusal of leave 1s that the order of 11 December 1987 dismissing proceeding G513

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can proceed to entry. In the result, the legal effect of the Court's order of 10 February is both to deny leave to Mr. Yates to continue

proceeding G513 and to decline to set aside the consent ludgment of 11
December dismissing proceeding G513. In those circumstances It is the
opinion of the Court that the judgment of Gummow J. finally determined
the rights of the parties, when the effect of the judgment is

characterised according to its legal rather than its practical effect. It follows that the judgment of Gummow J. was final in nature. Leave to appeal is therefore not necessary.

There remains the other portion of the motlon before the
Court, namely, the motion to stay the entry of the order made by
consent on 11 December 1987. Hr. Yates Seeks an order that the stay
operate until the determination of the appeal from Gummow J.'s
judgment of 10 February 1988. The Court is of the opinion that
nuificient has been said to show that there is an arguable case to be
rained in support of the appeal and accordingly thinks that the stay
should be granted. The Court expresses no views, of course, on the
ultimate nuccenn or otherwise of the arguments which have been
foreshadowed before us as being the matters that will be raised in the
appeal.
The order of the Court is that the order made by this Court
on 11 December 1987 dismissing proceeding G513 of 1986 and the

consequential order for costs be stayed until the determination of the appeal from the judgment of Gummow J. of 10 February 1988 or untll further order of the Court. The costs of the motion today should be

costs in the appeal. The Court also orders that the hearing of the
appeal from the judgment of Gummow J. of 10 February 1988 be

expedited.

I certify that this and the preceding

four ( 4 ) pages are a true copy of the
reason6 for judgment herein of the
Court.
bssociate kXi3bdd.
W:  17 February 1988
Counsel for the applicant: Mr. J.P. Hamilton with
Hr. R. K. Eassie
Solicitors for the applicant: Snelgrove, Mucsnik & O'Brien

Solicitors for the respondent: Hr. R. Anderson of Lane 61 Lane

Dnte of Hearing3 17 February 1988
Date of Judgment:  17 February 1988
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