Yang (Migration) [2021] AATA 361 (10 February 2021)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
APPLICANTS: Ms Yunqi Yang
Mr Bo Liang
Master Weijian Liang
Miss Yinyi LiangCASE NUMBER: 2013582
HOME AFFAIRS REFERENCE(S): BCC2020/1620404
MEMBER:Antonio Dronjic
DATE:10 February 2021
PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa.
The Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the other applicants.
Statement made on 10 February 2021 at 10:40am
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – cancellation – Temporary Skill Shortage (Class GK) visa – Subclass 482 (Temporary Skill Shortage) – ceased employment for more than 90 days – sponsoring business closed with no notice shortly before visa due to expire – application for visa to work for new sponsor refused – no new sponsorship in 20 months since then – discretion to cancel visa – members of family unit – decision under review affirmed for first applicant, no jurisdiction for other applicantsLEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116(1)(b), 140(1), 348
Migration Regulations 1999 (Cth), Schedule 8, condition 8107(3)(b)CASES
COT15 v MIBP (No 1) (2015) 236 FCR 148
Rani v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379
Tien v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision dated 31 August 2020 made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs to cancel the first named applicant’s (the applicant) Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa under s.116 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The delegate cancelled the visa under s.116(1)(b) on the basis that the first named applicant (the applicant) breached condition 8107(3)(b) as the period during which the applicant ceased employment exceeded 90 consecutive days. The issue in the present case is whether that ground for cancellation is made out, and if so, whether the visa should be cancelled.
For the purposes of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.348 of the Act, the only decision that is before the Tribunal is the decision with respect to the first named applicant. The other applicants’ visas were automatically cancelled as a consequence of that cancellation, not by a decision but by force of the operation of s.140(1) of the Act, which made the cancellation of those other visas self-executing on the cancellation of the first named applicant’s visa: see Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379 at 385, 393, 400; Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80 at 96. As no decision was involved in the visa cancellation under s.140(1), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to them.
Background to the cancellation of the applicant’s visa
The decision record of 31 August 2020 sets out the reasons for the delegate’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa. The Tribunal summarises those reasons and findings as follows:
·On 15 September 2016, the applicant was granted a Subclass 457 visa to remain valid until 15 September 2020;
·The standard business sponsor who nominated the applicant…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the delegate's decision to cancel the applicant's visa should be affirmed. This required determining if a ground for cancellation existed under section 116 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and, if so, whether the discretion to cancel the visa should be exercised. Specifically, the Tribunal had to consider whether the applicant had complied with condition 8107(3)(b) of her visa, which stipulated that the period of cessation of employment must not exceed 90 consecutive days.
The Tribunal found that the applicant did indeed cease employment on 4 June 2019 and that this period of unemployment exceeded 90 consecutive days, thereby establishing a ground for cancellation under section 116(1)(b) of the Act. In considering the exercise of discretion, the Tribunal acknowledged that while policy guidelines, such as those in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3), could be a useful starting point, they were not legally binding and could not go beyond the wording of the legislation. Having regard to all the circumstances, including the applicant's submissions and the purpose of her visa, the Tribunal concluded that the reasons for cancelling the visa outweighed the reasons for not cancelling it.
Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 457 visa. The Tribunal also reiterated that it had no jurisdiction with respect to the other applicants whose visas were automatically cancelled by operation of law.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that the ground for cancellation in s.116(1)(b) exists. As that ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s.116(3), the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the power to cancel the visa should be exercised.Consideration of discretion There are no matters specified in the Act or Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations) that must be considered in the exercise of this discretion. The Tribunal has had regard to the circumstances of this case, including matters raised by the applicant, and matters in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) ‘General visa cancellation powers’. The Tribunal acknowledges that, whilst it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it.[1] Specifically, the Courts have held that the PAM3 guidelines constitute no more than an administrative advisory guide to decision makers in relation to the application of the Act and Regulations and that they are incapable of being elevated into legally necessary or relevant considerations. Indeed, there is judicial authority to the effect that the policy guidelines in PAM3 cannot go beyond the wording of the legislation, even where they are favourable to an applicant.[2] [1] See Brennan J in Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634.[2] See Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1429; Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168; Visnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209; Alimi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1520; Durzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1767 at [49]; Moller v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 168 at [14]; and Sakhno v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1492 at [55]. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers that the policy guidelines in PAM3 provide a useful starting point in respect of the exercise of its discretion. In considering this matter, the Tribunal has also taken into account the submissions and evidence it received from the applicant.The purpose of the visa holder’s travel to and stay in Australia The Subclass 457 visa is for skilled workers from outside Australia who have been sponsored and nominated by a business to work in Australia on a temporary basis. The Tribunal finds that the purpose of the applicant’s stay in Australia was to work for Skycrest Constructions Pty Ltd as an architectural draftsperson on a temporary basis. The applicant was unfortunate to lose her job in June 2019. She decided to remain in Australia and try to find a new employer. She managed to do so and on 18 June 2019, her prospective employer, Earthtrack Solutions Pty Ltd, attempted to nominate her for the position within their business. This application was refused by the Department on 19 July 2019. The applicant never commenced employment at Earthtrack Solutions as she was prevented from doing so by the conditions imposed on her bridging visa.