Yalda v Consulate General of the Republic of Iraq, Sydney (No 2)
[2021] FCCA 1611
•16 July 2021
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Yalda v Consulate General of the Republic of Iraq, Sydney (No 2) [2021] FCCA 1611
File number(s): SYG 1754 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS Date of judgment: 16 July 2021 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – questions arising after reasons for judgment delivered – whether it is open to the court to make an order for compensation under s 545(2)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) in an amount expressed in a foreign currency – order for compensation expressed in foreign currency made – whether applicant had made claims in addition to claims based on the dismissal of her employment – such claims made – procedural orders made to have those claims determined Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 340(1), 361, 365, 545(2)(b)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr 1.06(1), 2.04(1), 45.06, 45.07, 45.08, 45.09
Cases cited: Grace Worldwide (Australia) Pty Limited (ACN 070 345 845) v Steve Alves [2017] NSWSC 1296
Uganda Telecom Limited v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Limited (No 2) [2011] FCA 206
Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA v Nigerian Produce marketing Co. Ltd. [1971] 2 Q.B. 23
Yalda v Consulate General of the Republic of Iraq, Sydney [2021] FCCA 499
Number of paragraphs: 27 Date of hearing: 31 May 2021 Place: Sydney The Applicant: Appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Fernon SC Solicitor for the Respondent: Macpherson Kelley ORDERS
SYG 1754 of 2019 BETWEEN: MARIAM YALDA
Applicant
AND: CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, SYDNEY
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE MANOUSARIDIS
DATE OF ORDER:
16 JULY 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to s 545(2)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) the respondent pay the applicant compensation in the amount of USD18,377, being the loss the applicant suffered because of the respondent’s contravention of s 340(1) of the FW Act referred to in the declaration made on 19 March 2021.
2.By 23 July 2021 the applicant may file and serve an affidavit and short written submissions in relation to the following questions:
(a)whether, during the respondent’s employment of the applicant, the respondent:
(i)failed to provide the applicant payslips;
(ii)failed to make superannuation payments; and
(iii)required the applicant to take annual and sick leave during the course of any one year without allowing any annual leave that accrued in that year to accumulate in the following year or years; and
(b)whether by failing to do either or both of the things referred to in (a)(i) and (a)(ii), or by requiring the applicant to do the things referred to in (a)(iii), the respondent contravened any provision of the FW Act.
3.By 6 August 2021 the respondent may file and serve an affidavit (if any) and written submissions in response to any affidavit and submissions the applicant may file pursuant to order 2.
4.The matter is listed for directions at 10:00 am on 13 August 2021.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
On 19 March 2021, on the basis of reasons for judgment I published that day (earlier reasons),[1] I made a declaration that the respondent (Consulate) contravened s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). In addition, I concluded that the fair measure of the economic loss the applicant, Ms Yalda, suffered as a consequence of the Consulate’s contravention is an amount that reflects wages Ms Yalda would have earned had she remained in employment with the Consulate up to and including 25 July 2019.
[1] Yalda v Consulate General of the Republic of Iraq, Sydney [2021] FCCA 499, at [155]
I also ordered that the matter be listed for directions for the purpose of then setting the matter down to hear submissions on the following questions:
(a)the denomination in which the order for compensation should be expressed;
(b)whether it is open to the Court to find that Ms Yalda claims the respondent:
(i)failed to provide payslips to Ms Yalda;
(ii)failed to pay superannuation in relation to Ms Yalda; and
(iii)required Ms Yalda to take annual and sick leave during the course of the year without allowing these benefits to accrue;
(c)whether it is open to the Court to consider whether the Consulate took adverse action against Ms Yalda on 27 November 2018 when Mr Witwit directed her not to return to the Consulate’s premises; and
(d)if (b) or (c) or both are answered in the affirmative, what directions, if any, should be made for the Court to be in a position to hear the claims referred to in (b) (claims in question), or to consider the question in (c).
I heard submissions on these questions on 31 May 2021. In these reasons for judgment, which assume familiarity with my earlier reasons, I determine the answers to each of these questions.
DENOMINATION OF COMPENSATION AMOUNT
Ms Yalda submitted that the order for compensation should be expressed in the currency in which the Consulate paid her salary. Counsel for the Consulate submitted it was open to this Court to make an order for compensation under the FW Act in a foreign currency. Counsel referred to the judgment of Foster J in Uganda Telecom Limited v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Limited (No 2), and in particular to a passage from his Honour’s judgment that includes the following:[2]
Neither party submitted that the judgment should not be given in US dollars. The parties’ terms of trade required payments to be made in US dollars and the Award was made in US dollars. The arbitration costs order was originally expressed in Ugandan shillings but has now been converted to US dollars. In my view, the appropriate course is to give the judgment in US dollars. Although it was once considered inappropriate for an Australian court to give judgment in a foreign currency, that is no longer the law. Judgments are now routinely given in a foreign currency, if the circumstances warrant such an approach. One circumstance which is regarded as warranting such an approach is where the action in question is to enforce a foreign money obligation, as is the case here (see Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd [1976] AC 443 at 497H (per Lord Cross of Chelsea); Westpac Banking Corporation v “Stone Gemini” [1999] FCA 917 at [2] (per Tamberlin J); and BHPB Freight Pty Ltd v Cosco Oceania Chartering Pty Ltd(No 4) (2009) 263 ALR 63 at [3] (p 64) (per Finkelstein J)).
[2] Uganda Telecom Limited v Hi-Tech Telecom Pty Limited (No 2) [2011] FCA 206, at [20]
As a general rule a court may give judgment in a foreign currency in response to a liquidated or an unliquidated claim for a monetary remedy based on a breach of contract. A court may do so where the “money of account” is a foreign currency.[3]
[3] For the distinction between “money of account” and “money of payment” see the judgment of Lord Denning in Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA v Nigerian Produce marketing Co. Ltd. [1971] 2 Q.B. 23, at page 54
Under Ms Yalda’s contract of employment the Consulate agreed to pay Ms Yalda a monthly salary of USD2,700. The Consulate would have continued to pay Ms Yalda this amount had it decided to renew Ms Yalda’s contract of employment, and it would have done so up to 25 July 2019, when Ms Yalda commenced her new employment. It follows that the monetary loss Ms Yalda suffered should be expressed in United States dollars; and that loss is USD18,377.[4] I will make an order requiring the Consulate to pay Ms Yalda compensation in the amount of USD18,377.
[4] (6 x USD2,700) + (25/31 x USD2,700) = USD18,377
OPEN TO CONSIDER CLAIMS IN QUESTION?
The scope of the claims Ms Yalda, Mr Al-Attar, and Mr Sultan each made was raised at the hearing in September 2020. The scope of Ms Yalda’s claims first arose indirectly when I came to deal with objections to the affidavits of Mr Al-Attar. In paragraphs 3 to 7 of his affidavit made on 30 January 2020 Mr Al-Attar asserted the Consulate did not pay him superannuation for the duration of his employment; the Consulate did not pay any tax to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) in relation to the salary it had paid to Mr Al-Attar; the Consulate did not provide Mr Al-Attar any payslips for the duration of his employment with the Consulate; the Consulate did not provide Mr Al-Attar with any group certificate in relation to his employment with the Consulate; and the Consulate forced Mr Al-Attar to take all annual and sick leave during the course of the year without permitting Mr Al-Attar to use any accrued leave for the following year.
Counsel for the Consulate objected to these paragraphs being read. Counsel submitted they were not relevant to any claim Mr Al-Attar made in his Form 2. The basis of that submission was that although in Part G of Form 2 Mr Al-Attar did make these claims they were not independent claims; they were alleged as the reasons for which Mr Al-Attar claimed the Consulate had taken adverse action against him.[5] At that point I asked Mr Al-Attar questions about what he considered to be the scope of his claim. After hearing his response I ruled that I was “not going to be taking these claims”, that is the claims made in paragraphs 3 to 7 of Mr Al-Attar’s affidavit made on 30 January 2020, “to be allegations of contraventions alleged”.[6]
[5] T114.30-T116.15
[6] T118.
The issue about the scope of the claims that Ms Yalda, Mr Al-Attar, and Mr Sultan each made, however, was raised in final address. Counsel for the Consulate submitted that what was before the Court was a “general protection claim”, and that “it would be a mistake to consider it as anything other than a general protection claim”.[7] The basis of that submissions was that each of the applications is “an application that is made as a general protections claim”.[8] Counsel further submitted:[9]
[Y]our Honour does need to take into account very carefully that this case has been constructed in a particular way on the apparent advise of lawyers from the beginning in the Fair Work Commission and one might think just from experience that there are very specific forensic reasons why the applicants would choose that course and those very specific forensic reasons would be the operation of section 361 of the Fair Work Act.
[7] T415.10
[8] T415.15
[9] T419.25
This part of counsel’s submissions ended with the following exchange:[10]
MR FERNON: Yes. And your Honour would appreciate obviously that those for whom I appear would be concerned about adverse comment in relation to matters that are not in contest.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Fernon, you are – I am not suggesting, without hearing anything further, of doing anything beyond what you understand to be in [contest].
MR FERNON: If your Honour pleases.
HIS HONOUR: All I am saying is in my own mind there is a doubt as to whether that is in fact how it should be restricted. If I have some real doubt about it, I think I can still deal with what’s in issue but if I have real doubt about it in some sort of way, whether it should be broader, that will be something that I will bring to the parties’ attention to hear submissions on. But I am only saying that just to preserve my concern and I am not suggesting – I mean, I might have been a little bit forthright in terms of how I put it to you.
MR FERNON: But I am grateful for your Honour because we can have a proper discussion.
HIS HONOUR: . . . All I am saying is I have a concern about how it’s been presented from the applicants’ side and what their expectations are and whether it is in fact correct for me to restrict it in th[at] way. And in fairness to you, it was raised at the beginning and I think I put it, I don’t know, to all of them that that’s the way they wanted to run it. All I am saying to you is if on further reflection – and I do reflect on these things very carefully – I think there’s some issue about expanding it, I will deal with the main issue, but if there is any reason I think there’s an issue as to whether it should be broader, it will be a matter for the parties to make submissions. So . . . the end result is proceed with the way that you say the case is restricted. I will proceed that way and I will give judgement on those issues. And to the extent I think it is broader, I won’t do anything further in relation to those broad issues until I hear submissions about whether I ought to. Is that something you can live with?
MR FERNON: Yes, your Honour. Thank you.
[10] T420. 0-T420.35
In its written submissions the Consulate submits that “[n]o claim is made in respect of the” claims in question.[11] That submission is based on a particular construction of Part G of the Form 2 Ms Yalda filed, and the manner in which Ms Yalda completed that part of the Form 2. The Consulate submits:[12]
The claim that was brought by Ms Yalda, and for which relief was claimed, alleged dismissal in contravention of a general protection. It was for Ms Yalda to establish the fact of a complaint and a proscribed reason. This was the claim notified to the Consulate. Specifically Ms Yalda alleged in part G of the Application that “As a result of one or both of the complaints, the Respondent suspended payment to the Applicant in September 2018 and terminated the Applicant’s employment …..” The complaints were identified in paragraph G7 and 8. These are not the ‘claims’ in question (b).
[11] Respondent’s Further Submissions on questions raised by Order 3 of the Orders of the Court of 19 March 2021, [8]
[12] Respondent’s Further Submissions on questions raised by Order 3 of the Orders of the Court of 19 March 2021, [9]
There are a number of difficulties with this submission. First, it is an unreasonable construction of Part G of Form 2. Part G is divided into three sections. The first section – which comprises the first six paragraphs – alleges facts: the Consulate did not pay superannuation; the Consulate did not pay any tax to the ATO; the Consulate did not provide any payslips; the Consulate did not provide any group certificates; the Consulate did not provide any annual salary increase; and the Consulate required Ms Yalda to take annual and sick leave during the course of the year and no leave can be accrued for the following year. The second section of Part G consists of two allegations: Ms Yalda proceeded to complain to the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) “as to employee entitlements”, and Ms Yalda made a bullying application to the Fair Work Commission (FWC). The third section of Part G consists of one allegation of fact: the Consulate suspended payment and terminated Ms Yalda’s employment “as a result of one or both of the complaints”.
The following observations may be made:
(a)Each of the allegations made in paragraphs 1 to 6 stands on its own; and none of the allegations can reasonably be construed as alleging a complaint, or as alleging a reason for the Consulate having taken the actions alleged in paragraph 9 of Part G.
(b)Paragraphs 7 and 8 each allege the making of complaints. Neither paragraph refers to the facts alleged in paragraphs 1 to 6 of Part G.
(c)Paragraph 9 of Part G is the only paragraph that does not stand alone; but it only refers to the facts alleged in paragraphs 7 and 8 – the complaint to the FWO and the lodging of the bullying complaint to the FWC. It does not refer to any of the matters alleged in paragraphs 1 to 6.
It is apparent from the Consulate’s response to the Form 2 that it regarded the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 to 6 of Part G as making standalone allegations, unconnected with the grounds on which Part G relies for claiming the Consulate had taken the actions alleged in paragraph 9 of Part G.[13]
(a)The Consulate contended that it did not terminate Ms Yalda’s contract of employment; the Consulate contended Ms Yalda’s contract of employment was not renewed.
(b)In the alternative, and specifically in response to the matters alleged in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of Part G of Form 2, the Consulate contended it did not renew Ms Yalda’s employment because she was not formally qualified for the translation work she had been employed to do.
(c)The Consulate specifically responded to paragraph 1 of Part G of Form 2 by contending that it “has rectified payment of superannuation entitlement to the Applicant”.
(d)The Consulate specifically responded to paragraph 5 of Part G of Form 2 by contending Ms Yalda does not identify any award that applied to Ms Yalda or that she was entitled to any increase in her salary.
(e)The Consulate specifically responded to the allegation made in paragraph 6 of Part G of Form 2 by contending that Ms Yalda’s annual leave and sick leave were governed by the terms of her contract which provided for annual leave and sick leave in the period 1 May 2018 and 31 December 2018 “and with which the Respondent complied”.
[13] Response to Application in relation to dismissal from employment in contravention of a General Protection (Fair Work Act)
The Consulate did not specifically respond to the allegations made in paragraphs 2 (not paying tax), paragraph 3 (not providing pay slips), and paragraph 4 (not providing group certificates) of Part G of Form 2. I do not propose to infer, however, the Consulate did not specifically respond to these paragraphs because it considered them to be irrelevant. A more plausible explanation is that the Consulate does not dispute paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Part G of Form 2.
Quite apart from Part G of the Form 2, Ms Yalda signalled clearly that she intended to allege the Consulate failed to provide her with payslips, and other contraventions of the FW Act. In her affidavit made on 29 January 2020 Ms Yalda made the following statements:[14]
[14] Affidavit of Mariam Yalda made on 29 January 2020
4.I have been dismissed because I brought the following points to my employer’s attention:
a.The Consulate did not provide any pay slips to me for the duration of my employment;
b.The Consulate did not provide any group Certificates to me, for the duration of the Applicant’s employment;
c.The Consulate paid no tax payable to the Australian Taxation Office, for any tax required to be withheld for the duration of me [sic] employment;
d.The Consulate did not provide any annual increases to me, in accordance with the Award for the duration of my employment.
5.The Consulate required me to take all annual and sick leave during the course of the year and no leave can be accrued for the following year, and no payment has been paid in lieu for unused annual leave.
. . . .
19,Therefore I seek the court to:
a.Amend application to include sham contracting;
b.Issue a monetary penalty against the Consulate General of the Republic of Iraq for violating Australian Federal Law for not paying superannuation, tax and sham contracting . . .
In response to an objection by counsel for the Consulate, I struck out the words “I was dismissed because” from paragraph 4 of Ms Yalda’s affidavit, and, after noting the objection to the balance of paragraph 4 based on form, I ruled I would admit the balance “and give it such weight as it merits”.[15] The balance of paragraph 4 comprises four compound propositions: the Consulate failed to do each of the four matters Ms Yalda stated it failed to do and Ms Yalda brought each of those matters to the Consulate’s attention.
[15] T70.45
It is true that Form 2 is a form the Chief Judge has approved for the purpose of r 45.06(b)(ii) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules), which applies to applications for an order in relation to an allegation that an employee was dismissed in contravention of a general protection mentioned in Part 3-1 of the FW Act. That by itself, however, ought not lead a reasonable reader of a Form 2 to assume that the only claim a person intends to make by lodging such form is restricted to the termination of employment.
(a)First, although r 45.09 of the FCC Rules provides that an application for an order in relation to an alleged contravention of the FW Act not mentioned in r 45.06 of the FCC Rules,[16] r 45.07 of the FCC Rules,[17] or r 45.08 of the FCC Rules,[18] must be in accordance with the approved form, no form has been approved for the purposes of r 45.09 of the FCC Rules.
(b)Second, r 2.04(1) of the FCC Rules provides that, unless the Court otherwise orders, strict compliance with an approved form is not required; substantial compliance is sufficient. Thus, even if there were a form prescribed for the purpose of r 45.09 of the FCC Rules, there would, at the very least, have been a question whether the inclusion of the standalone allegations made in paragraphs 1 to 6 of Part G of Form 2 would have constituted substantial compliance with any form prescribed for the purpose of r 45.09 of the FCC Rules.
(c)Third, even where there has not been substantial compliance with any prescribed form, the Court has power under r 1.06(1) of the FCC Rules to dispense with the requirements of r 45.09 of the FCC Rules that applications be in the approved form if the Court were satisfied it would be in the interests of justice to dispense with those requirements.
[16] Which applies to applications for an order in relation to an allegation that an employee was dismissed in contravention of a general protection mentioned in Part 3-1 of the FW Act
[17] Which applies to an application for an order in relation to an alleged unlawful termination of an employee's employment that occurred on or after 1 July 2009
[18] Which applies to an application for an order in relation to an alleged contravention, or an alleged proposed contravention, of a general protection mentioned in Part 3-1 of the FW Act other than that mentioned in r 45.06
Having considered in some detail Part G of the Form 2, the Consulate’s response, and Ms Yalda’s affidavit, there is no doubt in my mind the claims in question have always formed part of Ms Yalda’s case, and I ought to have determined those claims when I determined the matters that are the subject of my earlier reasons.
Given I am satisfied the claims in question have always formed part of Ms Yalda’s claims, it is not necessary that I make any orders permitting Ms Yalda to amend her application. Further, it may be that, on the current state of the evidence, there would be no need for Ms Yalda to file any additional evidence relevant to my determining any of the claims in question; and, for that reason, it may not be necessary to grant Ms Yalda leave to reopen her case.
The fact remains, however, that in response to submissions made by counsel for the Consulate, I decided I would not consider the claims in question without hearing further submissions about whether the claims in question did form part of Ms Yalda’s claims, and, if not, whether I should permit the parties leave to adduce further evidence. In those circumstances, it would be just to permit the parties to file additional evidence together with written submissions in relation to the claims in question. I propose, therefore, to make orders to the following effect:
(a)Within one week after the day I pronounce orders Ms Yalda may file and serve an affidavit and submissions in support of any of the claims in question.
(b)Within three weeks after the day on which Ms Yalda files and serves the material referred to in (a) the Consulate file and serve any affidavit and any written submissions in opposition to the claims in question.
(c)The proceeding be listed for a directions hearing.
Before I conclude this part of my reasons I should address counsel’s submissions that Ms Yalda’s case “has been constructed in a particular way on the apparent advise of lawyers from the beginning in the Fair Work Commission”, and that “one might think just from experience that there are very specific forensic reasons why the applicants would choose that course and those very specific forensic reasons would be the operation of section 361 of the Fair Work Act”.[19] I do not accept these submissions:
(a)Although it is the case Ms Yalda was legally represented before the Fair Work Commission (FWC), she has not been legally represented in the proceeding before me, and there is nothing to suggest that she drafted the Form 2 or any other document with the benefit of legal assistance. On the contrary, the overwhelmingly probable inference that is available to be drawn from the content of the Form 2 is that Ms Yalda received no legal assistance in drafting the Form 2.
(b)Ms Yalda applied to the FWC pursuant to s 365 of the FW Act, which provides that a person who has been dismissed, and who alleges that he or she was dismissed “in contravention of this Part” (that is Part 3-1, which is headed “General Protections”), may apply to the FWC for the FWC to deal “with the dispute”. The FWC’s jurisdiction under s 365 is limited to dealing with a dispute arising out of an allegation that a person has been dismissed in contravention of a general protections provision. That Ms Yalda, therefore, restricted her claim before the FWC to the contravention of a general protections provision is incapable of reflecting some forensic decision not to pursue claims in this Court that may otherwise be available to Ms Yalda. The limited claim Ms Yalda made before the FWC reflects the limited jurisdiction the FWC has under s 365 of the FW Act; and, therefore, affords no rational basis for inferring that Ms Yalda intended to similarly restrict her claims in this Court.
(c)Even if it is assumed that Ms Yalda was aware of s 361 FW Act, such knowledge could not afford a rational basis for inferring a decision to limit allegations to contraventions of provisions to which s 361 of the FW Act applies.
[19] T419.25
ADDITIONAL ADVERSE ACTION?
The Consulate submits it is not open to me to consider whether the Consulate took adverse action against Ms Yalda on 27 November 2018 when Mr Witwit directed her not to return to the Consulate’s premises. The Consulate submits Ms Yalda made no claim that Mr Witwit took adverse action against her on 27 November 2018 by directing Ms Yalda not to return to the Consulate; and that “no relief is sought in respect of such claim”.[20] The Consulate submits that to permit Ms Yalda to make such a claim now would deny the Consulate procedural fairness, and, in any event, it would require Ms Yalda to apply for leave to amend her application.[21]
[20] Respondent’s Further Submissions on questions raised by Order 3 of the Orders of the Court of 19 March 2021, [12]
[21] Respondent’s Further Submissions on questions raised by Order 3 of the Orders of the Court of 19 March 2021, [12] – [13]
These submissions must be viewed against the claims Ms Yalda made and the Consulate’s response. In paragraph 9 of Part G of her Form 2 Ms Yalda alleges the Consulate terminated her employment on 27 November 2018. In its response the Consulate denied it terminated her employment; and it relied on the affirmative contention that it decided not to renew Ms Yalda’s contract of employment. On the face of the Form 2 and the Consulate’s response, therefore, there arose the question whether, as Ms Yalda alleged, the Consulate terminated her employment or whether, as the Consulate contended, it did nothing more than decide not to renew her contract of employment.
Ms Yalda did not file any evidence of the circumstances in which Mr Witwit gave her the letter dated 27 November 2018; and Mr Witwit did not, in his affidavit, say anything about the circumstances in which that occurred. But Mr Al-Attar cross-examined Mr Witwit about the circumstances in which Mr Witwit gave to each of Ms Yalda and Mr Al-Attar the letter dated 27 November 2018.[22] The questions Mr Al-Attar asked were relevant to the question whether Mr Witwit terminated Ms Yalda’s and Mr Al-Attar’s contracts of employment and, for that reason, constituted the taking of adverse action against them.
[22] T380.
Although I am satisfied that my finding that Mr Witwit directed Mr Al-Attar and Ms Yalda not to return to the Consulate does form part of the case each of Ms Yalda and Mr Al-Attar brought, I do not consider it is open to me to determine whether this constituted adverse action. It is clear on the evidence that the Consulate manifested an intention, which it fulfilled, that it would pay Ms Yalda her salary up to the end of the term of her contract. In those circumstances, it could not readily be concluded that Ms Yalda had been dismissed from her employment; and that is because it is not apparent that Ms Yalda had a right under her contract of employment that the Consulate provide her with work.[23]
[23] See, for example, Grace Worldwide (Australia) Pty Limited (ACN 070 345 845) v Steve Alves [2017] NSWSC 1296, at [51]-[54]
DISPOSITION
I propose to make orders to the effect set out in paragraphs 6 and 21 of these reasons.
I certify that the preceding twenty-seven (27) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Manousaridis. Associate:
Dated: 16 July 2021
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