FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| XIAO & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 2964 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming decision not to grant first applicant an Employer Nomination (Permanent) (Class EN) Subclass 186 (Employer Nomination Scheme) visa – whether Tribunal reasoned irrationally by concluding it was not satisfied the nominating employer was willing or able to pay the first applicant an annual salary of $182,000 – whether Tribunal failed to have regard to the legal enforceability of employment contract purportedly pursuant to which the nominating employer agreed to pay the first applicant an annual salary of $182,000 – whether Tribunal failed to consider reasons nominating employer gave for being willing to pay first applicant annual salary of $182,000 – no jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs. 1.15C, 5.19, Schedule 2, subclass 186, cl.186.232 |
| Cases cited: NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134 |
| First Applicant: | GANG XIAO |
| Second Applicant: | LU NAI |
| Third Applicant: | SUREN XIAO |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2113 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 25 October 2016 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 25 October 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 1 December 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | Mr B Zipser |
| Solicitors for the Applicants: | Zhang Shijing Lawyers |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Mr K Eskerie of Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2113 of 2015
| GANG XIAO |
First Applicant
| LU NAI |
Second Applicant
| SUREN XIAO |
Third Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The question that arises in this application for judicial review is whether the second respondent (Tribunal), in affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the first applicant an Employer Nomination (Permanent) (Class EN) Subclass 186 (Employer Nomination Scheme) visa (Visa), made a jurisdictional error in concluding it was not satisfied the first applicant would be employed for an annual salary of $182,000.
To understand the jurisdictional error the applicants claim the Tribunal made, it will be necessary to identify why the question whether the first applicant would be employed for an annual salary of $182,000 was an issue the Tribunal was required to consider.
Background
The criteria for the granting of the Visa are specified in subclass 186 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). That subclass presupposes that the application for the Visa relates to a position that has been nominated in an application that seeks to meet the requirements of reg.5.19 of the Regulations. Sub-regulation 5.19(1) provides that a person may apply to the Minister for approval of a nomination of a position in Australia.
Subclass 186 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations provides for three alternative sets of criteria which,…
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- Case
- [2017] FCCA 2964
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal had discharged its obligation to "have regard" to the employment contract. This required the Court to determine if the Tribunal had engaged in an "active intellectual process" in considering the contract, or if it had merely been aware of its existence without genuine consideration, as articulated in *Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs*. The applicants argued that the Tribunal's silence on its consideration of the contract indicated a lack of genuine engagement.
The Minister submitted that the Tribunal had indeed considered the genuineness of the employment contract. Judge Manousaridis identified three difficulties with the applicants' argument. Firstly, the absence of a finding that the contract was a sham did not automatically mean the Tribunal was satisfied it was genuine; the Tribunal could have simply lacked satisfaction either way. Secondly, the Tribunal had actively considered the contract's genuineness by comparing the stipulated salary to the applicant's previous earnings, Australian statistics, and the Nominator's wage payments, ultimately concluding it was not satisfied the Nominator was willing or able to pay the contractual amount. Thirdly, even if the Tribunal had been satisfied of the Nominator's belief in paying the contractual amount, it had still considered the Nominator's ability to do so based on historical wage data. Consequently, the Court found that the Tribunal had genuinely considered the employment contract.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants submitted that, although the Tribunal referred to the Employment Contract, it did not genuinely consider it. The applicants relied on the judgment of Madgwick J in NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs.[30] One issue in NAJT was whether a delegate of the Minister had regard to a letter written by the appellant in circumstances where the delegate “at no point gave any reason for depreciating” the appellant’s evidence.[31] Madgwick J, with whose reasons Conti J agreed, said the delegate did not have regard to the appellant’s evidence. The applicants in the case before me particularly rely on the following passage from Madgwick J’s judgment:[32]A decision-maker cannot be said to ‘have regard’ to all of the information to hand, when he or she is under a statutory obligation to do so, without at least really and genuinely giving it consideration. As Sackville J noticed in Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 389; 109 FCR 152 at [58], a ‘decision-maker may be aware of information without paying any attention to it or giving it any consideration’. In my opinion, it would be very surprising if the delegate had genuinely paid attention to the letter and given it genuine consideration – had in Black CJ’s phrase in Tickner v Chapman [1995] FCA 1726; (1995) 57 FCR 451 at 462 engaged in ‘an active intellectual process’ in relation to the letter – yet remained silent about such consideration in the reasons he gave. I am satisfied he did not do so.[30] [2005] FCAFC 134, Conti J agreeing[31] [2005] FCAFC 134 at [117][32] [2005] FCAFC 134 at [212] The applicants submit the Tribunal in the case before me did not engage in “an active intellectual process” in relation to the enforceability of the Employment Contract. The Minister, on the other hand, submits the Tribunal considered the genuineness of the Employment Contract. There are three difficulties with ground 2. a)First, it assumes that by not making a positive finding that the Employment Contract was a sham the Tribunal necessarily accepted the Employment Contract was genuine. That is not correct. There were three possible attitudes the Tribunal could have adopted towards the Employment Contract. One was a positive satisfaction it was genuine; another was a positive satisfaction it was a sham; and the third was the absence of satisfaction the Employment Contract was genuine. That the Tribunal made no positive finding that the Employment Contract was a sham, therefore, does not imply it was satisfied it was genuine.b)Second, the Tribunal actively considered whether it should be satisfied the Employment Contract was genuine. It referred to the Employment Contract but noted “this alone is not sufficient to establish that [the first applicant] would be paid that amount in this case”.[33] The Tribunal then considered matters that were relevant to whether the first applicant would be paid a salary of $182,000 as referred to in the Employment Contract. These included whether the amount could be regarded as genuine, given the first applicant’s having previously been employed for a salary of $70,000, the average median full-time earning of advertising and sales managers as revealed by Australian government statistics, and the amounts the Nominator paid in wages during 2012, 2013, and 2014. It was after it considered those matters that the Tribunal concluded it was not satisfied the Nominator was willing or able to pay the $182,000 stipulated in the Employment Contract.c)Third, even if it could be said the Tribunal was satisfied the Nominator genuinely believed it would pay the $182,000 provided for in the Employment Contract, the Tribunal nevertheless considered whether the Nominator would be able to pay this amount, given the amounts the Nominator paid for wages during 2012, 2013, and 2014.[33] CB150, [16]