XJGH and Child Support Registrar (Child support second review)

XJGH and Child Support Registrar (Child support second review) [2018] AATA 753 (5 April 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2017/3251
Re:XJGH
APPLICANT

AndChild Support Registrar
RESPONDENT

AndDBYV
OTHER PARTY

DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member R W Dunne
Date:5 April 2018
Place:Adelaide

The decision under review is set aside and substituted.
........................[Sgd]................................................
Senior Member R W Dunne
Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)–16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.
CATCHWORDS
CHILD SUPPORT – percentages of care – Federal Circuit Court orders – meaning of care – meaning of pattern of care for the child – "actual care" – determination of extent of actual care – discretion to consider alternative methods of calculating actual care – relevant factors – decision under review set aside.
LEGISLATION
Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth), s 87AA
Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), ss 25, 49, 50, 54A, 54F, 54H and 54K
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Child Support Guide
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member R W Dunne
5 April 2018
INTRODUCTION

This matter involves a review of the decision of the Social Services & Child Support Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal at first review (“AAT 1”). The matter essentially involves questions concerning percentages of care for the purposes of the child support law.
XJGH, who is the applicant, and DBYV, who is the other party, are the parents of their daughter T, who was born in early 2010.
XJGH and DBYV separated in October 2010. In 2016 XJGH applied to the Child Support Registrar (“Registrar”) for child support and sought a Child Support Assessment in respect of T. The Registrar accepted the application and determined the care percentages for T as being 90% to XJGH and 10% to DBYV.
The Registrar’s decisions regarding the care percentages differed from an earlier decision that had been made by the Families Assistance Office (“FAO”) in 2015. In that decision XJGH had 100% care of T.
DBYV lodged an objection against the decision made by the Registrar and asserted that he had had 50% care of T since 10 October 2010.
The Registrar decided to allow DBYV’s objection but, as the FAO had already determined the care percentages for T and as there had been no subsequent change of care since that determination, the FAO determination should apply. Consequently, a new care determination should not be made and the existing FAO care determination should be used in the Child Support Assessment, namely 100% care to XJGH.
On 8 November 2016, DBYV applied to AAT 1 for review of the Registrar’s decision, together with an application for review of the date of effect of the Registrar’s decision. The AAT 1 decision was made on 16 May 2017.
On 5 June 2017, XJGH applied to this Tribunal for review of the decision of AAT 1.
At the hearing before me, XJGH attended by telephone and was accompanied by her mother by telephone. DBYV also attended separately by telephone. The respondent was represented by Mr Morris from the Department of Human Services.
I admitted into evidence the T-documents lodged pursuant to s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. There were other numerous documents provided to the Tribunal by XJGH as part of the review, but it was not necessary for any of these documents to be formally admitted into evidence.
ISSUE FOR THE TRIBUNAL
The issue for the Tribunal in this case is to determine the appropriate percentage of care that XJGH and DBYV had of the child T from 7 June 2016.
LEGISLATION
The legislation that is relevant in this case can be found in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (“the Assessment Act”), and the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (“Registration and Collection Act”). The relevant legislation is considered below.
The Assessment Act
Section 25 of the Assessment Act enables a parent of a child to apply for administrative assessment of support costs for the child under certain circumstances. An element of the formula relevant in the assessment is each parent’s percentage of care for the child. Subsection 5(1) of the Assessment Act defines percentage of care to mean the percentage of care for the child that is determined by the Registrar under Part 5 of the Assessment Act. Under s 50 of the Assessment Act, a determination of a person’s care percentage is based on the pattern of care the person has had, or is likely to have, over a care period. Section 54A of the Assessment Act sets out the method by which the actual care and extent of care of a child is to be worked out. Section 54B of the Assessment Act specifies the days to which the percentage of care applies.
Section 54F of the Assessment Act is concerned with the revocation of a percentage of care where there is a change of a parent’s cost percentage. Specifically, s 54F provides that, if a determination of a parent’s existing percentage of care for a child has been made under s 50 and the Registrar is notified or becomes aware that the care of the child that is actually taking place does not correspond with the parent’s existing percentage of care for the child, the Registrar must revoke the existing care determination.
Section 54G of the Assessment Act provides that the Registrar must revoke the existing care determination if a parent’s percentage of care falls below 14% (i.e. 52 nights per year).
Section 54H of the Assessment Act provides a discretion to the Registrar to revoke an existing care determination if there is a change in the percentage of care that does not result in a change to the cost percentage.
Section 54K of the Assessment Act is concerned with the interrelationships of the Assessment Act and the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (“the Family Assistance Act”). If the Registrar is required to determine a person’s percentage of care for a child and the Secretary has made a family assistance care determination under the Family Assistance Act (“FAC Determination”), the FAC Determination has effect as if it were a determination of the person’s percentage of care for the child that has been made by the Registrar under the Assessment Act.
The Registration and Collection Act
Part VII of the Registration and Collection Act provides an internal objection procedure for decisions of the Registrar, including care percentage decisions, defined to include …“a determination of a person’s percentage of care for a child that was made under a provision of … Part 5 of the Assessment Act” (see subsection 4(1) of the Registration and Collection Act).
An objection decision under s 87AA of the Registration and Collection Act is subject to merits review by AAT 1 under Part VIIA (see s 89 of the Registration and Collection Act). For care percentage decisions, provision is made for further merits review by AAT2 (see s 96A(b) of the Registration and Collection Act). Section 87AA of the Registration and Collection Act deals with the date of effect of objections, particularly where an objection is lodged more than 28 days after notice of the care percentage decision is served and if the Registrar is satisfied that there are special circumstances that prevented the person from lodging the objection within the 28 days.
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL FACTS
The material facts in this case are largely not in dispute. For the most part, they have been extracted from the Registrar’s statement of facts, issues and contentions (“the Statement”). Nevertheless, I am satisfied of the material facts on the balance of probabilities. I note that the Registrar does not contend for any particular outcome regarding the care determination(s) in this matter and the Statement is intended solely to assist the Tribunal in its review of the AAT 1 decision.
In the Registrar’s Statement, it is stated that XJGH and DBYV have a “registered child support case” in relation to T. When XJGH made an online application for a Child Support Assessment in respect of T, the Registrar accepted the application and determined the care percentage of T to be 90% to XJGH and 10% to DBYV. These decisions of the Registrar regarding the care percentages differed from an earlier decision that had been made by the FAO in 2015 that XJGH had 100% care of T. XJGH and DBYV were advised of the Registrar’s acceptance by letter dated 7 July 2016. On 18 July 2016, DBYV telephoned Centrelink. The record of the contact includes the following:
“PP [DBYV] stated that the case has been accepted with incorrect care information, as per Case notes in rego – [DBYV] states he shares 50/50 care with [XJGH] of child [T] since 10/10/2010.
This is a FAO decision made 19/02/2010.
Accepting case based on FAO care & information from RP [XJGH].
As this is based on a FAO decision, I have explained that PP [DBYV] can lodge a new care change which will not be back dated – if a new care event. If he wants to dispute the above PP [DBYV] will need to contact CNLK and dispute the care recorded – if this is upheld then the care dec will be sent to CSA. PP [DBYV] understood and will send the form and evidence to CNLK.”
DBYV subsequently made an online claim for family tax benefit in which he advised that he had 50% care of T and had done so since 10 October 2010. However, his online claim was withdrawn on 25 July 2016. On 31 August 2016, DBYV lodged an objection to the decision made by the Registrar on 7 July 2016. His reasons for the objection were that he asserted that he had had 50% care of T since 10 October 2010. On 20 October 2016, XJGH made an application to end the Child Support case. The Registrar decided to accept XJGH’s application and the Child Support Assessment ended on 19 October 2016. On 27 October 2016, the Registrar decided to allow DBYV’s objection and to determine that, as the FAO had already determined the care percentages for T and there had been no subsequent change of care since that determination, the FAC Determination should apply. Consequently, a new care determination should not have been made and the existing care determination of FAO should have been used in the Child Support Assessment, namely 100% care to XJGH. A file note of the Objections Officer decision notes that the care determination was made in accordance with s 54K of the Assessment Act. The date of effect of the care percentage decision was determined to be 31 August 2016, pursuant to subsection 87AA(2) of the Registration and Collection Act.
On 8 November 2016, DBYV applied to AAT 1 for review of the Registrar’s decision, together with an application for review of the date of effect of the Registrar’s decision, pursuant to subsection 87AA(2) of the Registration and Collection Act. On 16 May 2017, AAT 1 decided to set aside the decision made by a delegate of the Registrar and made the decision which is the subject of the review by this Tribunal. AAT 1 affirmed the Registrar’s decision to the extent that it related to the date of effect.
EVIDENCE
Evidence of XJGH
XJGH was referred to communications she had received in relation to the school where T attended. One of the communications came from a class teacher and an admin officer at the school. XJGH said that the communication had been recanted by the school principal. Apparently, the class teacher previously had a relationship with DBYV and what she was saying was not correct. XJGH said that an intervention order had been issued by the Magistrates’ Court on 20 October 2016 against DBYV. The intervention order contained several conditions, including that DBYV must not follow or keep XJGH under surveillance and must not be within 50 metres of her. DBYV had breached the intervention order relating to XJGH and there had also been intervention orders issued in relation to three other women. In relation to the care of T, the Federal Circuit Court no longer permitted DBYV to be involved and DBYV’s father had applied to be part of the care arrangements. DBYV’s father would care for T every second weekend because he had supervised the care of T by DBYV previously. XJGH said that she would care for T usually 100% of the time and that the care of T by DBYV was sporadic.
When asked about a 90%/10% care arrangement, XJGH said that by selection she had proposed this split as a means of resolving the care issue in mid‑2017. She said that the 90%/10% split was no longer accurate and it should now be 100%/nil in her favour. She said that this arrangement had been mandated by Judge Brown in the Federal Circuit Court. Previously, DBYV was able to care for T every second Sunday for four hours, but it had to be supervised by DBYV’s father. XJGH said that now DBYV could not see T at all, because of his drug habits and his other relationships. DBYV can see T, but only as from June 2018. XJGH said that T loved her father (DBYV), but that he is aggressive and he can only see T if he is supervised.
Comments were then made by Mr Morris, for the Registrar, in relation to the care split from 2010 to 2015. He said that there had been a FAO decision which gave 100% care in 2015 to XJGH. After June 2016, a Child Support Assessment had been sought by XJGH. The assessment was terminated because of domestic violence issues. After the Child Support Assessment was withdrawn, an objection was lodged by DBYV. The Objection Officer’s decision found that the care for T should have been 100%/nil and not 90%/10% in favour of XJGH. An estimate of 90%/10% had been made in the Child Support Assessment by XJGH as a compromise. Mr Morris referred to T8 in the T‑documents. He said that what appeared in T8 related to the period before 7 June 2016.
In questioning by Mr Morris, XJGH said:
(a)There had been four hours care for T every Sunday. This was mainly last year, but was suspended because of Court orders in 2017. There were no care arrangements in place for T in 2016. The care arrangements provided by DBYV for T were sporadic. There was no real pattern there.
(b)The statements made by DBYV and his father before AAT 1 were not accurate. Several Federal Circuit Court orders from Judge Brown in 2016 and 2017 had been provided to the Registry. Now, DBYV’s father cares for T alternate weekends and XJGH cares for T on the other weekends.
(c)DBYV was presently incarcerated because of a breach of an intervention order, either against XJGH or another woman. There had been another intervention order made in favour of a woman who had previously been a partner of DBYV. In early 2016, because the care of T by DBYV had been sporadic, there were no Court orders and it was not necessary for DBYV’s father to be present.
(d)In relation to T, there were things wrong between XJGH and DBYV before she was born. DBYV was involved with gambling and working for a prostitute. DBYV had had an amphetamine habit for 18 years.
Evidence of Sue Jones
Sue Jones is XJGH’s mother and is a deputy-principal with DECD. She provided two written witness statements, one dated 19 October 2016 and the other apparently undated. In relation to the transport of T to and from school, DBYV’s father would take her to school. XJGH would then pick up T afterwards. If she couldn’t, T’s grandfather would. Ms Jones said that when T lived at her home, DBYV or his father would take T to school and drop her home. In October 2016, there was less than 10% care of T by DBYV because he did not care for her when he said he would. She said that in 2016, her daughter only spent part of the year with her at her home and that was around the time that her daughter’s car was bombed. XJGH and T are now living elsewhere, but she still sees both of them on a daily basis. In early 2016, there was no formal ongoing care arrangement. Even if there was an informal arrangement, it was irregular and the 90%/10% care arrangement was not accurate then, at all. When AAT 1 revoked the existing arrangements at the end of 6 June 2016 and a 50%/50% arrangement was determined, Ms Jones said that this was ‘ludicrous’. She said she had read the AAT 1 decision and could not believe it. She said it was based on false statements by DBYV and his father.
In her statement dated 19 October 2016, Ms Jones said it was misunderstood that DBYV has had care of T for more than 10% since 2010. He has not had T for more than 10% of the time, in fact it would be less. She said that DBYV has been incarcerated for many reasons, including domestic violence and physical abuse, as well as other frightening incidents. XJGH has had major care of T, sometimes relying on others, including Ms Jones, to collect or drop T to school when XJGH has not had access to a vehicle. In her other statement, Ms Jones said that her daughter and T came and lived with her. She said she was currently taking time away from work and that XJGH was a responsible, reliable and loving mother to her daughter, T. She said that T has openly confided in her, telling her that she is scared of her ‘daddy’ because he yells at her all the time.
CONSIDERATION
What is the appropriate percentage of care XJGH and DBYV had of their child, T from 7 June 2016?
In this application for second review, the applicant is XJGH. The Other Party is DBYV and the respondent is the Child Support Registrar (“Registrar”). In giving her evidence, XJGH said that the reason why she had applied for second review was because the AAT 1 decision was based on false evidence. The matter itself was about the way in which XJGH and DBYV arranged for the care of their daughter, T in mid-2016. As the AAT 1 Senior Member specifically indicated, the matter involved the complicated law concerning percentages of care determined for the purposes of the child support law.
When the AAT 1 hearing was conducted, DBYV and his father attended in person and gave sworn evidence. Notice of the time and date of the hearing had been given to XJGH and DBYV by letter. It had been arranged that XJGH was to participate by telephone, with AAT 1 to call her on a number nominated by her. When the hearing commenced after the appointed time and each of the Senior Member’s attempts to call XJGH on the nominated telephone number produced a busy tone, he decided to proceed in her absence. XJGH made no contact with AAT 1 after that time. The hearing had been listed to enable AAT 1 to analyse the ongoing arrangements between XJGH and DBYV regarding the care of their daughter. XJGH did not have the opportunity to give her evidence about what had been happening. In the course of giving her evidence before me, XJGH said that her telephone number had changed and not unexpectedly a telephone call was not received by her from AAT 1.
I have perused the AAT 1 decision closely. In paragraph 13 of the decision, I note that the Senior Member considered it preferable to find facts about T’s care as at 7 June 2016 and he opted for a care period of three months, being 7 June 2016 to 6 September 2016. Coincidentally, this was the period of the child support assessment accepted by the Registrar and notified to XJGH and DBYV by letter dated 7 July 2016.
In paragraph 14 of the AAT 1 decision, the Senior Member pointed to the alignment of provisions governing determinations of percentages of care in the Assessment Act and the Family Assistance Act, and that determinations under one law are taken to be the equivalent determinations under the other. Hence, when XJGH applied to the Registrar for administrative assessment of child support, the Secretary’s delegate in the FAO had made 100%/nil determinations in respect of T which were taken to be pre‑existing determinations of 100%/nil under the Assessment Act.
In paragraph 15 of the AAT 1 decision, the Senior Member stated that determinations of percentage of care ordinarily remain in force until revoked under the appropriate provisions. When an application for administrative assessment of child support is made under s 25 of the Assessment Act, the Senior Member said that ss 49 and 50 of the Assessment Act expressly require the Registrar to determine the care of the child. I note that s 49 refers to determinations of percentage of care where the responsible person has had, or is likely to have, no pattern of care for the child during the care period. Then, s 50 refers to determinations of percentage of care where the responsible person has had, or is likely to have, a pattern of care for the child during the care period. As XJGH had applied for an administrative assessment for child support, it appeared that s 50 of the Assessment Act was the relevant provision. However, Mr Morris suggested that s 50 is not applicable because paragraph 54K(1)(e) applies. Paragraph 54K(1)(e) reads:
“54K Percentages of care determined under the Family Assistance Act that apply for child support purposes
(1) If:
(a)the Registrar is required by a provision of Subdivision B of this Division to determine a responsible person’s percentage of care for a child; and
(b)the Secretary has determined the responsible person’s percentage of care for the child (the family assistance care determination) under a provision of Subdivision D of Division 1 of Part 3 of the Family Assistance Act; and
(c)the family assistance care determination was made in relation to a claim for payment of family tax benefit; and
(d)the family assistance care determination has not ceased to apply or been revoked;
then:
(e)the family assistance care determination has effect, for the purposes of this Act, as if it were a determination of the responsible person’s percentage of care for the child that has been made by the Registrar under a corresponding provision of Subdivision B of this Division;
…”

On reflection, I agree with what Mr Morris suggested. In my view it follows that, if the Senior Member is saying that s 50 “expressly” requires the Registrar to determine the responsible person’s percentage of care for the child during the care period, this is not correct. Paragraph 54K(1)(e) ensures that the determination of the FAO continues and the family assistance care determination is still in place. Moreover, if what is said in paragraph 15 means that reassessment is required, the legislation does not ask for this by virtue of paragraph 54K(1)(e). Hence, where the FAO makes a determination, this applies to the Registrar. In effect, the delegate has made a determination or declaration that the FAO determination is still in place and as the declaration is still in effect this applies to the Registrar. If the Registrar seeks to make a determination, it will be made at odds with the FAO decision. If the Objections Officer seeks to make a second decision, the Officer cannot do this where there is a FAO determination in place and this is the correct situation. In paragraph 15, it is not correct to say that the Registrar had no choice but to determine percentages of care for T.
In paragraph 16 of the AAT 1 decision, the Senior Member says that the Registrar “must determine the responsible person’s percentage of care for the child during the care period” where a care period is “such period … as the Registrar considers to be appropriate having regard to all the circumstances”. Sections 49 and 50 each speak of the “pattern of care for the child” that the parent “has or is likely to have”. In paragraph 17, the Senior Member discusses the care period and, without having any evidence of the length of the care period, he opts for a care period of three months. I have referred to this in paragraph 32 above.
In paragraphs 19 to 24 of the AAT 1 decision, the Senior Member analysed the submissions and evidence from XJGH and DBYV concerning the care of T. The Senior Member said XJGH had told the Registrar that T was predominantly in her care, with DBYV having only sporadic care for about 10% of the time. On the evidence XJGH gave to me, this was correct. DBYV said that he and XJGH had shared T’s care 50%/50%. Based on the evidence of XJGH and her mother given to me, the 50%/50% share was simply not correct. DBYV had apparently provided the Registrar with a letter from his father which supported DBYV’s position. This letter was not truthful. There were other letters provided to AAT 1 that supported XJGH’s position. Having regard to all of the submissions and evidence concerning care in the AAT 1 decision, I am satisfied that, without question, it supported the position of XJGH.
However, in paragraph 28, the Senior Member said that XJGH’s position was weakened by her non‑attendance at the AAT 1 hearing. The Senior Member said he was entitled to draw the inference that, if she had attended, her evidence would not have advanced her case. I cannot agree with this approach and the inference was inappropriate. The Senior Member said he had questioned both DBYV and his father under oath and found their sworn evidence to be consistent and credible. In my view, based on what XJGH and her mother said to me, the evidence of DBYV and his father was not truthful and was designed to be misleading. Even though the evidence from T’s school was said to favour DBYV strongly, on balance I do not accept that it was accurate. In paragraph 30, the Senior Member found that the likely pattern of care for T in the care period was week‑about with each parent and the percentages of care that best reflected this pattern of care was 50%/50%. I do not find this approach acceptable and I do not agree with it. Based on the evidence provided to me by XJGH and her mother, the percentages of care that best reflected the pattern of care was 100%/nil.
In paragraph 31 of the AAT 1 decision, the Senior Member indicated that, prior to the events in question, the percentages of care apparently for T had been determined as 100% to XJGH and 0% to DBYV. The Senior Member stated that the “preferable primary decision” was to change those percentages to 50/50. The Senior Member said that the legal mechanism for doing so was to revoke the pre‑existing determinations under s 54F of the Assessment Act. Mr Morris suggested that it was not possible to revoke the pre‑existing determinations under s 54F of the Assessment Act. Firstly, he said that the Registrar did not have jurisdiction to make a fresh assessment. Secondly, revocation is a separate decision to a fresh assessment, and there was no revocation asked for by either XJGH or DBYV. As to the issue of revocation in paragraph 31, in my view the AAT 1 had no jurisdiction on the operation of s 54F, which relevantly reads:
“54F Determination must be revoked if there is a change to the responsible person’s cost percentage
(1) If:
(a)a determination of a responsible person’s percentage of care (the existing percentage of care) for a child has been made under section 49 or 50; and
…
(c)the Registrar or the Secretary is notified, or otherwise becomes aware, that the care of the child that is actually taking place does not correspond with the responsible person’s existing percentage of care for the child; and
(d)the Registrar is satisfied that the responsible person’s cost percentage for the child would change if the Registrar were to determine, under section 49 or 50, another percentage to be the person’s percentage of care for the child; and
…
the Registrar must revoke the determination.
Note:The Registrar must make a new determination under section 49 or 50 to replace the revoked determination: see paragraph 49(1)(b) or 50(1)(b).”
I note that, if the AAT 1 had jurisdiction, the appropriate provision in the Assessment Act would be s 54H, where the Registrar has a discretionary power and may revoke a care determination. The Registrar may revoke an existing care determination if there is a change in the percentage of care that does not result in a change to the cost percentage. However, under s 54H, revocation of a determination of a responsible person’s percentage of care is of course not compulsory.
In applying subsection 54F(1)(c) of the Assessment Act, even if the Registrar did have power to revoke, the only notification would be affecting XJGH and her selected care percentage for T, which was 90%/10%. If the case for XJGH is a 90%/10% care split, the cost percentage is still 100%/0%, and hence there is no change in the cost percentage. In these circumstances, s 54F cannot apply to compel the Registrar to revoke a determination.
In paragraph 32 of the AAT 1 decision, the Senior Member has stated that the pre-existing determinations should have been revoked from the end of 6 June 2016 and new determinations (50/50) made with effect from 7 June 2016. This follows on from what is said by the Senior Member in paragraph 31. As is said in paragraph 39 above, pursuant to paragraph 54F(1)(c) of the Assessment Act it is not possible to revoke the existing determinations under s 54F. It follows that what the Senior Member has said in paragraph 32 of the AAT 1 decision is not correct and cannot be given effect to.
In paragraph 33 of the AAT 1 decision, the Senior Member has referred to the objection lodged by DBYV on 31 August 2016 against the decision made by the Registrar on 7 July 2016. The Objections Officer allowed the objection. For the Registrar, it has been contended that the Objections Officer was correct in allowing the objection and in using the existing Family Assistance Determination in XJGH’s child support assessment. In the FOC Determination made by the Secretary in February 2010, 100% care of T was given to DBYV. It remained in force as at the date of DBYV’s application for a child support assessment.
In paragraph 35 of the AAT 1 decision, it was the Senior Member’s view that DBYV’s objection against the Registrar’s decision made on 7 July 2016 should have been allowed, such that the percentages of care for T were determined to be 50/50 with effect from 7 June 2016. Like the Registrar, I agree that the Objections Officer was correct in allowing the objection. However, I do not agree that the percentages of care for T should be 50/50 with effect from 7 June 2016. For reasons similar to those outlined in paragraph 43 above, it is my view that the percentages of care for T should be 100% to XJGH and 0% to DBYV with effect from 7 June 2016
CONCLUSION
Having regard to all of the documentary evidence, to the evidence of XJGH and to the evidence of Sue Jones I am satisfied that the appropriate percentages of care XJGH and DBYV had of their child, T were 100% to XJGH and 0% to DBYV from 7 June 2016.
DECISION
For the reasons set out above, the decision under review is set aside and substituted.

I certify that the preceding 46 (forty - six) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member R W Dunne

....................[Sgd]....................................................
Administrative Assistant
Dated: 5 April 2018

Date(s) of hearing:

Applicant: In person

Advocate for the Respondent: Mr O Morris

Solicitors for the Respondent: Department of Human Services

Joined Party: In person

[2018] AATA 753

5 April 2018

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Appeal

Jurisdiction

Statutory Construction

Procedural Fairness

Date(s) of hearing:
Applicant:	In person
Advocate for the Respondent:	Mr O Morris
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Department of Human Services
Joined Party:	In person