X & X

This matter concerns an appeal by the husband against property settlement orders made by Coleman J. The trial judge directed that the proceedings be referred to as "X" versus "X" due to the sensitive nature of the issues. The orders divided a property pool of approximately $1,334,890, allocating 55 per cent to the wife and 45 per cent to the husband. The parties married in 1970 and separated in 1998, with two adult children. At the commencement of the marriage, neither party possessed significant assets, and both were employed. The trial proceeded on the basis of equal contributions from both parties.

The Full Court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in his application of section 144 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) regarding the acquisition and use of specialised knowledge. Specifically, the court considered whether the trial judge had improperly relied on his own knowledge without requiring proof, particularly in the area of specialised medical knowledge, and whether this prejudiced the appellant. The court also had to consider whether, despite any error, the trial judge's property settlement orders should be varied or disturbed, and how the costs of the appeal should be allocated.

The Full Court held that the trial judge had failed to apply the correct test under section 144 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which mandates that a judge should not accept specialised knowledge without proof and must provide parties with an opportunity to make submissions and refer to relevant information to avoid unfair prejudice. The court noted that even under traditional common law tests, the breadth of matters the trial judge considered, particularly in specialised medical fields, was inappropriate. Despite identifying this error of law, the Full Court found that the trial judge's orders were not to be disturbed or varied, concluding that the appellant had no substantive complaint about the outcome.

Consequently, the Full Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's property settlement orders. The appellant was ordered to pay the wife's costs of and incidental to the appeal.